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Abstract 
This research project seeks explanations for an inconsistency between onerously-regulated, 
stable labour market institutions (LMIs) and everyday employment in the Brazilian variety 
of capitalism. The study adopts a new institutionalist approach and findings are based upon 
qualitative research on industrial relations in the construction industry. A key focus of the 
thesis is upon dynamic institutional interactions, known as complementarities, and their 
influence upon political processes relevant to labour. This aims to contribute to the 
understanding of institutional change and continuity during a key juncture in Brazilian 
development; a period of sustained economic growth and stability, accompanied by falling 
poverty and inequality under a Workers’ Party (PT) government since 2003.  
Chapter 1 introduces the new institutionalist approach and why it offers the most 
appropriate methodological set of tools to address the research problem. Chapter 2 
discusses the relevance of the historical period analysed (2003-2015) and discusses the 
Brazilian variety of capitalism in light of the coordinated, hierarchical and liberal models. 
Chapter 3 traces the history of LMIs in Brazil and finds an embedded historical legacy still 
influential in the contemporary workplace. Chapters 4-6 enter into the construction 
industry case study element of the thesis with chapter 4 an exploratory analysis of 
employment relations.  
Networks of mistrust are identified as a source of the inconsistency between the regulated 
LMI system and reality of employment. Labour representation and regulation are identified 
as two key issues analysed in more detail in the remaining two chapters (5 and 6). From a 
new institutional perspective, explanations for the inconsistency identified are found to be 
related to a composite set of interrelated factors with historical, informal, formal and 
rational choice elements. The research findings address more reductionist and static 
accounts as well as some popular misconceptions on the Brazilian LMI system.  
Within comparative capitalisms debates, Schneider (2013) categorises the Latin American 
institutional model as hierarchical. A further aim of this research is to extend upon this 
model with an analysis of LMIs in the Brazilian variety of capitalism. Brazil, in its stable 
and influential trade union institutions is argued to represent a variation of Schneider’s 
hierarchical market economy.  
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Introduction 
In 2011 there was a wave of optimism surrounding Brazilian development. Economic 
growth and stability had been sustained for almost a decade and was accompanied by 
unprecedented and dramatic reductions in poverty and inequality. The positive trajectory 
captured global attention as part of the ‘BRIC’ emerging markets trend, particularly as the 
sustained development bucked trends in the global economy after the 2007 financial crisis. 
The consolidation of growth, stability and falling poverty/inequality is described by the 
Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) (2012:13) as the ‘inclusive 
decade’ (2001-2011) and led influential international commentators to ask ‘Does Brazil 
Have the Answer’ (Nocera 2014: A19) and to observe that ‘Brazil Takes Off’ (The 
Economist 2009: cover). Many cited the selection to host the 2014 World Cup and the 
2016 Olympic games as iconic of the ‘new’ and ‘booming’ Brazilian reality.  
The starting point of this research project is located elsewhere; the construction site of the 
Abreu e Lima Oil Refinery in the Port of Suape in the northeast state of Pernambuco. In 
March 2011, tens of thousands of workers went on strike; highways were blocked, buses 
were set on fire and there were confrontations with security forces, scenes witnessed first 
hand1. The unrest was part of a national mobilisation of construction workers with strikes 
spreading almost simultaneously across the high-profile Growth Acceleration Programme 
(PAC) projects. Hundreds of thousands of workers were involved leading to the 
deployment of the National Guard in the remote Rio Madeira hydroelectric plant sites. The 
main contractor and one of Brazil’s largest construction companies, Camargo Correa, 
evacuated 20 thousand workers from the same site (Jimenez and Bacoccina 2011).  
Certain characteristics of the widespread labour unrest stood out. Initially, it ran contrary to 
the optimistic discourse on Brazil’s inclusionary growth trajectory in the 2000s and the 
labour-friendly credentials of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (Lula) Workers’ Party (PT) 
government in power since 2003. Secondly, in its scale and number of workers involved it 
represented mobilisation similar to and not witnessed since the emergence of ‘new’ trade 
unionism at the vanguard of democratisation movement from which Lula and the PT 
emerged in the 1980s. Related to the first two observations; the workers mobilised 
spontaneously, confronting employers, the state and in many cases their designated trade 
union.   																																																								
1 Also see accounts in Jornal de Comércio (2012), Estado de São Paulo (2011), Veras (2013) & Jardim (2015)  
	 16 
The Research Problem and Case Study 
An initial inconsistency is identified from the case study and this represents the research 
puzzle or question. Within Brazil’s system of labour market institutions (LMIs) there is a 
vibrant labour movement that emerged in the 1980s contributing to the survival of 
collective and individual labour rights contrary to international deregulationary trends and 
related globalisation pressures in the 1990s. This was followed by an increase in state 
involvement in the economy in the 2000s under a labour-friendly government with 
unprecedented levels of growth, stability and falling poverty and inequality.  
The widely-reported cleavage factors for the dramatic episodes of worker dissatisfaction 
leading to the explosions of unrest across the PAC sites in 2011 represent something of an 
anomaly. Precarious work, insecure and unregulated working conditions, insalubrious 
accommodation, inadequate meal provision and unpaid wages contributed to a high 
incidence of workplace accidents and incidents categorised by the relevant authorities as 
‘people-trafficking’ and ‘conditions analogous to slavery’. The Brazilian LMI system and 
its ‘labour-friendly’ trajectory since the 1980s and recent development path since the 
2000s is inconsistent with the reality at the workplace level. Long-standing stable 
institutions (employment and health and safety legislation, regulatory, representative and 
deliberatory tripartite organisations) exist to address or even prevent the vast majority of 
the cleavage factors identified.  
Within Cook’s (2012: 268) discussion of contemporary research agendas and approaches 
to political scholarship on labour in Latin America, the research problem represents ‘an 
empirical puzzle that needs explaining’ rather than a suitable problem chosen ‘to test 
quantitative and macro-comparative analysis’. The period considered is from the beginning 
of the Lula/PT government in 2003, this corresponds with the majority of the IPEA’s 
(2012:13) ‘inclusive decade’ of 2001-2011. Analysis extends to 2015. The recent 
economic downturn since 2014, although referred to in the thesis, is not within the scope of 
this research project. The workplace-formal system inconsistency within the historical 
period analysed suggests that falling inequality and poverty and economic growth and 
stability cannot automatically be presumed to represent significant structural change to the 
long-standing underlying institutional reality.     
On this contemporary period of stability and growth in Latin America, incorporating the 
‘inclusive decade’ and PT governments in Brazil, Cook (2012:266) argues for ‘the need to 
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examine how labor organizations are faring in new economic and political contexts’ yet 
observes that there are ‘relatively few studies’ on this new reality, speculating that the 
‘lack of attention might be due to scholars’ investment in the earlier claim during the 1990s 
that forecast labor’s secular decline’. Claims, as argued across this thesis, that are not 
substantiated by the socio-economic and LMI trajectory witnessed in Brazil since the start 
of the millennium. Again, this is a relevant consideration when considering wider research 
agendas and the intended contribution of this thesis.  
The starting point for the research was the labour unrest at high profile infrastructure 
projects that were somewhat iconic of the new Brazilian reality of dynamic development. 
The causes of site-level conflict represent deeper structural institutional tensions. Within a 
society historically characterised by poverty, inequality and a related intense exploitation 
of labour, the growth strategy and development within a formal system characterised by 
strong labour institutions at certain institutional levels, regions and industries can be 
expected to bring to the fore certain tensions in the Brazilian development model. The 
workplace reality referred to in the research problem represents what Schneider and 
Karcher (2009:2) on Latin American labour markets describe as ‘disappointing’ results and 
in employment terms, corresponds to what Schneider and Soskice (2009:34) describe as 
the ‘large share of the workforce […] in badly-paid, insecure jobs’ (see ch.2 part 2.2).  
The state-led growth initiatives such as the PAC, were accompanied by policies to 
strengthen and reform the LMI system through social dialogue. A key example is The 
National Labour Forum (FNT) initiative launched in 2003. There was also a successful 
ongoing real minimum wage increase policy and employment protection policies in 
response to the economic downturn since 2014. Within the construction industry there was 
a prompt and thorough institutional response to the labour problems identified at the PAC 
sites in the tripartite National Commitment for Improved Labour Conditions in the 
Construction Industry (NCILC) initiative.  
Part of the research problem to be investigated is that such policies envisaging 
improvements for labour and stronger institutions take place within an embedded 
institutional model with a formal LMI system characterised by substantial employment 
rights and protections and stable tripartite institutions. However, the de facto regulation of 
the formal system is fragmented, uneven and unpredictable and mostly applied 
retrospectively. It varies significantly between region, industry and institutional level. 
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Fieldwork observations identify inconsistent regulation within the same workplace (see 
ch.6 part 6.3). Resultantly, the partially effective formal system coexists with and allows 
for the persistence of long-standing employment practices closer to the exploitative reality 
of the 19th century than the formal provisions. 
Any labour related policies that envisage change and transformation are introduced upon 
this embedded institutional structure characterised by tensions between what Cardoso and 
Lage (2007: title) describe as the ‘facts’ – the long-standing formal system and the ‘norms’ 
the everyday practices that can be traced to before the introduction of the existing LMI 
system in the 1930s (see ch.3). The relevant policies over the period analysed and the 
dynamics of employment relations should shed light upon some of these underlying 
institutional tensions in the Brazilian LMI system.      
Within the context of the research problem, the construction industry is considered to be a 
valuable case study for multiple reasons. The research question originates from dramatic 
scenes of revolting workers witnessed first hand at the construction site of one of the high-
profile PAC infrastructure projects. Construction was a key driver of economic growth 
even in the midst of a global economic crisis. In turn the high growth in the sector 
originated from public investments as part of the identified increase in state participation in 
the Brazilian economy from the 2000s after the ‘stabilisation’ decade of the 1990s (IPEA 
2012: 40 see ch.2).  
The Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) was one of the most high-profile examples of 
public investment driven growth. R$ 1.9 Trillion (equivalent to 589 billion USD at the 
time of writing) was invested between 2007 and 2015 (Ministério de Planejamento 2016). 
Importantly, and related to key characteristics of the Brazilian capitalist model and its 
LMIs, part of these resources are worker and employer contributions to employment 
insurance and severance funds - FAT (R$220 bn in 2015) and FGTS (R$4.1 bn) (BNDES 
2016). These funds are overseen and partially administered by trade unionists (see 
Schneider 2013: 172-173; Soares 2013:549-550 in ch. 2).  
Together with the PAC stimulated infrastructure boom, there was corresponding growth in 
residential or light construction; again an intentional growth strategy stimulated by public 
finance initiatives. The Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV) programme to facilitate home-
ownership amongst lower income families was an important source of the high-growth 
witnessed in the construction industry and somewhat iconic of the emergence of a ‘new 
	 19 
middle class’ (see Neri 2012; Pochmann 2012) during the ‘inclusive decade’. The 
residential construction programme supports both the building and purchase of homes with 
subsidised credit from the state Caixa Economica Federal bank. As of 2015, 2.2 million 
residences had been built as part of MCMV, described as one of the world’s largest 
housing programmes, mobilising R$139.6 billion in loans with the government investing 
R$114.9 billion in subsidies for low-income families (Portal Brasil 2015).  
Considering the scale, impact and resources associated with the PAC and MCMV 
programmes; the first reason for researching the construction industry is its heightened 
relevance to contemporary Brazilian development. Direct and indirect state involvement in 
the construction industry represents a key part of the wider resumption of industrial policy 
by the PT/Lula government since 2003 (see De Toni 2015 and ch.2). Part of the research 
problem on the inconsistency between formal employment provisions and the workplace 
relates to a lack of any corresponding increase in effective institutional involvement in the 
employment aspect of the intense infrastructure and residential construction growth. This 
raises questions on the PT/Lula growth strategy and is evidence of the described tensions 
between the objectives of stronger labour institutions and sustained state-promoted 
dynamic economic growth within a society historically characterised by exploitative and 
unregulated employment.     
The second reason for studying construction relates to existing scholarship on labour in 
Brazil from both international and domestic academics. Given the relevance of new trade 
unionism as part of the democratisation process, from which Lula, the PT and the largest 
peak association, the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), originate, there is 
understandably a wealth of analyses on the institutional dynamics and trajectory of trade 
unionism in the Sao Paulo automobile industry. The identified academic tradition has been 
assisted and sustained by the geographical proximity and interaction with Latin America’s 
two most influential universities, the University of Sao Paulo (USP) and State University 
of Campinas (Unicamp).  
From the 1980s to the present day there is a steady stream of influential scholarship based 
upon labour and trade unionism in the Brazilian automobile industry. Within the most 
influential contributions on Brazil over the last three decades there is a marked tendency to 
concentrate analysis on the metalworker in the automobile industry as iconic of the 
working class and trade union movement. Almeida (1996) Antunes (1988, 1991), Araujo 
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& Gitahy (2003), Boito (2003), Humphrey (1982), Marcelino (2004, 2008), Ramalho 
(2005), I. Rodrigues (1999, 2002), L. Rodrigues (1999), Santana (1999), Trópia (2004), all 
base their findings on labour and trade unionism in the automobile/metalwork industry 
example.   
For this research, the much-studied automobile/metalworkers example continues to be of 
heightened relevance as it represents an essential part of the research question. The 
evolution of employment relations in the ABC2 Paulista is the main empirical evidence of 
the coherent and productive industrial relations within the Brazilian LMI system, what 
Rodrigues (2002:154) describes as ‘conflictive cooperation’ and where Brazilian labour 
representatives participate at board level in German multinationals (Daimler AG 2016). In 
this sense, the ABC/Automobile standard of labour relations is a ‘best case’ example and 
the research question relates to the inability for such institutional dynamics to be 
reproduced in other sectors and regions.  
In comparison with the automobile industry, construction is therefore something of a 
‘worst case’ example, as the cleavage factors contributing to the striking PAC workers and 
innumerous instances of employment irregularities would suggest. This is an intentional 
choice of case study for the following related reasons. Focussing upon a ‘worst case’ 
example better captures the embedded institutional tensions described in the research 
problem and evident in the conflict at the workplace level. Solely analysing labour in the 
automobile industry and its trajectory over the last 30 years may provide an overly 
optimistic impression of employment relations in Brazil.  
The institutional dynamics of the ABC standard are considered in this study as a somewhat 
region and industry specific ‘pocket of efficiency’. The idea of pockets of efficiency and 
the related idea of an embedded layer of institutions where, rather than transform the state, 
efficient institutional layers are added to the existing fragmented structure has been argued 
previously on Brazilian institutions by Guedes (1986:105) and Evans (1995:61) (see ch.2). 
This research applies the established concept specifically to labour market institutions.     
Construction work is arguably more representative of employment across Brazil in the 
2000s and 2010s than the automobile industry pocket of efficiency. According to Dieese 
																																																								
2 ABC refers to the ABC Paulista region composed of the municipalities of Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo and Sao Caetano do Sul. The 
most intensely industrialised region of Brazil where the automobile industry has traditionally been concentrated. It is considered the 
birthplace of new trade unionism and the related emergence of the PT, CUT and president Lula. 
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superintendent Aguiar (2013: interview) the workers employed at the PAC sites ‘were 
supposed to be the poster boys and girls’ for the new employment reality in Brazil under 
the Workers’ Party (PT). From a socio-historical point of view and related to the ‘worst 
case’ logic, construction traditionally absorbs unqualified male workers often migrants 
from the most deprived areas of the country. This characteristic is widely recognised by 
relevant parties and such a description is included in the majority of collective bargaining 
agreements (CBAs) across the southeast (All Sao Paulo State agreements, Rio de Janeiro, 
Belo Horizonte amongst others - Sistema Mediador 2015). This is also recognised in 
similar construction industry specific studies (See Rodrigues Costa 2013:17; Coutinho 
1980:79; Cardoso & Lage 2007:133). It is therefore of increased importance for related 
debates on inequality, poverty and development.   
It is argued that work in construction more adequately represents the average employment 
experience across Brazil than the metalworkers example3. There is a more even 
geographical distribution of the PAC and MCMV driven construction activity than the 
automobile industry, concentrated in large cities of the more developed southeast. Argued 
in chapter 6, the MCMV construction activity observed in a small provincial town over the 
period of a week, is likely to better represent the ideal type of employment in the 
construction industry than the more high-profile and dramatic examples from the PAC 
sites. At a Brazil-specific level of analysis the construction case study is an intended 
contribution of this research and a valuable comparative example to the much-studied 
institutional dynamics of the automobile industry.  
Methodology and Fieldwork 
The first half of this introduction discusses the research problem and its related sub-
questions and the construction industry case study. This section summarises how the 
research problem will be analysed. This is predominantly a qualitative research project for 
the following reasons: firstly, the empirical research problem dictates qualitative methods. 
Explanations are sought for the inconsistency between formal labour market arrangements 
and observable employment outcomes. As per the new institutionalist approach described 
in more detail across chapter 1, these can be expected from LMIs, their history, formal and 
																																																								
3 Similar to the typical metalworker - gender specificity of the average worker is recognised though further discussion is not within the 
scope of this thesis. Studying the recent LMI trajectory related to female-dominated domestic worker category represents something of a 
valuable research agenda in both labour and gender studies. The construction/domestic worker household is something of a low-income 
stereotype in Brazil.  
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informal manifestations and interrelatedness the latter known as complementarities. Such 
relational, non-tangible institutional elements are not easily quantifiable.  
Secondly attempts to quantify or establish relationships by reducing them to dichotomies 
such as the deregulation focus upon the relationship between levels of formal legislation 
and the reality of employment, neglect other equally if not more relevant variables such as 
enforcement levels and can therefore be misleading (see ch. 6, Deakin 2009:16, Lee & 
McCann 2011: 1; 2014:12). As Franzosi (1995:21) observes on strikes ‘anything that is not 
quantifiable is not included in one’s model’ and ‘things are left out not because they are 
irrelevant rather that they are non-quantifiable and/or do not fit into pre-existing models 
(p.375). For example, on regulation debates (see ch.6 part 6.1), Berg and Cazes (2007:14) 
describe how tripartite negotiation and collective bargaining - ‘important means for 
achieving a dynamic and responsive labour market’ are absent from indexes that attempt to 
provide quantifiable and comparative data on national labour market regulation. 
Thirdly, within the Brazilian context of persistently high informality and evasion of 
employment legislation some scepticism is required regarding the quantitative data 
available. On Latin America, Cook (2012: 268) observes that ‘in many countries 
quantitative data on unions, in particular, remain fraught with problems, raising questions 
about the reliability of analyses that draw heavily on such data’. The incidence of 
workplace accidents, a common cleavage factor leading to spontaneous worker unrest, 
represents a good example of unreliable data. Takahashi et al (2012:978) estimate 
underreporting of accidents at 90 per cent and union and business sources consulted during 
fieldwork describe such a practice as commonplace (Marreta-MG directors, Paulo, Laura, 
Camargo Correa 2013: observations and interviews, also see ch.6). Furthermore, the 
coexistence of formal measurable employment arrangements with informal practices 
identified in the same supply chain, employer and even individual employment 
relationship casts doubt on the accuracy of formal data.  
On income, fieldwork data from three different sites (Paulo’s company, Camargo Correa & 
Marreta-PE administration department 2013: observations) strongly suggest that evidence 
from wage slips is not an accurate reflection of what workers actually received at the end 
of the month. Dieese-CE’s Aguiar (2013: interview) argues that informal and 
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immeasurable employment arrangements are so pervasive, particularly in his home state 
that the credibility of official comparative income data is weakened4.  
Explanations are therefore sought from fieldwork research on the activity of relevant 
tripartite LMIs and their strategic interaction. In light of the research problem, specific 
attention is given to complementarities. Franzosi’s (1995:16) analytical approach to strikes 
is considered here to be similarly applicable to the dynamics of employment relations and 
LMIs where: 
Strikes are not simply multiple actor phenomena (most of which never make it into the 
picture); they are also multiple-action phenomena. If there is a multiplicity of actors, 
each actor will engage in different actions. 
Explanations for the research problem are sought from analysis of the strategic interaction 
between employers, the state and workers and their relevant representative institutions, 
taking care to capture the more subtle, less quantitatively measurable phenomena.  
The principal methods used are semi-structured, informal and in-depth interviews with 
relevant state, business and labour representatives as well as individual workers together 
with participant5 and non-participant observation and mini-ethnographies. Such methods 
are traditional and well established in social sciences. They therefore do not warrant a 
specific chapter. A summary of the fieldwork research carried out and sources cited is 
provided in Appendix I of this thesis. The originality of the research is in the construction 
industry case study during an unprecedented and distinctive phase of Brazilian 
development characterised by stability, growth and falling inequality. The evidence-based 
approach utilising extensive local knowledge is also argued to represent a contribution of 
this thesis, particularly when considering alternative studies that solely focus upon 
immediately quantifiable variables.  
Prior to starting this doctoral project, considerable local knowledge had been accumulated 
on the research problem identified. I lectured in anthropology, sociology and local 
economic development on law and journalism courses between 2009 and 2012 in 
Pernambuco. The nearby Oil Refinery in the Port of Suape was of considerable relevance 
to local and national debates across a variety of disciplines. It was during this period as a 
lecturer that the inconsistency between the discourse of inclusive and dynamic growth and 																																																								
4 He makes specific reference to the lower average income in the state of Ceará than Piaui that he attributes to a greater tradition of off 
the books payments or caixa dois in the former state. 
5 Participation limited to assisting in the distribution of pamphlets, newsletters & collective bargaining agreements for Marreta-MG, 
Sintepav-CE & Sticcrmf unions and covering for one teaching session at Marreta-MG’s EPOMG technical school.   
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problematic industrial relations in the workplace was identified. This previous experience 
expanded the scope of fieldwork as an established network had already been established 
providing privileged access to key sources.  
The Fieldwork itself involved two visits; the first for a 3-month period between September 
and December 2013 and a follow-up visit in 2015 for two months. Sixty-nine individuals 
were interviewed (38 construction workers across three sites, 18 union representatives 
from seven different unions, seven business/employer representatives, four state officials 
and two academics). The interviews overlapped with 25 days of observations of LMI 
activity which included strike and picket actions, localised union interventions, inspection 
patrols & administrative duties, mediation sessions, social events and a public hearing. 
Research activities took place in the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and 
Ceará.  
The first fieldwork visit was undertaken at an early stage of the research process and 
followed what the established methodology literature describe as a ‘wheel process’. It 
‘starts with empirical observation which leads to the development of a research proposal or 
conceptual framework’ and allows for a change in direction depending upon the 
information that arises (Burnham 2004:45). The actual research undertaken is perhaps best 
captured by Kitay & Callus (1998:108) on methods in industrial relations where  
It is not possible to start a case study with a predetermined research plan. The art of a 
good case study is in being able to follow leads and pick up on interesting issues as they 
arise 
The fieldwork started with a broad problem on the inconsistency between the institutional 
labour system and the workplace reality and related sub-questions on the difficulties in 
reproducing the coordinated LMI dynamics evident in the automobile industry and at the 
national level of industrial relations since the 1980s. Interviews and observations were 
intentionally open ended in order to identify the main issues from diverse groups and 
individuals with considerable accumulated experience.  
This wheel or open-ended method of fieldwork research explains the absence of any 
substantive debate on skills within LMI debates in this thesis. The subject area, research 
agenda, question and approach discussed across this introduction identify with the varieties 
of capitalism (VoC) agenda where formation of skills or ‘vocational training and 
education’ represent an essential element and a significant institutional distinction between 
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the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) (see 
Hall & Soskice 2001: 7-8; Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001; Schneider 2013: 113-
133). Skill-formation did not emerge as a relevant issue from the fieldwork analysis of 
industrial relations and related tripartite institutional activity. Business leaders interviewed 
(Ishikawa & Ferreira 2013: interviews) and related media reports (Konchinski 2011; 
Resende 2011) highlighted a chronic shortage of skilled labour in construction. This is not 
to say that skills are irrelevant in a given variety of capitalism rather there was minimal 
evidence of its relevance in industrial relations in the construction industry. Institutional 
activity observed was dominated by noncompliance and its consequences. This contributes 
to a network of mistrust (see ch.4) with regulation meriting more detailed analysis (ch.6).      
Fieldwork is considered overall to have been a successful exercise. Sufficient data was 
accumulated to make informed and robust observations on labour relations in Brazil from 
the construction industry case study and to direct the analysis of this thesis and 
competently address the research question. Gaining access to some important sources was 
unsuccessful. Contact with representatives of the Sinduscon business unions in Minas 
Gerais and Pernambuco was not achieved. Opinions from the business union would have 
provided a complete tripartite perspective after comprehensive information was received 
from corresponding union and state officials. Similarly, numerous attempts to visit the 
Pecem Steel Plant construction site in Ceará, a highly informative site-specific case study 
for this research, were unsuccessful. Fortunately, the follow-up visit in 2015 coincided 
with a public hearing on the problematic labour relations at the site and a variety of first-
hand accounts were received from union, state and Dieese representatives. A day was also 
spent in the company of three scaffolding workers recently dismissed from the site.  
Successful access to a network was achieved, both in terms of ongoing contact with 
relevant tripartite representatives and workers that continued after the initial visit in 2013.  
This assisted significantly with the return visit in 2015. The familiarity with the day-to-day 
operations of the relevant institutions gained from observations allowed for analysis of 
activities over the entire research period from secondary data. Ongoing research of union 
activity was possible through the analysis of newsletters and social media activity, 
providing data on the activity of construction unions not observed first hand. The data 
reinforces the idea of uniformity in the regular patrol and inspection activities of the 
individual union presented in chapter 4 (see part 4.4.2). Accounts received from 
counterpart institutions such as the Dieese, Sinduscon and unions together with the 
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availability of secondary data compensated for the described difficulty in collecting 
primary data from other key tripartite institutions.   
The fieldwork research/primary data is somewhat skewed towards trade union activity. 
Given the nature of the research question and related sub questions already discussed, this 
was an intentional research strategy. Union activity represents a key institution in the 
formal corporatist system and in the more coordinated solutions evident at the national 
level and in the ABC workplace. Fieldwork findings also observed union (in)activity as a 
major issue in Brazilian LMI and construction specific debates and therefore, like 
regulation in chapter 6, merits closer analysis in chapter 5. Thankfully, the unions were 
found to be the most accessible institutions during research and important gatekeepers in 
facilitating access to relevant public authorities, workers, construction sites and even 
business institutions and employers.  
Within this thesis there is an observable regional concentration of data coming from the 
state of Ceará, arguably a result of the research process itself together with the identified 
relevance of the Pecem Steel Plant case study. Ceará was the final fieldwork destination. 
The accumulated information, network and know-how established across the research 
process meant that a more thorough and balanced set of primary data was gained in this 
region. This involved interviews and extended observations of the activities of both the 
heavy and light construction trade unions (Sintepav-CE and Sticcrmf respectively), 
interviews and observations (Juca 2013) at the local Labour Ministry Employment 
Relations Secretariat (MTE/SRT), extended on-site ethnography at a Camargo Correa site, 
interviews with the Dieese regional superintendent (Aguiar 2013 & 2015), president of the 
Sinduscon-CE (Ferreira 2013) business union and head prosecutor for the Public Labour 
Prosecutor (MPT) (Marques 2015). It was also possible to attend the public hearing on 
employment relations at the steel plant organised by the MPT, where contributions were 
made by a variety of tripartite representatives (see ch.4 part 4.4.3).  
The follow-up fieldwork visit in 2015 was to Ceará aiming to carry out further research on 
the Pecem Steel Plant. The site was described as a ‘powder keg of labour unrest’ by state 
and union officials in 2013 and somewhat predictably, the scene of Brazil’s most 
prolonged strike in 2014. The Pecem site is of heightened relevance to the research 
problem given the complexity of employment relations leading to a breakdown in 
industrial relations that cannot be captured by quantitative analyses or more general and 
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reductionist accounts. The site has a highly active union and mobilised workforce, which 
together with the high profile of the development, has contributed to considerable 
inspection and regulation activity by the state authorities. Chronologically the explosion of 
worker unrest and prolonged strike activity comes two to three years after the problems 
observed at the PAC sites and the prompt and responsive national NCILC tripartite 
initiative to address the identified problems. It represents a compelling example of the 
difficulties of implementing policies for change and transformation in the context of the 
embedded institutional tensions described.  
As already mentioned, it was fortunate that the visit coincided with a public hearing on 
employment relations at the steel plant site and access to workers was achieved. The 
fieldwork is similarly fortunate in that the bulk of the research took place in 2013 before 
the outbreak of the ongoing Lava Jato scandal in 2014 involving billions of dollars of 
illegal payments related to the construction industry. There was a marked reluctance 
amongst LMI representatives to participate in the research in 2015 when compared with 
the more welcoming and hospitable response in 2013. 
The second half of this thesis (chs. 4-6) reflects the sequential logic of the fieldwork 
research process. Chapter 4 is a more open and exploratory study of employment relations 
at the three different institutional levels from which two key issues related to the research 
problem emerge; representation and regulation; analysed in more detail across the 
remaining two chapters, representation in chapter 5 and regulation in chapter 6. The 
chapters examine the relevant theoretical debates before applying them to the Brazilian 
LMI reality and then to the construction industry case study. 
An objective of this thesis and something of an ongoing challenge was to produce a study 
that represents a balance between the analytical discipline and structure of an institutional 
approach with the industrial relations tradition of ‘rich narrative accounts’ from the 
workplace (Kelly 1998:7). This is consistent with Cook’s (2012: 268-270) observations on 
research agendas in studying labour in Latin America. She calls for a revitalisation of 
‘sustained case-study analysis that relies on extensive fieldwork and which typically 
produces valuable inductive work’ together with greater engagement and cross-pollination 
with empirical work on Latin America as part of a research agenda to cover the recent 
period of unprecedented inclusive growth and stability.  
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Outline of the Thesis and Relevant Literature 
The main basis of this project is fieldwork research on ‘an empirical puzzle that needs 
explaining’ (Cook op cit). Discussion and analysis of the relevant literature is an ongoing 
consideration of the thesis rather than the focus of a single chapter. The literature varies 
significantly depending upon the layer of analysis and specific focus and objectives of each 
individual section. For example, chapters 5 & 6 discuss the relevant literature on 
representation and regulation respectively before applying the arguments to the Brazilian 
context and construction industry case study. This penultimate section of the introduction 
summarises the main aims of the six chapters with reference to the relevant literature.  
Chapter 1 discusses why the new institutional approach offers the most appropriate set of 
analytical tools to address the research problem. It further establishes two key definitions 
to be applied across the thesis: that of an institution and complementarity. The second half 
of the chapter introduces the more empirically based VoC approach and, given its 
importance to the research question, analyses the importance of LMI systems in the 
coordinated and liberal institutional varieties. The final part of the chapter introduces the 
hierarchical Latin American HME type leading into chapter 2 titled ‘the Brazilian Variety 
of Capitalism’.  
The relevant institutionalist literature cited in the first half of chapter 1, from which 
important definitions and analytical parameters of the research project are established, is: 
Amable (2000) Crouch (2010) Hall & Taylor (1996), Thelen (1999), North 
(1990,1991,2003) March & Olsen (1989) Peters (2005) Steinmo (2008) Steinmo & Thelen 
(1992) Streeck & Thelen (2005) and Streeck (2009). The VoC approach discussed across 
the second half of the chapter obviously draws heavily upon the original publication (Hall 
and Soskice 2001), the section on LMIs in particular (Thelen 2001). The fourth part of the 
chapter discusses outcomes for labour based upon the liberal/coordinated VoC distinction 
drawing on debates and analyses from Archer (1998) Haagh (1999, 2011 & 2012) Pagano 
(1989) Hall & Gingerich (2009) Standing (1999, 2009 & 2011) and the ILO (2012). As 
already mentioned, the VoC approach applied to Latin America (HME) is based upon 
Schneider (2009, 2013) Schneider & Karcher (2009) and Schneider & Soskice (2010).  
The objective of Chapter 2 is to establish the context of the research problem from a VoC 
perspective, i.e. LMIs in the Brazilian variety of capitalism in light of the hierarchical, 
liberal and coordinated distinctions. Accordingly, the same VoC body of literature already 
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listed is discussed in relation to the Brazilian economy. This chapter has the most 
quantitative element of the thesis based upon datasets from reliable international and 
national organisations (CEPAL, Dieese, IBGE, ILO, IPEA, OECD, World Bank). Referred 
to across this thesis, the positive trajectory of the ‘inclusive decade’ (IPEA 2012:13) is 
discussed further and presented in figure 2.10 and the idea of pockets of efficiency 
(Geddes 1986:105) is introduced.  
To support the underlying assumptions of the research question, that Brazil has 
coordinated tripartite institutional characteristics and its recent trajectory does not resemble 
that of a liberal market economy, two qualitative interpretations of the Brazilian model are 
cited. These are Evans’s widely cited Embedded Autonomy (1995) and Lazzarini’s (2011) 
Capitalismo de Laços [Capitalism of Ties]. Further related to the research problem, De 
Toni’s (2013 & 2015) analyses of industrial policy are referenced to support the idea that 
considerable state-lead coordinatory intentions and policies are evident in the Brazilian 
model.  
The third chapter looks at the historical legacies for labour and its relevant institutions in 
Brazil and is therefore reliant upon the established historical literature, which is discussed 
in light of the research question and within the parameters of the new institutional 
approach. The contributions to the Cambridge History of Latin America Collection 
(Bethell Ed.1984,1985,1986, 2008) are relied upon for a comprehensive history of labour 
in Brazil and this is assisted by the IBGE’s (2006) Estátisticas do Século XX multi-
authored collection to quantify certain key aspects of Brazilian LMI history (see ch.3 
figure 3.1).  
The historical chapter also relies significantly on Carvalho (2013) and Cardoso’s (2010) 
Portuguese language publications. Cardoso’s (2010: 332) comprehensive labour specific 
history on Brazil warrants specific attention in that it is a detailed account of the historical 
legacy that has bequeathed Brazil with a ‘very low threshold’ for acceptable employment 
arrangements. This represents an important element of the research question as this low 
threshold is evident in the day-to-day employment reality inconsistent with the more 
regulated LMI system and examples of effective coordination mentioned across the thesis. 
Collier and Collier’s (2002) influential comparative study is important to a key ongoing 
consideration of the thesis discussed in this chapter: that the 1930s labour reforms 
represent a ‘critical juncture’ that informed the trajectory of LMIs across the remainder of 
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the century. This weakens the idea of trade union mobilisation in the 1980s representing a 
‘new’ phenomenon. Consistent with and based upon Collier and Collier (also see Santana 
1999), an important consideration of this thesis is that the dynamics of the 1980s were path 
dependent upon the existing system. This is contrary to ideas that it represented any type of 
systemic rupture. For the research question this means that the examples cited of 
successful regulation and coordination at a national level and the ABC workplace are also 
embedded in the existing system introduced in the 1930s.  
Chapters 4- 6 enter into the fieldwork and construction industry case study of the research, 
therefore there is less discussion of the existing literature than in the first half of the thesis. 
Fieldwork data is summarised in Annex I. Chapter 4 analyses employment relations in 
Brazil. This is again within the parameters of the new institutional approach to the study of 
LMIs discussed in chapters 1 and 2. The functions of tripartite institutions and their three 
levels of analysis: national, regional/sectorial and workplace are taken from Camargo 
(1997). Initial analysis of tripartite relations in Brazil draw from Cook (2007) and Weyland 
(1996). At the workplace level the ABC Standard of employment relations is analysed in 
more detail based upon Rodrigues (2002). The ‘ABC standard’ is an important ongoing 
concern in the thesis as it represents the coherent and productive industrial relations within 
the existing system at the workplace level of employment relations.  
Together with the fieldwork data, the case study analysis of construction cites industry 
specific documents, the most relevant being the tripartite National Commitment for 
Improved Labour Conditions in the Construction Industry (NCILC) initiative (Brasil 2012; 
Dieese 2013; Ganz & Scherer 2012). This again is an important example for the entire 
thesis as it represents prompt, effective institutional coordination at the highest national 
bargaining level within the construction industry case study. The networks of mistrust 
relationship identified at the regional/sectorial level and summarised in figure 4.1 is mainly 
based upon fieldwork observations though also coherent with and influenced by Cardoso 
and Lage’s (2007) study on the design and effectiveness of regulatory institutions in Brazil 
and formatted to resemble similar-looking VoC analyses of complementarities. The public 
hearing on employment relations at the Pecem Steel Plant was attended in person and the 
minutes of the hearing are used as the source to summarise its findings in table 4.4.  
As already described, the order of chapters 4-6 represents the sequential logic of the 
research process. Therefore, the two main issues dominating industrial relations in Brazil 
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are discussed across the final two chapters. The first part of both chapters returns to the 
more general literature to discuss the existing debates, approaches and interpretations on 
representation (chapter 5) and regulation (chapter 6) within the context and parameters 
established over the first half of the thesis.  
Given the characteristics and history of Brazilian LMIs, discussion of labour representation 
in chapter 5 is narrowed to corporatist systems. Drawing from Archer (1998), Crouch 
(1979, 1982,1994) and Olson (1971) the conditions for effective representation within a 
corporatist system are established and discussed in light of the danger of an 
unrepresentative ‘iron law of oligarchy’ dominating trade union institutions (Michels 
1968). This is of particular relevance to Brazil given the peleguismo phenomenon 
specifically used by Archer (1998:88) as an example of representational failure in a 
corporatist system.  
The general debates and positions on labour representation are then applied to Brazil. 
Weyland (1996) is again cited and analysis of more contemporary relational dynamics 
draws from Horn & da Silva’s Eds. (2009) collection of ‘Essays on Trade Unions and 
Trade Union Reform in Brazil’ discussing the 2003-2004 tripartite FNT forum on reform 
of the Brazilian LMI system. An initiative introduced almost immediately by Lula’s PT 
government that is considered in this thesis to represent further evidence of the state-led 
tripartite intentions over the ‘inclusive decade’. Specific Labour Ministry (MTE 
2003,2004, 2005) documentation on the FNT initiative is also cited. Counter-factual 
analysis of whether LMI reform would result in improved representation mechanisms in 
Brazil cites Moreira Gomes’s (2010) arguments in favour of an end to Brazil’s corporatist 
LMI system as an adequate representation of common criticisms of the existing system.  
Analysis of regulation of employment in chapter 6 sits within long-standing debates on the 
quantity of intervention in labour markets. This research and its related questions, 
problems and approach firmly identify with what could be summarised as the ‘ILO 
position’ consistent with Berg and Cazes (2007) Deakin (2009, 2012) Lee and McCann 
(2011, 2014) and Marshall (2007). A key consideration of this position is the rejection of 
the deregulation school and its reductionist and ideological logic that associates any 
intervention in the labour market with negative consequences (unemployment, evasion, 
informality etc.). Such an idea is considered to be weak, unproven and somewhat negated 
by the northern European CME empirical examples and Brazil’s recent development 
	 32 
trajectory (see Baker et al 2004 & Berg 2010 respectively). The deregulation school 
position referred to across chapter 6 is based upon Botero et al (2004) The Economist 
(2004,2011,2016) World Bank (2007) and specifically on employment legislation in 
Brazil, Pastore (2005).  
Explanations for the widespread noncompliance observed in Brazilian employment, 
considered in this thesis to be heightened in the construction industry case study, are 
assisted by the analysis specific to regulation and compliance in Brazil carried out by 
Cardoso and Lage (2007). Fieldwork observations are supported by data from relevant 
industry and state publications (CNJ 2015, FIESP 2016, Sinduscon-SP 2012, TST 2016b).  
The conclusion presents and summarises the findings related to the research question. The 
nature of the institutionalist approach adopted means the analysis contributes to addressing 
certain popular misconceptions on the Brazilian LMI system. The concluding part of the 
thesis also acknowledges elements outside of the labour/employment relations 
institutionalist scope of the thesis that may also contribute to explanations for the 
inconsistency between the formal system and workplace reality identified in the research 
question. The thesis finishes with some tentative predictions on the future direction of 
LMIs in Brazil based upon research findings.   
Approach and Agenda 
Researching the observed inconsistency and related research problem lends itself firmly to 
the study of labour and industrial relations. Such a subject area is considered most 
appropriate to address the research question and carry out qualitative research for the 
following reasons: the workplace is a dynamic location involving a variety of actors and 
institutions. Influences on the reality of employment can be direct or indirect, formal or 
informal or a complex and context-specific blurred mixture. An essential consideration for 
this research is as to how the relevant actors interact and the importance of change and 
continuity. This is not easily quantifiable. The understanding of LMI dynamics cannot be 
expected from more static indicators. It is also argued to be inappropriate within the 
context of this research to adopt more ideologically loaded positions that may skew the 
findings and inhibit the identification of more subtle and less-tangible factors. The multi-
disciplinary nature and importance placed upon empirical observation finds industrial 
relations as a best fit for this research problem and related methods. 
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The ‘new institutional approach’ (NIA) offers a comprehensive analytical toolbox to 
address the industrial relations research problem identified. Explanations for observable 
phenomena can be expected from a society’s composite set of institutions or their ‘variety 
of capitalism’. This thesis considers the sub-varieties of new institutionalism as 
complementary to one another rather than competing or rival approaches. By bringing 
them together their established weaknesses can be addressed and mitigated. Within 
institutionalism, scholars observe a dichotomy and culture of isolation between Historical 
Institutionalism (HI) and the influential and increasingly popular rational choice (RC) 
approach related to the ‘behavioural revolution’ in economics. Again, for the purposes of 
this research, the distinctive sub-varieties of NI are argued to complement and reinforce 
one another.  
The idea of differing approaches used to ‘supplement and strengthen’ each other is 
described as a research agenda by Hall & Taylor (1996:955) and endorsed by Immergut 
(1998:28) Stoker & Marsh (2010:12) and Thelen (1999: 371), the latter institutionalist 
scholar identifying greater ‘tangency than commonly assumed’ between RC and HI 
variants. The appropriateness of the institutional analytical toolbox to address the research 
question is the focus of the first chapter. Combining institutionalist elements is an 
important consideration for addressing the real-world problem observed. 
The distance between the formal employment protections and provisions in Brazil and the 
workplace reality are complex, context-specific with important formal, informal and 
historical influences and, perhaps most significantly, have to be analysed as a composite 
dynamic system characterised by processes of both continuity and change. From the 
industrial relations research problem identified and the new institutionalist toolbox, the 
thesis seeks to contribute to comparative capitalisms debates by arguing that the Brazilian 
case, in its labour institutions, is a distinctive variety of capitalism.     
The Varieties of Capitalism (herein VoC) approach is described in its original form as an 
open research agenda ‘useful for understanding political economies that do not correspond 
to the ideal type of a liberal or coordinated market economy’ (Hall & Soskice 2001:35). 
For Latin America this has been done by Schneider (2009, 2013 also see Schneider & 
Karcher 2009 and Schneider & Soskice 2010) where the predominant institutional variety 
is described as one of Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs). The five key ‘reinforcing 
interactions’ or negative complementarities of Latin American labour markets within the 
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HME-type are identified as ‘extensive labour market regulation, a low skills regime, rapid 
turnover, sparse unions, and pervasive informality’ (Schneider 2013:91).   
This present research project is located within the research agenda of extending varieties of 
capitalism outside of the LME/CME advanced economy ideal types, in this case to Brazil. 
The intended original contribution of this thesis is to contribute to an understanding of 
Brazilian LMIs - an essential part of a society’s variety of capitalism. This is assisted by 
and related somewhat to Schneider’s HME ideal-type. Mentioned on more than one 
occasion across this study, hierarchical is a particularly apt description to describe 
employment relations in Brazil both historically and currently. The original contribution of 
this research however is a variant on the HME.  
Variant does not imply a contestation or rejection of the HME interpretation. The 
ambitious exercise to categorise the variety of capitalism from an entire continent will 
invariably and somewhat necessarily neglect certain national specificities. Consistent with 
observations on the varieties of capitalism approach in general, the HME represents 
something of a static snapshot of an entire institutional system, of which LMIs are one 
element (Schneider: ch.5). This research aims to contribute to varieties of capitalism 
debates on Latin America by extending upon the HME ideal type rather than challenge it. 
Indeed, Schneider (idem: 181) recognises an open-research agenda of ‘within-type 
variations’ that he argues are no greater than the observable heterogeneity within CME and 
LME type economies of the original VoC distinction.   
The underlying premises and definitions discussed across chapter 1 – institutions and their 
complementarities and observable outcomes as a result of a society’s composite set of 
institutions; are consistent with those used by Schneider (idem:91) who innovates by 
‘putting together all these pieces’ in a study on Latin America. It is the ‘sparse union’ piece 
that is contested. The relevance of the HME ideal type to the research question is discussed 
towards the end of the first chapter and across the second chapter on ‘the Brazilian variety 
of capitalism’. Explanations for the inconsistency between the Brazilian LMI system and 
day-to-day reality of employment, a reality mostly consistent with that described in the 
HME model, can be expected from an analysis of the Brazilian variety of capitalism.  
Sparse unions is one of the five core characteristics of labour markets in the hierarchical 
variety of capitalism (Schneider 2013:91) and of heightened relevance to explain outcomes 
given the underlying premise that institutions are complementary of one another (both 
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negatively and positively). Argued in greater detail across chapters 2 and 3, sparse unions 
is inappropriate to describe the Brazilian case for two reasons. Firstly, a long-standing 
system persists in Brazil that guarantees the existence and resources of labour and business 
representative institutions to all workers and businesses in formal recognised activities. As 
Cardoso (2003:34) describes and consistent with Collier and Collier’s (2002:757) 
observations, it historically represents a system which can be used to both repress and 
rapidly mobilise workers, which leads into the second point.  
The Brazilian system has produced strong unions that have contributed and evolved into 
influential peak associations with considerable sustained influence over policy at the 
national level. This is particularly the case since the 1980s with trade unions influencing 
the direction of the democratisation process, gaining influence at the highest levels of 
political decision making and contributing to a non-transition to LME-type labour 
arrangements across the 1990s when liberalisation pressures were at their peak.  At the 
opposite end of the LMI scale, a strong trade union presence is evident at the plant-level of 
the automobile industry/metalworkers category in Sao Paulo. A presence that contributes 
to prompt resolutions to workplace disputes that arise based upon social dialogue, 
resembling the coordinated dynamics of a CME-type economy. This is referred to across 
this thesis as the ABC standard of labour relations (Rodrigues 2002:154).  
The puzzle or problem attached to the research question when considered in light of VoC 
and the HME ideal-type is therefore: if not ‘sparse unions’ what explains the inconsistency 
between the employment relationship envisaged by the Brazilian LMI system and the 
workplace reality? In other words, what impedes the coordinated and effectively regulated 
dynamics of labour activity evident at a national level and on the ABC shop-floor from 
reproducing sufficiently to characterise employment outcomes across society? An 
important element here is historical legacies consistent with the HI and path dependency 
sub-areas of institutionalism. Cook (2012: 268) observes that legacies of labour market 
institutions in recent democracies such as Brazil are little explored, therefore the 
importance placed upon historical legacies in addressing the research question is another 
argued contribution of this thesis.   
Summary 
It is important to establish what is and is not within the scope of this research. Analysis is 
focussed at an intermediate level on the dynamics of industrial relations within the 
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Brazilian LMI system. A detailed analysis of the day-to-day employment conditions 
described is not an aim or object of study for this thesis. In a similar sense, and considering 
the identified importance of regulation and compliance that emerges from this research, a 
specific analysis of the relevant formal labour legislation is not part of the thesis. There is a 
wealth of legal scholarship on the formal labour legislation in Brazil. As per the 
institutional approach adopted for this thesis; formal labour codes represent only one of a 
variety of complementary institutions, with enforcement, compliance and evasion being 
equally relevant considerations.   
This thesis is a study of labour market institutions. The original motivation for the study 
was an empirical problem observed at the workplace level of the Brazilian construction 
industry. Initial analysis identified an inconsistency between the LMI dynamics associated 
with ‘new’ trade unionism in the ABC Paulista since the 1980s and employment in the 
construction industry. Explanations for this inconsistency represent the research question 
or problem. 
In line with the new institutionalist approach adopted for this research the contribution of 
this thesis can accordingly be described as a composite set of ‘complementary’ factors. At 
the more abstract level, the combination of elements of new institutionalism to analyse a 
labour market problem can contribute to the general study of LMIs. By considering the 
reality of employment as the result of a set of context-specific institutions, their history, 
interaction and formal and informal manifestations, more holistic interpretations can be 
expected. This is particularly the case in light of the influential and persistent reductionist 
deregulation arguments that negate key institutions and empirical examples and can 
therefore contribute to misleading diagnoses and prescriptions when used to inform policy. 
This places the research contribution within what is described here as ‘the ILO school’, 
given the institutional affiliation of the authors already listed.  
At a more empirical level the intended contribution of the research is to contribute to a 
greater understanding of varieties of capitalism outside of the advanced industrial 
economies. This involves analysis of Brazilian labour market institutions as a variation 
upon Schneider’s hierarchical Latin American model, contributing to a greater 
understanding of Brazil’s within-type HME variety of capitalism, something not done 
previously. An underlying premise of the research question: significant examples of 
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institutional coordination and effective regulation in the Brazilian system contests the 
‘sparse unions’ core trait of HME labour markets. 
At the national and industry specific level the intended contribution has two key aspects. 
The first contribution is chronological; labour is analysed during the unprecedented 
development trajectory of the ‘inclusive decade’ that captured the world’s attention. This 
then adds to the rich tradition of labour studies since the emergence of ‘new’ trade 
unionism in the 1980s. The choice of the construction industry is important within the 
context of the concentration of the existing body of scholarship focussing upon the more 
regionally concentrated and ‘best practice’ example of the São Paulo automobile industry. 
The ABC standard has considerable comparative value within this project and further 
informs and supports the idea of a distinctive Brazilian variety of capitalism and variant of 
an HME from its stable labour market arrangements. 
An underlying objective of the thesis is to combine the analytical parameters and related 
contributions of an institutional approach to the study of LMIs with the rich empirical 
tradition of industrial relations. If this objective is to be met, the findings will hopefully be 
of interest to scholars of labour and Latin American political economy as well as 
practitioners ranging from trade unionists and business leaders to workers and employers. 
Indeed, the main pillar of the research project, the fieldwork data, is considerably indebted 
to numerous construction industry representatives.  
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Chapter 1 Studying Labour Market Institutions 
Labour studies tends to be multi-disciplinary and draw from across social sciences: 
politics, sociology, economics and anthropology amongst others. This geographically 
specific study of labour institutions can therefore be expected to contain a mix of 
approaches from across relevant disciplines. Presented in this chapter are the definitions 
and boundaries applied to the thesis, influenced by the research problem: the persistence of 
hierarchical-type employment relations in Brazil despite the historical presence of a more 
regulated labour market system with tripartite institutions capable of coordinated solutions 
at some institutional levels and workplaces.  
A two-way relationship exists between the research problem and approach (theory, 
methodology and analytical tools) adopted by this thesis. The employment relationship is a 
key contributor to levels of social equity within a given society and therefore explanations 
are sought from the relevant labour institutions. The institutionalist approach adopted and 
discussed across this first chapter defines the units of analysis - the existence (and 
inexistence) of formal and informal labour institutions and their interaction. The thesis 
discusses how this influences the employment relationship.  
The first part of the chapter introduces the institutionalist approach and why it offers the 
most appropriate set of analytical tools to consider the research question, its Historical 
Institutionalism (HI) variety in particular. It also acknowledges and addresses the common 
criticisms of the approach regarding its capacity to adequately recognise gradual 
institutional change. The second part provides working definitions of an institution and 
institutional interrelations known as complementarities. Such definitions fall within the 
remit of an institutional approach and are applicable across the thesis.  
The third part of the chapter continues logically from the previous definitions introducing 
the idea of comparative capitalisms i.e. significantly different institutional models (and 
therefore realities) in the wider capitalist system. Particular attention is given to the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) distinction between Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) based mainly upon the empirical 
examples of the advanced economies of Europe and North America. 
Analysis of distinctive institutional arrangements for labour from different varieties of 
capitalism continues logically from the VoC discussion into the fourth part of the chapter. 
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The broad institutional approach and more empirically applied VoC framework stress that 
the reality of the workplace and employment relationship are the result of a society’s set of 
historically embedded institutions. Discussion of which system best represents labour 
interests is based upon academic analyses (Archer 1998; Haagh 1999, 2011 & 2012; 
Pagano 1989; Hall & Gingerich 2009; Standing 1999, 2009 & 2011) as well as referencing 
the ILO (2012) framework for practitioners. 
The VoC framework and agenda is directed towards the analysis of developed or advanced 
capitalist economies. This thesis aims to contribute to a greater understanding of the 
Brazilian model, argued across this research to be historically and deeply embedded. 
Schneider’s (2009, 2013) Hierarchical Market Economy (HME) model, introduced in the 
fifth and final part of the chapter and examined in greater detail in chapter 2 assists in this 
exercise. Schneider contributes to the VoC framework/agenda by applying its approach to 
Latin America.  
The HME represents an important analytical model for this thesis, which aims to 
contribute to the study of comparative capitalisms by extending upon the hierarchical 
category through the analysis of key peculiarities of Brazilian labour institutions. Within 
the context of liberal, coordinated and hierarchical institutional arrangements and the 
reality of employment in the Brazilian case study, the research project aims to evaluate the 
role and evolution of cooperative labour market institutions in Brazil. In turn this hopes to 
contribute to a wider understanding of the role of such institutions in contributing to 
developmental outcomes. The chapter concludes with a summary of the approach and 
definitions to be applied to the study of institutions and the labour market across the thesis.   
1.1 The New Institutional Approach  
This first part of the chapter presents the institutional approach and its compatibility with 
the aims of the research project. Whilst the exact scope and boundaries of the approach are 
subject to considerable debate and diverse interpretations, the three different sub-types 
specified by Hall & Taylor (1996:936) are herein considered to make up new 
institutionalism – the historical, sociological and rational choice varieties. Relevance and 
overlap with ‘new institutionalism in economics’, recognised by the same authors is 
similarly acknowledged here. The ‘new’ prefix for the approach relates to its broader more 
porous and flexible analytical tools when compared with traditional or ‘old’ institutional 
approaches. It further reflects an increase in popularity and credibility of the new 
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institutional approach (henceforth NIA) within political science since the 1980s after a 
decline of its ‘old’ form’ and as a critique of the behavioural ‘revolution’ in political 
science.  
The reality of employment is predominantly a product of the relevant institutions, their 
actions and interaction. Institutions in turn are the result of historical processes. In order to 
comprehensively explain observable phenomena there needs to be an understanding of 
what Thelen (1999:371) describes as ‘how institutions emerge from and are embedded in 
concrete temporal processes’. This lends itself to the Historical Institutionalism (hereafter 
HI) variety of NIA which similarly addresses a problem highlighted by Kelly (1998:5) of 
analyses that attempt to explain employment relations with arguments ‘couched in 
ahistorical terms without sufficient attempt to locate contemporary changes in historical 
perspective’.  
One of the key contributions of the HI approach is the importance placed upon the history 
of institutions, their continuities and embeddedness. This is commonly known as ‘path 
dependency’ described by Peters (2005:71) as  
when policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is 
initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far 
into the future […] meaning that when a government programme or organization 
embarks upon a path there is an inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to 
persist. That path may be altered, but it requires a good deal of political pressure to 
produce that change.  
 
Path dependency has made considerable contributions to understanding institutional 
systems by focussing on the historical persistence of certain characteristics. Two 
distinguished examples are Collier and Collier’s (2002) study of Latin America where the 
institutional characteristics of the ‘incorporation’ period of the 1930s and 1940s are 
demonstrated to have contributed significantly to the democratisation process half a 
century later and Thelen’s (2004) comparative study of the political economy of skills 
tracing the success of modern day German apprenticeships to institutional dynamics put in 
place in the 19th century.  
More closely related to the present research question is Cardoso’s (2010) study on the 
history of work in Brazil. With considerable attention to historical detail he argues (pp.40-
45) that the profound legacy of slavery established an inertial structural inequality and 
related extremely low threshold for what can be considered acceptable labour conditions. 
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Unfavourable dynamics still reproduced in contemporary society. This means that 
subsequent more modern labour reforms and legislation exist as a ‘utopian promise’ rather 
than an effective change in the reality for the majority of workers. Similarly relevant to the 
research question is Carvalho’s (2013) historical tracing of the history of citizenship in 
Brazil. Using the Marshallian concept of citizenship of which social/labour rights represent 
an important element, the historian stresses the persistence of the highly unfavourable 
legacy or ‘path’ embedded in the centuries of slavery and exploitative social relations 
(p.229).  
Within institutionalist thinking there is widespread consensus on the importance of path 
dependence to understand institutions and their outcomes (North 1990:8; Solow 1990:87; 
Pagano 1991:327; Wood 2001: 250). It is very difficult to envisage competent explanations 
for observed contemporary phenomena in Brazilian labour institutions and practices 
without considering historical legacies. There are considerable continuities in 
contemporary industrial relations from the original ‘incorporation’ reforms of the 1930s. 
Consistent with Cardoso (2010) and Carvalho (2013), the persistent hierarchical social 
structure and certain unfavourable informal processes for workers can be traced back even 
further to colonialism and slavery. Chapter 3 specifically discusses these historical 
processes of the relevant labour institutions and the idea of the reality of modern day 
employment as historically embedded is ever present across this thesis.  
Together with the ‘history matters’ aspect of HI, the nature of the case-study problem 
examined lends itself to such an approach in that it seeks explanations for empirical 
questions. Steinmo (2008:134) describes HI as ‘a research programme motivated by an 
interest in real-world puzzles and rare events’ in contrast to research aiming to ‘find 
general laws of history or politics’. Acknowledged by Steinmo & Thelen (1992:12) and 
Streeck (2009:12), this more empirical approach is criticised by scholars of a more 
positivist tradition as being ‘inelegant and atheoretical’ or dismissed as ‘story-telling’.  
Whilst this chapter does not discuss these theoretical and methodological differences in 
depth, HI is considered well suited to the aims of this research project. The positivist 
‘unscientific’ criticisms are rejected in that comprehensive explanations for the historically 
and geographically specific outcomes under analysis cannot be expected from a set of 
universal rules akin to those associated with exact sciences. The resurgence of an 
institutional approach to social sciences in recent decades could be argued to represent a 
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response to the non-emergence of a universal set of scientific rules to provide convincing 
explanations for significant differences in real-world phenomena (see March and Olsen 
1989; Peters 2005; Hall & Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Thelen & Steinmo 1992:1). The 
problematic nature of contemporary attempts to create and apply universal comparative 
rigidity indexes to compare individual labour market regulation systems is discussed in 
chapter 6.   
Within the same institutionalist school of thought, appreciation of the importance of path 
dependency is accompanied by recognition of its deficiency in adequately and competently 
explaining institutional change. The criticism is that a conventional path dependency 
approach stresses ‘continuity’ or a ‘static equilibrium’ only interrupted by major upheavals 
such as crises or systemic breakdowns described as ‘critical junctures’ or ‘punctuated 
equilibriums’. There is long-standing recognition (see Thelen & Steinmo 1992) of a 
weakness within the HI approach, in that path dependency can overstate the importance of 
continuity at the expense of institutional change not instigated by a major event.  
Thelen (2004: 290) also questions the idea of a major upheaval as the turning point for 
observable institutional change, arguing that there can be ‘significant continuities through 
historically “unsettled” times and ongoing contestation and renegotiation in “settled” 
periods that nonetheless over time add up to significant change’. Campbell (2010:92) 
similarly recognises the deficiency of path dependency and critical junctures to explain 
‘more incremental and evolutionary change’. Over two decades ago Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992:16) describe a ‘critical inadequacy of institutional analysis’ as ‘a tendency towards 
mechanical static accounts’. Consistent with HI, Streeck (2009:1) recognises that a 
society’s set of institutions has to be studied as a structure though stresses that it has to be 
considered a ‘dynamic process’ i.e ever changing rather than a ‘static structure’. As cited 
in Boas (2007:34): ‘Thelen (2003, 2004), Hacker (2004), Crouch and Farrell (2004), 
Schwartz (2004), and Alexander (2001) have all argued that prevailing models of path 
dependence overstate the degree of stability in political institutions’. 
Given the velocity of transformations in technology, production strategies and global 
events, it is important that institutional analysis can competently explain change whether 
gradual or abrupt. Consistent with the ongoing institutionalist debates, the tendency to 
overstate or overanalyse the static or embedded nature of institutions in detriment to 
identifying more dynamic and nuanced change is acknowledged here as an important 
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consideration for the research project. Summarised in table 1.1, Streeck & Thelen 
(2005:19) present five modes of transformative gradual change away from the more radical 
or sharp changes considered critical junctures or punctuated equilibriums.  
Table 1.1 Definitions and Mechanisms of Institutional Change: five types of gradual transformation 
Type Definition Mechanism 
Displacement Slowly rising salience of subordinate relative 
to dominant institutions 
Defection 
Layering New elements attached to existing institutions 
gradually change their status and structure 
Differential growth 
Drift Neglect of institutional maintenance in spite 
of external change resulting in institutional 
practice on the ground 
Deliberate neglect 
Conversion Redeployment of old institutions to new 
purposes: new purposes attached to old 
structures 
Redirection, 
reinterpretation 
Exhaustion Gradual breakdown (withering away) of 
institutions over time 
Depletion 
Source: Adapted from Streeck & Thelen (2005:31) 
Based upon the types identified by Streeck & Thelen, it is argued that sufficient 
mechanisms to analyse gradual change have been incorporated into contemporary 
Institutionalism. The addition of further tools to address identified deficiencies in 
analysing change are consistent with the flexibility and porous boundaries of an HI 
approach already described. In terms of this research it is necessary to recognise the 
importance and co-existence of both institutional continuities and dynamic change and take 
appropriate care not to neglect or overstate one at the expense of the other.   
The analysis within this thesis is not limited to the historical variant of institutionalism. A 
key advantage of HI is its flexibility to incorporate other perspectives. Hall & Taylor 
(1996:950) describe HI as ‘commodious’ incorporating both the instrumental and strategic 
calculus approach and the more interpretive cultural approach. The authors similarly 
identify an openness of the HI approach where ‘although they [HI scholars] draw attention 
to the role of institutions in political life, historical institutionalists rarely insist that 
institutions are the only causal force in politics’. For the underlying research question this 
means the NIA approach offers the porous boundaries compatible with the inductive, 
problem-based and empirical characteristics of the study. Lowndes (2010:60), commenting 
upon the NIA approach, recognises such value and suggests the ‘multi-theoretic character 
[…] may actually prove to be its greatest asset’.  
Institutionalists recognise that between the three variants of NIA there are significant 
cleavages (Thelen 1999:369), a tradition of ‘relative isolation’ (Hall & Taylor 1996:957) 
and competition between the distinctive schools of thought or ‘competing branches’ 
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(Immergut 1998:5). It is not the aim of this chapter to contribute to the well-established 
debates on the pros and cons of each individual tradition; instead it is argued that the NIA 
approach adopted by this study allows for useful applications from across its sub-
categories. The appropriateness of HI stands out in particular where its blurred boundaries 
and flexibility are considered to represent a distinct advantage. This is consistent with 
Peters (2005:85) who recognises that the lack of ‘sharp distinctions is in some ways a 
strength’ of HI. 
Other authors highlight compatibility between the varieties of new institutionalism as Hall 
& Taylor (1996:955) observe: 
if the most extreme assumptions of each [institutionalist] school’s theoretical position 
are relaxed, they share a great deal of common analytical ground on which the insights 
of one approach might be used to supplement or strengthen those of another. 
Thelen (1999:371) similarly observes that between RC and HI variants ‘there are more 
points of tangency than commonly assumed’. The RC focus on strategic interaction and 
decision-making processes is of particular relevance to discussion on regulation. It is 
important to contribute to an understanding of institutional (in)effectiveness through game 
theory explanations of noncompliance with legislation (see ch.6, figure 6.1). A 
cultural/historical embeddedness explanation for noncompliance would be incomplete in 
this instance without an understanding of the choices, constraints and outcomes in strategic 
interaction between relevant actors.   
Such boundary crossing is defended here as essential to provide a more complete set of 
analytical tools to adequately address the research question. It is also considered 
compatible with the HI approach described, as Hall & Taylor (1996: 957) conclude: HI 
‘stands in an especially pivotal position’ with considerable common ground with both RC 
and Sociological variants of new institutionalism. Fusing elements from the variants of 
institutionalism is described as a research agenda. Immergut (1998:28) endorses what she 
describes as a ‘fruitful combination’ of elements of the three approaches and Hall & Taylor 
(1996:957) call for ‘a more open and extensive interchange’ between the three varieties. 
Similarly Stoker and Marsh (2010:12) recognise the pluralism of institutional approaches 
though advocate interaction over isolation. Franzosi’s (1995:12) study on strikes in Italy 
describes ‘the lack of integration between competing approaches’ as ‘one of the most 
serious problems in the literature’. 
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An empirical study of labour institutions is characterised by an eclectic theoretical-
methodological approach. The theoretical differences and on-going debate between 
different sub-categories of institutionalism are acknowledged, though for the ends of this 
research project, a ‘border crossing’ institutional approach is considered a best fit. The 
overlap across the types of institutional approaches is a practical consideration rather than 
an aim of this thesis. An over-emphasis upon path-dependency analysis may limit the 
emergence of other important insights to address the research question.  
Discussed across chapter 3 there is strong evidence of historical embeddedness and 
continuities or path dependency, greater than that implied by popular and traditional 
accounts of ‘revolutions’. Within a similar context to the criticism of ‘static accounts’ 
already addressed, describing contemporary problems as solely a result of history risks 
missing important processes of more gradual and subtle changes in contemporary 
industrial relations analysed across chapters 2 to 6. For the purposes of this research there 
are no relevant tensions between the variants of institutionalism, rather as Hall & Taylor 
(op cit) describe, they can be used to ‘supplement or strengthen’ each other.  
1.2 Institutions and their Complementarities  
1.2.1 Institutions  
This second part of the chapter looks to establish two interrelated and important 
definitions, ‘institution’ and ‘complementarity’, to be applied consistently across the thesis. 
Studying institutions is an ever present across social science disciplines and invariably 
there is no hard and fast definition of what represents an institution. Within the NIA there 
is some nuance in definitions though considerable consensus on the main characteristics. 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2) describe the following definition by Hall (1986:19) as 
‘widely accepted’: ‘The formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity 
and economy’.  
Hall’s definition is consistent with North’s (2003:1-2) much-cited description where 
institutions are ‘made up of formal rules, informal constraints and their enforcement 
characteristics’ with a function to ‘provide incentives and disincentives for people to 
behave in certain ways; and if they are effective they structure and provide incentives and 
also structure economic, political and social activity’. Some of the more ample definitions 
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incorporate traditions, ideas and routines as institutions (see North 1991; Hall 1989 and 
March & Olsen 1989 respectively). 
In simple terms the consensus is that institutions are rules. There is less consensus and 
certainty as to where to draw the line when considering what is (and is not) an institution, 
described by Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2) as ‘a matter of some controversy in the 
literature’. The broad and open-ended nature of the definition is consistent with the 
flexibility offered by an NIA, argued again to be an advantage when analysing a real-world 
problem. This study recognises that criticism exists over the open-endedness and looseness 
of this definition, yet it is argued that such a fluid and broad definition is an advantageous 
and valuable tool to address the underlying research question.  
The working definition of an institution adopted for this research on labour institutions is 
on the broader end of the spectrum - any observable rule, idea, logic, tradition that has an 
influence upon the realities of employment is considered to be an institution and merits 
analysis. A key element of this definition is the importance of informal institutions, the 
idea that institutions represent more than a tangible organisation such as a trade union or 
government department or formal legislation in the form of a constitution or labour code. 
North (2003:2) describes formal rules as very straightforward and of less importance than 
the informal norms. He warns of the considerable limitations of analysis that focuses 
purely on formal institutional rules and enforcement mechanisms.  
Analyses focusing purely on formal institutions were a characteristic of traditional or ‘old’ 
institutionalism (Peters 2005:10). The limitations of narrowly focusing upon the formal, as 
described by North, could be argued to have contributed to the decline in popularity and 
credibility of this approach during the twentieth century. Following the same line of 
thought, the widening of the definition of institutions to incorporate the informal is a key 
difference between ‘old’ and new institutionalism and can be considered a contributing 
factor to the resurgence of the new approach (Lowndes 2010:60-61). Attention upon the 
informal is essential for any credible study of institutional outcomes. Recognition of the 
importance of the less visible and more abstract informal institutions is highly compatible 
with the broad, open-ended working definition of an institution outlined above.  
The importance of informal institutions is of particular relevance for this Latin 
America/middle-income economy based research project. Consistent with observations on 
‘old’ institutionalist approaches Levitsky (2012: 88) observes that early studies of Latin 
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America assumed that formal or ‘parchment’ rules are ‘stable and effective’. He then 
argues that this may work in the advanced economies though not in Latin America ‘where 
rules are routinely circumvented, manipulated or changed’. Such routines can be 
considered informal institutions. Whilst it would be argued here, consistent with North 
(1991), that informal constraints and rules should be considered regardless of the advanced 
or middle-income economy context, Levitsky’s position of heightened importance of 
informal institutions in studies on Latin America is agreed upon.  
Drawn from fieldwork observations and frequently cited across chapters 3-6 of this thesis, 
is an effective example of the importance of an informal institution, that of peleguismo. It 
represents a derogatory term dating back to the 1930s to describe a trade union leader or 
organisation allied with business leaders and/or government and therefore ‘betraying’ the 
workers’ movement. Fieldwork observations suggest that contemporary use of the term is 
widespread and has a variety of meanings within numerous contexts. At plant-level it is 
heard to describe workers who will not take a stand against bosses or refuse to participate 
in industrial action; at regional and national levels to describe union leaders and their 
organisations for being co-opted by business and/or state interests or alternatively for not 
believing in the inherent nature of capital-labour conflict.  
The example of peleguismo, demonstrates the value of the analytical tools of the 
institutional approach and related definitions, particularly the importance of informal 
institutions. Peleguismo has historical and cultural traits and a variety of different 
meanings dependent upon context and actor perspective. It will more often than not have a 
direct or indirect influence upon tri-partite collective bargaining processes without being 
explicitly observable. Trade union approaches to employer counterparts and the state are 
influenced by the stigma of peleguismo amongst the grass-roots and further up the 
hierarchy by political or central organisation affiliations.  
Peleguismo is a useful example to demonstrate the bidirectional relationship between 
research problem and approach. It is considered in this thesis as an important and complex 
informal institution with historical and cultural traits that influence institutional outcomes 
for labour. Adequately capturing its relevance for Brazilian labour institutions requires a 
combination of the new institutional approaches (HI, RC and Sociological) and a related 
broad definition of institutions to incorporate more subtle informal manifestations.   
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1.2.2 Complementarities 
In the context of this chapter, the relevance of peleguismo in observed institutional 
interaction highlights a further key element of the new institutionalism approach. To 
provide adequate explanations institutions have to be examined as parts of an integrated 
system. As Morgan et al (2010:7) observe ‘different institutions inside society cannot be 
studied in isolation’. To acquire an effective understanding of the outcomes they must be 
considered as a composite system, the sum of numerous parts that interact with each other.  
Observable phenomena are therefore the result of institutional complementarities. Another 
characteristic of the new institutional approach is the analysis of interaction to explain 
outcomes rather than studying individual institutions in isolation (Thelen & Steinmo 
1992:6). Like the focus upon the informal, the idea of complementarities can similarly be 
argued to have contributed to the resurgence of new institutionalism. 
Closely related to the definition of an institution presented above, this section of the 
chapter looks to establish a working definition of a complementarity and present its 
relevance to the underlying research problem. The definition discussed here and applied 
across the thesis is influenced by the institutional approach and is a logical and essential 
object of analysis. An aim of the institutional approach is to explain real-world puzzles, to 
do so adequately analysis must focus on a given society’s collective of institutions and 
their interrelatedness. As Amable (2000: 680) observes ‘it is more important to study the 
effects of interacting institutions or organisations than just to admit that “institutions 
matter”’.  
It follows therefore that outcomes should be considered the product of how institutions 
interrelate and interact with one another, their complementarities rather than the result of 
an economy’s collective of individual institutions. Coherent with the institutional approach 
and the concept of an institution already presented, the working definition of a 
complementarity applied across this thesis is similarly broad and open-ended. It is not 
merely a synonym of observable interactivity as some institutions may never directly or 
noticeably interact yet their co-existence and interrelation have relevant consequences for 
observed outcomes. An example from criminology is where a resourceful police criminal 
investigation department supported by comprehensive legislation and powers may be 
incapable of reducing crime within areas where historically embedded norms and the 
presence of parallel spheres of influence stigmatise and punish any collusion with the 
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authorities. Within such a context an effort to combat crime may unintentionally increase 
violence and insecurity within a given community.   
An example from this research project is the effect of the introduction of national labour 
legislation in the 1930s discussed in more detail in chapter 3. It is acknowledged (Costa 
2005:113; Bonelli 2006:387) that the majority of workers were excluded by this legislation 
(87% in 1940 estimated by Pochmann 2010). Despite this mass exclusion, according to 
Cardoso (2010:160) the mere existence of the legislation entirely changed the relationship 
between Brazilian state and society as it provided the expectation and promise of 
employment rights to the excluded masses, stimulating mass rural-urban migration in 
search of achieving formal inclusion.  
Complementarities between formal and informal labour arrangements are also widely 
recognised in the Brazilian case, known as the efeito farol [the lighthouse effect]. Neri, 
Gonzaga and Camargo (2001:78) identify what they describe as an ‘unusual’ effect of 
minimum wage legislation dictating the remuneration of ‘a high percentage of informal 
employees’. More recently Medeiros (2015: 289) recognises the lighthouse effect across 
the ‘inclusive decade’ period. Given the sustained significant increases in the minimum 
wage and the corresponding influence upon informal employment he describes it as the 
‘propulsion effect’.  
The term complementarity itself may initially seem misleading given the word has a 
positive association. Some institutional analyses use the term to focus on positive 
interactions as per the definition given by Hall and Soskice (2001:17 own emphasis): two 
institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one 
increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other. It is important to establish here as 
per Crouch’s (2010:117 own emphasis) definition that such a concept ‘enables analysts to 
consider when and how certain institutions “belong” together […], or, in contrast to 
indicate when two or more institutions might be incompatible with each other’. Amable 
(2000: 656 own emphasis) similarly defines complementary institutions as those that 
‘make one another more or less efficient according to their respective characteristics’. 
Complementarity is therefore used in this thesis to describe where institutional 
interrelationships and co-existence contribute to both negative and positive situations. 
The importance of considering outcomes as the result of a composite set of institutions 
follows logically from the weight placed upon informal institutions already discussed. 
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Informal institutions have to be taken into account to effectively analyse empirical 
phenomena. It is therefore essential to consider the complementarities between the formal 
and informal. Cited earlier, Levitsky (2012:89) argues that the need to analyse informal 
institutions in Latin America is heightened given their historical presence and influence 
across the region. It is consequently of similar importance to pay close attention to the 
complementarities between informal and formal institutions.  
There is a tendency to assume that informal institutions mostly interact negatively with 
formal institutions, undermining the effectiveness and objectives of the latter. This can 
often be the case, as described in chapter 6 on regulation where a variety of informal norms 
that incentivise ‘noncompliance’ are identified, limiting the effectiveness of 
comprehensive formal labour organisations and legislation. Levitsky (ibid 20) argues that 
there can also be a positive correlation between informal and formal institutions arguing 
that ‘effective formal institutions are frequently embedded in informal norms’. This is an 
important consideration and positive informal-formal complementarities are evident from 
research. Chapter 4 identifies ‘pockets of efficiency’ in plant level bargaining within 
Brazil’s automobile industry and amongst national-level peak associations. Importantly 
both institutions have informal origins and were incorporated into the formal employment 
relations system decades later with positive consequences for labour.  
1.3 Models of Capitalism and Labour Institutions  
The relevant approach and key definitions have been discussed and presented in the first 
half of this chapter. It is argued that when analysing labour market dynamics ‘institutions 
matter’: their interaction and historical nature in particular. It is established that the reality 
of employment in a given society is dependent upon its set of institutions and their 
complementarities. Such institutions can be formal or informal and are embedded in each 
society’s specific historic, social and cultural context. There will therefore be differing and 
sometimes unique characteristics between diverse societies. 
This leads into the third part of the chapter presenting the empirical application of a new 
institutional approach that considers diverse institutional arrangements within advanced 
capitalist economies. Hall & Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalisms (VoC) distinguishes 
between Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs). 
From an institutionalist perspective, VoC emphasises the importance of a society’s 
composite set of institutions and their complementarities. It similarly recognises the 
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importance of informal institutions and significant diversity between capitalist societies. A 
core element of the approach is how institutional complementarities can improve 
competitiveness and economic performance at micro and macro levels (Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009: 450).  
In a Liberal Market Economy (LME) coordination problems are predominantly resolved 
by ‘hierarchies and competitive market arrangements’ (Hall and Soskice 2001:8). 
Empirical examples of LMEs are: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and the 
United States. Also referred to as the Anglo-Saxon model or economies due to shared 
linguistic, historical and cultural traits. The Coordinated Market Economy (CME) in 
contrast relies heavily on ‘non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavours’ 
involving ‘collaborative, as opposed to competitive relationships’ (p.8). Empirical 
examples of CMEs are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden & Switzerland (p.20) sometimes referred to as the Northern 
European model. Whilst it is acknowledged that there will be market relations and 
hierarchy in a CME, its penetration is less than that in an LME and the reality of the 
workplace is often the result of ‘strategic interaction’ among relevant organisations and 
institutions.  
The idea of two significantly different (and coherent) institutional models within the 
capitalist system contests the traditional idea of an evolutionary process of convergence 
upon one best-practice liberal free market model. This is present in Rostow’s (1960) 
Modernisation Theory, Fukuyama’s (1992) idea of an ‘End of History’ and in the neo-
liberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s invariably prescribing flexibilisation and 
deregulation of the labour market and minimal state intervention. The VoC rejection of the 
idea of convergence is vindicated by empirical developments as, writing in the original 
VoC publication, Thelen (2001:75) observes: ‘this literature's predictions of convergence 
and homogenization through competitive deregulation have simply not been borne out’.  
Thelen (ibidem) recognises that the ‘deregulation literature’ is applicable to the LME 
examples of United States and Britain ‘where the decline of unions and of collective 
bargaining has continued unabated’. It is therefore the CME model and its comparable 
success in terms of economic growth and development that significantly weakens the idea 
of convergence; the persistence of an advanced economic model that maintains non-market 
collaborative institutions as an integral part of the coordination of various spheres of its 
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political economy and retains its competitiveness with LME type economies such as the 
USA and Britain.  
The CME/LME distinction of the VoC literature competently contesting the idea of 
convergence again demonstrates the value and contribution of an institutional approach 
discussed in the first half of this chapter. The VoC distinction draws attention to what 
could be described as two distinctive types of “common sense” derived from accumulated 
knowledge and experience within a given society’s set of institutions. This is aptly 
captured by the divergent rather than convergent responses to the restructuring, 
productivity and competitive pressures in the 1980s and 1990s usually labelled as 
‘globalisation’ and henceforth referred to accordingly.  
The VoC distinction recognises and ‘predicts’ that responses to globalisation pressures in 
the liberal market economies are to deregulate and allow for a greater penetration of 
market forces as Hall and Soskice (2001:57) describe ‘the conventional view’:  
In the face of more intense international competition, business interests in LMEs are 
likely to pressure governments for deregulation, since firms that coordinate their 
endeavors primarily through the market can improve their competencies by sharpening 
its edges. The government is likely to be sympathetic because the comparative 
advantage of the economy as a whole rests on the effectiveness of market 
mechanisms.[…] The result should be some weakening of organized labor and a 
substantial amount of deregulation 
Thelen (2001:76) describes the CMEs as ‘empirical anomalies’ to the conventional idea of 
convergence in their path or response to the same pressures and challenges created by 
globalisation again recognised by Hall & Soskice (2001:58): 
Governments [in CMEs] should be less sympathetic to deregulation because it threatens 
the nation's comparative institutional advantages. Although there will be some calls for 
deregulation even in such settings, the business community is likely to provide less 
support for it, because many firms draw competitive advantages from systems of 
relational contracting that depend on the presence of supportive regulatory regimes.  
It is anticipated that a given society will respond distinctly to change depending upon its 
set of institutions or its ‘variety of capitalism’. The comparative analysis of different 
responses to globalisation of the British LME and German CME is another useful exercise 
to highlight the contributions of this institutional approach. Britain is considered a more 
informative LME comparative example than the US as it previously had very strong trade 
union institutions and practices compared to the USA and therefore, as Thelen (2001:94) 
	 54 
observes, the reforms in response to globalisation pressures involving the ‘collapse of 
traditional bargaining institutions’ were ‘more dramatic’.  
In institutional terms, Britain lacked the historically embedded or path dependent 
complementarities between institutions. This was evident in the response to the findings of 
the 1977 UK ‘report of the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial Democracy’ known as the 
“the Bullock enquiry”. The report contained recommendations for compulsory employee 
representation on company boards, a key pillar of the CME model and its labour-capital 
codetermination practices, such reforms were not carried out due to the opposition of 
business and employer groups (Clarke 2012).  
Crouch (1979: 186-187) observes that corporatist initiatives such as the Bullock Report 
had ‘very limited success within British society due to the strength of the liberal legacy’; a 
decentralised trade union movement ‘with strong shop-floor roots’; deeply entrenched civil 
liberties and corresponding business organisations such as the CBI with ‘few powers of 
coordination’. Characteristics of Britain he argues, that ‘emerge from any comparison 
between it and those countries in which corporatism of various kinds has been more 
prominent – such as West Germany, Japan, Sweden and the Netherlands’. 
The distinctive CME model on the other hand is characterised by a vested interest in such 
institutional coordination and as a result the response to globalisation pressures was to 
deepen and continue with the embedded processes of cooperation. When considering the 
composite set of institutions, Britain lacked the complementarities between ‘strong 
overarching institutions for non-market coordination’ that underpins the CME model 
(Thelen 2001: 99).  
The relative historical absence of non-market institutional coordination in Britain meant 
that the deregulation path was more viable despite the opposition of once strong trade 
union opposition. There was not the same vested interest or comparative advantage of the 
institutional system akin to that observed in the CMEs such as Germany. Thelen (2004) 
compares the ‘political economy of skills’ between Germany, Britain the US and Japan 
stressing the historical divergence of each institutional arrangement and the consequences 
for labour markets. Thelen (idem: XIII & 2-3) highlights the historically embedded nature 
of institutional frameworks like that of Germany which have proven ‘incredibly resilient in 
the face of huge exogenous shocks’ and ‘key actors (especially employers) who have 
organised their strategies around these institutions will be loath to part with them’.  
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Similar to debates on the wider institutional approach discussed in the first part of this 
chapter, the VoC framework is also criticised for overstating static accounts of capitalist 
models and an inability to adequately capture processes of change. It is argued here 
however that VoC/Institutional analysis provides valuable insights into the direction of 
change based upon the attention to composite systems of institutions and their 
complementarities as evidenced by the convincing analysis of the LME/CME divergence 
in response to globalisation.  
The British LME and German CME experiences traced by Thelen (idem) demonstrate that 
distinct historical processes dating back to the 19th century generated deeply embedded 
non-market processes of coordination between institutions in Germany. Despite similar 
institutions existing in Britain (strong trade unions, collective bargaining processes) 
institutional interaction produced a distinctive ‘matrix of sanctions and incentives’ (Hall & 
Soskice 2001:5).  A set of complementarities involving more adversarial and hierarchical 
relations and a greater penetration of market logic in a more unequal society meant that 
there were less constraints and opposition to the liberalisation/deregulation involving the 
dismantling of labour institutions. In other words, there was not the similar shared 
institutional interest in non-market coordination between institutions from which 
comparative advantage was gained in the CMEs, as the response to the recommendations 
of the Bullock enquiry would suggest.      
The VoC approach identifies five spheres ‘in which firms must develop relationships to 
resolve coordination problems central to their core competencies’ from the perspective of 
the firm (Hall & Soskice 2001: 7-8). These are: Industrial relations, vocational training and 
education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and retention and training of existing 
employees. Given the need to consider the composite set or cluster of relevant institutions 
and their complementarities both negative and positive, the current research is not 
rigorously restricted to one of the five spheres rather the analysis prioritises those areas of 
the VoC most closely related to labour institutions and employment such as those 
summarised in figure 1.1.    
The different comparative advantages or efficiencies of LMEs and CMEs are closely 
associated to the institutional framework of their labour markets. The flexibility of the 
LME labour market is argued to contribute to ‘radical innovation’ assisted by the ease in 
which firms can rapidly respond to changing market conditions due to the ease of hiring 
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and firing workers as per figure 1.1. The Coordinated Market Economy (CME) in contrast 
relies heavily on ‘non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavours’ involving 
‘collaborative, as opposed to competitive relationships’ which requires a set of strong and 
complementary institutions as Hall and Soskice (2001:10) describe: ‘powerful business or 
employer associations, strong trade unions, extensive networks of cross‐shareholding, and 
legal or regulatory systems designed to facilitate information‐sharing and collaboration’.  
Figure 1.1 Selected Labour Complementarities across VoC 
subspheres in German CME and US LME 
 
Source: Adapted from Hall & Soskice (2001: 28 & 32 figures 1.3 
& 1.4) complete diagrams in annexes 1.1 & 1.2 
The institutional approach and the more empirically focussed VoC framework provide a 
useful set of conceptual tools for the present research question. Explanations for the 
frustrated potential of more coordinated solutions or the inability for pockets of effective 
representation and tripartite collaboration in Brazil to reproduce sufficiently to characterise 
employment relations should be found from its set of institutions, their history, interaction 
and coexistence (complementarities) i.e. the Brazilian Variety of Capitalism. Within the 
context of the research question of the systemic potential for more coordinated solutions 
from labour market institutions (LMIs) it is necessary to consider whether coordinated or 
liberal market arrangements are more favourable to labour in terms of wealth distribution 
and quality of employment. This is discussed in the following section.  
1.4 Institutional Influence upon Employment 
From the LME market/CME strategic coordination distinction, this fourth section 
considers which set of institutions more adequately operate in the interests of labour. This 
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requires discussion of what can be considered more and less desirable institutional 
arrangements. The LME offers a flexible or fluid labour market, argued to offer greater 
rewards for the most productive in society within a system characterised by managerial 
unilateralism. The CME in contrast is characterised by greater participation of workers and 
labour organisations in managerial decisions, where coordinated strategies often include 
wage-moderation when challenged by competitive pressures. The CME is associated with 
more stable long-term employment regimes with sunk investments in workers’ skills and 
qualifications. The coordinated non-market nature of inter-firm and inter institutional 
relations means the competitive poaching of workers associated with the market logic of 
LMEs is diminished. These relationships are summarised in figure 1.1 and presented in 
greater detail in annexes 1.1 & 1.2. 
For the purposes of comparison, the empirical examples of Britain and the USA are used 
as examples of LME type economies and Austria and Germany as representative of CMEs. 
These examples correspond to the two extremes of the LME/CME spectrum from Hall & 
Gingerich’s (2009: 458) statistical analysis of the ‘core contentions’ of the VoC approach 
with a similar spectrum used by Ruedda & Pontusson (2000:354). The main macro-
economic indicators for 2001 and 2014 are summarised in table 1.2. Brazil is added for 
comparison to be discussed across the remainder of the thesis. It is acknowledged that the 
macro-economic figures used are crude indicators that depend upon a variety of spheres 
across the macro-economy as well as international and historical variables. The Gini index 
in particular is a static indicator based upon historical data though worthwhile in this 
instance to reflect the LME/CME distinction consistent with Hall & Gingerich’s 
comparative analysis.  
An argued benefit of the LME model and free-market in general is the financial rewards 
for highly-skilled workers. This often leads those from free-market neo-liberal schools of 
thought to argue that this represents greater efficiency through higher motivation to 
succeed and ‘meritocratic’ system, this is related to popular ideas of ‘the American dream’. 
As already discussed, the comparable economic performance and competitiveness of the 
CME type economies weakens arguments on the superiority of liberal free markets as 
comparable GDP per capita figures between CME and LME examples summarised in table 
1.2 would suggest.  
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Table 1.2 Income (US$) employment and distribution indicators for selected CMEs, LMEs and Brazil 
CMEs Austria Germany  
 Gini  GDP/Cap Unemp.  Quintile 6 
Ratio 
Gini  GDP/Cap Unemp.  Quintile 
Ratio 
2001 23.1 25,270 3.6% 5.5 30.0 USD 24,790 7.8% 7.9 
2014 29.2  49,670 5.7% 4.6 28.3 USD 47,640 5.3% 4.7 
LMEs Britain United States 
2001 36.1 27,220 5.0% 7.1 40.8 USD 36,840 4.7% 9.0 
2014 36.0 43,430 5.9% 7.6 40.8 USD 55,200 6.1% 9.8 
Brazil 
2001 59.1 9,336 11.2% 29.7 
2014 54.7 15,065 4.9% 16.9 
Source: OECDStat (2015b) & UNDP (2003:282-283 & 2011:135-136) 
Were the argued benefits of greater rewards from the LME to hold firm or not, there is 
widespread recognition that the trade-off is a more unequal distribution of such rewards 
when compared with the CME model as reflected by the difference in Gini coefficients and 
quintile income ratios between CMEs and LMEs. Closer attention to the specific labour 
market characteristics, reinforce this idea of greater inequality and instability in an LME, 
where managerial unilateralism and a fluid labour market are two key elements (ease of 
hiring-firing). 
Unrestrained by wage constraint and employee involvement at the top-level of the firm, the 
LME model may offer greater rewards for those at the top of the labour market, yet it is 
dependent upon an atomistic labour market with an abundance of unskilled labour 
generating and sustaining hierarchy and higher levels of social inequality (Ruedda & 
Pontusson 2000:354-355; Crouch, Finegold & Sako 2001: vii-viii). As per an NIA/VoC 
approach this is argued to be the result of a self-reinforcing embedded cluster of 
institutions where market coordination dominates across the relevant spheres of the macro-
economy. 
It is considered uncontroversial to argue the more equity-enhancing a set of institutional 
arrangements for a given society the better. This is consistent with observations made by 
the OECD (2011:30-31 also see OECD 2008 & 2015), attributing the problem of 
increasing inequality to flexibilisation and deregulation reforms carried out from 1980 to 
2008. In the majority of OECD countries this ‘impacted on increasing wage inequality’. 
The Secretary General (OECD 2015) of the same organisation argues that inequality has 																																																								
6 Ratio of the average income of the 20% richest to the 20% poorest. Closest available survey year for 2001 & 2014 	
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‘reached tipping point’ and the organisation recommends that ‘Labour market policies 
need to address working conditions as well as wages and their distribution’ (Keeley 
2015:3). This leads into the next point, which identifies the need for a more holistic, 
broader concept of employment.  
Income and its distribution are essential variables to consider though there are other 
aspects that influence employment arrangements. Pagano (1991: 338) recognises ‘the need 
for a better working life is becoming more powerful as people already own a fair amount 
of consumption goods’ and on Brazil, Carvalho (2013:228-229) is critical of the 
dominance of basic consumption indicators to measure well-being and citizenship. The 
ILO’s (2012) Decent Work Agenda has ten measurements that cover stability, security, 
income and its distribution both within the individual workplace (safety, equal 
opportunities, skills and training unemployment and pension provisions) and the wider 
labour market (unemployment provisions, minimum wages and bargaining and 
representative mechanisms). These indicators are guided by the ILO’s four strategic pillars 
of full and productive employment, rights at work, social protection and the promotion of 
social dialogue (ILO 2012:7). Standing’s idea of industrial citizenship (1999:52; 2009:37; 
2011:11) cites seven elements of labour security coherent with the ILO agenda and the 
‘representation security’ compatible with the ILO’s strategic pillar of social dialogue.  
Detailed analysis of these relevant variables is not amongst the objectives or scope of this 
present project. The focus is at an intermediate level of LMIs and seeking institutional 
explanations for the inconsistency identified between the formal system and workplace 
reality in Brazil. The present analysis is narrowed to labour institutions as a key contributor 
to a given society’s development model whilst also informed by the VoC logic, which 
convincingly demonstrates that institutions cluster around a set of mutually reinforcing 
characteristics across the various spheres of the macro-economy. This interaction is 
market-based coordination in LMEs and strategic cooperation in CMEs (Hall & Gingerich 
2009:454).  
Pagano (1991) describes the labour variables that directly influence human welfare as the 
‘property-rights’ of labour that are dependent upon a society’s set of institutions. He is 
critical of orthodox economists narrow view of labour interests limited to wages, leisure 
time and consumption trade-offs and presents a broader concept of what variables should 
be included when considering labour well-being. Pagano (ibid:325) is critical of the 
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flexibility and competitiveness or ‘classical capitalism’ approaches to the labour market 
and the resulting hierarchical social structure this implies. It is argued that it is not only 
inefficient when a broader view of equitable outcomes/property rights for labour is 
considered though has self-sustaining characteristics despite its obvious inefficiencies. The 
liberal approach to labour is described as self-sustaining or ‘institutionally stable’ not 
because of any comparative advantages (as per the LME and neo-classical arguments) 
rather a historically embedded set of values or logic that penetrates the hierarchical society 
and the absence of a set of institutions and complementarities capable of offering a better 
solution. Part of the research problem is that many of the necessary institutions are present 
in the formal Brazilian LMI system though the ‘better solutions’ are not.  
A more equitable option presented by Pagano is Horizontally Unionised Capitalism 
(HUC), which envisages a less hierarchical structure where key aspects of employment 
are: co-determined inter-firm transferable job specification and training with employers. 
Pagano (1991: 327-330) stresses on three occasions that the viability of these alternative 
models depends upon the pre-existence of the relevant institutions that present an 
alternative division of labour and property rights. The alternative institutional 
arrangements to the market presented by Pagano are compatible with the CME/LME 
distinction and Pagano’s observations of instability and inequality derived from an 
application of liberal/neo-classical logic to labour markets can be levelled at the LME type 
economies. The institutional dynamics and more equitable employment arrangements 
envisaged by the HUC alternative are consistent with those of the CME model and its 
empirical examples. Of particular relevance is the importance of cooperation and 
codetermination between employers and labour organisations.  
Haagh (1999: 436-437) develops upon Pagano’s property rights for labour with the idea of 
‘occupational citizenship’ which stresses workers’ control and stability over their 
employment dependent upon the effective statutory labour rights reinforced by institutional 
support from tripartite organisations. In light of the current discussion of the VoC 
CME/LME distinction, like Pagano, Haagh (ibid:434, 447) argues that ‘transaction cost’ 
(neo-classical) policies impede occupational citizenship which requires the correct set of 
institutions and linkages between them such as those associated with the German system.  
Elsewhere Haagh (2012: 551) associates greater stability and control in horizontal 
capitalist states generating greater ‘freedom for all’. The welfare states of the Nordic 
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economies are compared with the more hierarchical liberal system of the United Kingdom, 
two opposite points of the LME/CME spectrum. Again consistent with Pagano, Haagh 
(2011:452) argues that institutions are required for occupational citizenship and a more 
horizontal capitalist system and the greater stability, control and freedom they offer. Not 
only the presence of individual institutions though ‘sophisticated institutional linkages’ 
(1999:430) and a ‘high level of purposeful coordination between institutions’ (2012:551).  
Archer (1998:7) argues in favour of ‘economic democracy’, which involves greater worker 
participation in firms operating in market societies, like Haagh (2012), he argues that this 
will provide greater freedom and offers a solution to the ‘unfreedom’ associated with 
market-driven labour markets. Similar to the VoC distinction, Archer’s analysis is applied 
to advanced capitalist economies where ‘decent wages and conditions’, ‘the welfare state’ 
and ‘parliamentary democracy’ have been achieved with the remaining goal being 
economic democracy. He argues that this is both ‘morally desirable’ and ‘feasible’. Its 
feasibility requires ‘well-developed existing institutions’ (p.5). The key institutions capable 
of contributing to economic democracy are unions, capitalist employers and the 
government interacting within a corporatist system described by Archer (1998:85) as 
follows: 
Corporatism has three key advantages over other industrial relations systems. First, by 
requiring workers to overcome collective action problems, it maximizes their strength 
and enables them to have a sustained power advantage over the employers. Second, it 
enables workers to pursue income policies, social contracts, and other forms of society‐
wide bargaining, in which they exchange goods, such as wage rises, over which they 
have a lot of influence for goods, such as greater control, over which their direct 
influence is weaker. And third, it enables the goods that are obtained to be distributed to 
all workers. 
 
As already mentioned, it is not within the scope or objectives of this thesis to provide a 
detailed analysis of the variables that represent equitable labour outcomes. The concepts 
discussed above (decent work, industrial citizenship, horizontally unionised capitalism, 
occupational citizenship and economic democracy) analyse labour outcomes from diverse 
perspectives, at different levels and with distinctive objectives. These are considered 
henceforth as the multidimensional employment variables. Such variables encompass the 
important and most obvious aspect of income and its distribution, though also a range of 
non-income aspects related to the participation, control and stability offered to labour from 
a given system.  
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The variety of analyses of labour institutions and employment realities consistently stress 
that observed results are dependent upon the appropriate set of institutions and 
complementarities. Consistent with the VoC logic, institutional arrangements or dynamics 
tend to be reproduced and reinforced across other macro-economic spheres. As such, 
industrial relations and LMIs have a pivotal role. Greater equality and stability from the 
employment relationship contribute significantly to a more equitable society.  
Based upon the empirical examples of LMEs and CMEs, the income distribution, 
employment tenure and skills and qualifications differences in particular, it is argued here 
that the CME set of corporatist institutions characterised by cooperative and co-determined 
tripartite solutions is considerably more favourable for labour than the more market neo-
liberal influenced LME alternative. The liberal market option is argued to be the result of 
an absence of the cooperative institutions and complementarities that underpin the more 
equitable CME model rather than any superiority or comparative advantage.  This is an 
essential ongoing consideration for the rest of the thesis: cooperative solutions, dependent 
upon an institutional system capable of such coordination, are preferable to those offered 
by free market influenced systems. This is apparent across the distinctive approaches to 
labour outcomes already discussed and the widely recognized global challenge of 
addressing increasing inequality.  
Thelen (2010:646) observes that CME-type institutions ‘are widely considered to support a 
more egalitarian form of capitalism’. Crouch, Finegold & Sako (2001: 2) cite the CME 
examples of Germany and Sweden when presenting a ‘not completely unrealistic utopia’ 
of a society without unskilled low productivity workers, an equitable distribution of 
income and low inequality in living standards. Such a utopia would be ‘compatible with 
the political aspirations of both the political left (seeking a reduction of material 
inequalities) and right (seeking to achieve any social goals through market-compatible 
means)’. 
The idea of CME superiority is further supported by closer analyses of the argued 
comparative advantages of the contrasting LME model. Crouch, Finegold and Soskice 
(idem:3) describe patterns of ‘bipolar growth’ in the US LME where the ‘unskilled’ and 
‘left over’ workers have to ‘find their place in the workplace by becoming disposable and 
cheap’. Haagh (2012:553-554) describes the argued relationship between greater financial 
rewards and productive talent in an LME type economy as tenuous, highlighting how lax 
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regulation allows for excessive and unproductive resources to accumulate to the top 1 to 5 
per cent of society. 
The benefits and appropriateness of an institutional approach and its related definitions in 
light of the research question have been presented and justified. Considering the empirical 
VoC institutional distinction between LME and CME type economies together with a 
selection of approaches considering labour market institutions, it is argued that coordinated 
institution models (CMEs) are more favourable for the interests of labour than the liberal 
market types (LMEs). These more favourable employment arrangements are dependent 
upon the existence of a distinctive set of cooperative institutions. The VoC framework and 
much of the discussion on better institutional models focuses exclusively upon advanced 
capitalist economies. The next section discusses the adequacy of this approach when 
applied to the middle-income/ emerging-market context of Brazil.  
1.5 Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs) 
The comparison of basic economic indicators between Brazil and the advanced capitalist 
economies in table 1.2 demonstrates the significantly lower GDP per capita and even 
greater inequality than the more hierarchical LME economies. This raises the question as 
to how applicable the VoC approach and its LME/CME models are to a society outside of 
the advanced capitalist/OECD economies. Furthermore, much of the discussion of more 
favourable arrangements for labour being dependent upon a given set of institutions is 
based upon comparisons and data from the most developed economies.   
The starting point of Archer’s (1998) discussion of the desirability and feasibility of 
economic democracy is that advanced capitalist societies have already achieved a welfare-
state, parliamentary democracy and decent wages and conditions. Brazil has only had a 
consolidated democracy since the late 1980s and precarious welfare state provisions linked 
to formal employment when compared to advanced economies. An element of the research 
problem investigated across this thesis is the persistence of conditions that are argued to be 
indecent and inconsistent with the provisions provided by the formal LMI system; the 
influence of labour representative organisations at the national level and the workplace 
industrial relations dynamics of the automobile industry.  
This may suggest that the LME/CME distinction is inappropriate for middle-income 
economies, however it is argued here that the difference in labour market arrangements 
	 64 
and the better wages and greater occupational stability and more encompassing welfare 
states produced by CME type institutional arrangement represent an important 
consideration for a high-inequality emerging capitalist economy. As per Hall & Soskice 
(2001:11) the importance of ‘institutions that provide actors potentially able to cooperate 
with one another with a capacity for deliberation’ is a transferable lesson and an essential 
consideration for the research question. As the same authors (p.35) argue, VoC represents 
an open research agenda that ‘can also be useful for understanding political economies that 
do not correspond to the ideal type of a liberal or coordinated market economy’.  
Schneider (2013:22) similarly recognises such diversity beyond the LME/CME distinction 
describing ‘good reasons to think that capitalism and many middle-income countries may 
have settled into institutional foundations of its own’ and that ‘capitalism in many 
developing countries is what it is, rather than on its way to becoming something else’. 
Schneider describes the common model of the Latin American variety of capitalism as 
being one of Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs). He (p.91) describes the core 
features of an HME as ‘extensive labour market regulation, a low skills regime, rapid 
turnover, sparse unions, and pervasive informality’. The coexistence of LME and CME 
characteristics is recognised (p.21), high turnover and extensive regulation respectively, 
yet there is little evidence of the argued comparative advantages of either model. In an 
HME, rather than coordination or markets it is an ‘oxymoronic coupling of hierarchy with 
market’ that contributes to a self-reinforcing and embedded system with a dysfunctional 
relationship between institutional components and subsequent inequitable employment 
arrangements.  
It is understandable and widely recognised that a VoC approach and its models will 
unavoidably neglect distinctive characteristics of individual societies; this is the case with 
the CME, LME and HME categories. As per Streeck (2009:1) institutional arrangements 
should be seen as dynamic processes rather than static structures, it is unlikely that such 
dynamic elements will be incorporated into ambitious regional categorisations of VoC 
ideal types. In the Brazilian case, it is argued across this thesis that ‘sparse unions’ is not 
an appropriate description of the reality of industrial relations. Firstly, as many of the 
institutions required for a more coordinated economic model exist in the long-standing 
corporatist system, argued in the previous section to offer potentially more equitable 
benefits than a market based model.  
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As the institutional approach outlined in this chapter dictates, the mere existence of such 
formal institutions is insufficient to provide more equitable solutions, the 
complementarities and role of informal institutions also needs to be considered. This also 
brings into question the ‘extensive labour market regulation’ core feature of HMEs when 
applied to the Brazilian case. That the regulation of the employment relationship in Brazil 
is extensive is not disputed, what is challenged however is the simplistic and defining 
relationship or negative complementarity between one institution (formal legislation) and 
observable LMI outcomes such as informality, noncompliance and unemployment.  
The HME ‘extensive regulation’ characteristic (Schneider 2013: 173) is based upon Botero 
et al’s (2004: 46-67) comparison of 90 economies, which categorises Brazil as having the 
world’s most regulated labour markets. The comparative exercise is criticised for its 
methodology, which presumes that widespread compliance characterises the employment 
relationship, neglecting evasion and other related key variables and is therefore considered 
to be misleading (Deakin 2009:6; Lee and McCann, 2014:8). The widely influential 
reductionist logic is not compatible with the complexity of the institutional approach and 
the need to consider a composite set of institutions, their informal manifestations, historical 
legacies and complementarities. The idea of ‘extensive regulation’ when applied to LMIs 
in Brazil is discussed across chapter 6 where it is argued that the arguments on the quantity 
of regulation are misleading and there should be greater recognition of the quality/nature of 
regulatory arrangements.  
Contrary to deregulation arguments that often cite Botero et al, there is evidence of the 
more regulated Brazilian corporatist system contributing towards democratisation and a 
progressive constitution in the 1980s. This point is analysed in greater detail across the 
remainder of the thesis. The Brazilian response to globalisation and liberalisation 
challenges in the 1990s did not involve the decline of ‘unions and the collective bargaining 
system’ (Thelen op cit) or the same ‘weakening of organized labor and a substantial 
amount of deregulation’ (Hall & Soskice op cit) that characterised the LME response. The 
corporatist system remained intact. There is evidence in certain industries and regions of 
coordinated capital-labour solutions evolving to address the challenges of the liberalisation 
reforms influencing the practice and position of the largest and dominant peak association, 
the CUT. This relatively effective coordination is described by Rodrigues (2002:154) as 
the ‘ABC standard’ of industrial relations characterised by ‘conflictive cooperation’.  
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The persistence of a resourceful corporatist structure and the observable ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ of effective and evolving capital-labour coordination in Brazil are not reflected 
in Schneider’s HME, characterised by ‘sparse unions’ and ‘extensive regulation’. The 
reality of employment in the Brazilian system is consistent with that described by 
Schneider and ‘hierarchical’ aptly captures the predominant dynamics of institutional 
relations in Brazil. This is an important part of the research question, the inconsistency 
between the existence and survival of collaborative and bargained institutional 
arrangements and the non-transition to an LME in Brazil (see next chapter) and the 
persistence of hierarchical outcomes. Part of the puzzle is to find explanations for why the 
observed effective coordination in some areas has not been sufficiently reproduced across 
other spheres of the macro-economy to characterise employment relations more generally.  
Conclusion 
This first chapter establishes the key analytical parameters to be applied implicitly across 
the remainder of the thesis. To argue that the analytical framework will be followed 
rigorously or parsimoniously would be somewhat contradictory. One of the key advantages 
of an institutional approach is its porousness and flexibility, considered ideal to study the 
real-world puzzle under analysis. Greater rigour is required when considering the key 
definitions related to this research project.  
Primarily there are institutions, a fluid and broad definition is argued to be most 
compatible with the aims of the research project. It is fundamental that analysis includes 
and recognises the importance of informal institutions. As North (2003 op cit) argues, 
analysis limited to formal rules and their enforcement is highly limited. A considerable 
number of legal studies on labour relations in Brazil are devoted to analysis of the relevant 
legislation, described by Levitsky (op cit) as ‘parchment’ rules. Levitsky recognises that 
traditional studies erroneously presumed such rules to be ‘stable and effective’.  
The inconsistency between the formal LMI system and workplace reality identified in the 
research question suggests some ineffectiveness of the formal institutions. Analysis of the 
formal relevant legislation in Brazil would reflect very positively upon the potential for 
coordinated institutional labour arrangements. Explanations for the inconsistency between 
the formal system and reality of employment requires a detailed analysis of its composite 
set of institutions; their history, informal and formal manifestations and importantly their 
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complementarities. This is the two-way relationship or complementarity between the 
empirical research problem and the institutional approach adopted.  
The research lends itself to the Varieties of Capitalism approach that differentiates between 
coordinated and liberal institutional arrangements amongst advanced capitalist economies. 
It is from the Brazilian variety of capitalism that answers to the research question are 
expected to be found. The empirical example of the CME type economies and their 
comparative development with LMEs significantly weakens the popular arguments of 
global convergence upon one type of deregulated neo-classical type market economy. It is 
argued here that the interests of labour and related greater stability and wealth distribution 
through employment are produced by cooperative institutional arrangements.    
When applying the VoC research agenda to Brazil, a middle-income or emerging economy 
outside of the traditional OECD examples, a key consideration for the research is that a 
composite system of institutions with the capacity to coordinate across various spheres of 
the macro-economy contributes to a more equitable society. The need for more de facto 
equitable institutional arrangements is heightened in the Brazilian case given the extremely 
high and persistent levels of inequality.  
Applying a VoC approach to a Latin American economy is assisted by Schneider’s HME 
model that demonstrates considerable tangency with the Brazilian economy. Within the 
labour focus of this research however, the idea of ‘sparse unions’ in HMEs does not fit 
with the Brazilian example and there is some controversy over the implications of the idea 
of ‘extensive regulation’. There is evidence of successful tripartite coordination that has 
contributed to the survival of the formal corporatist institutions during the liberalisation 
reforms of the 1990s generating greater employment stability in some regions and 
industries and a relevant factor in the development trajectory in the 2000s (see next 
chapter). Consistent with the HME description, Brazil does not display the comparative 
advantages of either the LMEs or CMEs. Therefore, part of the research question is as to 
why the successful coordination examples between Brazilian labour market institutions 
and greater rewards for labour implied in terms of stability and income, has not reproduced 
sufficiently to be able to characterise the reality of employment across society.  
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Annex 1.1 Complementarities Across Subsystems in the German 
Coordinated Market Economy  
 
Source: Hall & Soskice (2001:27) 
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Annex 1.2: Complementarities Across Subsystems in the 
American Liberal Market Economy  
 
Source: Hall & Soskice (2001:31) 
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Chapter 2 – The Brazilian Variety of Capitalism 
Hall & Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) distinction between Coordinated 
Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) provides valuable 
applications for the study of institutions. The liberal – coordinated dichotomy is based 
upon empirical examples of advanced economies. Schneider’s (2013) Hierarchical Market 
Economy (HME) model applies the VoC approach to emerging or middle-income 
economies in Latin America. For Brazil, ‘Hierarchical’ is considered a particularly apt 
description in light of its high and persistent levels of inequality. From a VoC approach 
this chapter analyses the Brazilian institutional model, its labour institutions in particular. 
There is considerable tangency between Schneider’s Latin American model and the 
Brazilian economy. The negative complementarities observed in the HME model of labour 
institutions adequately reflect the reality of employment in Brazil referenced across this 
thesis and in the research problem.  
A comparative capitalisms exercise categorising groups of economies with similar 
institutional arrangements will invariably be somewhat static and neglect unique and 
exceptional characteristics and dynamics of an individual society. It is here that this 
research project seeks to contribute by looking at the existence and role of Brazilian labour 
market institutions that differ from the Latin American HME ideal type. Schneider’s 
(2013:91, 101) description of ‘sparse’, weak and small unions is an unsuitable description 
of the Brazilian institutional model. This is particularly the case since the 1980s where 
institutional relations in some spheres of the economy demonstrate a capacity for 
coordinated tripartite solutions involving a strong trade union presence.  
The observed tripartite institutional system is characteristic of a CME type labour market, 
argued to contribute to more equitable employment arrangements than the liberal market 
arrangements of LME type economies. On the other hand, the negative institutional 
complementarities of the hierarchical model are consistent with those observed in 
contemporary Brazilian employment. This is part of the underlying research problem: the 
persistence of this type of employment reality in Brazil despite the historical presence of a 
highly regulated institutional system that envisages and suggests a considerably more 
stable and representative type of employment relationship.  
The first section of the chapter considers the participation of the state in the Brazilian 
variety of capitalism in light of the LME/CME dichotomy. Quantitative data is presented 
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in the first part to locate the role of the Brazilian state in a comparative context. The 
second part discusses two more qualitative analyses of state influence: Evans’s Embedded 
Autonomy (1995) that makes extensive use of the Brazilian case-study in a comparative 
perspective and Lazzarini’s (2011) Capitalism of Ties [Capitalismo de Laços] description 
of Brazilian institutional relations. Some CME or non-market type traits and ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ can be identified from these interpretations. This weakens the idea of any 
irresistible path towards a minimal-state, liberal-market economy in Brazil.  
The second section narrows its scope to labour institutions, the main focus of the thesis. 
The first part discusses the HME ideal type and its relevance to Brazil. The negative 
hierarchical complementarities of Latin American capitalism are in the most part consistent 
with those observed in Brazil. The second part of the section argues that ‘sparse’ ‘weak’ 
and ‘small’ unions is not or should not be applied to the Brazilian institutional model. The 
role and influence of trade unions differs from the hierarchical ideal type with outlying 
characteristics when compared with other societies both within Latin America and beyond. 
This discussion of Brazilian exceptionality seeks to extend upon, rather than contest the 
HME discussion within comparative capitalisms debates. This is consistent with 
Schneider’s analysis that recognises ‘within-type heterogeneity’ (2013:181) and the HME 
as a ‘useful framework’ and research agenda to analyse ‘variations within Latin America’ 
(Schneider & Karcher 2010:24). The complex tensions, incompatibilities and negative 
complementarities identified in Brazilian LMIs means that it is described in this chapter as 
an incongruous system.    
Section three continues upon the idea of Brazilian exceptionality by discussing labour 
relations between 2003 and 2013. Closely related to the period described by the IPEA 
(2012) as the ‘inclusive decade’ (2001-2011) and the two-term PT-Lula government 
(2003-2010). The consolidation of economic growth and stability with reduced inequality 
and poverty over a 10-year period is historically unprecedented and therefore may be 
considered a turning point or ‘critical juncture’ for Brazilian development. Of considerable 
significance is that this positive trajectory took place without the major deregulation of 
labour markets evident in LME type economies and the institutional interaction over the 
period demonstrates some characteristics associated with the more equitable coordinated 
market economies. 
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The fourth and final section of the chapter considers the factors hindering the potential for 
greater institutional coordination between tripartite labour institutions; factors that may 
limit the continuation and/or deepening of the historically unprecedented trend towards a 
more equitable society evident over the decade in question. Many of the observed 
problems are recognised in Schneider’s HME model. The direction of this research 
considers the role and potential of Brazilian labour institutions in the evident negative and 
positive complementarities.  
The conclusion provides a summary of Brazilian labour institutions from a VoC 
perspective and the relevance of some unprecedented developments and trends in the 21st 
century also accompanied by significant continuities. This builds upon the previous 
chapter establishing the analytical parameters of an institutional approach (ch.1). It further 
serves to provide the institutional background for the microanalysis of labour institutions 
in the construction industry analysed over the second half of the thesis.  
2.1 State Participation and Influence in the Brazilian Variety of 
Capitalism 
The comparative capitalisms literature (Boyer 2007:522; Bresser-Perreira 2011:6, Jackson 
and Deeg 2008 :683) and the specific VoC literature (Hall & Soskice 2001:36, Schneider 
2013:22) recognise that distinctive types of capitalism exist outside of the OECD nations. 
Nevertheless, the VoC’s Liberal-Coordinated dichotomy still provides a useful research 
agenda to apply outside of the advanced economies. Argued in chapter 1: economies that 
possess institutions able to coordinate their actions offer greater influence to labour 
interests when compared with more market influenced institutional systems.  
The first part of this section attempts to locate Brazilian macro-characteristics within a 
comparative context with advanced OECD economies, the LME & CME sub-categories 
and Latin American averages. This then leads into discussion of the appropriate description 
of state participation in the Brazilian variety of capitalism, looking at the qualitative 
embedded autonomy, capitalism of ties and HME descriptions. Within the LME/CME 
dichotomy, liberal market societies are characterised by reduced state participation in the 
economy. As an initial and basic indicator of state involvement in society figure 2.1 looks 
at Brazil’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP compared with the OECD and Latin 
American averages together with Mexico and Chile.  
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Figure 2.1 Total Tax Revenue OECD & Latin America (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD, ECLAC & CIAT (2014).  
The increasing GDP/tax ratio between 1990 and 2012 in Latin America (+7.1%) and in 
Brazil (+8.1%) cannot automatically be interpreted as an increase in state intervention or 
participation in the economy. It has to be considered in the historical context of economic 
reforms coming after the heightened borrowing of the 1970s and the macro-economic 
instability resulting in hyperinflation over the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. As recognised 
within the relevant OECD report (2014: 23), these trends, particularly across the 90s can 
be associated with the ‘imposing of fiscal discipline’, which can often represent a reduced 
role of the state in the economy. The IPEA (2012:13) describe the 1990s as the 
'stabilisation decade’ preceding the ‘inclusive decade’. 
Figure 2.2 Total Tax Revenue CMEs, LMEs & Brazil (% of GDP)7 
 
Source: Data from OECDStat 2015 & CEPALStat  
 
																																																								
7 LME average from Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK & USA. CME average from Austria Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland  
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Figure 2.3 Changes in tax to GDP ratios in selected Latin American Countries 
 
Source: OECD/CEPAL/CIAT 2014 p32 (2) 1991 data used (3) estimated data for 2012 
Advocates of free-markets and a reduced role for the state are critical of the excessive 
presence of the state and the Brazilian Tax/GDP ratio is often cited (Pastore 2005:9; The 
Economist 2004: 51). Discussed across Chapter 1, CMEs characterised by higher GDP/Tax 
ratios than Brazil and LME type economies are argued to generate more equitable 
outcomes for society. In this sense the trend that sees Brazil’s tax ratio converging upon 
the CME average could be viewed positively. Yet within the context of this indicator, the 
Brazilian economic model stands out for its poor return in terms of socio-economic 
indicators when compared with economies with similar ratios. As The Economist (ibidem) 
observes the tax levels are ‘almost enough to finance a European-style welfare state’.  
At a macro-level, the inconsistency between the ‘OECD level of taxes’ and development 
indicators in Brazil mirrors the underlying research problem applied to the labour market; 
an inconsistency between the observed outcomes and a set of institutional characteristics 
with the potential for more equitable results. In the context of persistent inequality and 
poverty discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the idea that there is a poor return 
from tax levels in Brazil is not disputed. Recognised by Todaro & Smith (2006:27): Brazil 
‘should have been in a much better position to fight extreme poverty and improve 
economic equity and social indicators’. What is disputed, discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 1, is the idea that a liberal market path is the most desirable option for more 
equitable solutions. This is consistent with Evans (2005:25) who argues that ‘neo-
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utilitarian orthodoxy’ made developmental problems worse in ‘intermediate embedded 
autonomy’ industrial states like Brazil. 
Figure 2.4 Spending on interest payments (%) cost and proportion in 2012  
 
Source: Data from OECDStat & World Bank: World Development Indicators 
Figure 2.5 Interest payments (% of revenue) 
 
Source: Data from World Bank: World Development Indicators.  
The indicators of levels of state spending presented in figures 2.1 to 2.3 need to be 
considered together with data on the nature of this spending. Levels and cost of 
government spending on interest payments is presented in figures 2.4 and 2.5. The data 
demonstrates Brazil as a clear outlier in terms of the costs of servicing the debt burden 
both regionally and within its income group (fig. 2.5) and internationally (fig. 2.4). This is 
consistent with the fiscal discipline nature of state spending already mentioned and the 
persistence of the historical fragility of Brazilian public finances identified in chapter 3 
(Abreu 2008:312,331 & 385). Different to the debt crisis of the 1980s the majority of 
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interest, 94 per cent is paid upon internal debt (Tesouro Nacional 2016). Weisbrot, 
Johnston and Lefebvre (2014:11) consider this to be important as the government was able 
to ‘pay off the IMF in 2005 and subsequently avoided much of the Fund’s influence and 
conditionalities’. Conditionalities that have historically tended to favour liberal market 
type policies.  
Figure 2.6 Market inequality and political redistribution in selected Latin American countries in comparison to 
developed countries 
 
Source:  Schneider and Soskice (2009:32) data from Luxembourg Income Study & Goñi et al. 2008 
A further important consideration on public finance beyond the interest/debt burden is the 
redistributive nature of the spending. figure 2.6 demonstrates minimal ‘redistribution 
through the government’ in Latin American economies (Schneider & Soskice 2009:32). A 
World Bank (2004 xviii - xix) report on Brazil attributes public transfers to 39 per cent of 
the ‘excess inequality’ observed with social spending ‘heavily biased in favour of higher 
income groups’. In comparative terms, social spending is more regressive than that of the 
relatively inegalitarian example of the United States. Distribution and returns of education 
spending is similarly recognised as comparatively more regressive than that of the US 
LME and fellow HMEs Mexico and Colombia.      
A key factor when considering the inconsistency between Brazil’s level of state income 
and lower social indicators when compared with societies with similar levels of tax 
revenue is the debt service burden and the highly regressive nature of the remaining public 
spending. GDP/tax ratios are comparable to those of advanced economies, greater than 
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LMEs and converging upon CME levels as demonstrated in figures 2.1-2.3. In terms of 
debt servicing costs, Brazil is a significant outlier comparable only to ‘Lower Middle 
Income’ India, 55 places below Brazil in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranked 130 and 75 respectively (UNDP 2015).  
In terms of the financial participation of the state, the data presented is sufficient to suggest 
that Brazil does not resemble an LME type economy both historically (Fig.2.3) and in 
recent trends (Fig. 2.2). This weakens the idea of a path towards a minimal-state liberal-
market economy. The relatively higher state participation suggested here, both historically 
and currently in the Brazilian economy together with the rejection of the idea of a 
‘powerless state’ on a liberal market path, is consistent with the arguments and models of 
Evans (1995) and Lazzarini (2011). Both interpretations identify CME-type institutional 
relations within the Brazilian variety of Capitalism consistent with the premise of the 
research question on the type of labour market arrangements envisaged by the formal LMI 
system.  
Evans’s (1995:12) study seeks to ‘establish a connection between developmental impact 
and the structural characteristics of the state’. Based upon empirical examples, he presents 
the ideal type of a successful developmental state as one of ‘embedded autonomy’, 
characterised by the fusion of institutional or ‘corporate coherence’ (autonomy) and a 
‘concrete set of societal ties that binds state to society and provides institutionalized 
channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’ 
(embeddedness).  
There are similarities between the premises of embedded autonomy and the VoC approach, 
both stress that observable phenomena are the product of composite institutional systems 
encompassing ‘informal networks and norms’ and the form in which institutions interact to 
resolve coordination problems (Evans 1995:26; Hall and Soskice 2001:13). Embedded 
autonomy resembles the CME model in the sense that it stresses the importance of the 
quality and nature of state involvement for successful industrial/developmental policy. 
This moves away from ‘more versus less’ state intervention arguments (Evans 1995:22) 
and challenges the neo-liberal prescription of free markets and a reduced role for the state. 
Indeed, Evans (idem:200-221) describes the impetus for embedded autonomy as 
‘Discontent with neo-utilitarian visions of state-society relations’ that do not recognise the 
‘possible benefits of having a cohesive, coherent state apparatus’.  
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CME similarities with Evans’s ideal type are evident in the use of Austria as an archetype 
of embedded autonomy. He (idem:240-242) describes a ‘highly organized industrial sector 
closely linked to the state apparatus’ and, importantly in the context of this present 
research, ‘state-labour links as intricate as those that connected the state and capital’. The 
coordinated/cooperative element of Austrian institutions is reflected in the Joint 
Commission: ‘a state-sponsored forum for translating the interests of capital and labor into 
policies’.  
Brazil is categorised as an intermediate example of embedded autonomy together with 
India. Evans describes ‘replicating the embedded autonomy of the developmental state’ as 
a ‘giant step forward’ for intermediate states. Evans’s (idem 29, 62-64) model recognises 
the importance of the historical embeddedness of a society’s set of institutions and 
describes the Brazilian state as an ‘uninterruptedly powerful presence in the country’s 
social and economic development’ with a central role in ‘an impressive record of 
industrialisation’. This contributes to the idea of Brazil as an outlier in terms of state 
influence already discussed and the ‘uninterrupted’ nature of Brazilian development 
described across the next chapter.  
Using the term widely associated with Geddes (1986: 105) the embedded autonomy 
elements of the Brazilian model are characterised by ‘pockets of efficiency’ where the state 
is not transformed, instead efficient institutional layers are added to the existing, less-
efficient structure hindered by clientelism, rent-seeking, fragmentation and political 
interventions (Evans 1995:61). Successful examples of institutional coherence from the 
Brazilian case study are identified as the National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES), a source of important long-term financing for the most successful 
elements of industrial development. These in turn are identified as the auto-industry, a joint 
project between the state and MNCs; Petrobras – the state-owned oil company described as 
a ‘sectorally specific version of embedded autonomy’ both characterised by a ‘dense 
network of ties’ (idem:64).  
Evans’s (1995:64) outlook for the future feasibility of embedded autonomy-type 
development or the maintenance or creation of further pockets of efficiency is pessimistic 
stating that ‘the decay and dismantling of state institutions ensures that examples of 
embedded autonomy will be harder to find in the future’. Such pessimism is justifiable 
given the observable tendencies at the time of the research and publication, with neoliberal 
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ideas and policies at the height of popularity. Market resolution was a uniform response to 
all economic problems (Idem:153). Evidence at the time suggested Brazil was on the path 
towards an LME demonstrating a loss of faith with, and dismantling of state involvement 
in the economy.  
The data presented in the first part of this section suggests that a transition to an LME type 
economy predicted by Evans and many others was not borne out. This idea is reinforced 
when Lazzarini’s (2011) more recent Capitalism of Ties8 (herein CoT) analysis of the 
Brazilian model of capitalism is considered. CoT demonstrates the persistence and 
adaptation of comparable levels of state influence and strong ties with business into the 
21st century. Lazzarini’s analysis begins in 1996 with the first wave of privatisations of the 
Cardoso government and aims to challenge the widely-held idea that this process 
represented a reduction or removal of state influence from the economy.  
At first glance and argued by many, the reforms of the 1990s such as privatisation, global 
trade and investment liberalisation followed by a large increase of companies listing on the 
Brazilian stock exchange in the 2000s seems like a path towards an LME type economy. 
Through a comprehensive analysis of state-business relations between 1996 and 2009 with 
data from approximately 700 Brazilian firms, Lazzarini (2011: 147-164), demonstrates that 
the economic reforms of the 1990s and 2000s changed very little in the distribution of 
power or the centrality and levels of state influence over the economy.  
According to Lazzarini (idem:10) the close state-business ties embedded in Brazilian 
history persisted and actually became stronger.  It is argued that the Brazilian capitalist 
model, through indirect state bank and pension fund influence, is as state led as ever. This 
goes against common criticisms and initial fears of the economic liberalisation process 
regarding the denationalisation of the economy, a weakened state and a society at the 
mercy of free market logic as the author describes (idem: 19-20 emphasis in the original); 
although the rise in participation of foreign capital in the country and less direct 
government participation through state enterprises is undeniable, [..] It is proposed that 
the capacity for intervention of the government hasn’t diminished and that the main 
economic actors in the economy continue to be entities directly or indirectly linked to 
the government in association with some private groups of greater influence. In reality 
and paradoxically, the privatisation phenomenon and greater global insertion from the 
1990s in Brazil helped to reinforce the influence of government and certain domestic 
groups. This distinct interpretation emerges when we observe what did and didn’t 
change in the relationship patterns between diverse stakeholders in the economy. 																																																								
8 Capitalism of Ties is presented in English language publication Musacchio & Lazzarini (2014) ‘Reinventing State Capitalism: 
Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond’ Harvard University Press 
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Capitalism of ties was deepened not dissolved by the diverse restructuring that took 
place in Brazil. 
Considerable similarity can be observed between the CoT model and Embedded 
Autonomy. Lazzarini’s ‘ties’ are consistent with the ‘coherent, cohesive state apparatus 
with close, institutionalized links to an economic elite’ that characterise Evans’s model 
(Evans 1995:225). Both authors recognise the importance and contribution of the BNDES 
in state business ties and the two models stress the importance of the quality rather than 
quantity of state intervention. CoT is presented as a unique model of capitalism, with the 
state-business ties described not inherently negative such as those associated with ‘crony-
capitalism’ (Lazzarini 2011:3-4). Both positive (long-term and patient capital, potential 
large-scale projects) and negative (anti-competitive and vulnerable to clientelism) 
characterise Lazzarini’s model (idem: 111).  
The persistence of close state-business ties into 21st century Brazil described by 
Lazzarini’s CoT model means Evans’s (op cit) concerns of a liberalisation process that 
would remove the institutional requisites for a successful developmental state did not take 
place.  Considering both the CoT and embedded autonomy interpretations, the suggestion 
that Brazil’s variety of capitalism does not historically resemble that of an LME nor is it 
converging towards this type of economy is further reinforced. Whilst certain trends such 
as privatisation and increasing stock-market capitalisation resemble a liberal market path, 
Lazzarini’s detailed analysis competently demonstrates that state influence has changed 
and adapted over recent decades. The capacity of and levels of state intervention in Brazil 
have been maintained if not increased (Lazzarini 2011:10).  
Different to this present research project, the state-business centrality of the two models 
discussed places little emphasis upon labour institutions. Evans (1995:14) presents the 
inclusion of state links with ‘other social groups, like labor’ as a research agenda within 
embedded autonomy and strong labour institutions and tripartite relations characterise the 
Austrian archetype model (op cit). Lazzarini’s analysis does not incorporate the role of 
labour institutions though it is important to recognise that the state financial and pension 
fund institutions directly and indirectly tied to private companies frequently have trade 
unionists participate at director level.  
Soares (2013:549-550) observes that Lula filled half (1,300) of the senior strategic director 
and consultancy roles in key organisations with trade unionists. Amongst which are: 
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unemployment insurance funds (FAT & FGTS), pension funds, state companies such as 
Petrobras and the BNDES development bank referenced in both Lazzarini’s and Evans’s 
models (op cit). Soares estimates trade unionists were in control of or had significant 
influence over an annual budget of 57 billion US Dollars.9  
The state-business relations of Brazil described in the CoT model are therefore quite unlike 
the arms-length, non-interventionist or competitive institutional dynamics associated with 
an LME and closer to the coordinated networks and state-guided institutional relations 
associated with a CME. Citing Lazzarini’s research, Schneider (2013:172-173) argues the 
CoT type of state involvement in Brazilian companies ‘trumps the possible transition to 
more LME-type corporate governance’. However, he rejects the idea that it represents a 
movement towards a ‘sort of state-directed CME’ instead arguing that the BNDES and 
pension fund pressure upon national companies represents an element of hierarchy rather 
than CME type coordination. This again supports the idea presented here of a non-
transition towards an LME. The idea that the dense state-business ties represent hierarchy 
rather than CME-type traits does not weaken the premise of the research question which 
argues that Brazil has institutions capable of reaching coordinated solutions.  
The idea of Brazil as a hierarchical variety of capitalism rather than a hybrid or emerging 
variant of liberal and coordinated types based upon advanced economies is convincing, 
albeit it is not focussed specifically upon labour market institutions (LMIs). The HME 
provides a useful analytical model for understanding the reality of employment in Brazil 
referred to across this thesis, however it is precisely at the labour market institutional level 
that this research offers a Brazilian variant of the HME. Schneider’s model looks at general 
HME institutional outcomes and this research focuses specifically upon LMIs where 
significant within-type heterogeneity is observed in the Brazilian case. Analysis in the next 
section is narrowed to the labour market and its institutions; a key element to understand 
the Latin American/HME type of capitalism.  
2.2 Brazil as a Hierarchical Market Economy (HME)?  
This second section of the chapter presents the core features of HME labour institutions 
and how they contribute to the described ‘disappointing’ outcomes observed (Schneider 
and Karcher 2009:2). The comparison of inequality and GDP per capita levels in figure 2.6 
suggests a comparative cluster of middle-income, high-inequality Latin American 																																																								
9 200 billion Brazilian Reales (BRL) at Exchange rate of 3.5 BRL/USD 
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economies. Schneider’s hierarchical model identifies similar sets of mutually reinforcing, 
continuity-enhancing institutions and complementarities across the labour markets of the 
region. Analysis focuses upon the coherence between the HME and the observable 
characteristics of the Brazilian model. The second part of the section discusses the 
specificities of the Brazilian model that diverge from the HME ideal type. 
Figure 2.7 Economic and Political Complementarities in Latin American Labour 
Markets 
 
Source: Schneider & Karcher (2010:12) 
The five core features or institutions of HME labour markets are summarised as ‘extensive 
labour market regulation, a low-skills regime, rapid turnover, sparse unions and pervasive 
informality’ (Schneider 2013: 91). As per the institutional approach adopted and discussed 
in more detail in chapter 1, these institutions need to be analysed as interacting bodies 
within a composite system. The original VoC distinction (Hall & Soskice 2001) identifies 
two models within the capitalist system with diverse sets of complementary institutions 
producing distinctive comparative advantages. The complementarities between the core 
features of HME labour markets are described as interacting negatively both politically and 
economically by Schneider and Karcher (2010:12) as outlined in figure 2.7.  
The consequences of these core elements of HMEs correspond to the reality of 
employment in Brazil referred to across this thesis and consistent with those observed in 
Brazil. Low average-skills and short job tenure mean low pay and instability for workers. 
The pervasive informal sector excludes a significant proportion of the workforce from the 
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considerable formal protections and labour rights. Within the HME analysis (Schneider 
and Soskice 2009:34) there is recognition of the existence of ‘good and stable careers in 
the public sector, MNCs and in large domestic groups for those with higher education’. 
The labour market reality referred to across this thesis and in the HME negative 
complementarities refers to the ‘large share of the workforce […] in badly-paid, insecure 
jobs with no possibility of training’. 
The idea of a correlation between the size of the informal sector and amount of regulation 
in Latin America is disputed. Summarised by Schneider & Karcher (2010:2): ‘more and 
better enforcement’ and tripartite social dialogue is prescribed by the ILO for greater 
formalisation and ‘rigidity and overregulation’ cited by the World Bank for the size of the 
informal sector. This reflects wider differences (Haagh & Cook 2005:174) between the 
neo-liberal ‘employment as a commodity’ and more rights and well-being industrial 
relations approaches to the labour market. The next chapter highlights historical 
embeddedness or path dependencies that contribute to the evasion of labour legislation and 
the persistence of a large informal sector in Brazil rather than a universal positive 
correlation between regulation levels and informality. The insufficient enforcement or 
excess regulation debate applied to Brazil is discussed in more detail across chapter 6.  
The HME characteristic of weak, sparse or small unions is considered inadequate in the 
case of Brazilian labour institutions, particularly since the 1980s and into the 21st century. 
As per figure 2.8 and commented upon by Schneider (idem:173), Brazil’s union density of 
17.5% in 2012 is high amongst HMEs, significantly higher than that of the US (10.8%) 
comparable with Germany and Australia (17.9% & 17% respectively) and behind Uruguay 
and Argentina (30.1 % 37.7%) in the region (ILOStat 2016). Schneider (2013:173) argues 
that union density figures ‘overstate the real extent of labour organization’ due to existence 
of compulsory union dues in many sectors10.       
																																																								
10 The syndical tax of one day’s wages/year to finance trade union organisations is compulsory for all workers independent of affiliation. 
Monthly union dues of 1-2% of wages are voluntary though depending upon the category they may, consistent with Schneider, be de 
facto compulsory given the difficulty to opt-out for certain categories. The hospitality workers’ trade union of Riberão Preto-SP was 
condemned and fined by the Higher Labour Courts (TST) for charging dues to non-members in March 2016 (four years after the original 
complaint) (TST 2016a) 
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Figure 2.9 Collective Bargaining Coverage & Union Density 2012 or 
most recent available 
 
Source: Data from ILOStat (2016) & World Bank: World Development Indicators (2016) 
Union density as an insufficient indicator of labour organisation is agreed upon here. As an 
example, the Germany – Brazil equivalency fails to capture the existence of plant-level 
works councils in the north European example. For Brazil, it is argued here that the union 
density figures understate the influence of labour organisation. Collective bargaining 
coverage together with union density presented in figure 2.9 may give a better impression 
of trade union presence in Brazil yet formal quantitative indicators are still a limited 
measure to fully understand the particularities of the Brazilian labour market institutions in 
comparison with other Latin American/HME economies.  
The unicity system in place since the 1930s guarantees the existence (one union per 
category and region) and resources (syndical tax) of labour and business representative 
institutions independent of voluntary affiliation. This has drawbacks in terms of the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of labour representation with trade unions existing outside the 
workplace, fragmented regionally and sectorally and prone to co-option and complacency 
(Cook 2007:60,70; Weyland 1996: 53-56, Schneider 2013:179). In this sense, the HME 
characteristics of fragmented institutions and a weak plant-level presence characterise the 
historical role of trade unions in Brazil analysed in more detail in the next chapter. 
However, the idea of weak unions in the HME ideal type neglects the recent trajectory of 
trade unions since the 1980s and some CME-type industrial relations ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ within certain regions and sectors.  
Brazil’s labour institutions represent a system that can be used to both repress and rapidly 
mobilise workers (Cardoso 2003:34) and labour mobilisations can be expected when 
authoritarian controls are relaxed (Collier and Collier 2002:757). Since the 1980s with the 
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‘new trade union’ movement at the vanguard of the democratisation process, there is an 
evident path of increasing trade union strength and influence and that does not correspond 
to the ‘sparse’ unions trait of HMEs. The emergence and influence of peak associations 
during the 1980s, the CUT in particular, has the potential to counteract the fragmented 
structure of the CLT institutions.  
Weak plant-level presence is a historical characteristic of Brazilian trade union activity 
consistent with the HME model, yet there is a significant counter trend since the late 
1970s.  Metalworkers unions in the automobile industry established employer-worker plant 
level negotiations evolving into the CME-type of institutional complementarities described 
by Rodrigues (2002:155) as ‘conflictive cooperation’. In the late 1980s the plant level 
negotiation evolved into the tripartite Camaras Setoriais [Sectorial Chambers] across 
national industry. According to Anderson (1999:2) this type of institution was 
unprecedented in representing a shift away from authoritarian imposition towards 
consensual tripartite solutions in industrial relations.  
The Camaras are of considerable historical significance in that this type of sectorial and 
regionally specific CME-type institution emerged at a time when free-market and 
liberalisation ideas dominated government policy and the approach of the dominant CUT 
trade unionism to industrial relations was adversarial, combative and suspicious of 
tripartism. The unfavourable context was further aggravated by economic (hyperinflation) 
and political (president Collor’s impeachment) crises. The agreements were a ‘reasonable’ 
success in minimising layoffs and maintaining real wages in the automobile sector 
(Anderson 1999:37). Despite the Camaras being temporary (until 1995) their success and 
effectiveness means that they represent something of an influential benchmark of 
successful tripartism in subsequent Brazilian industrial policy and employment relations 
debates.  
A further outlying characteristic of Brazilian trade unions and labour institutions was their 
survival after the liberalisation reforms of the 1990s and continued influence into the 21st 
century. This again reinforces the idea that Brazil is not on a path to an LME-type 
economy. The HME framework recognises this continuity-reinforcing characteristic of 
trade unions as Schneider (2013:108) observes ‘unions have the best documented effect on 
continuities in labour market regulation’. Such continuity may not have positive 
connotations in the HME analysis as it sustains the negative complementarities 
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summarised in figure 2.7. In light of the current research question it is viewed positively in 
the sense that it represents the continued capacity for more equitable CME-type solutions. 
This is arguably a similar, albeit labour market specific logic to Evans’s concern that 
liberalisation reforms would remove the potential for embedded autonomy in Brazil. 
It is argued here that Brazil has a greater trade-union presence than that described in 
Schneider’s ideal type. The idea of weak unions is considered more appropriate to describe 
Chile at the opposite end of within-type HME variation from Brazil in terms of the 
presence and influence of labour institutions. Chile is frequently cited as an example of 
weak, sparse and small unions in the HME analysis with union influence legally restricted 
to firm-level wage bargaining (Schneider 2013:174, Haagh 2002:92). Chile is often paired 
with Brazil in a comparative sense (Cook 2007, Collier and Collier 2002) and the two are 
similarly paired within the HME analysis as examples of ‘effective governance, political 
stability, and bureaucratic capacity’ and with the greatest potential to escape from ‘the 
middle-income trap’ (Schneider 2013:176, 168).  
The idea of divergent trade union paths since the 1980s between Chile and Brazil is 
recognised by Haagh (2002:93) who observes ‘one-sided’ flexibility reforms’ creating less 
influence or ‘weaker upward ties’ in Chile when compared with Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay consistent with figure 2.9. Collier and Collier (2002:746) pair Brazil and Chile 
given the similarities in the initial processes of incorporation of the labour movement. 
Haagh & Cook (2005: 178) describe two distinct path dependent responses to liberalisation 
processes in the 1980s and 1990s. Brazil’s corporatist labour institutions were able to 
secure most of their individual and collective rights with union influenced political 
liberalisation processes in the 1980s preceding the subsequent economic liberalisation in 
the 1990s.  
The combination of historical particularities of Chile: aggressive anti-union economic 
liberalisation in the 1970s coming before democratisation in the late 1980s and a more 
liberal and less developmentalist tradition when compared with Brazil, contributed to 
weaker labour representation and ‘union acquiescence to unfavourable labour reform’. On 
labour rights, Cook (2007:196) reflects positively on the survival of Brazil’s collective and 
individual rights when compared with the more deregulated institutional arrangements that 
emerged in Peru and Chile.  
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In terms of trade union presence, figure 2.9 suggests that Brazil is closer to Argentina than 
Chile or Mexico. Similar to arguments already presented on Brazil, union strength in 
Argentina likewise does not fit with the HME description of ‘sparse’ unions, though like in 
Brazil, weak plant-level presence limits the transformative potential. In an exercise 
comparing employment regimes in emerging economies, Haagh & Cook (2005) describe 
Argentina’s strong unions as the opposite of Chile’s weak corresponding institutions. With 
regards to trade union capacity to defend existing rights from deregulatory pressure, 
Argentina’s recent trajectory is similar to that of Brazil.  
Haagh and Cook (idem: 184) observe a less successful trajectory for Argentinian trade 
unions, despite their strength, when compared to corresponding processes in Brazil. This is 
attributed to path dependent institutional characteristics, particularly the institutional 
interaction or complementarities with a ‘weak Argentine state’ unable to influence ‘strong 
employer associations intent on gaining greater freedom in the labour market, and a strong 
labour movement intent on safeguarding its collective resources’. In terms of trade union 
strength Brazil is placed between Chile and Argentina (idem: 193). Although Brazilian 
trade unions are historically weaker than the corresponding institutions of its southern 
neighbour, the strength and influence of labour institutions has increased significantly 
since the democratisation process of the 1980s.  
The success of Brazilian labour institutions is found in the society’s path dependency and 
institutional complementarities. The emergent new trade unionism interacts with a 
traditionally and relatively strong corporatist developmentalist state. This is recognised by 
Haagh and Cook’s comparative analysis (2005:193): demonstrating relative success in the 
Brazilian trajectory where ‘union strength, combined with the corporatist tradition, created 
more space for dialogue and a search for qualitatively ‘deeper’ solutions to the 
employment crisis’. This resulted in labour rights being extended during the 
democratisation process and successfully defended over the subsequent liberalisation 
reforms.  
The comparative analysis discussed above supports a key premise that underpins this 
thesis: Brazil, in its corporatist institutions, response to liberalisation pressures and recent 
trajectory, possess many of the labour institutions with the capacity for 
coordinated/cooperative solutions. Solutions argued to produce more equitable 
employment arrangements for society based upon the CME/LME advanced economy 
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distinction. The argument presented in this second section of the chapter contests the HME 
core characteristic idea of ‘weak unions’ as characteristic of Brazilian labour markets. It 
does not, however contest the validity of the hierarchical capitalism analytical model.  
Many of the outlying characteristics or ‘within-type HME variation’ are recognised in 
Schneider’s analysis, which provides a useful research framework. Consistent with the 
institutional/VoC approach adopted and demonstrated by the quantitative data presented in 
the first part of this section and Haagh & Cook’s (2005) comparative analysis, quantitative 
data or single variables such as trade union strength are only suggestive of institutional 
characteristics. To fully address the research question, institutions have to be considered as 
part of a path-dependent, interacting composite system.  
It is argued here that ‘sparse’, ‘weak’ or ‘small’ are inappropriate terms to describe 
Brazilian labour institutions. This core Latin American feature is perhaps more apt to 
describe Chile, Mexico and Colombia the latter two described by Schneider as closest to 
the HME ideal type. The other core characteristics: pervasive informality, high labour 
turnover, low skills and high regulation are core characteristics of Brazilian labour 
markets. This is the essence of the research question, given the described CME-type 
regionally outlying institutional characteristics at the core of the Brazilian model, why does 
the reality of employment still demonstrate the negative complementarities of the HME 
model?  
This thesis describes labour markets in the Brazilian variety of capitalism as incongruous, 
in the sense that it is an inconsistent system due to the tensions created by the 
incompatibility between the formally envisaged arrangements and the long-standing 
workplace practices described in more detail in the next chapter. The idea of an 
incongruous model is consistent with Weyland’s (1996:15) idea of a fragmented 
institutional system hindering equity-enhancing reforms since the 1980s (see ch.4 part 4.1). 
On regulation and related to the implication of inconsistency, incongruous is compatible 
with Lee and McCann’s (2014: title) concept of ‘regulatory indeterminacy’ (see ch.6 part 
6.1). The idea of an inconsistent system is coherent with the IPEA (2012: 4-5) description 
of Brazil as a scale model of the world with some characteristics resembling advanced 
industrial countries and others less developed nations. ‘Brazil as a scale model’ relates to 
the popular term in development circles of ‘Belindia’: ‘a large, poor India coexisting with a 
small, rich Belgium’ (Beghin 2008:1).  
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An incongruous system is consistent with Schneider’s description of labour market 
systems in HMEs in so far as it recognises the relevance of incompatibility or negative 
complementarities. Specific to Brazil it varies from the HME model in that it refers to a 
less static and more complex LMI system. The inconsistency implied by incongruous 
means that the HME interaction summarised in figure 2.7 is not a systemic inevitability. 
For example, in the Brazilian variety of capitalism there is evidence of strong unions with 
significant plant level representation mechanisms contributing to widespread compliance 
with the ‘high labour regulation’. This is referred to across this thesis as the ABC standard 
in the Sao Paulo automobile industry (see ch.4 part 4.3). Discussion across the remainder 
of this thesis (see the CSP Pecem steel plant case study in ch. 4 part 4.4.3 and ch. 6 part 
6.6.3 in particular) supports the idea of more complex and context-specific 
complementarities than those envisaged by the description of labour markets in the HME 
Latin American variety of capitalism.  
The next section of this chapter considers whether the Brazilian model may finally be 
shifting away from its incongruous system and moving towards a more consistent and 
coordinated LMI system into the 21st century. The consolidation of democracy, economic 
growth, political stability, falling inequality and poverty in the first decade of the 21st 
century has been unprecedented in Brazil’s history. This without having followed the neo-
liberal agenda of deregulated labour markets that characterised Chilean and liberal market 
economic reforms.  
2.3 The inclusive decade 2003-2013  
This third section of the chapter analyses the direction and role of labour institutions since 
the start of the Workers’ Party (PT) - President Lula government in 2003. The 
consolidation of prolonged economic growth and stability, falling inequality and poverty 
represent a positive and historically unprecedented period in Brazilian development as 
indicated by figure 2.10 and table 2.1. It took place under a political party and president 
that emerged from the ‘new’ trade union movement of the 1980s. Following discussions in 
the first half of the chapter this section considers the period from a VoC perspective within 
the LME, CME and HME ideal types. Specific attention is focused upon whether the 
period represents a genuine shift towards more coordinated institutional arrangements to 
contribute towards more equitable outcomes for labour and society. 
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Figure 2.10: Development trends over ‘the inclusive decade’: Brazil 2003-2013  
 
Source: see Table 2.1 below 
Table 2.1 Comparison of 2003 and 2013 development indicators  
Indicator 2003 2013 % Change Source Notes 
Average Real 
Wage (BRL) 
1,851 2,319 + 25.3 % Monthly Employment 
Survey (PME) IBGE 
6 Metropolitan regions only. Figures 
for January of each year used after 
annual correction for inflation 
Real Min. Wage 
(BRL) 
240 678 + 69.45 % Dieese (2016:4)  
GDP (USD 
trillion) 
2.106 3.121 + 48.2 % World Bank: World 
Development Indicators 
PPP - Constant International 2011 
Formal Sector 
Employment (% 
Share) 
45.9 55.8 +21.6% Continuous National 
Household Survey –
(PNAD) IBGE 
Author’s calculation from 
informality rate definition III. 
Derived from Berg (2010:10). No 
data/survey for 2010 
GINI Coefficient 0.583 0.527 -9.52% IPEA: Data from 
PNAD/IBGE 
No data/survey for 2010 
Rate of poverty 
(%) 
35.75 15.09 -45.45% IPEA Data No data/survey for 2010 
Rate of extreme 
poverty (%) 
15.18 5.50 - 73.79 % IPEA Data No data/survey for 2010 
 
Symbolically, the PT/Lula rise to the presidency in the 2002 elections represents the 
introduction of a labour-friendly government (see Scherrer and Hachmann 2012:146). 
Close ties between the PT and the CUT trade union peak association transforms the latter’s 
traditional role from an opposition force to a position of loyalty, support and partnership. A 
distinctive change in labour relations was an objective of government and trade unions 
evident in both discourse and policy. The tripartite National Labour Forum (FNT) under 
the direction of the labour ministry (MTE) was introduced in the first year of the Lula 
administration and related to electoral promises of dialogue and consensus in reform 
processes.    
The stated objectives of the FNT as per the MTE (2004: 23-24) final report were: the 
democratisation of labour relations through greater freedom and autonomy, reform of 
employment legislation to make it more compatible with the new demands of national 
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development and generate employment and income. The forum was intended to stimulate 
dialogue and tripartism to promote social justice in labour institutions, conflict resolution 
and collective trade union rights. This strongly suggests that the intended direction of the 
Lula administration was towards a more coordinated institutional model. 
The coordinated direction of the development strategy of the PT government is further 
evidenced by the creation of the permanent tripartite National Social and Economic 
Development Council (CDES) and National Industrial Development Council (CNDI) the 
latter a ‘national tripartite arena for discussing strategic issues of industrial policy’ created 
in 2004 and to promote high-level dialogue between state, business and labour (de Toni 
2013 & 2015:8). In VoC terms these forums represent a shift towards a CME type 
institutional arrangement rather than greater penetration of market logic. Between the 
distinctive diagnoses and prescriptions of the World Bank (deregulation) and the ILO 
(greater enforcement and tripartite dialogue) already commented upon (Schneider and 
Karcher op cit), the FNT and development councils represent adherence to the latter.   
When considering institutional change, the PT/Lula decade discussed in this section is 
frequently compared to the previous administration of president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (FHC), often labelled as ‘neo-liberal’. In comparison to LME-type economies and 
Chile as already discussed (Haagh & Cook op cit) there is a tendency to overstate the level 
of reform in Brazil over the 1990s. This is evident in arguments on weakened state-
influence countered by Lazzarini’s CoT model. It is also applicable to labour market 
arrangements. Consistent with a historical trend of continuities, trade union institutions and 
protective labour legislation survived the reforms of the 1990s. The flexibilisation reforms 
that were carried out were subject to collective bargaining approval and as Cook (2007:86) 
observes were not always popular with employers as short term contracts reduced funds 
available to ‘employer federations that managed professional system training and social 
assistance programmes financed by the payroll taxes (sistema “S”)’.  
There is significant continuity in the labour relations system and it is argued here that 
structural institutional reforms carried out by the Lula administration were moderate. 
Significant change is apparent between the approaches of the FHC and Lula 
administrations to industrial relations rather than any structural institutional change per se. 
Cook (idem: 102-103) describes adversarial relations between the CUT and government in 
the 1990s where the latter introduced reforms ‘through decree or provisional measures’ 
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albeit with the support of the fast-growing Força Sindical (FS) peak association. In 
contrast, the PT government’s approach is characterised by a commitment to consensus 
and social dialogue, evident in the election campaign and upon taking power with the 
immediate creation of forums such as the FNT, CNDES and CNDI. It is similarly 
recognised (Araujo & Veras 2011: 108, Marcelino 2008) that relations between the 
traditionally rival peak associations CUT and FS have evolved into cooperation within the 
tripartite forums mentioned.  
An important change is evident in the Lula administration’s approach to industrial policy, 
contributing to the positive development trajectory. Whilst industrial policy is outside the 
immediate labour market focus of this thesis, it supports certain premises of the research 
question; Brazil has continued with a system contrary to liberal market prescriptions of a 
reduced state and deregulated system and therefore maintained the institutional capacity 
for more coordinated solutions or a model approximate to Evans’s embedded autonomy 
ideal type.  
Weisbrot, Johnston and Lefebvre (2014:13) highlight the ‘reactivation of industrial policy’ 
as a key contributor to Brazil’s positive development trajectory in the 21st century. The 
influential role of the BNDES is highlighted with its disbursements increasing from 2.2 per 
cent of GDP in 2015 to almost 4 per cent in 2013. According to the authors, the 
reactivation is considered historically significant 
Previously, industrial policy had been abandoned under an IMF-imposed austerity 
program in 1983, with neoliberal policies dominating throughout the rest of the 80s and 
90s, as in many other Latin American countries.  
The adoption of a more state-led approach to industrial policy through the tripartite 
councils, funded through the BNDES and other sources of public finance, represents a 
significant change in direction between the FHC and Lula administrations. There was 
considerable pressure upon the second-term FHC administration from business 
representatives frustrated with the inertia of Brazilian industrial development. These 
demands were met with timid initiatives, which according to de Toni (2015: 7,9) never got 
off the ground due to industrial policy being a dirty word or an ‘anti-agenda’ in the FHC 
administration considered ‘harmful and the cause of irreparable damage to free market 
equilibrium’. This meant that any industrial policy type initiatives from relevant 
government departments were met with hostility from the finance ministry.  
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The free market institutional logic described is the same recognised by Evans (op cit), 
concerned how its penetration would hinder the potential for future embedded autonomy 
type development in Brazil. Importantly De Toni recognises the success of the tripartite 
Câmaras Setoriais within the automobile industry as an exception to the industrial policy 
void of the 1990s. This trend is similarly recognised across this research project as an 
established pocket of efficiency of coordinated solutions within Brazilian industry. The 
experience of successful social dialogue is argued to have softened the CUT’s traditional 
hostility or mistrust of tripartism (Cook 2007:70). Therefore, the shift towards greater 
tripartism and social dialogue by the Lula administration had precedents in the previous 
decade albeit somewhat region (Sao Paulo) and sector (automobile) specific.  
The reactivation of industrial policy is a development parallel to the described shift 
towards greater tripartism. De Toni (2015:8) describes three simultaneous vectors of 
Lula’s election pledge to defend national industry, a high degree of intragovernmental 
coordination between key ministries and the promotion of high level dialogue and debate 
between the public sector, business and labour through tripartite forums such as the CNDI, 
CNDES and FNT.  
In terms of the premises of the research question, the reactivation of industrial policy and 
related shift towards greater tripartism and social dialogue strengthen the ideas presented 
across this chapter that Brazil is not in transition towards an LME type economy. The 
participation of existing labour institutions across the decade of unprecedented 
developmental success strengthens the idea that Brazil has the institutions for a more 
coordinated economic model and raises the question as to whether the ‘inclusive decade’ 
represents an institutional shift towards greater coordination.  
Focussing upon labour market institutions, this second part of the section critically 
discusses the driving factors behind the 2003-2013 developmental success. Analysis is 
from a VoC perspective considering whether the improvements can be considered a 
definite shift away from an HME towards the more equitable outcomes associated with 
coordinated capitalism. The idea of Brazil as a Latin American nation capable of breaking 
out ‘of the negative complementarities in hierarchical capitalism’ is presented in 
Schneider’s (2013:181) analysis. Schneider acknowledges the optimism regarding Brazil’s 
‘excellent start to the 21st century’ whilst recognising the numerous positive factors 
required to converge to transition away from the HME negative outcomes.   
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Considering the trajectory of development indicators across the ‘inclusive decade’ shown 
in figure 2.11 and the HME complementarities summarised in figure 2.7, recent trends of 
falling inequality without any significant reform to collective or individual labour rights 
weakens arguments on the ‘high labour regulation – large informal economy’ negative 
relationship. This also strengthens the social dialogue and greater enforcement prescription 
to deal with high inequality over the deregulation option preferred by the neo-liberal 
school.    
Berg (2010:7-8) seeks explanations for the rising formality in Brazil and the contribution 
of government policies towards ‘the improved performance of the labour market’. 
Formality here, consistent with analysis in the next chapter (see figs. 3.2 & 3.3), represents 
those workers in receipt of labour rights through a signed workbook or social security 
contributions. There is ongoing global debate on the informalisation of formal work though 
this is not considered to be the case in Brazilian labour markets. Consistent with arguments 
already presented in this chapter, Berg (ibidem) observes that ‘labour market reform was 
not as far-reaching’ as the rest of Latin America and argues there was ‘greater institutional 
influence on the working of the labour market, not less’ in the 2000s. The five factors 
contributing to increased formalisation identified by Berg (idem:23) are as follows:  
a) a more favourable macroeconomic environment characterized by a more competitive 
exchange rate and more inclusive pattern of growth; b) reduced labour supply; c) the 
Simples law; d) improved labour inspection and new approaches to formalization; and 
e) greater legal awareness and respect for the law. 
Berg seeks to respond to perceptions that there was an element of luck in the increased 
formalisation trend, which is only partially influential in factors (a) – high commodity 
prices and b) demographic trends reducing labour supply. Elsewhere institutional influence 
is evident in the ‘more inclusive pattern of growth’ evident in figure 2.11. Educational 
reforms resulted in an increased number of youths in full-time education reducing the 
supply of labour. Improved education levels could also be considered to have contributed 
to the greater legal awareness of workers. Berg (idem:17) identifies improved labour 
inspection through improved procedures despite a persistently inadequate number of 
labour inspectors in Brazil (see ch. 6).  
The increased formality and institutional influence upon the labour market not only 
suggests a shift away from the high regulation – large informal sector complementarity of 
the HME present in figure 2.7. It also weakens the oft-presented idea of an innate positive 
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correlation between regulation and informality. Improved education levels could be loosely 
associated to skill levels though there is no evidence of improvement in the low job tenure 
rates. Statistics indicate an increase in labour turnover between 2002 and 2013 (Dieese et 
al 2013:3).  
Greater legal awareness amongst workers contributing to increased formality can be linked 
to improved education. Although not mentioned by Berg, it is possible that trade union 
institutions contributed to the improved labour inspection figures. The contribution of trade 
unions towards effective labour inspection is recognised in Schneider’s HME model: 
‘unions key for labour law enforcement’ (in fig. 2.7), in the industrial relations literature 
(Weill 1999:340) and evident during fieldwork (see chapter 5 on union as an extra layer of 
regulation). It is therefore probable that trade union presence and influence may have 
contributed to the improved inspection cited by Berg. This further reinforces the idea that 
the ‘sparse unions’ HME core characteristic is not appropriate to describe the Brazilian 
model.  
The contribution of trade union institutions to the more positive complementarities can 
also be inferred from the evidence of increased worker bargaining power. Weisbrot, 
Johnston and Lefebvre (2013: 3) cite the growth of income and employment and the 
expansion of government social spending together with rises in formality and the real 
minimum wage as indicative of an increase in worker bargaining power. They highlight 
the growth of average real wages, maintained even as the economy began to slowdown in 
2011 and argue ‘This indicates that there may have been an institutional change in the 
bargaining power of workers in Brazil, which could continue to contribute to reducing 
inequality in the future’. 
The increased influence of labour through the tripartite forums upon a state more open to 
social dialogue and consensus has already been described and the minimum wage policy is 
much celebrated as a significant achievement by the trade union movement (see ch. 4 part 
4.1). Boito & Marcelino (2010:64) describe a resurgence of trade union activity contrary to 
the ‘thesis of the irreversible historic decline of unionism’ from the 1990s. The 
measurement of influence is strike activity between 2004 and 2008. Whilst the number of 
strikes had been comparatively high in Brazil since the 1980s and this trend continued 
through the 90s; Boito & Marcelino (idem 67-68) identify a shift from defensive industrial 
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action in the 1990s to successful ‘offensive’ action increasing rights and wages and 
demonstrating significant levels of organisation and mobilisation.  
Significant change since 2003 is apparent in the PT/Lula approach towards tripartism, 
consensus and social dialogue when compared with the previous administration and 
authoritarian tendencies of the past. The reactivation of industrial policy represents a 
significant shift from the previous two decades described as ‘crisis’ (1980s) and 
‘stabilisation’ (1990s) by the IPEA (2012:13). The successful development trajectory 
arguably vindicates such an approach to employment relations and industrial policy 
contrary to neo-liberal prescriptions. The consolidation of stability and growth, reduced 
informality and significant falls in both relative (inequality) and absolute poverty is 
unprecedented in Brazilian history. Comparatively it goes against trends of increasing 
inequality elsewhere (OECD 2011: 22). It suggests that Brazil is shifting away from the 
HME economic model, not on a liberal market path but one closer to a coordinated market 
economy.  
2.4 Coordination or Hierarchy? 
The idea of Brazil transitioning towards a more equitable society akin to a CME should be 
considered with caution. Trends shown in figures 2.10 and 2.11 are positive and 
unprecedented, but it should be recognised that in socio-economic terms Brazil starts from 
a very low threshold. This is recognised in the IPEA (2012:8) inclusive decade report 
where it is highlighted that inequality is at its lowest since records began though the 
trajectory would still need to continue for a further 20 years to reach levels of inequality 
comparable to the USA, not a society associated with equitable wealth distribution (also 
see ch.1 table 1.2).  
The official discourse and rhetoric of consensus, partnership and tripartism at the highest 
level with trade unionists in positions of significant influence and power since 2003 
warrants careful analysis. Expectations for the Lula/PT government were high and groups 
with more anti-capitalist ideologies were disappointed by the administration’s conciliatory 
approach to labour-capital relations and/or continuities or the non-reversal of liberalisation 
and public spending reforms from the previous FHC government.  
Opposition and dissatisfaction is evident with two new political parties splintering from the 
PT: the United Socialist Workers’ Party (PSTU) in 2004 and the Socialism in Freedom 
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Party (PSOL) in 2005. Two new trade union peak associations were formed, breaking 
away from the CUT: Conlutas affiliated to the PSTU in 2010 and the Brazilian Workers’ 
Centre (CTB) formed from the classist strands within the CUT affiliated to the Communist 
Party (PCdoB) in 2008. The anti-capitalist ideology is different to the institutional 
approach of this thesis envisaging labour interests to be better represented in coordinated 
capitalism. However, the criticisms of the dynamics of state-labour relations and the 
presence of trade unionists in positions of power under the PT administration are relevant 
when considering the direction of change between 2003 and 2012. 
Critics argue that the state-labour relations are characterised by passivity, co-option and 
hierarchy/elitism. This is distinctive to the consensus and social dialogue envisaged in the 
official government discourse. Araujo and Veras (2011:84) describe a transition from 
‘defensive resistance’ under FHC to a ‘passive attitude’ of expectation of government 
initiatives with the trade union movement losing its political protagonist role of the 1980s 
and 1990s. Soares (2013:548) considers the participation of trade unionists to be a 
Gramscian process of transformism where the trade unions have established closer ties 
with the state at the highest levels of institutional relations and are distant and detached 
from the shop-floor.  
Former PT academic, Oliveira (2011 in Soares 2013:543) argues that the trade unionists at 
the highest level represent a ‘new social class’ acting in self-interest rather than 
representing labour. Perry Anderson (2011:5) describes a process of the PT colonising the 
federal administration where militants ‘all but completely detached from the working class 
[…] became functionaries enjoying, or abusing, every perquisite of office’. The trade 
unionist presence at this highest level of institutional relations could therefore be 
considered representative of the PT ruling political party rather than labour interests. 
Whilst much of this criticism comes from anti-capitalist groups, Sinduscon-CE’s president 
Ferreira (2013: interview) made similar observations arguing that the trade unionists were 
granted such senior positions not to represent labour interests, but in exchange for their 
loyalty to the PT administration.  
From a historical perspective, Braga (2012:204-205) argues that the trade union activity at 
the cúpula [summit] or top of the labour institutions hierarchy represents a regression from 
the ‘new’ or ‘authentic’ grass-roots trade unionism of the 1980s to the pre-1964 cupulista 
or hierarchical organisation detached and distant from the workplace. Argued in more 
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detail in the next chapter some scepticism is required regarding the hegemonic domestic 
discourse of a significant break between ‘new’ and ‘old’ trade unionism. It is a somewhat 
imaginary distinction created by academics and trade unionists. As Santana (1999:112) 
observes pre-1964 unions were closer to the workplace than the popular discourse 
describes. Significant continuities between ‘old’ and ‘new’ trade unionism are understated 
by the popular and convenient discourse of ‘new’, ‘authentic’ and ‘grass-roots’ trade 
unionism.  
The criticisms of the PT and Lula administrations summarised above generally come from 
more anti-capitalist ideological perspectives than this current institutional study. The 
evident continuities in fiscal prudence and the conciliatory approach to industrial relations 
frustrated the expectations of many expecting a more significant rupture or critical juncture 
with the existing system. The criticisms that trade union presence and influence at the 
upper institutional echelons is not representative of workers and detached from the shop 
floor is plausible and again highlights the appropriateness of the term hierarchical to 
describe Brazilian society.  
Given the continuities and persistence of the 75-year-old corporatist institutions and the 
emergence of influential peak associations since the 1980s and across the 1990s, the HME 
trait of weak, small or sparse trade unions is contested in the Brazilian case. On the other 
hand, ‘weak plant-level representation’ (Schneider 2009:103), with the exception of the 
automobile industry in the southeast since the 1970s, accurately reflects Brazil’s labour 
institutions. The idea of a verticalised, subservient relationship between the state and the 
largest peak associations is credible, given the hierarchical nature of the state, its historical 
strength and authoritarian legacy. 
It is argued that Brazil has the institutional framework and intentions for coordinated 
labour solutions. The shift towards greater consensus, tripartism and social dialogue by the 
Lula government increases the feasibility of this type of model argued to produce more 
equitable employment arrangements. The unprecedented positive development trajectory 
over the 2003-2013 decade, consolidating stability, growth, poverty and inequality 
reduction suggests this approach to institutional relations was vindicated and weakens the 
alternative liberal market prescriptions. It remains to be considered as to how coordinated, 
cooperative and consensual labour relations actually were. The effectiveness and outcomes 
from the FNT, and CNDI forums provide a useful insight in this respect.  
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The removal of the final vestiges of the corporatist and authoritarian traits of the 
Vargas/CLT system, namely the unicity system of one union per category and region and 
the compulsory financing of the institutions through the syndical tax was a long standing 
and defining campaign for both the CUT and PT since the 1980s. It was also a stated 
expectation and objective of the FNT. Its removal was part of the forum’s agenda and a 
timetable for transition to a more plural, democratic and autonomous system was 
established. Provisions for plant-level representation, historically weak in Brazil, were also 
suggested. Despite the high profile and symbolic character of the FNT the majority of its 
initiatives stalled and any institutional or systemic change was minimal. 
Peak associations were incorporated as formal institutions with legal entitlements, which 
represents very little in the way of meaningful change given the long-standing hegemony 
of the CUT and FS. No consensus could be reached on plant-level representation and the 
one shop steward per 200 workers reform was repetition of existing provisions (Verlaine 
2005). Any further measures for plant-level representation were left to be bargained 
between employers and unions. Despite the long standing CUT/PT campaign whilst in 
opposition to reform the employment relations system, attempts stalled and the unicity and 
compulsory dues are still in place today.  
The CNDI initially made some important steps towards coordinated solutions to contribute 
to Brazil’s positive development trajectory, seeking to overcome the historical incongruity 
of fragmented state institutions and a lack of intragovernmental coordination. With close 
support of the ‘deep pockets’ of the BNDES, the CNDI represented something of an 
additional embedded autonomy or pocket of efficiency type institutional layer. Guimarães 
(forthcoming) describes the forum as a ‘very effective space for strategic debate and search 
for coordinated solutions’. Citing the high level of coordination between state institutions 
and consensus with the private sector, De Toni (2013: 16) describes the success of the 
CNDI up to 2007 as an outlier and historically unprecedented. 
De Toni (2013: 54) observes how the coordinated success of the CNDI was not reproduced 
during the second Lula administration (2007-2011). He attributes this to ‘the absence of 
the same vectors contributing to the exceptional performance of the first mandate’. Factors 
cited by De Toni for the ‘demobilisation of the CNDI’ are: a change in personnel with the 
new Development Minister Jorge not benefitting from the same strong ties and credibility 
with the business sector as his predecessor Luiz Furlan, the global economic crisis 
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weakening the external commodity and domestic market booms leading to a preference for 
‘top-down’ Finance Ministry imposed crisis measures - ‘dispensing with the need for 
forums or more collective decisions’.  
From a VoC perspective the example of the CNDI under the two Lula governments 
represents hierarchy reproducing itself into an institution which demonstrated the potential 
and benefits of coordinated/cooperative solutions, albeit temporarily. This simultaneously 
reinforces the idea of the presence of institutions with the capacity to achieve coordinated 
solutions in the Brazilian institutional model and the difficulties of producing durable 
coordinated outcomes given the persistence and self-reproducing characteristics of 
hierarchy. 
Closer analysis of the CNDI example weakens the tripartite coordinated credentials of its 
initial success. De Toni’s (2013,2015) account of the dynamics of the industrial policy 
institution is more indicative of a bipartite rather than tripartite forum. Labour 
representatives made up only 10% of the CNDI forum participants. When this is 
considered together with the criticisms of cupulismo and self-interest of the trade union 
elite within a hierarchical system without plant-level employee representation, the tripartite 
credentials of the forum are further weakened.  
The failure of any significant consensual reform from the FNT, where there was a more 
balanced distribution of representation between state, labour and business, is suggestive of 
difficulties and limitations in reaching coordinated solutions. Given the historical legacy 
described in the next chapter and the hierarchical nature of social relations such an impasse 
should not come as a surprise. Schneider’s (2013:35) analysis recognises the difficulty of 
coordinated solutions where ‘the relative disengagement of business and labour with each 
other means that both groups tend to organise more to engage the state’. De Toni’s account 
of the CNDI (2013:54) suggests such business-labour disengagement may exist within the 
tripartite forums mentioned. Weak negotiation mechanisms at lower levels of labour 
relations are also acknowledged by Schneider (2013:28): ‘the absence of other 
intermediating forums like works councils or factor committees reduce the potential for 
managers from negotiation and thereby increase the relative returns to hierarchical 
employment relations’.  
The existence of the FNT, CNDI and similar forums, simultaneously exemplify the 
capacity and difficulties for effective coordinated solutions in Brazilian industrial relations. 
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An unfavourable historical legacy, hierarchical social structure and weak or non-existent 
negotiating mechanisms at the plant-level impede the reproduction or trickle-down of 
coordinated institutional solutions across employment relations. Based upon fieldwork 
research and using the construction industry as a case study, chapters 4 to 6 look at these 
difficulties to achieve consensual solutions at intermediate and workplace levels.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provides a snapshot of the Brazilian variety of capitalism between 2003 and 
2013. This comes after Chapter 1 discussing the new institutional approach adopted and its 
relevance to the research question and the varieties of capitalism research agenda. The next 
chapter provides the historical legacy or path dependency of this snapshot and 
demonstrates heightened continuity in Brazilian institutions, often greater than that 
envisaged by alternative interpretations.  It is argued across this present chapter, both 
historically and currently, that there is greater state participation in the economy when 
compared with other Latin American and upper-middle income economies. 
Institutional dynamics in the 21st century strongly suggest that the Brazilian model does 
not resemble a liberal market economy nor is it on the path towards such a variety of 
capitalism. A key factor to this non-transition is the institutional continuity of the 
corporatist labour system meaning liberalisation reforms across the 1990s did not result in 
the permanent decline of labour market institutions or reduced state influence contrary to 
other interpretations and predictions at the time. This is demonstrated by the successful and 
unprecedented development trajectory from 2003 accompanied by institutional 
arrangements divergent from the neo-classical agenda of a minimal state, greater market 
penetration and deregulated labour markets.  
Within the context of the research question and institutional approach of this thesis such a 
non-transition can be viewed positively. In the same manner that Evans argues that 
replicating embedded autonomy represents ‘a giant step forward’ for intermediate states, it 
is argued here that replicating the more equitable coordinated institutional arrangements of 
the CME type economies would be of great benefit to Brazil. A society characterised by a 
system historically hostile to labour with high levels of social inequality. 
Whilst evidence strongly suggests a non-transition to an LME type economy, the idea of 
CME-type solutions contributing to the positive trajectory between 2003 and 2013 should 
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be considered with caution. Closer analysis of institutional interaction during the period 
suggests that despite some ‘pockets of efficiency’ and the survival of an institutional 
system with the capacity for more coordinated solutions, the overall Brazilian system 
continues to be more aptly described as one of hierarchy than coordination. Again, 
parallels can be made with Evans’s ‘embedded autonomy’ where Brazil is an intermediate 
case with some of the institutional characteristics of this ideal type of development state.  
It is argued here that Brazil has many of the institutional prerequisites for more 
coordinated solutions that contribute to a more equitable society through greater stability 
and wealth distribution through the employment relationship. The existence of resourceful 
trade unions, their evident influence and strength since the 1980s goes against the ‘weak 
sparse and small’ core features of the HME type model. Nevertheless, the reality of 
employment is consistent with other negative complementarities of Schneider’s Latin 
American variety of capitalism summarised in figure 2.7. Here lies the essence of the 
research problem, which seeks explanations for the persistence of negative hierarchical 
complementarities in the employment relationship despite the existence of institutions that 
envisage considerably greater protection, stability and representation for labour.  
The positive developmental trajectory of the ‘inclusive decade’ should also be considered 
with caution. The emphasis upon social dialogue and consensus under the Lula 
government and creation of tripartite forums is suggestive of a shift towards greater 
coordination, however closer analysis of the institutional dynamics and the tangible results 
of the tripartite forums suggest that the coordinated nature of institutional relations over the 
positive development trajectory may be overstated. Despite the high profile of the FNT it 
produced very little in terms of consensual reform (see ch. 5 for further discussion).  
The CNDI forum was initially an example of successful coordination though reverted into 
a more hierarchical arrangement when challenged by less favourable economic 
circumstances and change of personnel. Using the language of Evans’s (1995:12) model: 
the ‘corporate coherence’ (autonomy) and ‘continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals 
and policies’ (embeddedness) are weakened by the penetration and reproduction of 
hierarchy rather than horizontal tripartite ties. 
The survival of the corporatist trade union institutions is considered favourable for labour 
in that coordination offers more equitable employment arrangements than liberal-market 
solutions. A shift towards a more liberal market model would involve the dismantling of 
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such institutions and therefore reduce such a capacity. Evans feared this would happen in 
the 1990s reducing the likelihood of embedded autonomy. With the Brazilian economy 
currently in recession and undergoing a political crisis, the system will undoubtedly face 
further pressures for reform. History suggests that the existing corporatist labour 
institutions are somewhat sticky and resistant to change and may survive such pressures. 
Therefore, the potential for more coordinated solutions will remain. Despite the positive 
trajectory of the first decade of the 21st century, a shift towards greater de facto 
coordination to characterise institutional relations is yet to be realised despite the evident 
intentions. The reality of employment remains closer to that of an HME than the advanced 
economy coordinated or liberal institutional models.  
The inconsistency between the tripartite coordinatory design of the embedded Brazilian 
LMI system and the widespread reality of employment closer to the hierarchical 
institutional model represents the underlying research problem of this thesis. The next 
chapter traces historical legacies from the 19th century and the introduction of the existing 
CLT system in the 1930s up until 2003. This is to identify examples of path dependency 
and institutional change relevant to contemporary observations on employment and 
industrial relations. Analysis of contemporary employment relations and the construction 
industry case study begins in chapter 4: an exploratory analysis of employment relations 
that identifies representation and regulation as two key factors discussed in greater depth in 
the remaining chapters, 5 and 6.  
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Chapter 3 – A brief history of labour and its institutions in 
Brazil 
Explanations for the reality of employment for the majority of Brazilian workers in the 21st 
century can be found within the society’s set of institutions, both formal and informal, and 
their interaction and co-existence - known as complementarities. Such institutions are path 
dependent, the consequence of historical processes. Identifying such processes is an 
essential exercise to provide convincing explanations for the reality of modern day 
employment. Consistent with a Historical Institutionalism (HI) approach, this involves 
path tracing: identifying relevant historical processes and continuities as well as 
recognising significant change, the latter often provoked by ‘major watersheds’ known as 
critical junctures (Collier & Collier 2002:27).  
The objective of this chapter is to identify the key historical processes dating back to the 
19th century that contributed to Brazil’s relevant modern-day labour institutions. As per the 
advantages of an HI approach, this is argued to offer a more holistic understanding of 
socio-economic issues when compared with more ahistorical and positivist approaches (see 
ch.1). Many important contributions to the specific literature on historical legacies in 
Brazil (see Collier & Collier 2002, Cardoso 2010, Carvalho 2013) precisely stress the 
importance of ‘the past’ when discussing observable contemporary phenomena and look to 
address its neglect in alternative analyses. Cook (2012: 268) describes the analysis of 
historical legacies to explain LMIs in the recently democratised Latin American economies 
as ‘little explored’. 
This chapter considers the relevance of historical legacies to the research question and 
intended contribution of the thesis. Explanations for the inconsistency between institutional 
arrangements and workplace reality can be anticipated from an analysis of relevant LMI 
historical legacies or path-tracing. The formal institutional capacity element of the research 
question contests the ‘sparse unions’ trait of Schneider’s Latin American HME model. The 
HME describes functional characteristics of Latin American labour market dynamics (see 
figure 2.7) that are mostly consistent with the reality of employment in Brazil. 
Nevertheless, Schneider does not discuss the historical origins of the complementarities at 
any length. Part of the stated contribution of this research is to contribute to a variation on 
the HME-model, considering the history of LMIs is an essential part of this exercise and 
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should further support the contestation of the ‘sparse unions’ trait in the Brazilian variety 
of capitalism. By analysing historical legacies, it is anticipated that more dynamic and 
gradual processes of change can be identified in contrast to more static models. 
The four sections are separated chronologically into identifiable periods or between what 
may or may not be considered critical junctures. The periods: pre-1930, 1930-1964, 1964-
1989 and 1989-2003 are consistent with and informed by those used widely in the 
literature (Carvalho 2013, Fausto ed. 2007, Bethel ed. 1984 in particular). The majority of 
analysis in the first section focuses upon pre-1930 Brazil considered the initial conditions 
or regressive path dependency: the legacy of centuries of slavery, colonialism and 
monoculture as well as discussing independence and abolition and their relevance or non-
relevance to labour. In a similar fashion to the literature cited above, analysis is 
proportionate to its historical relevance for labour rather than chronology, with certain sub-
periods meriting greater attention.  
The 1930-1964 second section covers the incorporation of the labour movement and the 
establishment of encompassing nationwide labour legislation and institutions and the 
‘aftermath/legacy’ period (Collier & Collier 2002: 354). This period extends to the military 
coup of 1964 and the onset of a 20-year authoritarian dictatorship. The initial incorporation 
period is of particular relevance as it establishes the formal labour institutions (business 
and worker unions, encompassing labour legislation and state agencies), the majority of 
which are still in place today.  
The third section 1964-1989 covers the military dictatorship and the two ‘Brazilian 
economic miracles’ of intense industrialisation and the subsequent democratisation 
process. Much of the existing literature focuses upon economic development, the priority 
here as per the thesis as a whole is analysis of labour and its relevant institutions. It is at 
the end of this period that the new trade unionism movement emerges which leads into the 
fourth and final section of the chapter. The 1989-2003 period covers the economic 
restructuring of the 1990s and the consequences for labour institutions. The concluding 
section of the chapter looks to summarise what can be considered as relevant historical 
legacies and paths from the four periods analysed and any significant change consistent 
with the definitions and parameters established and discussed in the previous chapters (see 
table 1.1).  
		 107 
3.1 Pre-1930: A deeply embedded path for labour  
By the time of independence Brazilian society had already established a significant and 
robust developmental path. Within this first section of the chapter there is only a brief 
description of pre-1822 society to characterise the specific colonial legacy or initial 
conditions for independent Brazil’s socio-economic structure, its labour arrangements in 
particular. The main focus of this section is the 1822 to 1930 period. This covers three 
historically significant events: Independence, Abolition and the transition from an imperial 
political system to a republic. The first part analyses the impact upon labour of key inter-
related colonial continuities that persist well into the 20th century. The second part looks at 
the different forms of organised labour institutions that emerged tenuously at the beginning 
of the 20th century particularly after the First World War and into the 1920s with patterns 
and characteristics of some relevance to the future direction of labour institutions and 
social relations in Brazil.  
Upon independence Brazil inherited what Carvalho (2013:17-18) describes in terms of a 
broad Marshallian definition of citizenship as a ‘very discouraging legacy’; a description 
similarly applicable to labour conditions for the vast majority of the population. The legacy 
of Portuguese colonial rule was a vast territory under an absolutist state dominated by the 
large monocultural rural plantation producing primary goods for export. The socio-
economic structure was based upon slave labour. Whilst the institution of slavery was by 
no means unique to Brazil, comparatively its intensity and embeddedness within society is 
without equal. Wilberforce described the nation as 'the very child and champion of the 
slave trade, nay the slave trade personified' (Bethell 1985:192).  
Compared with other societies in the Americas the scale of slavery was unprecedented as 
Alencastro (2010: 87) summarises what he describes as Brazil’s ‘original’ sin where 44 per 
cent of the 11 million Africans removed to the Americas arrived in Brazil over three 
centuries (1550-1856) compared with only 5.5% being trafficked to the United States over 
a shorter period (1675-1808). From a path dependency perspective, the very ‘discouraging’ 
colonial legacy and social structure described changed very little post-independence 
(1822). It can therefore be considered a non-critical juncture in terms of any rupture to the 
extreme hierarchy described by Cardoso (2010:19) as a profoundly unequal social order ‘in 
many ways hostile to most Brazilians’.  
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Bethel (1985:196) describes Brazil’s transition from colony to independent empire as 
‘characterized by an extraordinary degree of political, economic and social continuity’ and 
therefore a ‘counter-revolution’. Such a conservative transition to independence was an 
intentional strategy on behalf of the ruling elite, influenced by a strong vested interest in 
the status quo of the socio-economic structure and a desire to avoid the drawn out more 
violent independence processes witnessed in Spanish America resulting in the 
fragmentation of the region between weak and strong states (Carvalho 2013:27). 
Fear and resistance to any hint of reform that could facilitate a popular uprising also 
influenced the highly conservative independence process. According to Viotti da Costa 
(1986:793) oligarchical intentions were to ‘govern the country without taking any account 
of the mass of the population, whom they feared and despised’. The oligarchic pact 
between the central state and the local oligarchies during this period prioritised stability 
and order. This was maintained by what Viotti da Costa (1986:735) describes as a shared 
interest in ‘the maintenance of traditional structures of production based on slave labour 
and the export of colonial staples to the international market’ and the fear of any type of 
revolt from below: “white fear of the black wave” (Azevedo 1987: title). 
This local-central power equilibrium further strengthens a deeply embedded regressive 
path dependency with negative consequences for the majority of the population of Brazil. 
For most workers in 19th century Brazil this meant subjection to a regime of exploitation, 
oppressive violence and complete dependence upon the local oligarchy for sustenance and 
survival. According to Carvalho (2013:21-22) not only the slave but also the average 
Brazilian was dependent upon the local oligarch ‘to live, work and protect them from 
arbitrary government actions and other landholders’ and therefore at the ‘mercy of the 
arbitrary nature of the most powerful’.  
Much is made of the paternalism of social and labour relations in Brazilian history 
(Schmitter 1971: 97-98, Buarque de Holanda 2009 [1936]: 91). This sometimes 
understates the underlying threat and regular use of violence; a shared responsibility of the 
state and local oligarchies in response to any form of manifestation that contests their 
vested interests in the existing social order. As Graham (1985: 794) describes Brazil after 
independence: 
The stability which so concerned both Conservatives and Liberals mainly sprang not 
from political institutions, however, but from social relationships based upon the 
exchange of loyal service for protection and favours […] in every case, benevolent care 
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gloved outright force. In political life elaborate systems of patronage made it possible to 
grant benefits - especially authority over others - to those who steadfastly supported the 
existing structure. Favours not only won compliance from those expected to obey, but 
assuaged the sensibilities of those charged with enforcement.  
Further evidence of the embeddedness of the described regressive path is its resistance to 
international pressure for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. A condition of British 
approval for independence was a Brazilian commitment to abolish slavery and there was a 
formal legislative Anglo-Brazilian treaty in 1826 and ‘severe penalties’ on the international 
slave trade introduced in 1832 (Bethel & Carvalho 1986: 696). The phrase para ingles ver 
(‘for the English to see’) originates from this formal anti-slavery legislation and can be 
described as a somewhat persistent informal institution in Brazilian society. It is defined by 
Carvalho (2013:46) as a ‘law implemented for formal reasons with no intention of it ever 
being enforced’.  
Like Independence, when abolition finally arrived sixty-six years later in 1888 it is widely 
considered as a non-critical juncture in terms of any significant change in the existing 
hierarchical and exploitative social order (Cardoso 2010:97; Carvalho 2013:17; Hale 
1986:372). As Viotti da Costa (1986:767) describes ‘The system of patronage remained 
intact and oligarchical groups continued to control the nation to the exclusion of the 
masses’. It is important to recognise that the regressive path for labour described in this 
section, profoundly affected the majority of workers in Brazil, not merely those directly 
subjected to slavery.  
The majority of the working population fared little better than the slave labour. Fragoso 
(2000) uses the term ‘non-slave labour’ instead of ‘free’ given that the latter term would be 
an inaccurate description to describe the situation in which the majority of Brazilian 
workers found themselves.  Consensus can be observed on the blurring of slave and non-
slave labour during the 19th century as Cardoso (2010:66) observes: 
Often the only distinguishing feature of the free man (white or not) and a slave was that 
they were not the property of anyone, but in other respects such as diet, clothing, 
housing, life expectancy etc. they were very similar. 
Graham (1985:757) describes the slave - free worker distinction as ‘not always clearcut’ 
and that ‘the distinction between slave labour and wage labour tended to blur’. It is 
therefore reiterated that the persistence of an extremely hierarchical social structure based 
upon slave labour, that remained relatively untouched by independence or abolition, had 
profound negative repercussions for the majority of workers to the extent that a clear 
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distinction between slave and non-slave labour was difficult. As Viotti da Costa 
(1986:726) describes abolition and the transition from monarchy to republic: 
Rural oligarchies continued to control government, state and federal. And the great 
majority of the Brazilian population, free poor, ex-slave — and immigrant — continued 
to be exploited as it always had been. After two decades of reform the country did not 
seem fundamentally to have changed.   
The exploitative social relations were similarly reproduced into the urban environment, 
despite the absence of the rural latifundio structure. Hall & Spalding (1986: 328) describe a 
Latin American tendency where urban growth coincided with the ‘flooding’ of the labour 
market creating a substantial ‘industrial reserve army’ making any organisation or 
mobilisation very difficult. The regressive social structure persisted and reproduced itself 
in the urban environment at the beginning of the 20th Century. Oligarchic fear of any 
reformist pressure from below and a distinct preference for social order and continuity 
persisted. It was enforced by considerable coercion and facilitated by the poverty, 
vulnerability and dependence of the majority of urban workers. Due to the persistence of 
secular institutions of repression and control, conditions were unfavourable for the 
emergence of labour institutions in urban areas.  
There are some notable, albeit tenuous developments in terms of labour organisation that 
merit attention which leads into the second part of this section. The first manifestations of 
organised labour were the mutual aid societies present in the second half of the 19th 
century, a response to precarious urban living conditions rather than any contestation of the 
social system ‘attempting to provide benefits in cases of accident, sickness or death’ (Hall 
& Spalding, 1986:337). There was evidence of a propensity to strike in Rio de Janeiro and 
Sao Paulo in the 19th century though these tended to be sporadic mobilisations; again not 
challenging the social structure and predictably, given the prevailing social relations, were 
met with violent repression. The police, as Fausto (1986:793) observes, represented ‘a 
traditional appendage of the large landowners’.  
Fausto (1986:810) describes the period of 1917-1920 as a ‘phase of major growth in the 
labour movement’. Influenced by developments abroad (Russian and Mexican revolutions) 
together with domestic conditions, workers begin to organise. Within the emergent 
organisation of labour there were significant strikes bringing Sao Paulo to a standstill in 
July 1917 and increased union membership with 20,000 workers in the Rio de Janeiro 
textile union. The predominant strand of labour organisation in Brazil and Latin America is 
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widely reported as being anarcho-syndicalism, where according to Hall & Spalding 
(1986:341) 
the notion of 'direct action' generally occupied a central place. By this militants meant 
that workers should rely on strikes, sabotage, boycotts and similar weapons, rather than 
seeking gains through the institutions of the bourgeois state, among which they included 
all political parties.11 
There was significant divergence and pragmatism within the Brazilian strands of anarcho-
syndicalism. Hall & Spalding (idem:342) describe a regional tendency in Latin America of 
hybrid anarcho-syndicalism, where anarchist aspects of the doctrine became ‘very diluted 
indeed’. Contrary to the underlying ideology many unions would call for state intervention 
and devote a ‘considerable amount of their attention and energies to their securing of 
economic gains’. In this sense the anarcho-syndicalism overlapped with another significant 
strand within the emerging trade unions, which is described as reformist or “yellow” by its 
critics. Reformist unions are those who work towards gains for members through the 
constraints of the existing system.  
The emergence of organised labour in urban Brazil between 1917 and 1920 evident in 
strike activity in the two main cities does not represent a transformative change to the 
social structure or any alteration to the existing repressive path dependency already 
described. The inability of labour organisations to challenge the hierarchical social order is 
due to the interrelated characteristics of both the ruling oligarchy and the masses. Hall & 
Spalding (1986:333) acknowledge that collective action and establishing organisations has 
been historically difficult for workers ‘everywhere’ particularly in the earlier phases of 
industrialisation though they describe the conditions prevailing in Latin America as 
particularly unfavourable or ‘especially difficult’ (p.328).  
Such unfavourable conditions are well summarised by Fausto (1986:809-810); initially 
describing the existence of the ‘necessary conditions for the emergence of a labour 
movement in the cities’ and class consciousness given the dynamics of urban sociability of 
workers less constrained by the paternalism and clientelism of rural power dynamics. 
However, when considered in light of other interrelated characteristics, the potential for a 
labour movement with political influence to contribute to transformative change is 
frustrated. A key factor is economic, given the abundance of available labour due to a 																																																								
11 Interestingly representatives of trade unions with pre-1930 origins (Marreta-MG, Marreta PE & STICCRMF) consulted during 2013 
fieldwork place considerable importance upon their anarcho-syndicalist roots.  	
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mixture of mass immigration, abolition and internal migration. The dominant coffee 
industry generated a surplus urban labour force and as a result bargaining power was 
reduced and replacing striking workers was relatively easy.  
The especially difficult conditions for mobilisation are further reinforced by the action and 
inaction of the state and its oligarchic pact, what Cardoso describes as ‘vertical violence’. 
Justified by the predominant liberal ideals of the era, there was almost no state 
involvement with employment relations other than brutal repression. This is consistent 
with the persistence of the hierarchical and exploitative social relations. The minimal 
protective legislation that did exist (child labour provisions) was para ingles ver (Carvalho 
2013:62). Significant continuities from previous centuries can be identified in state action 
as Dean (1986:723) describes elite attitudes 
Trade unions they regarded as subversive, workers as indigent dependants, and the 
unemployed as lazy and potentially criminal. Labour relations in the cities, if practised 
at all, were considered a form of charity, and it was expected that workers should 
reciprocate with humility and gratitude. 
The increasingly powerful State and the persistence of the oligarchical pact where 
employers could rely upon the repressive forces to suppress any challenge to the existing 
social order meant that attempts at organised labour were further limited by severe 
repression. Hall & Spalding (1986:331) observe that ‘The ferocity of state repression even 
shocked foreign police agents, not normally suspected of excessive sympathy toward the 
labour movement’. The persistence of an unfavourable set of institutions and 
complementarities means that organised labour weakened significantly after a peak in 
activity between 1917 and 1920. Together with abolition and independence this initial 
mobilisation can similarly be considered a non-critical juncture in terms of any substantive 
change to the regressive path dependency embedded in the hierarchical social structure.  
Despite much discussion on the origins of the Brazilian labour movement the 
transformative effect of the pre-1930 mobilisations should not be overstated. Most of these 
institutions emerged in an urban environment, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in particular; 
within a society where only 16.6 per cent lived in cities with a population over 20 thousand 
people and seventy per cent of the urban population were involved in agricultural activity 
(1920 census in Carvalho 2013:54). This initial emergence of some forms of labour 
institutions could therefore be considered somewhat exceptional and regionally specific 
when considering the entirety of Brazil’s workforce.  
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When the existing system did finally come to an end it was not due to internal factors or 
pressure from below. The socio-economic model before 1930 was dependent upon primary 
goods and external markets sustained by a mutually supportive and self-reinforcing 
oligarchic pact between large landholders and the state that had proven to be resistant, 
hostile and impermeable to change over centuries. It imploded due to its own 
unsustainability exposed by the global crash of 1929.  
3.2 1930-1964: The path of labour market institutions and the promise of 
employment rights 
The period discussed in this second part of the chapter is considered in two sub-sections. 
Using Collier and Collier’s (2002) terminology: the 1930-1945 ‘incorporation’ period 
where labour and its related institutions are introduced into the formal ‘political arena’ and 
the ‘aftermath/heritage’ of the reforms between 1945 and 1964. For many analysts the 
1930s is the starting point for studying modern Brazil. The systems introduced over the 
decade are still by and large in place today, particularly labour-related institutions. As a 
result, analysis of this first ‘incorporation’ sub-period is prioritised. 
It is particularly important to consider whether the incorporation reforms significantly 
alter, break with or overcome the historically embedded regressive path for labour depicted 
in the previous section. A related question is as to what degree have antecedent conditions 
influenced the 1930-1945 institutional reforms? This means continuities in terms of the 
conservative tradition of the state, i.e. prioritisation of maintaining social order, control 
based upon a combination of violence and paternalism and any formal legislation 
favourable to workers being para ingles ver. 
The period is undeniably one of significant change. In terms of the balance of power there 
is a shift towards centralisation of State power bringing the previous oligarchic pact to an 
end. In line with international trends there is State recognition that the previous laissez –
faire socio-economic and international relations model was responsible for Brazilian 
problems: national under-development and sustaining what is described as the ‘social 
issue’: the abject poverty in which the majority of Brazilians found themselves. There is 
therefore a significant shift in the role of the State from minimalist liberal form dependent 
upon proxy rule through regional powers to a more interventionist centralised power 
seeking to act in the ‘national interest’ and supported by an increasingly influential and 
powerful military.  
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An important element of the new approach was the regulation of employment relations 
through the accelerated introduction of robust national institutions and bureaucratic 
apparatus summarised in more detail in Annex 2.1. It culminated in the Consolidação das 
Leis de Trabalho (CLT) [Consolidation of Labour Law] in 1943 an institution still in place 
today. The post-1930 reforms are closely associated with the personality of president 
Getúlio Vargas who took power in a coup and ruled until 1945 with some democratic 
interludes though mainly in an authoritarian manner particularly during the Estado Novo 
1937-1945 period. The terms Vargas/CLT/Estado Novo to describe the reforms are herein 
used interchangeably.  
The first consideration is as to what proportion of the Brazilian workers actually benefitted 
from the newly introduced protective legislation. One key factor, widely recognised as 
having significant consequences for labour and Brazil’s subsequent development path (see 
Collier and Collier 2002: 166-167, Costa 2005:115, Carvalho 2013:146, Cardoso 
2010:164, Silva 2008:473) was the non-inclusion of rural workers to the CLT until 1963. 
This meant that the majority of Brazilians, the 70 per cent of the population living in rural 
areas in 1930, or the 65.9 per cent of the economically active population (EAP) employed 
in agriculture in 1939 (Abreu 2008:286) were formally excluded from its direct benefits.  
Further analysis of the practical impact of the CLT protections in the urban labour market 
suggests they did not represent an effective legal right or entitlement but a benefit to a 
relatively privileged minority. The new provisions encompassed formal sector workers in 
officially recognised professional categories. So even within the urban sectors significant 
proportions of workers were excluded from the benefits of what Santos (1979:75-76) 
describes as ‘regulated citizenship’. According to Silva (2008:464) these excluded groups 
are those at the base of the ‘pyramid of urban social stratification’ including domestic 
service workers (estimated at 20 per cent of the total female workforce in 1920) and self-
employed casual workers. Consistent with Silva (2008:464) and Carvalho (2013:153) the 
urban workers most likely to be excluded from formal employment and its CLT 
protections are those from sectors ‘rooted in the country’s slave owning historical culture’.  
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Figure 3.1: Percentage participation in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant prices - Brazil 1900-
2000  
 
Source: IBGE 1990 & 2001 in Bonelli 2006:387 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of the participation of workers protected by social and 
employment legislation as a proportion of total workforce (%)   
 
Source: IBGE protection estimates: occupations with some social and 
employment protections; Elaborated by Pochmann (2010) 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the exclusionary nature of the reforms. Applying a highly 
optimistic supposition that all industrial workers benefitted from CLT legislation this still 
only represents 18.4 per cent of economic activity in 1940. The idea of mass exclusion 
from labour rights is reinforced by Pochmann’s (2010) estimates using IBGE data 
presented in figure 3.2 with only 12.5 per cent of the workforce covered by social and 
employment legislation in 1940. Similarly relevant from this data is that this exclusion of 
the majority persists until 1980 when half the workforce continues to be excluded from the 
50-year old legislation. As per Peters (2005:71) on path dependency quoted in chapter 1: 
‘when a government programme or organization embarks upon a path there is an inertial 
tendency for those initial policy choices to persist’. Evidence strongly suggests that 
exclusion from the protections of the CLT legislation persisted across the 20th century.   
Using Santos’s (1979: 75-76) terminology, Cardoso (2010:170-171 emphasis in original) 
describes how those without a formally recognised profession are excluded from regulated 
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citizenship and are therefore ‘pre-citizens’ for whom the benefits of the CLT regulations 
exist as a possibility or promise. He further describes access to the promised labour rights 
as often being a ‘long and frustrating obstacle course’. Receipt of CLT benefits required a 
CTPS workbook, which to be issued required the production of a birth certificate. 
Possession of the required formal registration was rare particularly for those having 
migrated from rural areas. Obtaining the appropriate documentation to be entitled to the 
CLT rights was a bureaucratic inferno, particularly for the poorest in society.    
The considerable formal and informal barriers to the effectiveness of the CLT reforms lead 
French (2004:97) to argue that the ineffectiveness was intentional in its design. He 
suggests legislators were aware unfavourable political conditions meant the law would not 
be respected and compliance represented a choice for employers. If this were to be the case 
it would represent an example of the para ingles ver historical trait of legislation passed as 
a façade with no intention of enforcement; a phenomenon that can be traced to the evasion 
and noncompliance with anti-slavery measures. Within the HI approach it is an example of 
the ‘drift’ form of ‘institutional change’ (see ch.1 table 1.1), however in this case it would 
be ‘deliberate neglect’ to impede rather than instil change.  
Whether noncompliance and exclusion was an intentional objective of legislators and 
reformers is not discussed in any further detail here. Yet it can be considered an embedded 
historical trait that persists into contemporary employment relations (see figure 3.2, 
Cardoso and Lage 2007 and ch. 6 on regulation). It is one of a number of characteristics of 
the Estado Novo labour reforms influenced by the dynamics of the previous historical 
period. Such historical legacies within the reforms are perhaps understated in alternative 
analyses that take this period as a starting point for modern Brazilian society.  
The persistent pre-1930 conservative, authoritarian, hierarchical and paternalistic historical 
traits are particularly evident in the corporatist trade union system introduced. By 1930 the 
labour movement was, in Cardoso’s words (2010:167) ‘weakened and defeated’ from its 
1917-1920 peak and was highly unlikely to have achieved the gains introduced by Vargas’ 
‘revolution’. Despite the relative absence of any popular pressure, all the CLT reforms 
were present in the demands of striking workers during the 1917-1920 period and labour 
debates of previous decades where they were ignored, repressed and/or denounced as 
subversive and ‘anti-Brazilian’.  
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This means the reforms were top-down paternalistic initiatives rather than responses to 
popular pressure and this has consequences for subsequent effectiveness. The CLT is 
presented as a privilege or a gift rather than a legal right or entitlement. The paternalistic 
element is personified by the figure of Vargas as the ‘father of the poor’ who upon the 
return to democracy in 1945 plays heavily upon his ‘gift’ of social legislation to the 
Brazilian people. The individual rights introduced within the reforms were granted at the 
expense of collective organisational freedoms. In this sense it reflects the formalisation of 
historical social relations where workers are expected to ‘respond with humility and 
gratitude’ (Dean op cit) to any benefits granted. In this case trade unions are created, 
structured and expected to be compliant and collaborative organisations in exchange for 
the granting of employment rights.  
The unions were state controlled bureaucratic entities; their formation and leaders 
dependent upon state approval and subject to intervention and disbandment in the case of 
noncompliance with Labour Ministry regulations. Employment disputes became an 
administrative issue to be resolved by the newly established labour courts, which 
represents progress from the previous era where such matters were left to ‘the oppressive 
instruments of law and order’. Strikes were prohibited, as was inter-category organisation. 
Independent of its legality, inter-sectorial organisation was made difficult by the vertical 
and fragmented structure of trade union organisation (Silva 2008:472).  
Any labour organisation outside of the corporatist system was met with both violent and 
non-violent repression, particularly left-wing groups as the historical fear and loathing of 
the masses evolved into a fear and loathing of the left-wing ‘subversive’. Even in the 
absence of repression, alternative grass-roots labour organisations would struggle to 
compete with the resources and bureaucratic apparatus offered by the corporatist structure 
particularly after the introduction of the imposto sindical [syndical tax] in 1941. All 
workers independent of membership contribute the equivalent of a day’s wages to finance 
the system, distributed between the union (60 per cent), federation (15 per cent), 
confederation (5 per cent) and Labour Ministry (20 per cent).  
The new trade union institutions existed outside of the workplace, whilst there were State 
representatives in the unions, there were no union representatives at the plant-level, 
meaning that the institutions were detached from the shop-floor and rank and file. This 
separation between worker and union is aggravated further by the consequences of the 
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syndical tax. Carvalho (2013:121) observes that the guaranteed funds incentivised the 
proliferation of small trade unions that could effortlessly command these resources rather 
than increased worker unionisation. Silva (2008:473) observes how ‘The unions increased 
in number without effective representation or meaningful membership, run by individuals, 
the so-called pelegos’. 
Carvalho (2013:122) describes peleguismo as one of the most negative consequences of 
the authoritarian trade union legislation. As described in chapter 1, the pelego – is a union 
leader or representative acting in self-interest with close ties to the State and employers at 
the expense of adequately representing their category. Carvalho describes the syndical tax, 
the vertical structure of trade union institutions and the labour court system as having 
created a hotbed of peleguismo. Silva (2008:473) describes the pelego trade union leaders 
as being ‘for all practical purposes, de facto staff of the Ministry of Labour completely 
subservient to orders of the government of the day’.  
When analysing the composite CLT system an incompatibility or negative 
complementarity can be observed between the individual labour rights legislation and the 
trade union institutions introduced. Firstly, as Roxborough (1995:342) observes, ‘Nothing 
equivalent to shop stewards ever developed and unions had no workplace function’. 
Secondly, the unions that did exist had an institutional design to collaborate with or answer 
to the State to guarantee social harmony and the national interest, rather than actively 
defend employment rights. Silva (2008:473) relates that the guaranteed financing of the 
unions independent of membership meant that they were ‘already quite docile’ and with 
the establishment of specialist labour courts to arbitrate between capital and labour and the 
government determining the minimum wage they became ‘even more irrelevant in terms of 
their capacity for collective bargaining’. Within this system responsive and active trade 
union representation to incentivise workplace compliance with the CLT is improbable. 
The conservative or even counter-revolutionary nature of the reforms means that 
significant continuities and persistence of traits unfavourable to labour should be expected 
to have persisted beyond the 1930-1945 incorporation period. This is the case when 
considering the predominant rural social structure of labour relations and land ownership. 
The ‘discouraging legacy’ for labour described in the previous section was left ‘virtually 
untouched and unaffected’ (Silva 2008:473). The lack of a significant break with the 
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regressive path for labour follows historical tendencies of the State to prioritise ‘stability 
and order’, evident since the independence process a century earlier.  
The absence of a significant rupture with the previous social structure calls into question 
whether the CLT can be considered a ‘critical juncture’. In the sense that it did not bring an 
end to the regressive patterns embedded in previous periods and the conservative nature of 
the reforms bear many of the negative hallmarks of the previous state-society dynamics. 
Similarly there is no immediate substantial change in the reality for the majority of 
Brazilian workers. The unequal social structure proves resistant or even ‘hostile’ to reform. 
Such continuities arguably still influence employment in contemporary Brazil (see 
chapters 4-6). Whether it is a ‘critical juncture’ is a matter of perspective.  
The 1930-1945 labour reforms represent less of a period of substantive change than that 
presented in more traditional, emotive and nationalistic interpretations of a “revolution” 
centred around the messianic figure of Vargas (see Oliveira Vianna 1951 in particular).  As 
Levine (1998:112 own emphasis) observes ‘his [Vargas’] revolution was partial; one in 
which new constituencies and rules were grafted onto traditional political practices’. 
Consistent with Levine, the Vargas reforms could be described as an example of the 
layering type of gradual transformation (Streeck & Thelen 2005:31) summarised in table 
1.1 in chapter 1. Rather than a critical juncture or radical break with the embedded 
regressive path for labour already discussed, it could be described as an additional layer 
‘attached to existing institutions’. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the gradual evolution of 
workforce inclusion under the employment legislation.  
Cardoso (2010:159-160) recognises that the promises of social inclusion were not yet 
realised when they were introduced. However, he argues that the introduction of “regulated 
citizenship” ‘entirely changed the relationship of the Brazilian State with its people’. The 
additional layer of social and employment protection described in the previous paragraph 
became an expectation, ambition and goal for Brazilian workers according to Cardoso. The 
undelivered promise of social protection and well-being represented something worth 
fighting for and the bureaucratic, legislative and repressive apparatus introduced, places 
the existing system in a privileged position to dispute hearts and minds ‘with other 
promises (such as socialism)’.  
Cardoso (idem:181) demonstrates the idea of CLT protections as an aspiration through an 
analysis of the difference between the number of CTPS workbooks issued, the Urban 
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Economically Active Population (EAP) and workers making social security contributions 
presented in figure 3.3. The difference between the number of workbooks issued and those 
covered by the CLT provides a good indication as to how many workers, within the sectors 
eligible for such benefits had a formal CLT regulated employment relationship as an 
objective. It similarly suggests, from the 1950-1960 period in particular, there is a 
significant disparity between those in receipt of and those seeking the benefits offered by 
the CLT. This is an essential ongoing consideration when considering the relationship 
between the formal legislation and its effectiveness. Despite the exclusionary and 
somewhat authoritarian nature of the formal LMI system already described, Cardoso’s 
interpretation is an early example of the ‘lighthouse effect’ of an identifiable 
complementarity between the formal legislation and informal employment (See chapter 1, 
Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo 2001:78, & Medeiros 2015:289) incentivising and directing 
excluded workers to seek out their legal entitlements. 
Figure 3.3 Evolution of the Urban Economically Active Population (EAP), the number of 
workbooks issued by the Labour Ministry and the number of social service contributors - 
Brazil 1940-1976 
 
Source: IBGE: Annual Statistics – Brazil, various years; e IPEA data for estimations of 
the urban EAP and social service contributors compiled by Cardoso (2010: 181) 
Collier and Collier (2002:752-753) place considerable importance upon the 1930-1945 
‘incorporation’ period. It is considered a major watershed/critical juncture given the 
influence it had upon the subsequent regime dynamics over the next fifty years, the ‘new’ 
trade unionism as part of the democratisation process of the 1980s in particular. 
Considering both the Collier and Collier and Cardoso interpretations, the Vargas/CLT 
reforms draw the battle lines or ‘define the political arena’ for the subsequent trajectory of 
Brazilian society and the labour movement. Therefore, despite the exclusionary nature 
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already discussed, the institutional reforms represent a critical juncture when the 
subsequent dynamics set in motion are considered. This is evident in the subsequent 
aftermath/legacy period 1945-1964. 
A more democratic political system was introduced from 1945 albeit with some relevant 
authoritarian continuities such as the corporatist unicity trade union system. Considerable 
restrictions on the right to strike persisted, as did the prohibition of cross-category union 
organisation. This period saw an emergence of popular pressure and contestation from 
below that was absent before and during the ‘incorporation’ period. The labour movement 
that emerged displayed some similar traits with its pre-1930 manifestations with anarcho-
syndicalist, socialist and communist strands and similar ‘pragmatism’, ‘dilution’ and 
‘flexibility’ of ideological identities to those evident in pre-1930 labour mobilisations (Hall 
& Spalding op cit).  
Despite the persistence of ‘red scare’ within society used to justify the 1964 coup, the 
communist party mostly worked within the constraints of the CLT system. As Santana 
observes (1999:106-107) the communists ‘gave life’ to the corporatist system between 
1945 and 1964 with negligible challenges made to the syndical tax that maintained its 
structure. Collier and Collier (2002:549) describe the communist party, dominant in Rio 
and Sao Paulo as ‘pursuing a fairly conciliatory, nonrevolutionary position, working within 
the official framework and hoping to gain legalization’. This mirrors the hybrid or 
pragmatic characteristics of the pre-1930s anarcho-syndicalist labour manifestations.  
Carvalho (2013:122-123) provides an informative description of the development of the 
labour institutions post 1945. He describes how the majority of the post-democratisation 
labour struggle ‘revolved around attempts to remove the pelegos’ from the leadership of 
the trade unions. He describes this as ironic as the Estado Novo system being used to 
remove the pelegos was the same one that had put them in control of the unions in the first 
place. Within the types of gradual change framework (Streeck & Thelen op cit), evidence 
from this period indicates the ‘conversion’ potential of the CLT institutional framework: 
‘the redeployment of old institutions to new purposes: new purposes attached to old 
structures’. 
The more politicised groups described as “authentic”, some from the outlawed Communist 
Party took control of many of the trade unions and Pension and Retirement Institutions 
(IAPs) and in breach of CLT regulations formed unified peak organisations such as the 
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General Workers’ Command (CGT) and Unity and Action Pact (PUA). The declining yet 
‘still important’ force within the trade unions, the pelego groups reorganised as an anti-
communist faction calling themselves the democráticos (Collier and Collier 2002: 550).  
Without a trade union presence in the workplace, Carvalho (2013:123) argues that the 
transition from pelego to politicised more militant leaderships did not significantly change 
the relationship between the trade unions and the rank and file with the latter continuing to 
be excluded. He describes the shift as ‘merely a change at the cupula [summit]’ of the 
institutions and likens trade-union power to an ‘army without soldiers’. This described 
absence of popular support or grass-roots engagement of the ‘summit’ of the new trade 
union groups was exposed by the failure of a general strike called by ‘confident trade 
union leaders’ for the 31st of March in opposition to the military coup where: ‘the masses 
in whose name the leaders spoke did not appear in defence of the [ousted] government’ 
(Carvalho 2013:144 also see Bethel & Castro 2008:168).  
The idea of pre-1964 trade unionism being an ‘army without soldiers’ distant from the 
shop floor is contested by Santana (1999). He argues that it represents an imagined 
discourse contributing and strengthening an idea of a rupture in trade unionism and the 
‘new’ or ‘authentic’ identity emerging in the 1970s. He cites a body of work (idem: 110) 
including his own that evidences significant efforts and some success by communist 
groups to create plant-level representation mechanisms pre-1964 and therefore the 
hegemonic trade unionism strands of the 1945-1964 ‘cannot be characterised as detached 
from the grass-roots at the workplace’. Leaders becoming more responsive to the rank and 
file over the 1950s is also acknowledged by Collier and Collier (2002:549). 
The mobilisation of rural workers during the 1945-1964 period is of considerable historical 
significance given that the incorporation reforms had left the traditional rural employment 
relations and social structure untouched. In 1960 this sector still represented the majority 
of the population (50 per cent) and labour force (55 per cent of workers in the primary 
sector) (Carvalho 2013: 139). Rural mobilisation initially formed outside of the CLT 
structure through the Ligas Camponesas [Peasant Leagues] movement in the northeast, 
which spread nationwide. Responding to popular pressures and the post-Cuban Revolution 
fear of the radicalised Ligas, rural workers were finally incorporated into the CLT system 
two decades after its finalisation. Inclusion was through the Rural Workers Charter in 1963 
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introduced by Goulart’s government described by Silva (2008:487) as ‘desperately seeking 
to broaden the precarious base of its popular support’.  
The inclusion within the formal institutional system and the restrictions and resources this 
implies meant that formal rural trade unionism spread rapidly, displacing the ligas 
camponesas in terms of influence (Silva 2008: 487). By 1964 The Rural Workers 
Confederation (Contag) included 26 federations, 263 authorised unions, with almost 500 
awaiting recognition. Carvalho (2013:140) describes the newly emerged rural trade 
unionism as a much greater threat, albeit perceived rather than genuine, to the traditional 
landholding elite than the urban trade unions of the 1930s, particularly given the clamour 
for agrarian reform. In response to the emerging pressure from below, a land reform and 
expropriation decree was passed in March 1964. Within the wider context of increasing 
post-Cuban revolution ideological polarisation and the fear of the perceived revolutionary 
intentions of the Goulart government together with economic instability and high inflation, 
there was a military coup within the same month of March marking the beginning of 20 
years of conservative authoritarian rule.  
From the 1930-1964 period certain characteristics stand out on the history of LMIs in 
Brazil; initially the exclusion of the majority of the workforce from the protections 
introduced over the 1930s suggests continuity of the noncompliance tendencies that pre-
date the CLT system itself. The low levels of inclusion should not however downplay the 
significance of the reforms identified by Collier and Collier (2002:752-753) as a critical 
juncture. The relationship between Brazilian workers changed considerably as Cardoso 
(2010 op cit) observes with the promise of labour rights coming ‘to define the political 
arena’.  
The CLT system appears robust as its survival into the present day would suggest. 
Evidence indicates however that it should not be interpreted as a static system, a common 
misconception on contemporary criticisms of the 75-year old LMI arrangements. The 
observable change between the original institutional design of authoritarian control of civil 
society and the labour mobilisations that represented a significant cleavage factor leading 
into the authoritarian reversal of 1964, shows that it is not a static system in terms of 
labour mobilisation and trade union influence. This is consistent with Cardoso and Collier 
and Collier (op cit) on the potential of the system to rapidly mobilise labour. This capacity 
for ‘conversion’ is not captured by more static analyses. Union presence and influence may 
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be ‘sparse’ during certain historical periods and at certain institutional levels (union 
absence within the workplace see Roxborough op cit), but ‘sparse’ does not adequately 
describe the influence and path of trade unions in Brazil since the 1930s.   
3.3 1964-1989 –Reconversion and Continuity: Military Rule and 
Democratisation 
The period of military rule and subsequent democratisation process is analysed in this third 
section. Three specific points are examined: firstly, as to what degree the authoritarian 
coup altered the two paths for labour already identified and discussed: the ‘regressive’ pre-
1930 legacy and the ‘CLT path’ characterised by the promise and expectation of labour 
rights. The second point discusses how this economic ‘miracle’ period affected labour and 
society. The third element considers the historical significance of the mobilisation of 
labour organisations at the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, widely described as ‘new 
trade unionism’. Cardoso (2003:50) describes the 1980s as the ‘pinnacle of trade union 
organisation in Brazil’ yet this period coincides with the ‘lost decade’ of an economic 
crisis of unprecedented proportions with considerable repercussions for labour (and 
general development).  
When analysing relevant continuities and change for labour, the military coup can be 
considered an authoritarian/conservative reversal or regression with some significant 
parallels to the Vargas reforms three decades earlier. In terms of labour reforms, the 
existing corporatist/authoritarian system already provided the state with the formal powers 
for authoritarian intervention. Once again demonstrating the systemic capacity for 
‘conversion’. As Cardoso (2003:34) argues, it represents a system that can be used as a 
tool for ‘control and repression’ by an authoritarian regime or for ‘rapid nationwide 
collective organisation’ in an emerging democracy. One of the first comprehensive 
measures of the newly installed military regime was the immediate and widespread 
intervention in the more combative trade unions. Between 1964 and 1970 there were 536 
interventions in trade union organisations with 35 directors dismissed or ‘retired’ (Klein & 
Figueiredo 1978).  
For the majority of military rule the formal labour institutions reverted to the role 
originally intended for them by the Vargas reforms; collaborative organs of the state to 
contribute to the national interest. There was no strike activity of any significance between 
1968 and 1978, regional minimum wage levels were determined by the State often using 
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the ‘always underestimated’ inflation figures (Abreu 2008: 363). Trade Unions therefore 
returned to their previous pelego format providing some social assistance to members, 
remained outside of the workplace and continued to be funded by the guaranteed resources 
of the unicity system; institutions of control and arbitrary assistance rather than the 
‘authentic’ representation of workers’ interests. Within the gradual transformation 
framework already discussed, the authoritarian reversals can be described as a rapid 
process of institutional reconversion.  
The military regime did not significantly alter the existing labour institutions. The Length 
of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS) system was introduced, acting like employment 
insurance with employer and worker contributions. It replaced the CLT provision granting 
stability for workers over ten years in their job seeking to introduce more flexibility to the 
labour market. Whether in practice the introduction of the FGTS (still in place today) 
represents the effective removal of a labour right is questionable, as Abreu (2008:369) 
observes ‘it became a generalised practice to fire workers before they completed the ten-
year period to avoid the high costs of firing’. This within the already discussed historical 
context of the majority of the workforce excluded from the CLT protections.  
The military government actually extended and consolidated the CLT labour rights during 
its rule. Social welfare provisions, (medical assistance, retirement and pension benefits) 
were extended to cover the historically significant (and excluded) rural, domestic and self-
employed workers. The reforms affecting rural workers, described by Carvalho (2013:171) 
as the ‘eternal pariahs of the system’, merit specific attention given the historical neglect 
already described. The rural social welfare benefits were part of the Rural Assistance Fund 
(Funrural) and the responsibility for distribution was with the rural CLT trade unions under 
Contag. 
Carvalho (idem: 172) describes how the initial repression of rural movements by the 
military regime followed by the subsequent extension of social benefits reinforced 
traditional conservatism12. He further observes that the state did not make demands of the 
landholding elite to finance the extension of social benefits. This reflects a similar 
reluctance or unwillingness to intervene in the traditional rural power and privilege 
structure to that of the Vargas regime.  
																																																								12	To	use	a	Brazilian	expression:	pau	(stick)	followed	by	pão	(bread).	
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The trajectory of the CLT reforms during the military government is consistent with the 
Estado novo trait of gifting social rights in exchange for control. A characteristic argued 
here to be embedded in the pre-1930 historical tendency where ‘humility and gratitude’ is 
expected for any favourable concession to workers (Dean op cit). High economic growth 
figures also meant that it was not only in the rural areas that the regime benefitted from 
popular support and credibility. This leads into the next sub-section considering how the 
economic ‘miracles’ of the period affected workers or altered the reality of employment for 
the majority of the workforce.  
The period from 1964 to the end of the 1970s saw intense economic, geographical and 
demographic change considerably altering the characteristics of the economy and society. 
In absolute terms there were significant human development improvements that benefitted 
the labour force as well as the wider population, substantial poverty reduction in particular. 
Silva (2008:494) describes an unprecedented ‘degree of social mobility’ between 1945 and 
1980, yet recognises that such improvements are absolute rather than relative and observes 
(502) that:  
with economic growth rates at the levels observed during the period under discussion, 
redistributive processes would have to have been very warped indeed not to have 
produced some improvements in the conditions of the poorest classes. 
Abreu (2008:380) observes that ‘the absolute improvements in all deciles of the income 
distribution particularly the very poor was highlighted by pro-government analysts’ 
whereas those in opposition to the government pointed out increases in income 
concentration. In terms of inequality the richest five per cent of Brazilian society saw their 
share of income increase from 28.3 per cent in 1960 to 39.8 per cent in 1972 and the 
participation of the richest one per cent almost doubled from 11.9 per cent in 1960 to 19.72 
per cent in 1972. The poorest fifty per cent saw their share of national income fall from 
17.4 per cent to 11.3 per cent during the same period (IBGE, 1979:196 in Lago, 1989:290). 
Within the context of the nationalist and populist euphoria surrounding the economic 
growth within an authoritarian regime and a historical legacy of embedded inequality it can 
be anticipated that income concentration was not a major official concern.  
Similar to the trade union legislation already mentioned, the military government was 
bequeathed with a defined and restrictive wage negotiation structure within the CLT 
legislation. Despite the statistical precariousness for the historical period in question 
(recognised by Silva 2008: 502, Santos 2006:27, Lago 1989:209), Lago (1989: 286) 
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observes that ‘whichever indicator is chosen, the 1967 to 1973 period demonstrated a fall 
or stagnation in the real minimum wage’ in spite of strong economic and productivity 
growth. The overall general trend observed by Lago (idem:287, 294) and Abreu 
(2008:363), whether wages fell, stagnated, or increased, is that earnings did not rise in 
proportion to the high growth of domestic wealth during the period. Lago recognises that 
this relative loss for workers was somewhat mitigated by the investments in social 
infrastructure during the period.  
Were there to have been a radical challenge to this unequal and persistent social order 
through institutional reforms, consequences for labour could have been different. However, 
any radical break with the past similarly goes against the described historical traits of 
stability, order and continuity. Whilst the CLT guaranteed the existence of trade unions, 
the authoritarian and corporatist nature of the Vargas legislation meant that such 
institutions could not be expected to challenge the development model under an 
authoritarian conservative regime as Lago (1989: 294) speculates: 
The impression remains that very satisfactory growth would also have been possible 
with a less restrictive wage policy, greater individual freedoms and greater participation 
of the mass of the population in decision-making and in sharing the fruits of economic 
growth.  
The high growth economic strategy of the authoritarian regime proved unsustainable in the 
late 1970s due to unmanageable public finances and related rising inflation. The labour 
movement emerged at the vanguard of opposition to the regime organising a wave of 
strikes in what is widely described as the ‘new trade unionism’ movement. After a decade 
(1968-1978) without any significant labour mobilisations there was a wave of strikes 
originating in the ABC Paulista industrial region, the location of the most intense 
transformative industrial development over the previous decades.  
Worker discontent was heightened by real wage losses with official state wage policy 
granting rises at half the rate of inflation. Employers used regular layoffs and rotation of 
the workforce to further suppress wages and bargaining power, aggravating worker 
grievances (ABC da Greve 1990). An initial strike by metalworkers at Saab-Scania initially 
spread across the neighbouring automobile plants then nationally across other industries 
leading to the general strike of March 1979 involving 3 million workers in ‘industry, 
mining, urban services, banking, civil construction and education’ across fifteen states 
representing the birth of the new trade unionism (Bethell & Castro 2008:214).  
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There is a celebrated and somewhat romanticised interpretation of the worker mobilisation 
within the ‘new’ trade union movement as emerging from the shop-floor as Roxborough 
(2008:362) describes ‘the pelego union leadership was bypassed and new leaders emerged 
from the rank-and-file’. Such a description is arguably partial or inaccurate; Collier and 
Collier (2002:757) are critical of the ‘too many analysts’ describing the wave of labour 
mobilisations and strike activity as surprising or as a ‘new’ social force. The authors 
comprehensively argue that the emergence of strong and influential trade unions is path-
dependent upon the creation of the trade union institutions during the 1930-1945 
incorporation period. Collier and Collier therefore argue that a re-emergence of the labour 
force ‘might be anticipated’ whenever controls were relaxed as observed during the 
‘aftermath’ 1945-1964 period.  
This is consistent with Cardoso’s (op cit) observation that the existing system could be 
used to both repress or rapidly mobilise workers and the idea of conversion and 
reconversion presented in this chapter. It is widely recognised that the ‘new’ or ‘authentic’ 
trade union institutions and leaders (including future president Luis Inacio da Silva – 
“Lula”) emerged from within the existing 50-year old CLT institutions13 (Bethell and 
Castro 2008: 214, Collier and Collier 2002:757, Braga 2012: 166-167; Santana 1999:110). 
Therefore, from an institutional path dependency point of view, the social forces taking 
Lula from the factory floor to a close second in the presidential election of 1989 and the 
presidency in 2003 can be traced to the dynamics of the CLT institutions created in the 
1930s.  
The workers’ mobilisation did possess some ‘new’ or historically unprecedented 
characteristics. The mass mobilisation and the nationwide adherence to the general strikes 
represents a significant change from the hierarchical ‘army without soldiers’ detached from 
the masses of workers described by Carvalho (op cit) during the previous 1945-1964 wave 
of mobilisation, albeit an account disputed by Santana (1999) and others. The 
establishment of factory commissions within the ABC Paulista industrial region is 
similarly unprecedented in the context of the historical absence of CLT trade unions in the 
workplace, though this is argued to be somewhat industry and region specific (see ch. 4 – 
on the ABC standard of representation).  
																																																								
13 Braga rejects the ‘authentic’ or ‘grass-roots’ credentials of the ABC metalworkers unions, tracing the origins of the leaders to ‘known 
pelego groups’. Similar opinions were shared during fieldwork in 2013 from Marreta-BH union representatives and a group of veteran 
social movement militants in Recife (Sinttel 2013) who recalled hierarchical and impermeable metalworkers’ leadership groups contrary 
to the ‘authentic’ and ‘grass-roots’ image.  
		 129 
It is similarly notable that rural worker mobilisation characterised by conservatism under 
authoritarian rule was also a significant force during this period a further example of the 
rapid systemic capacity for conversion. The ongoing dispute over land rights and the 
support of the Catholic Church through the Pastoral Land Commissions (CPTs) mobilised 
the workers through the official Contag confederation. According to Carvalho (2013:182) 
rural trade unionism was comparable in numbers to the metalworkers’ vanguard though 
without the same ‘firepower’ as their urban counterparts. The ongoing economic crisis 
meant that middle-class, civil servants and state employees, traditionally protected by 
formal labour legislation were similarly mobilised and allied with the masses. Cardoso 
(2003:36) describes how a fall in purchasing power of federal civil servants between 1983 
and 1989 ‘catapulted’ them into collective action and emerging as the second most 
influential group within the CUT organisation despite public service worker unionisation 
yet to be legalised.  
Even though new trade unionism was embedded in the existing CLT parameters there were 
some significant long-term institutional developments stemming from the mass 
mobilisations. The Partido dos Trabalhadores [Workers’ Party] (PT) is formed, described 
by Bethell and Castro (2008:214) as ‘the only party born outside congress without ties to 
the traditional ‘political class’’ together with the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) 
peak association which as of 1989 had 2,000 unions affiliated covering 8 million workers, 
described by Cardoso (2003:38) as hegemonic in Brazilian trade unionism. In terms of 
labour rights and legislation it should be recognised that the CLT protections were 
maintained and extended during authoritarian rule, so there are no major upheavals 
comparable to the 1930s incorporation period in evidence. The labour provisions included 
in the 1988 Constitution (CF88) summarised in annex 2.1 are mostly repetition or 
extensions of the existing CLT legislation. 
The 1980s labour reforms of most significance for the trade union institutions were the 
legalisation of the right to strike and independence from the state. Two key corporatist 
provisions remained: unicity - one union per category and region and the syndical tax - 
compulsory funding and Labour Ministry authorisation required to form a trade union - the 
carta sindical (see chapter 5 for discussion of corporatist continuities). There are also two 
key omissions; workplace representation and inter-category organisations are not 
incorporated into the employment relations system despite their presence and influence 
within the labour movement. For individual workers the introduction of universal 
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unemployment insurance under the Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador [Workers’ 
Protection Fund] (FAT) system stands out as a significant gain.  
From a historical perspective, the real and tangible gains for labour from the 
democratisation process should not be overstated. CLT labour rights and protections 
continued and expanded as they had during the previous authoritarian period. The social 
and labour rights within the CF88 formally covered the entire population in contrast to the 
CLT legislation of the 1930s that formally and informally excluded the majority of the 
population (rural, domestic and self-employed workers). Brazil’s development path 
described in this chapter meant that by the 1980s it was the world’s most unequal society 
(IMF 2011:33, Berg 2010:24). The benefits and protections offered by the relevant 
legislation cover formal employment, therefore it can be expected that a large section of 
the population, corresponding to historically under-privileged groups, would continue to be 
excluded from its coverage.  
When the context of the ‘lost decade’ of 1980s Brazil is considered together with the 
historical persistence of the widespread ineffectiveness of the CLT, little transformative 
change or a critical juncture can be expected for Brazilian workers from democratisation 
and the constitution. One positive complementarity during the period is the existence of a 
mobilised and vibrant labour movement within what Bethell & Castro (2008:229) describe 
as an unexpectedly ‘strong civil society’. Yet membership and protection is conditional 
upon a formal employment relationship and the trade union institutions are perhaps more 
moderate than they have been widely depicted.  
During times of crisis the persistence of low and falling real wages is no longer mitigated 
by public social and infrastructure investments as was the case during the economic 
‘miracle’ periods described by Lago (1989:294). Despite considerable demographic and 
industrial change since the 1930s, the persistence of the inequality and hierarchy 
aggravated and exposed by the socio-economic conditions of the ‘lost’ decade can 
similarly be described as a social structure unfavourable or ‘hostile’ to the majority of 
workers as it was at the beginning of the 20th century. 
The reforms of the 1980s can therefore be considered another institutional layer that 
represents a ‘utopia’, a possibility, promise or aspiration for workers (Cardoso op cit) 
rather than a tangible and widely respected right. During the period in question there was 
concern expressed by leading intellectuals including future president Fernando Henrique 
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Cardoso that the enthusiasm and optimism for political and civil rights ‘distracted attention 
from the need to confront Brazil’s fundamental structural problems, economic and social’ 
(Bethell and Castro 2008:223).  
Carvalho (2013:7) retrospectively describes ‘naivety in the enthusiasm’ surrounding the 
belief that a democratic system and highly progressive formal ‘citizen’s constitution’ 
represented the answer to all Brazil’s historical problems. This ‘naivety’ mirrors the 
weaknesses of solely considering formal institutions, characteristics of ‘old’ institutional 
approaches discussed in the previous chapter (see North 2003:2 & Levitsky 2012: 88). The 
subsequent non-materialisation of significant change should have been expected in light of 
the absence of widespread CLT compliance since its introduction in the 1930s.   
The first democratic election took place in 1989 with Lula, the PT candidate and former 
metalworker and union leader, coming in a close second to Fernando Collor after a second 
round of votes. This was a signal of the strength, influence and credibility of the labour 
movement particularly within an international context of highly weakened labour 
institutions in the advanced industrial countries14. In terms of the economy, inflation for 
1989 was at 1,800 per cent resulting from a series of failed heterodox stabilisation plans 
involving price and wage freezes.  
Declining real wages/purchasing power has traditionally been a grievance of the Brazilian 
population mobilising significant protest and opposition. This is evident from the Rio de 
Janeiro penny riots of 1879, the mobilisations of the 1950s pressuring the government into 
a 100 per cent increase in the minimum wage, amongst the main grievances of striking 
metalworkers in the 1970s and evident in the present day with the 2013 and ongoing 2016 
protests against public transport fare rises.  
3.4 1989-2003: Democracy Before Stability and the Survival of the LMI 
system  
The 1989-2003 period brings the analysis towards contemporary Brazil, overlapping with 
discussion of contemporary employment and institutions covered over the next three 
chapters. The 1990s is characterised by profound macro-economic reforms to achieve 
stabilisation and correct historical imbalances that have been persistent since the middle of 
the twentieth century. This section continues the path-tracing of labour institutions coming 																																																								
14 Most obvious comparisons are with Reaganism in the United States and Thatcherism in the UK  
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after the ‘lost’ decade characterised by recession and instability and a peak in labour 
mobilisation. The two issues analysed are the effect of the economic reforms upon labour 
institutions and the direction(s) of the trade union movement in light of liberalising reforms 
that often involve the flexibilisation of employment legislation. 
There has been minimal mention of inflation and economic instability up until this point, 
though it is worth highlighting that macro-economic instability was not a new phenomenon 
originating in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Instability was most intensely observed over 
the ‘lost decade’ by a dramatic crash coming after the economic ‘miracles’ financed by 
foreign loans rather than internal resources. Within the already identified tradition of para 
ingles ver reforms, Abreu (2008:312,331 & 385) observes a ‘structural long-term fragility 
of Brazilian balance of payments’ since the late 1930s and describes control and orthodoxy 
attempts as ‘lip-service’ during both the democratic interlude of 1945-1964 and under 
military rule. 
Economic instability characterised by high inflation or an unstable wage/price relationship 
contributed to popular mobilisations under Vargas in the 1950s and was an important 
cleavage factor leading to and justifying the military coup of 1964. The disproportionate 
increase of prices in relation to wages was an initial grievance for prompting the shop-floor 
mobilisation across the São Paulo automobile factories in the 1970s. There is consensus 
that high inflation disproportionately affects the poorest in society and aggravates income 
inequality (Kuznets 1955; E. Cardoso 1993: 114-115; Bulir 2001:157). Within the context 
of the secular persistence of a social structure unfavourable for the majority of Brazilian 
workers, high inflation can be considered a further factor contributing to an adverse 
situation for labour.  
The narrow (margin of 6 per cent) victory of Fernando Collor over Lula in Brazil’s first 
democratic election was on the basis of promises of economic reform involving what Costa 
(2005:120) describes as an ‘avalanche of liberalisation measures’ privatisation, trade 
liberalisation and deregulation of the labour market as part of the competitiveness and 
efficiency rhetoric. This is consistent with a global trend of ‘neo-liberal’ or free-market 
reforms in the advanced economies from the 1970s. To many observers this was an 
alarming development in the Brazilian context given that it represented the reversal of 
rights formalised in the constitution only a few years prior.  
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As argued in this chapter, the historical problem with labour rights in Brazil since the 
1930s has not been their formal content, but the persistent formal and informal exclusion 
of the majority of workers from their protections. As was the case during the conservative 
military regime, the majority of CLT provisions survived the economic liberalisation of 
reforms of the 1990s. Haagh & Cook (2005:185) attribute the survival of labour rights into 
the 21st century to the order of Brazilian reforms. Political liberalisation and its strong 
mobilised labour movement came before the economic liberalisation process. In this sense 
there is a positive complementarity in the emergence of an active labour movement in the 
1980s and the survival of labour rights and protections in the following decade.  
Despite the survival of the CLT labour institutions, the wider Brazilian economic model 
changed significantly and rapidly from its inward looking closed and interventionist state-
led form to a more liberal open economy with negative consequences for labour. In the 
context of the persistent problem of the majority of the labour force being excluded from 
the CLT since its inception, the 1990s sees a reversal of a trend (albeit a slow and gradual 
one) of increasing inclusion as demonstrated in figure 3.2. Consistent with this increase in 
informality and the global tendency of liberalisation policies where full employment is no 
longer considered a viable objective, unemployment doubled and became something of a 
new social problem. With the state spending cuts and loss of industrial jobs, 
unemployment is a problem facing those historically accustomed to a formal employment 
relationship. The excluded majority do not benefit from formal provisions and protections 
for unemployment.  
With regards to more equitable labour arrangements and the political trajectory of the 
1990s the successful containing of inflation is important. Within the historical context of 
persistent, robust and increasing income inequality the stabilisation had an immediate and 
one-off positive effect upon income distribution and real wages particularly benefitting the 
lowest earners (Amann and Baer 2000:1807). It also provided greater stability, particularly 
after a decade of high and hyperinflation and a series of failed heterodox reforms.  
In the same manner the military regime benefitted from credibility and popularity from the 
economic ‘miracle’, the liberalising groups in government in the 1990s benefitted 
significantly from the popularity of the successful stabilisation policies. The popular 
approval and sustained price stability contributed to Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s election 
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and re-election in 1994 and 1998 respectively. The PT/CUT candidate Lula was in second 
place on both occasions.  
There were also significant changes in the path of the trade union movement entwined with 
the stabilisation reforms.  The ‘authentic’ position of the CUT peak association was anti-
capitalist, combative and in opposition to the stabilisation measures involving 
privatisation, trade liberalisation and the involvement of foreign capital and multi-lateral 
agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. Overall the stabilisation decade is described as 
one of crisis for Brazilian Trade Unionism particularly for the CUT strand (see Boito 2003, 
Cardoso 2003, Pochmann 1998, Rodrigues 1999).  
The new economic logic and role of the state that the stabilisation reforms implied, de-
indexation, fiscal surpluses etc., weakened the bargaining power of the unions. The 
privatisation of state industries and the drive for competitiveness meant that the two main 
power bases of the CUT, industry and public workers were significantly weakened with 2 
million industrial jobs lost between 1990 and 1999 and unemployment doubling from 4 to 
8 per cent over the same period together with the increase in informality already mentioned 
(Cardoso 2003:42).  
In political terms the CUT were defeated not only in the 1994 and 1998 elections though 
also in their opposition to the liberalisation process. Within a new political context of fair 
and free elections, the combative CUT approach to negotiations was reciprocated by the 
government taking an aggressive position towards strike activity. The credibility gained 
from the success of stability policies, within a logic that cites union influence as an 
aggravator of inflation and given the economic conditions already described, the popularity 
and credibility of the trade unions fell significantly from its peak of the previous 
‘democratisation’ decade.  
The government’s position was also strengthened by a split in the union movement with 
the creation of the Força Sindical (FS) peak association that emerged in 1991 as a ‘results-
based’ or ‘pragmatic’ organisation. The founding principals were the rejection of 
‘combative/confrontational’ trade-unionism. FS therefore emerged as an alternative or 
opposition to the then dominant left-wing CUT and its unions. From a power base of the 
City of Sao Paulo metalworkers’ union the peak association was consistently supportive of 
liberalisation reforms and was the fastest growing trade union organisation from 1992-
2001 increasing 170% to CUT’s 70% (IBGE 2003 in Trópia 2009:41).  
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The direction of the CUT during the 1990s merits attention; given the size, scope and 
number of affiliated trade unions, significant internal diversity can be expected and some 
internal paradoxes and contradictions can be observed. Despite the ‘authentic’, anti-
capitalist and combative rhetoric of the central organisation, patterns of employment 
relations within the CUT’s ABC regional and industrial powerbase demonstrate a different 
trend towards plant-level cooperation with employers. 
 Within the economic context of industrial restructuring, automobile workers made deals 
with employers through the tripartite Camaras Setoriais [Sectorial Chambers]. More 
flexible employment regimes were bargained in exchange for the avoidance of mass-
dismissals. Therefore, some of the flexibilisation policies formalised in the 1990s such as 
flexitime (banco de horas) and production/performance based pay (PLR) as part of a set of 
reforms opposed by the CUT originate from the shop-floor of the CUT dominated unions 
(See chapter 6 for the evolution of ABC Paulista employment relations standard, a 
selection of flexibilisation reforms are summarised in annex 2.1).  
A further long-standing CUT campaign since democratisation has been for greater 
democratisation of the collective employment relations system, namely the removal of the 
corporatist elements of unicity and the syndical tax. In the context of the path traced in this 
chapter and recognised by Cardoso (2003:40) this opposition is something of a paradox. 
The corporatist elements of the system have contributed to the survival of trade union 
institutions over two decades of authoritarian rule and throughout the 1990s reforms. This 
contrasts with the deregulation and flexibilisation processes in other societies. Argued in 
this chapter and consistent with Collier and Collier (2002) the emergence of the CUT 
dominated ‘new’ trade unionism in the 1980s was path dependent upon the 1930s reforms.    
The main liberalising reform to the collective representation system from the 
democratisation and 1998 constitution was trade union independence from the state. This 
new more subtle freedom had unintended consequences, argued here to follow familiar 
historical patterns, that contributed to the decline of trade unionism in the 1990s. Cardoso 
(2003:40) describes the ‘partial liberalisation in the new Constitution’ as a key element in 
its 1990s decline. Citing IBGE census data, Cardoso observes a 40 per cent increase in the 
number of trade unions between 1991 and 2001 though only a corresponding 10.2 per cent 
increase in formal employment and decreasing rates of unionisation.  
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Such a phenomenon is described as union pulverisation or fragmentation, a negative 
complementarity for labour can be observed between the greater ease in creating a new 
union/category within the unicity system (recognition of new category, sub-category or 
region) and the resources guaranteed by the syndical tax. The imbalance or contrasting 
trends between the number of unions, formal employment and unionisation rates suggest 
that the objective of many of these new unions is to capture the guaranteed resources. This 
is a familiar historical pattern, or unintended consequence of the unicity system 
comparable to trends in the 1930s and 40s described by Carvalho and Silva (op cit) where 
small trade unions proliferated to effortlessly command the resources offered without 
meaningful membership and representation.  
Within the context of unsuccessful challenge to the economic reforms labelled generically 
as ‘neo-liberal’, the loss of the quasi-monopoly of trade unionism with the emergence of 
the pragmatic FS and the ‘battle for democracy’ already won, there is a significant shift in 
the CUT approach to industrial relations over the 1990s. Santana (1999:111) describes how 
the CUT’s new trade unionism matured from a movement into an institution and this 
involved the radical challenge to the existing trade union structure giving way to 
‘accommodation and coexistence’. Rodrigues (1999:88-91) describes an increasing 
distance between the combative discourse and increasingly reformist practice of the central 
organisation participating in tripartite forums such as the Camaras Setoriais, making 
concessions to avoid mass dismissals and negotiation of collective and individual 
bargaining agreements with employers. This new position is described by Rodrigues as 
‘defensive realism’.  
The defensive posture of trade union organisations can be viewed as a success when 
considering the survival of labour organisations, labour rights and protections within 
society. This is particularly the case when compared with union decline in the more liberal 
advanced industrial economies. Whilst the economy underwent an economic liberalisation 
process, formal labour rights remained relatively unaltered and are a long way from 
representing the “hire and fire” flexible neo-liberal ideal type that characterises the Anglo-
Saxon economies.  
The flexibilisation of the CLT during the period in question was controversial though 
many of the reforms are subject to approval within collective bargaining agreements 
(flexitime and variable salaries for example). The persistent historical problem with the 
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CLT protections is their non-effectiveness and exclusionary character rather than content. 
For formal sector workers at least, active labour institutions defending existing rights offer 
a potential complementarity to address this secular problem.  
As of 2003 the CLT labour protections and trade union system were still firmly in place, 
albeit with some reforms already discussed and summarised in annex 2.1. The unicity and 
the syndical tax corporatist provisions continue. Despite the importance of the CUT and FS 
peak associations and plant-level representation over the previous two decades in 
collective bargaining processes, such institutions were yet to be formalised in 2003.  
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates considerable continuity in Brazilian labour institutions, with 
unfavourable characteristics that can be traced back to the 19th century. This goes against 
popular interpretations of revolutions. The 1930s reforms creating the CLT system, the 
authoritarian intervention of 1964 and the democratisation process of the 1980s were and 
still are popularly and incorrectly described as ‘revolutions’. Skocpol (1994: 5 & 313) 
defines social revolutions as ‘rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class 
structures, accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from below’ 
within the context of an administrative-military breakdown of the state. This type of 
radical change or breakdown is not apparent in the history of Brazilian labour institutions 
traced in this chapter. This gives credence to the idea that a regressive path dependency 
from the 19th century still influences employment relations.  
The Vargas ‘revolution’ of the 1930s is characterised by a strong state, an absence of 
popular revolts from below and the initial policy choices introduced exclude the majority 
of workers. The corporatist system installed possesses familiar historical characteristics of 
authoritarianism with objectives of ‘stability and order’ in the national interest. The 
exclusionary nature of the legislation introduced and the absence of trade unions at a plant-
level give weight to the idea that the reforms follow in the para ingles ver historical 
tradition of formal legislation designed to fail. Consistent with Levine (1998:112) and 
Cardoso’s (2010:159-160) interpretations, the incorporation period is argued here to 
represent a moderate conservative process. Rather than substituting or radically altering the 
regressive path for labour, it represents an additional layer upon existing institutions.  
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Collier and Collier’s (2002) description of the incorporation period as a ‘critical juncture’ 
is appropriate when the subsequent path of 20th century labour institutions is considered. 
Albeit not a social revolution, the system introduced defines the political arena and the vast 
majority of actors operate within its constraints. Despite the ‘fear of communism’ used to 
justify the conservative “revolution” of 1964, the left-wing institutions mainly operated 
within the CLT institutional parameters. As argued in this chapter, the system 
demonstrates the potential for conversion (and reconversion) with cycles of control (1930-
1945), mobilisation (1945-1964) – control (1964-1978) mobilisation (1978-1988).  
The examples of the labour institutions and plant-level mobilisation at the vanguard of the 
democratisation movement in the 1980s and the subsequent survival of the regulated 
corporatist structure over the subsequent decade of liberalisation reforms is considered 
here to represent a progressive path dependency. The persistence of high inequality and 
poverty levels throughout the 20th century strongly suggests that this progressive path has 
yet to overcome or replace the regressive path also described in this chapter.  
Within the wider research focus of this thesis, whilst this chapter identifies considerable 
historical continuities in contemporary Brazil in two distinctive historical paths identified; 
the persistence of exploitative practices for labour (regressive path) and the promise of 
extensive labour rights (the CLT path). Historical evidence demonstrates such continuity is 
not synonymous with a static LMI system. This is particularly the case in relation to the 
stickiness of the long-standing CLT corporatist arrangements. Within the gradual modes of 
change (Thelen and Streeck 2005:31 see table 1.2) there is evidence of ‘layering’ and 
‘drift’ in the introduction of the original CLT system in the 1930s where existing 
regressive practices for labour were not displaced and evidence suggest the reforms 
followed in the para ingles ver tradition of ‘deliberate neglect’ of formal legislation.  
There is also evidence of ‘conversion’ and ‘reconversion’ or the ‘redeployment of old 
institutions to new purposes’ in the systemic capacity for the existing institutions to rapidly 
mobilise workers and represent labour interests. Such a capacity has been sustained into 
the 21st century as the defence and expansion of existing labour rights since the 1980s 
leading up to the PT government in 2003 would suggest. This capacity for conversion is 
not captured by more statically descriptive analyses as is argued to be the case on the Latin 
American HME ideal-type, the history of trade unions in Brazil is again not one of ‘sparse’ 
institutions. 
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The recognition of gradual change is also a weak point of alternative path dependency 
analyses as discussed in chapter 1. There is an inability to recognise institutional change 
‘not instigated by a major event’ resulting in a tendency to overstate continuity. What is 
observed in the Brazilian case however, is an imagined major event or critical juncture in 
the emergence of the ‘new’ ‘authentic’ trade unionism emerging since the 1970s. This 
misrepresents the conversion or reconversion changes within the existing system as a break 
or rupture with the existing system. It would be argued here, consistent with Collier and 
Collier (2002:757) and Santana (1999:110), that ‘new’ trade unionism emerged from rather 
than in opposition to the existing corporatist system. This is an important ongoing 
consideration as calls to reform the existing system from trade unionists themselves are 
often embedded in an imagined concept of authentic grass-roots worker representation 
incompatible with the long-standing CLT arrangements (see ch.5 on representation).  
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Annex 3.1 Timeline of selected labour reforms in Brazil 1930-2000 
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Chapter 4 - Employment Relations in the Brazilian Variety of 
Capitalism 
This chapter analyses industrial relations in Brazil, building upon previous discussions 
where it has been argued that the economy is not on a liberal market-type path. Levels of 
state participation do not resemble the liberal model and, specific to employment relations, 
the survival of the corporatist institutional system across the 1990s with resourceful trade 
unions and the emergence of influential peak associations means that the formal system 
and its recent trajectory is closer to that of a Coordinated Market Economy (CME).   
Drawing upon fieldwork observations, this chapter seeks explanations for the observed 
inconsistency between the employment relationship envisaged by the formal institutional 
system and the workplace reality. The first half of the chapter looks at general industrial 
relations in Brazil at three interrelated levels: national, regional/sectorial and workplace. 
The second half enters into the construction industry case study analysed at the same three 
levels. Specific attention is given to relations at the Pecem Steel Plant construction site; the 
subject of a public hearing called in 2015 by the regional Public Labour Prosecutor (MPT-
CE) to address the persistent and heightened problems observed. Over 2014 there was an 
almost complete breakdown of on-site employment relations, three-years after the 
problems witnessed across the PAC sites.  
This chapter draws upon primary analysis of employment relations based upon fieldwork 
within the construction industry complemented by relevant data from a range of secondary 
sources. It remains within the parameters established by the new institutional approach and 
specific research problem of this thesis. As already discussed, and within the varieties of 
capitalism research agenda; the existence, capacity and success of tripartite interaction 
between state, business and labour institutions are key variables for consideration. It 
represents what has already been identified by this thesis as the sustained capacity for 
collaborative solutions from the embedded Brazilian labour market institutional system 
(see ch.2).  
A transition towards an LME in the Brazilian case is not evident nor does it seem likely 
from a path dependency perspective when the endurance of the corporatist system is 
considered. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, it would be a significantly less equitable or 
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institutionally compatible path than the alternative of greater coordination, particularly in 
light of the extremely high levels of inequality that characterise Brazilian society. More 
cooperative solutions are not straightforward however. As an institutional approach would 
anticipate, the feasibility of institutional coordination is dependent upon a complex and 
context-specific set of institutions, their historical legacies, informal manifestations and 
complementarities. 
Pagano (1991:325) argues that the liberalisation path results from an absence of 
institutions and complementarities offering more coordinated solutions that more 
adequately represent the interests of labour. The less favourable LME path is argued to be 
one of less resistance within VoC debates. Hall and Soskice (2001: 63) observe that 
deregulation is an easier path. The observation is considered to be similarly applicable to 
the idea of transitioning away from an HME model as argued by Schneider (2013:38)  
In most realms, it is more difficult to build networks of trust or institutionalize 
negotiation in LME and HME then it is to introduce markets and hierarchy to 
undermine or displays networks and bargaining in NMEs and CMEs. 
Consistent with the basic pillars of ILO policy (2012) the coordinated option or ‘social 
dialogue’ is considered here as the means to meeting the challenges of generating quality 
employment to contribute towards equitable development. It also represents a superior 
alternative to the ‘less resistant’ path of deregulation offering less equitable employment 
arrangements. 
This chapter is somewhat exploratory in its analysis of the three levels of industrial 
relations both generally and specific to the construction industry. The idea that coordinated 
or social dialogue solutions are desirable in the high-inequality/hierarchical context of 
Brazil is a basic underlying premise. The objective is to identify the main obstacles 
towards greater coordination between LMIs. Availability of research data and the ongoing 
contestation of the HME trait of ‘sparse unions’ means analysis of trade union activity is 
prioritised. The main issues identified in this chapter are then discussed in more detail 
across the remaining two chapters applying established theoretical debates to the 
Brazil/construction employment relations case.   
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4.1 National Level Bargaining: Labour Interests at the Highest Level 
Camargo (1997:10) describes the functions of tripartite institutions and identifies three 
different hierarchical levels of collective bargaining: national, sectorial/regional and plant 
level. For LMIs Camargo (p.6) describes three basic functions of employment legislation15: 
‘to create an institutional environment where negotiations between workers and employers 
lead to efficient solutions’; and to ‘possess incentives and penalties in order that solutions 
are socially efficient and not solely in the immediate interests of the parties involved.’ And 
the third:  
To guarantee that the parties involved in negotiation have sufficient bargaining power to 
be able to appropriate the fruits of productivity with equanimity and as a result 
guarantee an acceptable degree (for society) of equality in the negotiated solution  
At the national level, rights and obligations to be respected throughout the labour market 
are negotiated. At this highest bargaining level, the Brazilian system has proven to be 
resistant to liberalising reforms with existing collective and individual rights maintained in 
the face of a global shift towards freer markets. In the LME type economies, the 
flexibilisation and deregulation of labour markets in the 1980s and 1990s represent a key 
differential when compared to the more coordinated path taken by CME economies. On 
Brazil, Cook (2007:103,196) describes Brazilian labour institutions as comparatively 
effective in resisting liberalisation pressures particularly in defence of collective rights. 
She attributes this success to strong unions; this bodes well for meeting the basic function 
of employment legislation to ensure negotiating parties have ‘sufficient bargaining power’.  
The capacity of labour representative institutions to defend existing rights at the national 
level described by Cook (idem) is not synonymous with productive social dialogue or 
coordinated tripartite solutions. Indeed, Cook (p.70) observes that in previous decades the 
dominant peak association, the CUT, were mistrustful of tripartite mechanisms. She further 
describes (p.85) the bargaining power of labour being limited in previous decades due to 
rivalry and differences between the CUT and Força Sindical (FS) peak associations, 
describing the latter’s accommodation with government flexibilisation reforms as 
undermining the former’s position. Weyland (1996:67) similarly recognises partisan 
‘cleavages’ between peak associations as weakening labour interests at the highest level.  
																																																								
15 Within North’s (1991) definition of Institutions being ‘formal rules and informal restraints’ the term is used interchangeably with 
Camargo’s use of “legislation”. 
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The division of trade union institutions at a national level in the 1990s can be associated 
with the institutional trait of organisational fragmentation in Brazil. Weyland (1996:15) 
attributes the persistent failure in redistributive and equity enhancing reforms in post-
democratic Brazil to institutional fragmentation. Compared to Weyland’s diagnosis there is 
an observable shift in the 2000s towards greater labour unity and tripartite dialogue (see 
Araujo & Veras 2011:108, Riethof 2004:41 and Marcelino 2008). It represents a change 
from the described mistrust of such mechanisms by the CUT in previous decades. A 
similar change is observable in the state’s approach; according to Cook (2007 102-103) 
such an emphasis on tripartism ‘marked a departure from the previous government’s policy 
of issuing decrees and provisional measures’.  
This shift towards greater tripartism in the 2000s coincided with unprecedented levels of 
sustained economic growth and stability with a dramatic decrease in poverty and falling 
inequality. The IPEA (2012: 8) ‘inclusive decade’ report attributes 58 per cent of the 
positive results between 2001 to 2011 to the labour market. A key contributor to labour 
market improvements and therefore overall social indicators was the sustained and 
significant increase of the minimum wage, increasing 76.54 per cent in real terms between 
2002 and 2015 (Dieese 2016:4). The real minimum wage increase policy with provisions 
to continue until 2020 can be considered a social dialogue success, with the central trade 
union organisations participating actively, and importantly in unity, towards the 
implantation of the policy widely considered to be a key element of the success of the 
‘inclusive decade’. CUT president Marinho (2007) describes it as representing mature and 
responsible negotiations between central trade union organisations and the government 
towards the best possible adjustment to the minimum wage.  
More recently a coordinated tripartite response to a prolonged economic downturn is 
evident. A provisional counter-cyclical measure (PPE) to protect employment at businesses 
affected by the economic downturn was introduced. It involves reduced hours & part-
subsidised salary reductions and was the outcome of tripartite negotiations. Although this 
essentially involves a temporary financial loss for labour, in terms of tripartite dialogue it 
demonstrates a capability to reach consensus for a type of cooperative policy often 
associated with the German economic model and resembles the trade-offs of a successful 
corporatist system described by Archer (1998:103-104). The CUT secretary general, Nobre 
cites the European CME model when justifying trade union support for the PPE: 
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‘numerous European countries have similar programmes, and in our opinion the German 
model is the most efficient’ (Aragão 2015).  
Institutional relations at the national level in the 2000s could be said to possess some 
characteristics of a CME model or at least the shift towards greater tripartite intentions and 
initiatives in the 2000s compared with previous decades can be considered a move in the 
direction of coordination. The ongoing problem considered throughout this thesis persists 
however; despite some ‘efficient solutions’ at a national level the reality of employment is 
inconsistent with that of the coordinated models and similarly lags behind that of LME 
type economies. It is therefore important to analyse the levels of cooperation at the 
sectorial/regional and plant levels to gain an understanding understand why some success 
at the national level is not reproduced sufficiently to characterise the reality of 
employment nationally.  
4.2 Incongruity and Networks of Mistrust: Regional/Sectorial Bargaining  
In formal legislative terms the institutional conditions to fulfil the functions of employment 
legislation as described by Camargo exist at the Brazilian regional/sectorial level. The 
corporatist unicity system of one union per category and region for both business and 
labour financed by compulsory dues guarantees the existence and resources of institutions 
responsible for participating in negotiations. These representative organisations are legally 
obliged to negotiate collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). Negotiation takes place on 
an annual basis over a two-month window leading up to the base date, the anniversary of 
the previously negotiated CBA. It is here that the potential for greater social dialogue and 
cooperation towards better employment is identified.  
In practice, dialogue with business representatives tends to be more adversarial than 
cooperative and the majority of the union activity is directed towards pressuring the state 
rather than producing tripartite agreements. This is recognised by Collier and Collier 
(2002: 508) and Schneider (2013:35). The latter author observes that ‘in hierarchical 
capitalism (as in most LMEs), business and labor rarely negotiate’ and ‘In Latin America, 
the relative disengagement of business and labor with eachother means that both groups 
tend to organise more to engage the state’. In this sense the Brazilian system is consistent 
with the HME model.  
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Within Latin America, Brazil has the highest union density of 19.5 per cent (ILOStat 2016) 
above the OECD average and that of most liberal economies though less than the 
coordinated economies of northern Europe. As argued in chapter two, solely focussing 
upon union density figures understates the influence of labour organisations in the 
Brazilian context. The unicity system means that the majority of formal workers are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated between labour and business 
representatives independent of their union affiliation (see ch. 2 figure 2.9). Considering the 
observable recent coordinated success at the national level and the robust presence of 
bargaining institutions at the intermediate level, it is again argued in terms of presence, 
resources and influence that Brazilian trade unions do not fit with Schneider’s (2013:91) 
description of ‘sparse unions’ for HME/Latin American economies.  
Other core HME labour market features, low skills, high turnover and extensive 
informality are consistent with those observed in Brazil. Therefore, despite a greater union 
presence, the disappointing results point to an institutional system not as effective as it 
perhaps should and could be in meeting the basic functions of employment legislation. The 
system guarantees negotiation between business and labour representatives and resources 
for the relevant institutions though this does not lead to widespread cooperation or indeed 
‘efficient solutions’ to an extent that it characterises industrial relations nationally.  
A controversial factor is the unicity system that establishes one union per industrial 
category and region leading to the fragmentation of both the business and labour 
representative bodies. Despite what is argued to be the success of social dialogue at a 
national level, the type of fragmentation Weyland (1996) attributes to the failure of equity 
enhancing reforms persists and has accelerated in recent years at the regional/sectorial 
level. In Evans’s (1995:225) Embedded Autonomy terms, a ‘coherent and cohesive’ 
institutional apparatus is lacking (see ch.2). The number of trade unions has increased by 
54 per cent between 1998 and 2012 whilst the rate of unionisation actually fell by almost 1 
per cent during the same period (Cardoso 2014: 22-23).  
Union (Julio, Claudinho, Aguiar 2013 interviews) and state representatives (Farias, Juca 
2013 & Marques 2015 interviews) describe such an increase in the number of trade union 
organisations; what they believe to be newly accredited unions formed to capture the 
resources the system offers and therefore weakening and further fragmenting the labour 
movement. This phenomenon is widely known as trade union pulverisation. Fragmentation 
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at the intermediate level generates considerable heterodoxy in the collective bargaining 
outcomes between sectors and regions, reflective of the high regional and socio-economic 
inequality across society contributing to what this thesis presents as an incongruous 
system. Such fragmentation and asymmetry between parties means that the capacity for 
collective bargaining at a regional and sectorial level to contribute to nationwide 
transformations in the reality of employment across society is constrained. 
As recognised by Weyland (1996:38), the regional and sectorial fragmentation of trade 
unions and the varying capacity for bargaining this implies can be mitigated by the 
association with and participation of central trade union organisations (CUT, Força 
Sindical, UGT etc.). The effectiveness of such institutions is evident at a national level and 
their strength and resources are drawn from the regional/sectorial level institutions 
sustained by the unicity system. Similarly, the Inter-Trade Union Department of Statistics 
and Socioeconomic studies (Dieese) created by the labour movement in the 1950s offers 
research, consultancy and assistance to individual trade unions in bargaining campaigns 
and negotiations. 
Association with and assistance from the central organisations and the Dieese in collective 
bargaining is voluntary. It cannot therefore, address the problems of inactive, complacent 
trade unions run in self-interest and disengaged from the category they legally represent. 
This phenomenon locally known as peleguismo and discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, is considered a pervasive problem created by the corporatist system and a 
significant contributor to the inequality of representative capacity between different 
unions. According to Trópia (2014: conference contribution) the greatest concern 
regarding ineffective representation of workers is the one third of trade union institutions 
with no affiliation to any central organisation, rather than the much-debated ideological 
cleavages and rivalries between peak associations. 
The problem of peleguismo distorts the intended distribution of bargaining power of the 
institutional system and has provoked significant pressure for change. The main stimulus 
behind the FNT initiative was the problem of increased fragmentation or pulverisation of 
trade unions since democratisation (MTE 2003 & 2005). The systemic weaknesses caused 
by fragmentation and peleguismo are often cited by both liberal arguments favouring an 
end to the corporatist system and trade unionists arguing for a more democratic, free and 
‘authentic’ representation system. Both arguments need to be considered with caution (see 
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next two chapters). Such reforms could potentially be counter-productive as a means to 
improve LMI effectiveness. Deregulation could set the system on a liberal path resulting in 
the disappearance of labour organisations, albeit often weak and flawed, making the 
possibility of bargained solutions towards improved employment conditions or ‘efficient 
solutions’ less feasible in the future, removing the capacity for coordination/tripartism 
identified across this thesis.   
Based upon examples from the construction industry, it is argued in the next chapter that a 
militant and mobilised category can be an effective check and balance to the problem of 
peleguismo by pressuring the union to be active and assertive in their representation and 
collective bargaining (see part 5.4). Effective representation is evidently possible within 
the existing system. Interviews with union and Dieese representatives (Albano, da Silva, 
Julio, Aguiar 2013 & Marques 2015 interviews) would suggest however, that such 
effectiveness represents the exception rather than the rule. Problematic and incongruous 
representation mechanisms at the regional/sectorial level are recognised here as a 
significant contributory factor to the formal system – employment reality inconsistency 
identified in the research question and analysed at greater length in the next chapter.  
A further issue impeding better results from institutional relations is the level of conflict 
between labour and business representatives. An important question here is as to why such 
high levels of conflict exist. This problem is not immediately related to the phenomenon of 
peleguismo, indeed it is common for a trade union perceived as having a cordial and 
cooperative relationship with employers to be labelled as a co-opted, pelego institution. 
The rhetoric of a considerable number of trade unions is one of struggle and confrontation 
with employers; this often means a rejection of the idea of tripartism. Such a posture is 
often labelled as ‘authentic’ or ‘new trade unionism’ in contrast to the state-controlled 
passive organisations that predominated before the 1980s democratisation process. 
From an employers’ perspective when negotiating with a resourceful and active union a 
common grievance is that productive dialogue and cooperation is made impossible due to 
the combative anti-capitalist ideology of the labour institution. Conticom-CUT president 
Claudinho (2013: interview) counter argues that combative strategies are necessary as 
employer organisations do not come to the table ‘of their own free will’ and have to be 
pressured into negotiations through industrial action. When asked about the potential for 
greater coordination between business and labour representatives, regional Dieese 
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supervisor for Ceará, Aguiar (2013 interview emphasis in the original) confirmed 
reluctance amongst some unions to cooperate with employers, responding with jest: 
Working together? That’s known here as PE-LE-GUIS-MO, in the minds of the boys 
[trade unionists] integrated capital-labour relations are unacceptable – I mentioned 
social dialogue and you can imagine the hammering I took. They said it would be 
tantamount to submission and called me a pelego. 
Unwillingness on behalf of the labour unions to contemplate greater cooperation with 
employers is a historical characteristic and relevant variable though should not be 
considered in isolation or dismissed simply as the result of predominant political 
ideologies (see next chapter). The strategy of confrontation needs to be analysed in the 
context of strategic interaction with other relevant factors within the employment relations 
system summarised in figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1 Networks of Mistrust: Tripartite Relations at the Regional/Sectorial Level 
 
Source: Adapted from own fieldwork research and Cardoso & Lage 2007  
Networks of mistrust within Brazilian employment relations is an important consideration 
for the remainder of this chapter and the following two chapters on representation and 
regulation respectively. Starting at the bottom of the diagram, the worker - trade union 
relationship is weakened or indeterminate for a number of interrelated reasons. A low 
threshold for employment conditions together with a historical absence of representation 
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within the workplace (see Cardoso 2010:332 and section 4.4 in this chapter respectively) 
means that the willingness and ability to complain to the representative union (linkage a) is 
constrained. The indeterminate nature of the union –worker relationship is reinforced by 
the problem of peleguismo already described, where unions exist outside of the workplace 
and are sustained by compulsory dues (syndical tax) and monopoly of representation 
(unicity) mechanisms (see ch.5), weakening the responsiveness or representativeness 
towards workers (linkage b). Such an indeterminate relationship in turn weakens the 
inspection function of the trade union (linkage d) to work towards greater compliance with 
the existing formal employment legislation.  
Within the Brazilian system the designated trade union in turn is responsible for 
representing workers to reach a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with employers 
(linkage c). This is not identified as a weak or indeterminate relationship here, yet it has to 
be considered together with the relationship between workers and their designated union as 
well as the long-standing practice of unregulated or informal employment (linkage i). This 
is a key feature of the networks of mistrust: the high incidence of noncompliance by 
employers with the legally enforceable negotiated CBAs, general employment legislation 
enshrined in the CLT and Constitution as well as health and safety rules (NRs) (linkage f). 
Resultantly, the role of the state’s inspection, enforcement and legislative activities needs 
to be considered. 
When the scarce inspection resources of the state are considered (see ch.6 on regulation, 
Berg 2010:17, Cardoso and Lage 2007:87, and described by Julio, Ishikawa, Juca 2013: 
interviews) the state inspection of compliance with labour legislation is weakened (linkage 
d) and the Labour Ministry (MTE) are dependent upon complaints from the trade union 
whose indeterminate representation and inspection role has already been described. This 
complex composite structure of strategic interaction creates an incentive and penalty 
structure that stimulates evasion by employers (linkages f & g). Endemic noncompliance 
generates very high levels of litigious conflict overwhelming the relevant state labour 
institutions, crowding out the possibility of more productive and proactive negotiated 
solutions. The levels of litigation going through the labour courts are internationally 
unprecedented with 3.5 million cases received by the Labour courts per year (TST 2016b 
see ch.6, fig 6.2), the weakness of the processes leading up to the MTE (linkage a) 
complaints to the labour courts in figure 4.1 suggests noncompliance could be even greater 
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than that indicated by the huge burden upon the labour courts (this is also suggested by 
labour judge Farias 2013: interview).  
Mediation processes (linkage e) are observed by this research to be effective (Juca 2013: 
interview), however these are often dealing with the consequences of the networks of 
mistrust where unions and employers are unable to reach consensus on a CBA or related 
industrial dispute without third-party intervention. Linkage h – legislation is argued to be a 
strong linkage in the sense that the formal CLT system of employment rights and 
protections has remained stable and resisted deregulation pressures (see ch.2 part 2.2).  
The construction industry case study demonstrates inter-company mistrust equally as 
relevant as the tensions between employers and workers. Between different companies in 
the supply chain, levels of compliance with relevant employment legislation and additional 
CBA provisions vary, this contributes in some cases to a breakdown in on-site industrial 
relations (see part 4.4.3 in this chapter). This can be related to the historically embedded 
relationship in linkage i, which contributes to the difficulties for union and state 
institutions to ensure greater compliance. It also places a strain upon the internal 
compliance mechanisms of the larger companies within complex supply chains involving 
diverse productive phases and numerous sub-contractors.   
4.3 Institutional Absence and Employer Resistance: Plant Level 
Bargaining  
Despite the pessimism implied by the idea of ‘networks of mistrust’ at the 
regional/sectorial level, there is a more optimistic body of work (see Rodrigues 2002; 
Ramalho, Rodrigues & Conceição 2009; Boito & Marcelino 2010) focussing upon new 
trade unionism and the automobile industry in the southeast region. Rodrigues (2002:148) 
describes how ‘in some parts of the country’ union activity evolved to contribute to a 
strong representational presence on the shop floor to undertake direct negotiations with 
employers. In terms of the capability and feasibility of greater tripartite cooperation, the 
example of Sao Paulo metalworkers offers empirical evidence of successful, responsive 
and evolving capital-labour cooperation within the constraints of the existing system. This 
example is referred to across this thesis to support the idea of CME potential within the 
Brazilian LMI system and the inconsistency between these practices and the employment 
reality elsewhere is an important characteristic of the incongruous LMI system described 
across this thesis.  
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Rodrigues (Idem: 154) describes how employment relations within this region and sector 
have progressed from ‘extremely conflictive and even confrontationist’ to ‘conflictive 
cooperation’. Ramalho (2005:516) explains how the institutional dynamics from the ABC 
Paulista experience were successfully replicated in ‘new areas of production’ when the 
automobile industry transferred production to new or non-traditional productive regions in 
the neighbouring state of Rio de Janeiro. The experience of the ‘new’ trade unionism 
movement in plant-level bargaining could similarly be argued to have contributed 
upwardly to the effectiveness of labour representation at a national level.  
The largest central trade union organisation, the CUT has its origins in the ABC Paulista 
new trade unionism and Força Sindical’s main power base is the City of Sao Paulo 
Metalworkers Union. Perhaps of greater significance is the experience of the two 
traditionally rival organisations successfully coordinating activities in 1999 to campaign 
for a nationwide bargaining agreement to cover the automobile industry. This could be 
considered an important historical precedent that contributed to the subsequent strength 
and unity of trade union influence at the national level, evident in the more recent 
minimum wage policy and PPE negotiations already described. 
The ABC model provides a useful template for employment relations elsewhere. With 
heightened relevance to the current research question, Rodrigues (2002:155-156) asks to 
what extent this effective model stemming from a strong plant level presence is capable of 
expanding to the rest of the country. The author attributes the success of the ABC trade 
union standard as having influenced the posture of the dominant elements of the CUT 
central organisation contributing to the shift from a confrontational posture to an approach 
that has ‘negotiation as its primordial objective’. He argues that such a standard of trade 
union activity can be seen as a national benchmark and ‘should not be restricted to one 
region’ yet recognises that the ABC Paulista experience has unique political economic and 
social characteristics and differs hugely from other regions in the country.  
Dieese’s Aguiar (2013: interview) similarly recognises this regional and sectorial 
exceptionality declaring that ‘the ABC is the ABC, anything untoward in the factories 
workers bring production to a halt within 30 mins’. He goes on to describe a very different 
reality in the state of Ceará. With a percentage of industrial employment close to that of 
Sao Paulo state and very high compared to the rest of the northeast region, Aguiar argues 
how this should theoretically be a positive factor for generating stable formal employment. 
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In contrast, he describes that in reality the quality of employment is ‘terrible’, amongst the 
worst in the country with local criteria for what constitutes decent work having an 
extremely low threshold. The poor outcomes are associated with archaic authoritarian 
human resources practices, low wages and the country’s highest percentage of workers 
without employment protections working under self-employment agreements. Aguiar’s 
depiction of contemporary employment practices in Ceará is closer to the historically low 
threshold for employment conditions described by Cardoso (2010: 332) than the Sao Paulo 
automobile industry example.  
The example of effective trade unionism within the automobile industry demonstrates the 
potential for plant level bargaining to produce what could be described as efficient 
solutions for both capital and labour within the constraints of the existing system. Plant 
level representation is described as ‘a long-standing demand of unions’ (Cook 2007:101). 
However outside of the ABC ‘pocket of efficiency’, plant-level bargaining is a 
shortcoming of the Brazilian institutional system. It hinders more cooperative and 
proactive solutions capable of mitigating the HME-type negative complementarities. In 
this instance there is consensus with Schneider’s description of negative complementarities 
in hierarchical LMIs (2009:102) where ‘weak plant-level representation’ impedes labour-
management cooperation’. 
Nationally, trade union presence tends to be shop door rather than shop floor. This limits 
the capacity of the system to produce the type of coordination capable of delivering the 
more equitable labour market results associated with CME type economies. The general 
absence of union representation within the workplace means that disputes and irregularities 
are almost always dealt with post facto rather than proactively, in some cases years after 
the transgression within a highly overburdened and slow legal system (see ch.6 figure 6.2). 
This then reinforces the noncompliance strategy on behalf of employers when the 
likelihood of detection and eventual sanctions are considered. This sees employers 
profiting from evasion when inflation, interest rates and statute of limitations variables are 
considered. As labour judge Farias (2013: interview) describes: if the infraction is detected 
or reported they will be made to pay what the law dictates they should have paid in the first 
instance years ago.  
This further contributes to the idea of ABC Paulista exceptionality from the national norm. 
In contrast to the widespread noncompliance described by Cardoso & Lage (2007), Pastore 
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(2005) and Farias (2013: interview); Rodrigues (2002:151-152) observes that working 
conditions are rarely an issue in ABC metalworker negotiations due to the organisational 
characteristics of these workplaces. Conditions are described as much better than the 
national average with active plant-level representation dealing with issues on a day-to-day 
basis.  
The exceptionality of what Rodrigues calls the ‘ABC metalworkers trade union standard’ 
(pp.148-9) with unionisation rates of 70-80 per cent, three to four times the national 
average is recognised. It demonstrates the possibility of coordinated industrial relations 
originating from effective plant-level representation and bargaining. The pro-activeness of 
day-to-day union activity could be argued to represent an alternative to the retroactive 
patterns observed elsewhere. The post facto patterns produce uncertainty, instability and 
adversarial industrial relations. This fuels and sustains the ‘network of mistrust’ reducing 
the potential for a more cooperative relationship and related improved employment 
conditions for workers to emerge.  
Despite the promising ABC metalworkers example, a number of factors limit the 
possibility of effective plant-level representation. The historical legacy of employment 
relations within Brazil makes the idea of organic change to more horizontalised capital-
labour interaction in the workplace a distant possibility. Alves and Silva (1987:48) 
describe how democracy had never entered the ‘factory doors’ in Brazil. Carvalho (2001: 
53-54) describes how the legacy of slavery and the large rural property still persist, 
particularly in the North and Northeast with a culture of impunity and authoritarian control 
of workers by bosses. This is represented by linkage (i) in the bottom right corner of figure 
6.1, where there is a historically embedded worker-employer relationship away from any 
formal institutional involvement or protections. Given the widespread absence of trade 
union representation within the workplace, it can be presumed that the regressive path for 
labour traced in chapter 3, the historically low threshold for acceptable working conditions, 
is strongest at this level of employment relations.  
A further consideration on plant-level representation is its complementarity with the 
regional/sectorial and national level institutional bargaining arrangements. The persistence 
of the corporatist elements at a sectorial/regional level could be said to crowd-out the 
possibility of greater grass-roots representation, particularly in the instances where the 
designated union is complacent and/or run in self-interest (pelego). Critics of the current 
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system argue that existing unions lack incentives to support and mobilise plant-level 
organization due to the compulsory financing. Some trade unionists, such as the Marreta-
BH directors and lawyer (2013: interviews) also suggest that rival pelego unions are 
resistant to factory level commissions, loathe to share power and control and possibly 
nurture future opposition groups for control of their organisation.  
Visions of liberalising reforms at the regional/sectorial level contributing to an organic 
emergence of productive plant-level employment relations akin to the ‘authentic’ ‘ABC 
metalworkers’ union standard’ need to be considered with caution and are arguably 
misplaced and potentially counterproductive. As argued in the previous chapter, it has to 
be recognised that the ABC dynamics emerged from the regional/sectorial institutions of 
the existing corporatist system. The idea of the corporatist institutions hindering grass-
roots or bottom up representation also neglects the considerable regional and industrial 
exceptionality of the ABC experience as well as the diverse historical and socio-economic 
characteristics of Brazilian society. The embedded inequality or hierarchy within society 
makes it highly difficult to envisage a nationwide reality where workers have sufficient 
bargaining power to engage in productive social dialogue and resolve disputes at the plant 
level as Schneider (2013:15) recognises: 
vast differences in education, norms, ethnicity and sometimes gender and language 
sometimes create a gulf between workers and managers that make both sides less 
disposed to engage in coordination and negotiation. 
4.4 The Construction Industry  
This second part of this chapter narrows the analysis of industrial relations to the 
construction industry case study. Identified in the first half of the chapter, there is evidence 
of effective institutional coordination at the national level whilst outcomes in the 
intermediate regional/sectorial level are characterised by networks of mistrust. The 
mistrust is sustained by the negative complementarities summarised in figure 4.1, 
facilitated by fragmented, uneven and unpredictable representation and enforcement 
contributing to widespread noncompliance. This results in employment relations distant 
from the ‘efficient solutions’ expected from bargaining institutions (Camargo op cit).   
Representation and bargaining take place predominantly outside of the workplace and 
therefore the plant level is characterised by a historical institutional absence. This 
observable absence arguably fuels the networks of mistrust, widespread noncompliance in 
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particular, as grievances tend to be dealt with predominantly post facto and only after 
recourse to legal action. The case of employment relations in the ABC Paulista therefore 
stands out as best practice. There is a huge difference between the ABC standard described 
by Rodrigues (2002) where issues on working conditions are resolved on a day-to-day 
basis and rarely enter into the collective bargaining process and construction. The issue of 
working conditions dominates tripartite relations at all three levels (national, sectorial & 
shop-floor) in the construction industry. 
4.4.1 Prompt Tripartite Policies: National Industry Level Bargaining  
Consistent and parallel with industrial relations trends in Brazil, there is evidence of 
successful social dialogue in the construction industry towards decent work at the national 
level. This is apparent in the 20-year-old tripartite Permanent National Committee for 
Construction Industry Working Conditions and Environment (CPN) that contributes to the 
health and safety legislation specific to the industry - NR-18. The protective legislation is 
detailed and extensive, meeting all the specific health and safety needs for workers. 
Evidence from fieldwork interviews with relevant state, business and trade union 
representatives, including current CPN member, Ishikawa (2013:interview), suggests there 
is consensus on the necessity and importance of the relevant NR-18 legislation. Health and 
safety secretary for the Contricom trade union confederation, da Silva, describes the 
industry specific legislation as consistent with those societies where workers’ health and 
safety is taken most seriously (NCST 2014).  
Further evidence to support the claim of effective social dialogue at the national level 
comes from the ‘National Commitment for Improved Labour Conditions in the 
Construction Industry’ (NCILC) signed in March 2012. The tripartite agreement came in 
response to perhaps the most intense instances of labour unrest since the 1980s across the 
PAC construction sites. The most dramatic scenes of burning workers’ villages came from 
the remote Jirau hydroelectric plant site, 2 thousand miles from Sao Paulo. According to 
the CEO of Camargo Correa, the company responsible for the construction site, 20 
thousand workers were evacuated from the site at a cost of 15-18 million BRL (Jimenez 
and Bacoccina 2011). The disturbances provoked a response from the Employment 
Minister and the President’s office with the National Guard called in to contain the unrest.  
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Table 4.1 List of NCILC Tripartite Forum Participants 
State Labour Business 
Coordination 
-Office of the President 
-Ministry for Labour & Employment (MTE) 
Participating Ministries 
Planning, Budgeting and Management 
Pensions 
Social Development and Hunger Prevention 
Presidential Chief-of-Staff 
Education 
Cities 
Mining & Energy 
Sport 
National Integration 
Transport 
Human Rights 
Technical Assistance  
Dieese 
Peak Associations 
CTB 
CGT 
CUT 
Força Sindical 
NCST 
UGT 
Conlutas*  
Trade Union 
Confederations 
Conticom 
Contricom 
CNTI 
CNTIC 
Fenatracop 
 
National Union for the Heavy 
Construction/Infrastructure Industry 
(Sinicon) 
Brazilian Chamber for the Construction 
Industry (CBIC) 
 
*Represented through Sticrmb & Sticcrmf   
Source: Brasil: Governo Federal 2012, Dieese 2013  
The NCILC document is a comprehensive response to all the problems exposed by the 
unrest across the country’s largest construction sites. The initiative makes provisions for 
greater security in the recruitment of workers. This is a response to the problems of illicit 
intermediaries (gatos) transporting workers, sometimes speculatively, to the remote PAC 
sites, in the worst cases tantamount to people trafficking and conditions analogous to 
slavery. It similarly recognises the deficiencies of the trade union representation exposed 
by the high levels of conflict present across the PAC sites and includes provisions to 
introduce plant-level representation stating that:  
social dialogue within the workplace is an efficient form of avoiding labour disputes 
that negatively affect the progress of construction, and its dissemination as best practice 
in labour relations has the potential to create a healthy workplace, improve productivity 
levels and reduce the need to resort to the overburdened labour courts for conflict 
resolution. (Brasil 2012: 17) 
The remaining guidelines of the NCILC are summarised in table 4.2  
Table 4.2 Summary of Main NCILC Guidelines  
Item Problem(s) NCILC Response 
Recruitment Illicit use of intermediaries, 
precarious recruitment 
practices  
- All recruitment should use the MTE’s National 
Employment System (SINE) as an intermediary.  
- Workers to be recruited at their point of origin  
- Greater monitoring of employer compliance with 
recruitment processes 
-Preference for local workers 
-Adequate return transport provisions for candidates 
- Ensure compliance in outsourced companies 
-No informal workers or companies allowed on site 
Skills and 
Training 
Unskilled labour, falsified 
work experience  
-Promote an articulated industry specific programme of 
training and certification system (Certific) 
Health & Safety Noncompliance, high levels of 
accidents 
-Health and safety committee for each construction site 
with worker and employer representatives monitored by 
trade union 
- Promote workplace inspection in PAC, World Cup, and 
Olympic sites 
Trade Union 
Representation in 
Inadequate representation, 
worker-union tensions, worker-
- 1 Shop-floor/Plant-level union delegate for sites with 
over 200 workers and one for each further 500 workers 
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the Work Place employer tensions, widespread 
unrest.  
up to a maximum of 7 – delegates nominated by relevant 
union 
-Add human and labour rights and industrial and inter-
personal relations in worker and managerial training 
programmes 
Working 
conditions 
Insalubrious conditions on 
construction sites 
Precarious provision of 
transport, meals and 
accommodation. 
Inconsistency of conditions 
between contracted and sub-
contracted employees 
On-site criminality  
- Reinforce existing legislation, NR-18 for migrant 
worker accommodation provisions 
-Promote inspection to ensure compliance with 
legislation and CBAs 
-Adequate conditions for the provision of meals 
- Extra leave every three months and paid return journeys 
for migrant workers.  
Community 
Relations 
Rise in anti-social and illegal 
behaviour in surrounding 
communities  
-Social and environmental compensatory measures 
- Establish dialogue with communities affected by work 
-Preference for hiring and qualifying local workers 
- Training and qualification programmes for local 
communities 
- Reinforce public security  
Conditionality of 
Public Works 
Financing 
Poor working conditions in 
state financed projects 
- Where state resources are used the relative Federal 
Administration should adopt measures to ensure 
compliance with the measure of the NCILC 
Source: Brasil (2012) Compromisso Nacional: Aperfeiçoamento das Condições de Trabalho na 
Industria da Construção  
The creation of the NCILC demonstrates the willingness and capacity of institutions to 
cooperate towards improved labour conditions in the construction industry. It similarly 
suggests national responsiveness or upward links to the plant-level mobilisations involving 
hundreds of thousands of workers. The Dieese (2013:8) describe the agreement as ‘a 
historical achievement for employment relations in the sector, working towards a national 
agreement to ensure decent working conditions and employment relations across the 
construction supply chain’.  
Diverse union groups working together towards a national bargaining agreement for the 
construction industry mirrors similar efforts made in the automobile industry towards a 
single nationwide collective agreement in the 1990s. The evident capacity for consensus in 
the industry also reflects general cooperative tendencies at the national level evident in the 
minimum wage negotiations, the recent employment protection provisional measure and 
the ongoing defence of existing labour rights from liberalisation pressures. 
The assertion that the NCILC represents a ‘historic achievement’ for employment relations 
towards decent work at the national level is questionable. There is little optimism for 
potential widespread positive change when a variety of other interrelated factors are 
considered. The reality of tripartite relations at the regional/sectorial and plant levels and 
the issues of representation and compliance summarised in figure 4.1 and discussed in 
more detail across the next two chapters are key factors limiting the NCILC’s 
effectiveness.  
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Post-NCILC fieldwork evidence supports the idea of limited transformative change. 
Interviews and site-level observations included accounts from Sinduscon CE president 
Ferreira (2013: interview) who represented CBIC in the national tripartite negotiations and 
on-site observations and interviews at two of Brazil’s largest construction companies 
Cyrela (Ademilson 2013: interview) and Camargo Correa (2013: observations/interviews). 
Based upon their experiences, all the business representatives consulted were mistrustful of 
the formal recruitment (SINE) and skill certification (Certific) mechanisms, key NCILC 
recommendations. There was an obvious preference for recruitment and skill verification 
mechanisms through tried and trusted informal networks widely known as Rádio Peão [the 
worker grapevine].   
In summary, construction industry labour relations reflect those in the wider economy with 
evidence of successful tripartite social dialogue at the national level. This is evident in the 
long-standing CPN health and safety forum contributing legislation comparable with that 
of the most advanced economies. The prompt formulation of the NCILC initiative also 
demonstrates responsiveness and capability among tripartite institutions to achieve 
consensus in recognising and addressing widespread problems within the industry. 
Problems dramatically brought to their attention by workplace mobilisations. Such top-
down initiatives, in some cases reproducing existing legislation as is the case with the 
NCILC, are unable to overcome the networks of mistrust that prevail at the 
sectorial/regional level and the precariousness of representation at the plant-level. The 
inability to reproduce the coordinated solutions at lower bargaining levels limits the 
effectiveness of initiatives that can be described as social dialogue successes at the national 
level.  
4.4.2 Construction Regional/Sectorial Level 
As per the general regional/sectorial level of employment, the compulsory negotiation 
mechanisms within the Brazilian system are similarly argued to possess the potential for 
greater social dialogue and cooperation towards better employment within the construction 
industry. The idea of such potential is supported by fieldwork observations suggesting 
there is considerable coincidence of interest between state, business and labour institutions 
within the sector. Similar and sometimes duplicated activities by union, state and business 
organisations towards a shared goal of greater compliance, health and safety in particular, 
were evident from primary observations. Strong cooperative links are evident between 
trade unions and state institutions yet there is very little in the way of coordinated 
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initiatives between union and business groups, this despite evidence suggesting 
considerable tangency and overlap in their regulatory activities (see ch.5).  
There is noticeable uniformity in the day-to-day activities of the six individual unions 
observed in their relations with state and business representatives. Such uniformity may be 
considered surprising to some observers. Trade union directors themselves may disagree 
on this point given the diversity of ideological identities and related approaches to 
industrial relations between the unions observed. The uniformity in day-to-day practice 
between the unions is apparent in the regular localised interventions at construction sites. 
The interventions are most commonly responses to complaints made by employees or 
reports of workers having downed tools.  
The most common on-site disputes tend to be over health and safety irregularities, the 
provision and quality of meals and non-or delayed payment of salaries and benefits. This 
research finds that relations between employers and the trade unions are significantly more 
antagonistic and adversarial in the northeast of the country regardless of political, 
ideological and central organisation affiliations. This in turn limits the possibility of greater 
social dialogue and its potential rewards.  
Such regional relational disparities are arguably evident from the collective bargaining 
agreements (CBAs) of the construction unions. Across the construction industry in the 
southeast of Brazil there exists the Social Services for Light Construction institution 
(Seconci) providing health, education and social care to those within the industry. It dates 
back to 1964 and is sustained by compulsory employer payroll contributions negotiated 
into the CBAs across the region (MTE/SRT 2014). Within the CBAs of the northeast trade 
unions analysed there is no Seconci equivalent (with the exception of the small state of 
Sergipe). A comparative analysis of CBA documents shows items dealing with incidences 
of industrial action to be much more common place in the northeast region. This is evident 
in the CBAs for Recife (Marreta-PE 2014-2015), Fortaleza (Sticcrmf & Sintepav-CE 
2014-1015) and Belém (Sticrmb 2014-2015) (Sistema Mediador 2015).  
Within the construction case study there is much greater recourse to strike action in the 
northeast where the sector in the Fortaleza region saw the nation’s most protracted strikes 
of 2012 (light construction-Sticcrmf), 2014 (CSP Pecém Steel Plant – Sintepav-CE) and 
2015 (light construction Marreta-PE). Importantly the unions involved were both the 
combative anti-capitalist Sticcrmf affiliated to Conlutas in the 2012 instance and the 
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pragmatic results-based Sintepav-CE affiliated to Força Sindical at the steel plant site. This 
supports the idea that the northeast – southeast regional variable is of greater relevance 
than the ideology of the individual union.  
The Pecem Steel Plant construction site is a useful case study to understand employment 
relations both within the construction industry and at the regional/sectorial level. It is 
argued to represent a scale-model of employment relations within the industry and the 
region. The observable tensions could be said to exist elsewhere albeit in less dramatic and 
intense forms. The high profile of the steel plant, which represents a huge transformative 
industrial investment to the region means that it receives considerable attention from the 
relevant authorities with numerous inspection visits and mediation sessions carried out.  
Analysed in more detail in the next chapter on representation, the union responsible for the 
on-site workers, Sintepav-CE cannot be considered a pelego institution and has evolved 
since the PAC unrest of 2011 to be very active in its representative and bargaining 
activities, particularly within the Pecem development. Despite these promising institutional 
pre-conditions, the heightened level of conflict in industrial relations witnessed at the steel 
plant site provides useful empirical evidence as to the multi-faceted and complex 
difficulties in reaching coordinated LMI solutions towards more socially efficient 
outcomes.  
4.4.3 Companhia Siderurgica de Pecem (CSP) Site, Ceará 
The highly problematic labour relations at the CSP steel plant were the subject of a public 
hearing in February 2015, called by the MPT as the levels of on-going conflict were ‘of 
concern to the public authorities’16. Julio Castro, head of human resources for the Pecem 
Steel Company (CSP) a joint venture between Brazilian mining multinational Vale and 
Korean companies Dongkuk Steel and Posco addressed the hearing expressing his 
frustrations with the persistent conflict given how important the investment is to the region 
and in light of the ‘progressive human capital policies envisaged for the steel plant’. He 
cites the transformation of the city of Ipatinga in the southeast state of Minas Gerais as an 
example of how a similar major industrial investment transformed the local development 
reality. Castro estimates the steel plant will create 2,800 direct jobs and 16 thousand 
indirect posts. 																																																								
16 Public hearing organised by the Labour Public Prosecutor (MPT) ‘Labour relations at the Pecem Steel Plant construction site’ attended 
on the 26th of February 2015 
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The comprehensive proactive labour policies and local development initiatives carried out 
in preparation for the operations at the plant presented by Castro are highly compatible 
with established concepts of labour welfare and sustainable development. Policies involve 
investment in the local community with comprehensive training and qualification policies 
in preparation for the start of operations at the plant. If CSP were to keep the human capital 
promises presented at the hearing, the potential for the creation of quality employment is 
high. Industrial employment at the operational plant could recreate the ABC Paulista 
standard and represent a ‘pocket of efficiency’ in a historically less-developed region 
characterised by poor quality employment (Aguiar op cit). 
Speaking after Castro, Jean Hermelino, head of employment relations for Posco 
Engineering and Construction (PEC) the Korean company responsible for the site build, 
describes feeling aggrieved by the violence and damage caused by regular worker 
mobilisations. He highlights that the level of employee benefits and remuneration within 
the specific CBA for the site are superior to any comparative agreements nationwide. 
Hermelino presents the terms and conditions on offer as though they were an altruistic act 
of good faith rather than the result of collective bargaining with a militant and well-
organised labour institution (Sintepav-CE). Sintepav-CE president Gomes responds to 
Castro and Hermelino’s grievances observing that the plant-level reality is far detached 
from the positive descriptions given by the business representatives. He cites widespread 
noncompliance with relevant legislation and the non payment of wages to 40 per cent of 
workers in any given month.   
The CSP construction site case study is a convincing example of the complex networks of 
mistrust, argued across this chapter to hinder the possibility of greater social dialogue to 
contribute to improved labour conditions. The level of benefits and financial rewards 
within the plant specific CBA agreement are amongst the most rewarding within the 
construction industry. However, the widespread noncompliance with this legally binding 
negotiated agreement and national employment and health and safety legislation across the 
supply chain of 102 different subcontracted companies provokes regular outbreaks of 
labour unrest. The level of conflict reached such a level that all parties are negatively 
affected and any potential for local sustainable development through quality employment 
creation is checked. The MPT, Posco and CSP estimate that between 2012 and 2015 there 
were stoppages totalling 150 days at an estimated cost of R$2 million/day (Marques 2015: 
interview and MPT public hearing: 2015). 
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The network of mistrust between parties within the CSP site is complex and multi-
dimensional, contributing to self-perpetuating conflict. Such an assertion is supported by 
first-hand accounts from three scaffolding workers (Scaffolders 2015: 
interview/observation) recently dismissed from the Pecém site, the organiser of the public 
hearing MPT Public Prosecutor Gerson Marques (2015: interview) and the accounts 
presented at the hearing itself. Some quite startling information received from the three 
workers was not possible to verify and therefore not included for analysis. Other accounts 
from the workers were subsequently corroborated by information provided at the public 
hearing. The issues highlighted by Marques at the opening of the hearing and based upon 
the complaints received by the MPT are summarised in table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 Selection of complaints received by the Public Labour Prosecutor's 
office (MPT) on working conditions and employment relations at the Companhia 
Siderurgica de Pecem (CSP) construction site. 
a) Health and safety irregularities 
b) Delays in severance payments and the receipt of other assistential 
benefit entitlements 
c) Black-listing of workers who had participated in previous strikes 
d) Delays in employing successfully recruited workers 
e) Inadequate meal provision 
f) Abusive strikes non-compliant with relevant collective strike legislation 
g) Posco and Labour union Sintepav-CE bargaining without any 
participation of the 102 sub-contracted companies 
h) Existence of bribes and kick-backs between subcontracting facilitated 
by the existence of rent-seeking intermediary fake companies (laranjas). 
i) Criminality on the site, drug-use by workers, suspicions of workers 
carrying firearms creating insecurity in the working environment 
Further Items: Persistence of noncompliance with working environment 
regulations even after detection, huge number of complaints within the 
justice system, on-site pressures making completion of legal processes 
difficult. 
Source: MPT 7a Região, Minutes of Public Hearing 
Items (a) and (e) were common complaints highlighted by representatives of the Union, 
Dieese (Aguiar 2013: interview) and MTE (Juca 2013:interview) prior to the outbreak of 
prolonged conflict and unrest in 2014. The MTE representative Ibiapina presented 
inspection data at the hearing describing the opinion of inspection teams that ‘there was an 
alarming incidence of labour irregularities’ citing violations of NR health and safety 
regulations contributing to unsafe working conditions that would be repeated even after 
detection and sanction. The statistics presented at the hearing detailed 198 inspections, 600 
infractions detected and sanctions upon 102 different companies between 2010-2014.  
Sintepav-CE president Gomes cited these statistics in response to employers’ grievances 
on excessive union/worker militancy at the site. He observed that these already alarming 
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figures represent the tip of the iceberg of the real incidence of irregularities on site given 
that employers receive prior warning of the MTE inspections. Gomes’s observation is 
corroborated by the accounts from the three scaffolding workers. They describe the 
numerous inspections and already high number of irregularities detected by the MTE as 
barely scratching the surface of the real number of infractions. It is further suggested that 
rewards were distributed amongst workers and subcontractors for evading detection of 
numerous other, often more serious infractions.  
The three workers had not moved on from the region due to item (b) in table 4.4, awaiting 
severance payments. Their accounts of the reality on site supported items (h) and (i). One 
likened the lawlessness of the construction site to the Serra Pelada gold rush area of the 
1980s Amazonia region. Another of the workers speculated that some individuals will have 
made their first million from the construction site through companies used to channel 
kickbacks and bribes and/or acting as gatos - extra-official recruitment agencies (item h). 
They all describe drug-use and dealing as commonplace together with the threat and use of 
violence on-site. A local journalist (confidential interview) similarly observed considerable 
and unexplainable increases in wealth of some individuals associated with the site over a 
short period of time. Gaining access to the site was described as extremely difficult and 
considered unsafe to report on or investigate by journalists.  
Items (f) and (g) are of particular relevance to an understanding of the complexity and 
multi-dimensional nature of the employment relations problems on-site. The issues of 
noncompliance, high incidence of industrial action causing financial prejudice and delays 
to the build cannot be simply associated with employer – worker tensions. Significant 
antagonism is evident between the contracting company, Posco and subcontracting 
companies as well as between the subcontractors themselves. Posco agreed a site-specific 
CBA with the Sintepav-CE union, considered to be one of the country’s most rewarding 
without any participation of the other companies involved.  
These companies submit price competitive tenders for work ignorant or negligent of the 
CBA additions and therefore not incorporated into costing, making non compliance almost 
inevitable. Here there is incongruity between an employer’s free-market LME approach to 
outsourcing within a more coordinated and highly regulated institutional environment 
supported by greater state and union involvement to enforce sanctions and penalties for 
noncompliance. The inter-company tensions were recognised at both the public hearing 
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and by the three workers consulted, this has led to a situation where many subcontracting 
companies are said to have a vested interest in, and actively incentivise strike action at the 
site. This is to provide greater leverage to renegotiate their terms with Posco. The tensions 
between companies are often presented in crude Brazil versus Korea terms further 
deepening the ‘network of mistrust’ on-site.  
The CSP-Pecem steel plant site represents a highly informative case study and exemplifies 
the complexity of improving social dialogue towards improved labour conditions for 
workers and greater productivity for business. Workers and business are locked into a 
relationship producing ‘negative complementarities’ where profound and complex 
networks of mistrust prevail. In the steel plant case study: a weak, unrepresentative pelego 
union cannot be attributed as a factor to explain poor tripartite/social dialogue outcomes. 
Instead, a lack of organisation and coordination on the business side has contributed to 
difficulties in meeting the relevant legislation prolonging the conflictive relations on site. 
In the CSP case the business side of the LMIs are evidently fragmented, disorganised and 
underrepresented.17 
Strike action by workers at the CSP site gained self-perpetuating characteristics as the 
described bargaining dynamics meant workers have almost always been paid in full for 
strike days. MPT Prosecutor Marques (2015: interview) recognises highly impressive 
solidarity and a related capacity for worker mobilisation across the site, however he argues 
that the propensity to strike has got out of hand with workers now accustomed to receiving 
full pay during strike periods.  
Employers feel aggrieved that operations in the entire site will be halted due to 
irregularities and grievances (usually on payment) at one or two of the approximately one 
hundred on-site contractors. This problem often originates from non-payment further up 
the productive hierarchy, by Posco for instance. Sintepav-CE president Gomes (2015: 
public hearing) partially agrees with employers that irregularities at one company should 
not bring the entire site to a halt, though criticises businesses for their lack of empathy with 
unpaid workers and ignorance of the close family, community and solidarity networks that 
exist between workers across the supply chain.  
																																																								
17 No corresponding local heavy construction business union to Sintepav-CE existed until January 2016, a few months before the 
completion of the Steel Plant (O Povo 2016) 
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Industrial relations contributing to quality employment at the CSP-Pecem site can be 
considered a success if analysis is limited to the formal content of the relevant CBA 
negotiated between Posco and Sintepav at the highest level of negotiations. Within the 
complex web of mistrust that prevails on-site, the high threshold set by the conditions of 
the CBA actually worsens employment relations and reduces the potential for productive 
plant-level social dialogue. When faced with a mobilised workforce supported by a union 
that is obliged to be active by the shop floor as is argued to be the Sintepav case, the 
immediate result is heightened conflict that becomes self-perpetuating rather than 
improved social dialogue mechanisms. Within the context of networks of mistrust in figure 
4.1: any potential for improved employment outcomes from collective bargaining (c) is 
impeded by the persistence of evasion/noncompliance (f). 
4.4.4 Employer Resistance: Plant Level Representation 
Based upon the empirical example of the ABC Paulista metalworkers model and 
recognised by the NCILC initiative, relations at the plant-level could be considered to be a 
key variable towards successful or unsuccessful employment outcomes. An absence of 
institutionalised workplace resolution of conflicts outside of the Sao Paulo/metalworkers 
example means that issues are dealt with retrospectively overwhelming the state 
institutions and crowding out the possibility of more cooperative solutions from the 
existing negotiation and bargaining processes.  
In cases such as the CSP-Pecem site, such dynamics represent a bottleneck to local or even 
national development given the strategic importance of the steel plant to industrial policy. 
Furthermore, remedial action is often only provoked by dramatic displays of worker 
unrest, as exemplified by the strikes across the PAC sites and the subsequent creation of 
the NCILC. The physical and human resources mobilised across the PAC sites are 
considered in this thesis as a stress test for Brazilian industrial relations; a test that was 
essentially failed. The problems witnessed at the steel plant came five years after the initial 
unrest at the Rio Madeira PAC sites and one to two years after the NCILC initiative. An 
initiative that failed to avoid further heightened conflict at the high profile Pecem project. 
This reinforces an underlying premise of the research question: the difficulty for the 
observed potential for effective coordination, at the national level in this case, to reproduce 
sufficiently to characterise the reality of employment.  
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The need for plant-level representation is recognised in the retroactive responses to the 
problems observed across the PAC sites. The capacity for workers and employers to come 
to timely consensual solutions within the workplace is argued to be a key institutional 
deficiency of the existing system characterised by networks of mistrust and antagonistic 
and adversarial relations, particularly in the less developed northeast. Within this context 
the automobile industry’s ‘ABC Paulista Metalworkers Union model’ where issues relating 
to working conditions are resolved more proactively on the shop-floor (Rodrigues 
2002:148, 151-152), represents a best practice model for improved employment relations 
in the construction industry. 
The idea of proactive plant-level solutions could be described as a distant possibility or 
even utopic within the context of deep mistrust in the construction industry supply chain. 
When considering the particularities of the construction industry the challenges to more 
productive plant-level relations are considerable. The levels of conflict witnessed at the 
CSP-Pecem site and the institutional commitments to improve relations could potentially 
evolve into something akin to the ‘conflictive cooperation’ described in the automobile 
sector. Given the productive reality of the construction sector such evolution is unlikely. 
The industry operates in comparatively short windows, under 12 months in the light 
construction sector and up to five years for the larger infrastructure projects. Within these 
operational windows the turnover of workers and subcontracted companies is high due to 
the different productive phases (approx. 3 to 12 months).  
The construction industry absorbs individuals from the poorest regions and sectors of 
society. Therefore, in a society with a strong legacy of embedded hierarchical and 
authoritarian labour relations it is very difficult to envisage horizontalised plant-level 
relations where workers can look to protect their comprehensive CBA, NR and CLT rights 
through direct dialogue with employers. It should be recognised that this is not a problem 
exclusive to construction, Brazil or blue-collar work, but with the employment relationship 
in general.  
A further difficulty for institutionalising plant-level representation is employer resistance. 
This was evident both nationally within the tripartite National Labour Forum (FNT) 
negotiations between 2002 and 2004, where employers opposed the introduction of 
compulsory plant-level representation mechanisms and union participation in the election 
of internal representatives (Marinho 2004:9; Cook 2007: 102). The NCILC measures to 
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introduce plant-level representation to address a range of problems observed in the 
construction industry were resisted by employer representatives both during discussions 
and in its implementation according to the Dieese report (2013:15) on the effectiveness and 
potential of the tripartite commitment. Sindiscon-CE president Ferreira (2013: interview) 
expressed considerable mistrust of compulsory plant-level representation provisions. He 
argued unions would distribute stable shop-steward employment opportunities amongst 
themselves as favours rather than contribute to workplace dialogue.  
Both generally and specific to the construction industry an absence of institutionalised 
mechanisms of representation and dialogue at the plant-level is a relevant factor limiting 
the possibility of greater coordination and more equitable outcomes for workers. Analysis 
at this level is consistent with Schneider’s HME model (2009:102) where ‘weak plant-
level representation’ impedes labour-management cooperation. There is evidence of social 
dialogue successes at the national level and significant potential for more cooperative 
solutions in the formal system at the regional/sectorial level though this does not translate 
into widespread employment improvements given the relative absence of cooperation in 
the workplace.  
Conclusion    
The analysis of employment relations across this chapter identifies a formal system, 
referred to in the underlying research question, with considerable protections for labour 
with substantial individual and collective rights and a capacity and design compatible with 
collaborative solutions. Prompt tripartite policies towards improved employment 
conditions are evident at the national level of institutional relations both generally 
(minimum wage and PPE) and in the construction industry case study (NCILC and CPN). 
This is a clear indication of increasing coordination since the 2000s coinciding with the 
sustained inclusive growth of the ‘inclusive decade’.  
Whilst a shift towards greater tripartite dialogue is evident since the start of the Lula/PT 
government in 2003, the dynamics of effective social dialogue can be traced back to the 
1980s at the workplace level of the automobile industry in the ABC Paulista region. The 
ABC dynamics upwardly influenced the position of trade unions at the national level of 
bargaining through the largest peak association, the CUT. Within this research project this 
evidence of coordinated success is of considerable relevance for two reasons. Firstly, it 
represents empirical evidence of the institutional capacity of the Brazilian labour market 
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system to reach effective coordinated solutions. Secondly it is important to note that the 
dynamics of these successful examples date back to the 1980s and resulted from rather 
than contrary to the existing institutions of the long-standing corporatist LMI system.  
As per the inconsistency identified in the research problem, the examples from the national 
level and ‘ABC standard’ of industrial relations do not characterise employment more 
generally in Brazil despite the recent positive development trajectory. It is at the 
intermediate level of industrial relations that difficulties can be observed. Employment 
relations are characterised by networks of mistrust related to uncertain and indeterminate 
relationships between designated unions and their workers and high levels of 
noncompliance summarised in figure 4.1. Within this context of weak linkages or negative 
complementarities it is difficult to envisage the institutional coordination ‘pockets of 
efficiency’ evident in the ABC standard and at the national level reproducing sufficiently 
to characterise employment and LMI activity across the Brazilian variety of capitalism.   
From the analysis of this chapter: two key issues are identified on the inconsistency 
between institutional design and the workplace reality of employment characterised by 
networks of mistrust. These are representation and regulation. On representation it is 
argued that the Brazilian system is fragmented at the regional/sectorial level where the 
majority of resources of the collective representation system are concentrated, a process 
that has increased since the partial liberalisation of the collective rights system in the 
1980s, a process widely referred to as pulverisation. A further long-standing criticism of 
the existing system is its capacity to sustain unrepresentative, inactive and complacent 
trade unions weakening worker representation.  
If this thesis were a study of linguistics, the corpus of fieldwork vocabulary would be 
dominated by variations of the term pelego. Representatives consulted strongly suggested 
that pelego trade unionism is the rule rather than exception in the Brazilian system. The 
systemic capacity to produce unrepresentative unions is discussed at more length in the 
next chapter. Representation is also an essential ongoing consideration of the entire thesis 
and research contribution aiming to extend upon the HME Latin American ideal type, 
contesting the ‘sparse-unions’ core trait in the Brazilian variation.   
Regulation debates dominate collective bargaining in the construction industry case study 
at all three institutional levels. This is its ‘worst case’ characteristic when compared with 
the ‘best case’ of the ‘ABC standard’ of industrial relations where working conditions are 
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described as promptly and proactively resolved on the shop-floor. Regulation of the 
employment relationship is also a key element in the VoC CME/LME distinction and fuels 
a persistent an ongoing general debate at global levels between liberal deregulationist and 
social dialogue/greater enforcement positions. Implicit from the research question, this 
thesis identifies with the ILO social dialogue and enforcement position (see ch.2 part 2.2). 
The next two chapters identify and discuss the wider debates on representation and 
regulation respectively before applying them to the Brazilian model and specific 
construction industry case study of this thesis.  
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Chapter 5 - Corporatist Representation of Labour in Brazilian 
Employment Relations 
 
This chapter discusses representation in the Brazilian industrial relations system. The 
previous chapter identified worker representation as a key element of the inconsistency 
between the employment relationship envisaged by the formal LMI system and the reality 
of the workplace referred to in the research question. Analysis is defined by the parameters 
of the new institutional approach of the thesis and the research question. Focus is 
predominantly upon labour and trade unions within a corporatist system18. This continues 
logically within the ongoing consideration that the corporatist institutional arrangements of 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) offer more equitable development than liberal 
deregulated market alternatives (LMEs).  
Up to this point in the thesis, it has been argued that Brazil has maintained an industrial 
relations system with the institutional design or capacity for more coordinated tripartite 
solutions. Since the 1980s there is evidence of effective evolving cooperation and 
consensus achieved between labour, business and the state mostly within the constraints of 
the existing system. The emerging success, particularly apparent in the Sao Paulo region 
and automobile industry, is all the more notable given the unfavourable circumstances 
from which it emerged. A historical legacy of exploitative employment relations and an 
authoritarian state and system, a dominant trade union strand that shunned tripartism and 
an administration that favoured market based solutions over consensus and dialogue 
throughout the 1990s.  
The unprecedented and successful development trajectory of the Brazilian economy since 
2003 suggests the institutional system may finally be ‘maturing’ or shifting towards a more 
inclusive collaborative phase. The embeddedness of the long-standing labour institutions 
together with the increasing state participation in the economy indicates that Brazil is not 
on a path towards an LME. Nevertheless, closer analysis of institutional relations and 
labour outcomes across the ‘inclusive decade’ suggests that despite the much-celebrated 
																																																								
18 Noronha (2000: para 2.) rejects the common application of the corporatist or neocorporatist label for contemporary Brazil. He argues 
Brazil is atypical when compared with the European corporatist ideal type. He describes the post-democratisation Brazilian institutional 
model as ‘legislated (however with considerable discretionary power to employers)’ and with ‘pluralist tendencies’ rather than tripartite 
corporatism. Noronha’s interpretation is not contested here and specificities of the ‘Brazilian variety of capitalism’ are an ongoing 
consideration of the thesis. For the sake of understanding and simplicity as well as the analytical framework adopted, (Archer 1998 & 
Crouch 1979,1983, 1994) the term ‘corporatism’ is used across this chapter. The legislated nature of the Brazilian system is discussed in 
the next chapter on regulation.  
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developmental results, the reality of employment remain closer to those of a hierarchical 
market economy (HME) than the more equitable CME (see ch.2. fig.2.7).  
The objective of this chapter is to consider the representativeness of labour within the 
contemporary Brazilian system. Representation - ‘strong or weak’, ‘authentic or 
compromised’ is frequently cited from all sides in debates on labour market institutions 
(LMIs). It is not always carefully defined. Within the context of this chapter, overall 
effective labour representation is that which manages to influence activities, policies and 
regulation in the interests of workers – which in turn should contribute to overall equity 
gains within society. Such interests can be related to income (amount and distribution), 
safety, control, stability, progression and fairness at work (see ch. 1, part 1.3). 
As presented in the previous chapter, there are three complementary levels of labour 
interest representation: the workplace, the regional/sectorial union and confederations and 
peak associations at the national level. Analysis of the intermediate regional/sectorial level 
is prioritised across the chapter as it is the point where the trade union interacts directly 
with workers and the majority of resources are concentrated in the Brazilian case.19 
Criticisms of the existing and long-standing corporatist arrangements and debates on 
systemic continuity and reform are also concentrated at this level of representation.    
The main question is whether the Brazilian system allows for effective representation. This 
is discussed in light of the long-standing problem of ‘artificial’ trade union institutions 
with ‘low levels of representativeness and impermeable to social control’ sustained and 
protected by the monopoly of representation and compulsory dues provided by the existing 
system (Horn 2009b: 151). The proliferation of such unions, described as phantom, de 
gaveta [in the drawer] or by the catch-all pelego term, is widely argued to have accelerated 
since democratisation (Cardoso 2003:302, 2014:22; Horn 2009a:59; 2009b:151; MTE 
2005).  
The first section considers established arguments and debates on the effectiveness of a 
corporatist system. Borrowing from Archer (1998:85) it seeks to identify the ‘potentials 
and dangers of corporatism’ and determine the necessary institutional conditions for trade 
union representation to contribute to a more equitable coordinated economic model. A 
wealth of literature and theory exists on industrial relations; the majority based upon 																																																								
19 60 per cent of the mandatory dues (syndical tax) and the majority of the ‘assistential’ and 'associative’ contributions of workers 
(generally a monthly payroll deduction of 1 per cent each). 
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empirical examples of European and North American advanced economies. Accordingly, 
given the institutional approach of this thesis, it is applied to the Brazilian case in the 
following section with care to allow for the analysis of national specificities.  
The second section applies the discussion of corporatism to the Brazilian institutional 
model. It then examines the long-standing debates on the need for a more democratic and 
grass-roots interest representation system often argued in terms of compliance with the 
ILO’s Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association. The stalled National Labour Forum 
(FNT) reform process is analysed together with explanations as to why the controversial 
monopoly of representation (unicity) and compulsory dues (syndical tax) provisions have 
survived persistent pressures for reform. It considers counterfactually whether the removal 
of the provisions could contribute to a more representative system of employment 
relations.  
The second half of the chapter returns to the fieldwork and ethnographic element of the 
thesis based upon the construction industry case study. Analysis is informed by the 
‘potentials and risks’ of corporatism and the issues of peleguismo, fragmentation and weak 
plant-level representation discussed and identified across the first half of the chapter. The 
second part of the section examines the significance of the intense industrial conflict 
witnessed across the high-profile Growth Acceleration Policy (PAC) public infrastructure 
construction sites.  
The evolution of representation by the Sintepav unions at the PAC construction sites of 
Suape in Pernambuco and Pecem in Ceará is used a case study. It demonstrates that 
effective trade union representation is possible within the existing institutional system and 
unrepresentative inactive unions are not a systemic inevitability. The conclusion considers 
counterfactually whether the clamour for a more pluralist or democratic system would 
improve the representation of labour interests or contribute to a greater systemic capacity 
to do so. It also argues for a distinctive definition of effective representation in the 
Brazilian context that leads into the following and final chapter on regulation.    
5.1 On Corporatist Representation  
This section discusses the necessary conditions for effective trade union representation 
within a corporatist system. The idea of proportionate representation of interests is 
consistent with the work of Archer (1998: 68) who identifies ‘unions, capitalist employers, 
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and the government as the three actors with the most influence over the feasibility of any 
strategy for achieving economic democracy’. As to what represents effective 
representation of labour depends upon the ideological perspective of the observer. Marxists 
would argue that workers should be represented and organised to end capitalism and 
introduce a new type of society whilst a laissez-faire perspective would see any type of 
business or labour organisation and the involvement of the state as ‘inefficient’ 
interference in the free market. Neither camp would favour a corporatist system. 
In contrast, Archer (idem: 91-92) identifies ‘three key advantages’ of corporatism 
representing the basis of a feasible and gradual transition to economic democracy. The first 
is ‘the maximisation of workers’ strength’ providing influence over wage levels and 
production issues such as modernisation and the organisation of the workplace. Second is 
where worker strength within corporatism provides ‘a wider variety of goods than in other 
industrial relations systems’ through trade-offs with employers and the state such as wage 
restraint for greater control (idem 103-104). The third advantage is that such bargained 
goods can be distributed to the entire working class.  
According to Archer (idem :74), to realise the described advantages within a corporatist 
system, industrial relations actors need to be organised which is dependent on the level of 
centralisation. Crouch (1994:12) prefers the term ‘articulation of local with central power’ 
as centralisation could be interpreted as the relationship of a ‘central bureaucracy out of 
touch with active forces on the ground’. Archer (1998: 71-73) specifies three attributes of a 
highly organised class: the first is ‘a high concentration of power’ - the degree of influence 
of participation of peak associations upon the activities of affiliates in terms of collective 
bargaining and collection of dues amongst other powers. Second is organisational unity – 
dependent upon whether there is unity or fragmentation at the peak council level or if 
workers are separated by class and category. Archer argues unity is stronger ‘if there are a 
small number of large industrial unions’. The third attribute is the membership density of 
trade unions.  
This thesis and its research question identifies with the potential-stressing optimists that 
believe corporatism is a system in the best interests of workers rather than the pessimistic 
idea that it serves the interests of the state and capital. In this sense it is consistent with 
Archer’s ‘economic democracy’ and Crouch’s analyses, stressing the potential for better 
representative mechanisms for labour interests from the corporatist system. This is based 
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upon empirical evidence of CME-type economies and the pockets of efficiency identified 
in the Brazilian institutional system discussed across the previous chapters. To justify the 
optimistic position of this research the criticisms present in the collective organisation 
literature and oft heard during fieldwork merit analysis. There is a traditional position 
arguing that corporatist representation of labour encourages the co-option or incorporation 
of labour institution in detriment to the interests of the rank and file.  
The idea of unrepresentative collective organisations is long standing in the sociology of 
organisations. Michels (1968 [1911]) argues that Weberian type bureaucratic processes of 
professionalisation and rationalisation within organisations lead to the ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’. Therefore, the rank and file are dominated and ruled by their trade union, which 
may operate in self-interest with distinctive interests to those of its members (Crouch 
1982:163). Similar classical accounts of the inevitability of oligarchy in organisations are 
given by Pareto describing the ‘perpetual circulation of elites and oligarchy’ and Mosca 
describing the dictatorship of the majority by the minority as inevitable (Evans 2006: 42-
3).   
Later interpretations shift away from the Michelsian pessimism on the inevitability of 
unrepresentative oligarchy within a corporatist system. A more nuanced relationship 
between the rank and file of workers and trade unions with a range of potential outcomes is 
presented. The Michelsian type of relationship is recognised as a possibility or risk of a 
corporatist system rather than inevitable. Archer (1998:89) describes oligarchy as ‘a 
potential problem for most organisations’ and something of a practical consideration in 
order for organisations to function properly. He further observes that it is evident in trade 
unions of both the highly centralised Austrian model and in the United States ‘where 
unions are highly decentralized’.  
Crouch (1982: 187-188) argues that the view of trade unions as a mere ‘reflection of 
members’ wishes’ is misguided though the opposite assumption of an impenetrable 
oligarchy detached from the rank and file is considered even more unrealistic. He describes 
the relationship between members and their representative organisation as one of 
interdependence, where the shop floor needs the advice and assistance of the union and the 
union requires the shop stewards and other activists to provide its ‘basic means of 
mobilisation’, which may in some cases involve the discipline, or restraint of workers. 
Hyman (1971 in Crouch 1982:166) argues against the inevitability of the ‘iron law of 
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oligarchy’ observing that in some circumstances union leaders are obliged or even want to 
follow and ratify the actions of shop-floor movements and follow members’ wishes.  
Crouch (1994:8) argues that collective bargaining arrangements and strong trade unions 
require discipline in order for governability to ensue and for representation to be 
‘compatible with economic growth and stability’. Crouch (1979:188) makes the case for 
‘bargained corporatism’ over the more libertarian ‘free collective bargaining’ with both 
systems characterised by strong trade unions. The latter would characterise the UK system, 
unable to reach coordinated solutions as the failure of the Bullock enquiry would suggest 
(see ch. 1, 1.3) and was subsequently dismantled over the 1980s. According to Crouch 
(idem:193) the bargained corporatism option represents:  
a convenient compromise half-way between collective bargaining and incorporation of 
unions, in some senses it would constitute yet another compromise between the forces 
of order and freedom, or between capital and labour.  
A risk would be a swing to the incorporation or co-option of unions to discipline labour in 
the interest of the state, business and/or self-interest. Crouch (idem:188) argues that such 
subordination is unlikely in a free society as ‘no trade-union can cooperate indefinitely 
with employers and government without doing something to represent its members’ 
immediate interests’. The successful example cited of West Germany’s trade union 
movement is cited. Described as the ‘most co-operative in Western Europe’ with a legal 
system disciplining workers operating outside the formal institutions. Streeck (1997:34) 
similarly describes how such a ‘firmly institutionalised’ compromise was achieved in the 
German model.  
Olson’s (1971:2-6) influential ‘logic of collective action’ also recognises the disciplinary 
or subordination element of trade union representation. He argues that the ‘rational self-
interested individual’ will not voluntarily act to ‘achieve their common or group objectives 
unless there is coercion to force them to do so’. The survival of a trade union institution is 
therefore reliant upon ‘some form of compulsory membership’. The danger of compulsory 
membership creating self-serving organisations that fail to represent their members’ 
interests, is acknowledged.  
Unlike the Michelisan interpretation, Olson presents union co-option as a possibility rather 
than an inevitable outcome. Similar to Crouch and Hyman, he identifies interdependence 
between unions and their members where the existence of non-representative unions is 
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‘severely limited’ where ‘organizations often perish if they do nothing to further the 
interests of their members’. It is stressed throughout Olson’s study (idem 3,13,68,87,88) 
study that compulsory membership is essential for ‘an enduring stable labour movement’ 
of the type Archer (op cit) presents as necessary to realise the potential of a corporatist 
system.  
Olson (idem:88) rejects criticisms of the compulsory element of contemporary unionism 
restricting individual freedom as ‘misleading and unhelpful’. On freedom, an underlying 
argument of Archer’s (1998: 3,9) economic democracy is that a liberal market employment 
relationship is characterised by ‘unfreedom’ whereas greater freedom is ‘morally-
desirable’ and feasible within a corporatist system if ‘certain conditions are met’. Workers 
can gain greater control and influence over their jobs and the operation of their workplace 
through trade offs with employers. This arguably offers more complete freedom than 
formal voluntary association mechanisms in pluralist free collective bargaining systems.  
Similar arguments on freedom are made in Haagh’s (2012:551) Occupational Citizenship 
model comparing the liberal UK with the more corporatist Scandinavian models. A ‘high 
level of purposeful coordination between institutions’ in the latter more horizontalised 
capitalist system is argued to offer greater freedom, stability and control. Using a more 
holistic concept of freedom, it can therefore be surmised that despite some authoritarian 
and compulsory means within a corporatist system the ends or outcomes offer the potential 
for greater freedom within society.  
The conditions identified by Archer (1998:132) for the feasibility of a corporatist industrial 
relations system are as follows: 
1. the workers must have an exchangeable good that threatens the capitalists' profits, 
2. the trade‐off must be compatible with the requirements of national economic 
management, and 3. the corporatist industrial relations system must be compatible with 
the requirements of national economic management 
He (idem: 235-6) argues that in some economies these conditions have been met. He cites 
the persistence of centralised bargaining in Germany and other countries where ‘the basic 
structure of collective bargaining has scarcely altered’ and identifies ‘examples of bipartite 
and tripartite central agreements involving national union organisations’ across Europe 
with the exception of ‘atypical’ Britain. Crouch (1994:7) similarly recognises ‘sustained 
success’ across Northern European economies categorised as CMEs in the VoC 
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literature20. Two decades on, Archer’s optimism on the potential of corporatism has been 
vindicated. As discussed in more detail in chapters 1 and 2, global convergence upon a 
single liberal market system in response to the pressures of globalisation did not take place 
and the CME institutional model persisted and prospered.  
The development trajectory of the CME-type European economies when compared to the 
more liberal systems characterised by pluralist free collective bargaining –the LMEs, 
represents the feasibility of a successful corporatist system. When a more composite 
concept of freedom is adopted, the more equitable development and comparable levels of 
economic efficiency of economies like Austria and Germany when compared to the liberal 
market economies, weakens the arguments that the compulsory membership elements of a 
corporatist system offer less freedom than a libertarian system. Within these successful 
examples, trade union representation combines labour representation with a governance 
and social order function as ‘state‐bearing forces’ (Böckenförde,1977: 244 in Crouch 
1994:7) or as Wright Mills (1948 [1971]:8-9) describes, trade unions as the ‘managers of 
discontent’. 
As per Archer there are ‘potentials and dangers’ in a corporatist system. The potential for 
greater ‘economic democracy’ depends not only upon the centralisation and unity of trade 
union organisations though also their capacity to reach collective bargaining trade-offs 
‘within the requirements of national economic management’. The means of a successful 
corporatist system may be considered somewhat antiliberal given the necessity of 
compulsory dues to ensure ‘a stable trade union movement’ and the need for trade unions 
to be able to control and discipline their members (Archer 1998:79; Crouch 1979: 175). 
Whilst a successful corporatist system could be considered freedom enhancing when a 
more composite definition of freedom is applied, the more authoritarian means may be 
incompatible with embedded liberal and civil liberties traditions. This is argued to be the 
case in the US and British LME examples, as Crouch (1979: 186-187) observes in the case 
of the UK (see ch.1).  
Empirical developments into the 21st century, ‘continuing and if anything increasing 
divergence between the ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ market economies’ (Thelen 2001:72 see 
ch.1) has strengthened the case for a corporatist system. The more equitable development 
																																																								
20 ‘in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and possibly Belgium and Denmark’ 
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of the CME with a vested interest and key role for strong representative trade unions 
vindicates the optimism regarding the potential and feasibility of such a system.  
In summary, traditional accounts view unrepresentative trade unions acting in self-interest 
or co-opted to capital or state interests as an inevitable consequence of collective 
organisation. More contemporary and empirically influenced analyses suggest that this is a 
risk or possibility in a corporatist system rather than a foregone conclusion. A relationship 
of interdependence more accurately reflects the relationship between the trade union and 
the rank and file.  
The vast majority of discussion, approaches and theories of trade union representation in a 
corporatist system are based upon the empirical examples of advanced capitalist countries. 
The next section considers the applicability and relevance of trade union representation 
approaches to the middle-income/emerging Brazilian institutional model. In terms of the 
research question, the activity and presence of trade unions to represent labour interests is a 
key variable and is discussed across the remainder of this chapter.  
5.2 Corporatist Representation in Brazil  
This section applies the ‘potentials and dangers’ of a corporatist system to the Brazilian 
institutional model. Criticism of the existing system together with proposals and initiatives 
for its reform are ever present in labour market debates and have intensified since 
democratisation in the 1980s. Of particular controversy is the persistence of the monopoly 
of representation and compulsory financing provisions, hereby referred to as unicity and 
syndical tax respectively. The criticisms are discussed in this section and considered 
counter-factually as to whether the proposed alternatives would produce a more 
representative system. Specific attention is given to the proposals and outcomes of the 
FNT reform initiative under the Lula government, which aimed to create a more 
‘democratic and modern’ LMI system.  
Brazilian LMIs created in the 1930s had state control as an objective and the CLT labour 
code was ‘heavily inspired’ by fascist Italy’s Carta del Lavoro (TST 2013). Labour and 
business unions were divided with one union per region and category, subject to state 
intervention and sustained by compulsory dues. Peak associations and strikes were 
prohibited. Additionally, and described in more detail in chapter 3 (see figures 3.1-3.3), the 
rights and protections of the legislation excluded the vast majority of the workforce. 
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Noronha (2000) views these ‘authoritarian mechanisms approximating fascism’ as a 
negative trait of Brazil’s state corporatism when compared to the ideal type of Swedish 
neocorporatism. 
The unicity system resulted in ‘a proliferation of small trade unions’ (Carvalho 2013:121) 
and importantly, they existed outside the workplace. Quoted in chapter one on path 
dependency, Peters (2005:71) describes ‘an inertial tendency’ for ‘initial policy choices to 
persist’. The formal structure of the Brazilian CLT system today bears many similarities to 
its original form, the continuation of the unicity and syndical tax in particular. 
Characterised by disunity and decentralisation with a dispersal of power across a large 
number of small unions - the original institutional design of the Brazilian system could 
almost be described as the antithesis of Archer’s (1998:72) attributes of a ‘highly 
organized class’. 
Weyland’s (1996:21) analysis of Brazil identifies institutional fragmentation as a key 
variable; not solely in the employment relations system, but across Brazilian institutions 
generally with a specific focus upon tax and social security systems. He argues that such 
fragmentation is one of the main institutional obstacles to equity enhancing reform in post-
democratisation Brazil. Weyland describes a systemic weakness in the capacity to create 
the necessary encompassing, cohesive and united representative associations required for 
more equitable change. On LMIs he (idem: 43) identifies multiple cleavages accentuating 
the fragmentation of the formal institutional system. He argues that fragmentation is 
accentuated by the ‘cleavage between the informal and formal sector’ separating workers 
from the ‘marginal mass’ (see next chapter for analysis of the formal/informal cleavage).  
The emergence of peak associations such as the CUT is acknowledged by Weyland 
(idem:66-69) as representing ‘the most important organizational change that democracy 
has brought’, though he describes how they have been similarly fragmented or ‘kept apart 
by ideological and partisan divergences that the regime change [democratisation] has 
fueled’. Within LMIs and across Weyland’s analysis (idem:22,29,47,56,68) an exception 
to the fragmented tendency is identified in the rural National Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers (Contag). Contag is argued to represent an island of ‘more encompassing 
organization’ and the ‘most encompassing in Brazilian society’, having maintained its 
internal unity and producing a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering all workers 
both informal and formal. A single nationwide CBA has been an objective of the 
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automobile industry trade unions since the 1990s and more recently the construction 
unions, evident in the voluntary NCILC initiative in 2012 (see previous chapter).  
Despite the emergence of the peak associations and the persistent unity of Contag through 
democratisation, the partial liberalisation of the collective representation system had the 
unintended consequence of accelerating the division of the already fragmented LMIs on 
both the employer and business sides. According to Carvalho Neto (2009:29), the rationale 
for the maintenance of the unicity system post democratisation was to allow for the 
survival of the existing trade unions and avoid their fragmentation and division or 
reduction to firm-level bargaining21 and that ‘it was presumed that the organisational 
autonomy would stimulate mergers and incorporation of increasingly encompassing and 
strong entities’.  
What took place was the dismembering of the union structure in a process widely 
described as trade union ‘pulverisation’, a term used interchangeably with fragmentation 
and atomisation. Carvalho Neto (2009:29) and Horn (2009a:67) list a variety of motives 
for the increased fragmentation: new professions and technology, ideological differences 
and what can be described as traditional self-interest peleguismo. Carvalho Neto describes 
the more sinister creation of new categories for ‘certain groups’ to appropriate the 
compulsory financing, or create entities to allow for social ascension and the accumulation 
of power and influence.  
The 2003 FNT reform initiative of the Lula/PT government was a response to the process 
of trade union ‘pulverisation’ and related representational deficit amongst many trade 
unions, facilitated by the partial liberalisation of collective labour legislation as the MTE 
(2003:3) document introducing the initiative states: 
there are many legitimate and representative trade unions, but this contrasts with the 
proliferation of increasingly small and less representative unions, amongst both 
employer and labour representative institutions, this makes it necessary to move on 
from the existing model of trade union organisation, criticised for years for its 
authoritarian and corporatist origins, its low representativeness and for being 
impermeable to social control.  
The objectives, content and outcomes of the FNT merit attention when analysing 
representation in the contemporary Brazilian system. There are three key observations to 
be considered in turn. Firstly, the content of the proposals aiming to remove the 																																																								
21 An argued weakness of the Chilean system see ch. 2, Haagh (2002:92) and Schneider (2013:174)  
		 182 
controversial syndical tax and unicity system were modest and timid initiatives that offered 
more continuity than change (Horn 2009b:164). Proposed alternatives to the syndical tax 
did not remove compulsory trade union funding, replacing it instead with alternative 
obligatory mechanisms. The suggested reform of the unicity system offering greater 
pluralism at the trade union level to comply with the ILO’s convention 87 on the freedom 
of association still retained elements of monopoly of representation in collective 
bargaining processes.  
The second observation on the FNT is that there was minimal evidence of consensus in the 
reform proposals. The objectives of the initiative were to reform the system through 
tripartite dialogue, an example of the state-lead coordinated intentions described in 
chapters two and four. However, little in the way of coordinated outcomes can be observed 
from the process. As a result, very little if any substantive reform actually emerged. 
Acknowledging the high profile of the Forum, Chiarelli (2009:125), paraphrasing Aesop, 
observes that the ‘mountain did not even bring forth a mouse’. The moderate and 
continuist reform proposals presented to congress were mostly archived. The only 
observable reform to the existing system, passed in 2008, was the formal recognition of the 
peak associations with a 10 per cent share of the syndical tax income. Given the presence 
and influence of peak associations since the 1980s, including at the FNT negotiation table 
itself, it represents a symbolic rather than transformative reform.   
The third point is the almost complete absence of any deregulation or liberalisation agenda 
within the debates of the FNT. This is commented upon by Horn (2009b:177-178) who 
observes that neoliberal type arguments in favour of a complete deregulation of the 
employment relations system were not systemically presented in any of the FNT debates. 
He states that this absence may be due to the political climate related to the 2002 and 2006 
election and re-election of Lula. However, the FNT is not the first attempt at reforming or 
‘democratising’ the system post-democratisation. The 1993 ‘Forum Barelli’ was a tripartite 
initiative involving the then extra-official peak associations that similarly failed to produce 
any meaningful reform (Camargos 2010:110). Corporatist continuity prevailed at a time 
when deregulation and market policies were at their height of popularity elsewhere in the 
polity (see Evans 1995:153). 
The absence of a deregulation agenda reinforces the idea already presented that Brazil is 
not on a path to an LME. The similarities between the FNT and the Barelli forum are also 
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indicative of a tendency to overstate the level of liberalisation and flexibilisation reforms 
of the 1990s and underestimate the systemic continuities between the FHC and Lula 
governments (see ch. 2). The inability of the FNT to produce meaningful tripartite 
consensus again exemplifies the research problem - the difficulty to move away from 
hierarchical arrangements and reach coordinated solutions. One particular source of dissent 
within the forum warrants attention given its importance to the day-to-day reality of the 
workplace. This was the proposal for strengthening or introducing compulsory 
mechanisms for the plant-level representation of labour.  
An observable and persistent absence in the Brazilian LMI system is formal institutional 
provisions for plant-level representation. This has contributed to a tradition of union 
representation outside the workplace. Whilst this thesis contests the ‘sparse unions’ core 
characteristic of HMEs when applied to Brazil, the defining feature of ‘weak shop-floor 
presence’ (Schneider 2013:79) is consistent with the characteristics of the national model. 
It is an important consideration when applying the corporatism approaches outlined in the 
previous section to the Brazilian case, given that they mostly take mechanisms for 
workplace representation and the existence of shop-stewards as a given when contesting 
the inevitability of ‘the iron law of oligarchy’.  
When the historical weakness of trade union representation within the workplace is 
considered together with the syndical tax something of a negative complementarity can be 
observed. The compulsory dues combined with the absence of workplace representation 
weaken the upward links or ‘interdependence’ (Crouch op cit) between union and worker. 
Olsen (op cit) recognises the risk of peleguismo in trade unions sustained by compulsory 
dues where ‘Some organizations may out of ignorance fail to further their members’ 
interests, and others may be enticed into serving only the ends of the leadership’ though he 
argues that it is unlikely as it would likely lead to organisational failure.  
When the characteristics of the Brazilian institutional model are considered such a check 
and balance on the existence of unrepresentative unions is weak. Considering the 
compulsory dues together with a general absence of plant-level representation, the 
potential for unrepresentative unions or ‘dangers of corporatism’ can be considered 
heightened in this case. Indeed, Archer (1998:88) describes the Brazilian ‘pelegos 
phenomenon’ as a ‘particularly graphic product’ of the danger of unions not representing 
labour interests in a system of interest intermediation.  
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In light of the idea of a negative complementarity contributing to a heightened danger of 
unrepresentative trade unions described, counter-factual analysis of the recommended 
reforms is important. In particular, the long-standing controversy of the syndical tax and 
unicity. Measures that have survived authoritarian regimes, political and economic 
liberalisation processes and two tripartite forums in which their reform or removal was 
anticipated.  
Moreira Gomes (2010:117) argues that the ‘modernisation and democratization of Brazil’s 
labour rights system depends upon the end of the corporatist system’. Moreira Gomes 
(idem:107) and Carvalho Neto (2009:141) both stress the urgent need for the Brazilian 
system to comply with the ILO’s Freedom of Association Convention 87, which would 
involve the end of unicity and the syndical tax. Both commentators argue that this did not 
take place in the FNT forum as the participating business and labour representative 
institutions have a vested interest in the maintenance of the corporatist elements. Moreira 
Gomes (2010:97-103) argues that a less authoritarian system allowing for freedom of 
association would allow for more ‘authentic’ and ‘true’ trade union representativeness.  
The problems of fragmented organisations, weak plant-level representation and the 
proliferation of pelego type unions heightening the ‘dangers’ of corporatism are recognised 
here. However, counterfactually, the idea of improved representation from the removal of 
unicity and the syndical tax appears fanciful. The adoption of policies or removal of 
obstacles towards greater freedom of association could be counterproductive. The 
phenomenon of trade union pulverisation was facilitated by the partial liberalisation of 
collective labour legislation; greater pluralism and choice would therefore only accentuate 
or perpetuate such a problem. This is anticipated by Horn (2009b:178), identifying the risk 
that the FNT proposals for greater pluralism would create ‘an ungovernable patchwork 
quilt’.  
The ‘islands’ or ‘pockets’ of effective representation, acknowledged by continuists and 
reformists alike, emerged from the existing corporatist system. The Contag union identified 
by Weyland as an example of an effective encompassing organisation was created by the 
existing system when labour legislation was finally extended to the countryside (see 
chapter 3, 3.2). The imagined discourse of authentic representation in the ‘new’ trade 
unionism can be misleading. The activities of the ABC metalworkers’ union, cited by 
Moreira Gomes (2010:99) and Carvalho Neto (2009:134), represented effective new 
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representational practices (strike-activity, plant-level commissions, direct negotiations with 
employers). Though these were new practices by an existing institution - created, sustained 
and path dependent upon the existing system. The influential peak associations operating 
extra-officially until 2008 did not exist in opposition to the corporatist system, rather they 
emerged from and were sustained by the stability of the formal representative institutions 
at the intermediate level.  
Removal of the corporatist elements of the system may therefore weaken its identified and 
proven potential instead of addressing the observable problems and dangers of the system. 
There is a tendency to overstate the influence or inevitability of certain outcomes from the 
formal Brazilian industrial relations system. Encompassing national peak associations can 
mitigate the effects of the fragmented union structure at the lower levels of organisation 
providing the centralisation, unity or articulation required to benefit from a corporatist 
system (Archer & Crouch op cit).  
Weyland (1995:67) argues that such potential is frustrated due to the ‘partisan and 
ideological cleavages’ between the peak associations, however there is greater observable 
unity into the 21st century during the Lula & Dilma PT administrations. This is recognised 
by Araujo & Veras (2011: 108), Marcelino (2008) and Riethof (2004:41). A united 
position is also evident in the automobile and construction industries at the national 
bargaining level (see ch.4), FNT and similar tripartite forums, national debates on the 
minimum wage, pension reform and anti-cyclical policies.  
The risk of an unrepresentative pelego union sustained by the compulsory dues could also 
be mitigated by plant-level organisation and representation. The absence of workplace 
representation mechanisms is recognised as an institutional weakness of the Brazilian 
system, however the precariousness has not impeded its emergence and existence. 
Successful factory-level bargaining developed in the ABC metalworkers’ union example 
and managed to upwardly influence and strengthen the bargaining strategies of the 
dominant CUT peak association (see ch.4, parts 4.1 & 4.4.1). This demonstrates bottom-up 
influence and ties from the shop floor to the more centralised national institution. It also 
suggests the risk of a ‘central bureaucracy out of touch with active forces on the ground’ 
(Crouch op cit) or the top-down imposition of peak association policy upon the individual 
union (Chiarelli 2009: 125) is not a systemic inevitability.  
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In summary, when considering the composite representational system in Brazil there is a 
heightened risk of its institutional complementarities contributing to unrepresentative 
institutions. This then limits the potential of the corporatist system. Arguments in favour of 
a system more compatible with ‘freedom of association’ removing the compulsory 
financing and monopoly provisions of the existing system are counterfactually weak. The 
institutional complementarities of Brazilian LMIs mean there is a heightened danger of 
unrepresentativeness. However, the potential for successful corporatism contributing to 
greater social equity, the tripartite/social dialogue path argued across this thesis, is 
dependent upon the same system. The ABC metalworkers standard with effective plant 
level representation practices and the encompassing peak associations all emerged from the 
existing system rather than in opposition to it.  
Even the most vociferous and persistent advocate of labour law flexibilisation in Brazil, 
Pastore (2003) argues in favour of strong unions and considers the simplistic proposal to 
remove compulsory dues as potentially counter-productive, weakening effective unions. 
Within the overall direction of the thesis the removal of the corporatist elements of the 
system in the name of ‘freedom of association’ could have the undesired effect of setting 
the economy upon an LME path characterised by atomistic and flexible labour markets and 
greater income inequality than the coordinated model. The libertarian Chilean system 
could be argued to offer greater ‘freedom’ of choice for workers though contributes to a 
minimalist system with less potential or institutional mechanisms to represent labour 
interests (see Haagh & Cook 2005:179).  
Considering the risks and potential of the Brazilian system, the remainder of the chapter 
examines representation within the construction industry. Specifically examining how the 
problems of fragmentation, weak shop-floor presence and heightened risk of peleguismo 
manifest themselves in contemporary industrial relations. This is considered together with 
the identified systemic capacity for effective representation and mitigation of the dangers 
in the day-to-day operations of LMIs in a key labour intensive industry.  
5.3 Worker Representation in the Construction Industry  
President of the CUT National Confederation for the construction industry (Conticom), 
Claudio da Silva Gomes (Claudinho 2013: interview), estimates that only one in ten of the 
150-160 trade union bodies in the construction sector adequately represent their category. 
He believes that union (in)activity that may favour business over labour is not usually an 
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intentional strategy rather a result of their omission from actively representing their 
workers.  
Representatives of other trade unions or relevant LMIs22 do not dispute Claudinho’s 
estimate. Gerson Marques, Head Prosecutor for the Public Labour Prosecutor (MPT-CE) 
(2015: interview), argues that Claudinho’s one in ten estimate would be an optimistic 
estimate when considering other economic sectors where the proportion of 
unrepresentative unions is likely to be even higher than in construction. He describes how 
during MPT investigations on union activity, data received from the Labour Ministry 
(MTE) showed that over 50 per cent of trade unions had never entered into any sort of 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Within the same data, documentary evidence 
demonstrated a significant number of unions with presidential or directorship terms of 
10,15 and even 20 years.  
Marques describes this data as alarming and questions what this significant number of 
unions actually do in their role and relationship with designated workers. He links 
unrepresentativeness with the high number of enquiries the MPT receives from individual 
workers trying to discover which union represents them, where they are based and as to 
whether any CBA exists. Both Marques and Marreta-PE president Dulcilene Morais (2013: 
interview) acknowledge an organised crime element in some unions23. The proliferation of 
the described unrepresentativeness adequately captures the manifestation of the ‘dangers’ 
of Brazilian corporatism described in the first half of this chapter.   
The willingness and transparency of the six unions observed during fieldwork, allowing 
access to: workers, directors, mediation sessions at the MTE, inspection patrols, picket 
activity, press and legal offices, social and community events and facilitating meetings 
with state and business counterparts, strongly suggests they are all part of the identified 
minority of active representation institutions. MTE, Dieese, and business representatives 
consulted generally confirmed the representative credentials of the unions in question24. 
When business counterparts and/or workers criticised the union it usually related to the 
combative, adversarial and ideological nature of activity, strikes in particular, rather than 
any complacency or omission.  
																																																								
22 Conversations during fieldwork at Marreta-MG, Dieese-CE, SRT/CE and MPT-CE amongst others  
23 Authorities disbanded the retail workers trade union in Rio de Janeiro in 2014, run by the same family for 35 years described in an 
MPT (2015) publication as a ‘mafia’. 
24 Sinduscon SP, MTE/MG, Cyrela Reality, MRV Engenharia – MG (Marreta-MG 2013: observations), Dieese-CE, SRT/CE, Brasília 
Guíabe-PE (Sintepav-PE 2013: observations)	
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In the absence of primary fieldwork data on the (in)activities of an unrepresentative pelego 
union. This research is dependent upon the accounts of relevant parties and to consider 
counter-factually how an inactive or complacent union effects worker representation 
within the Brazilian system. A common pride in the representational credentials and 
traditions can be observed from the six unions though with distinct partisan, ideological 
and discursive identities. 
There is the CUT-affiliated, Cutista (Sinticom-SP & Marreta-PE) strand of traditionally 
‘authentic, grass-roots and combative’ trade unionism closely linked the ruling PT party. 
The Força Sindical tradition (Sintepav-CE & PE) is one of more moderate results-based 
trade unionism emerging in the 1990s in opposition to and as an alternative to the 
combative Cutista strand (Trópia 2009:14-15). Marreta MG & Sticcrmf possess a more 
critical anti-capitalist discourse. Belo Horizonte’s Marreta-MG reject any interference 
from official peak associations or political parties in the representation of the rank and file. 
Fortaleza’s Sticcrmf has a more radical Trotskyist identity through its affiliation with the 
Conlutas peak association and PSTU political party breakaway groups from the CUT & PT 
respectively. 
Sintepav-PE and Sintepav-CE and other corresponding Sintepav unions are what can be 
described as ‘new new’ trade unions; created by the division in the construction economic 
category between civil [light] and pesada [heavy] construction as part of the post-
democratisation fragmentation of existing trade unions.25 Within the construction industry 
there is evident antagonism from the traditional unions towards the new pesada category in 
São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Pernambuco.26 Failed legal challenges to the division in 
category and perceived weakening of influence and representational scope by the creation 
of what are invariably described as an ‘opportunistic, inauthentic pelego’ institutions by 
rivals, is further aggravated by existing ideological and partisan divisions. The ‘new new’ 
trade unions tend to be creations of the traditionally more moderate Força Sindical peak 
association (Sintepav unions in the northeast, Sintrapav in Sao Paulo) or with no peak 
association affiliation (Siticop in Minas Gerais).  
																																																								
25 The Supreme Court initially vetoed the creation of a heavy construction union in Campinas as it was in breach of the unicity principle, 
though the decision was not unanimous. Assisted by international differentiation between the two categories the division of the 
construction category into light and heavy categories was subsequently approved. 
26 Fortaleza seems to be an exception, Nestor and Raimundo (2013: interviews) presidents of STICCRMF (civil) and Sintevap-CE 
(pesada) respectively – describe a relationship of cooperation and mutual respect.  
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Politicised trade unions are recognised as a characteristic of labour representation in 
Schneider’s HME model (2009:562) and partisan cleavages contributing to the 
fragmentation observed by Weyland (1996:67). A regular criticism of the unions with 
more ideological and combative identities and approaches to industrial relations is that 
their ideological goals are prioritised over, or incompatible with, the representation of their 
category. During fieldwork such criticisms were directed at Marreta-MG, Marreta-PE and 
Sticcrmf by employers, training institution representatives and supervisors recounting on-
site confrontations with the union in question. On Sticcrmf, Sinduscon-CE president 
Ferreira (2013: interview) argues that the highly-politicised union is capable of running 
itself into the ground in support of the PSTU political party and its aims are to bankrupt 
employers and destroy the system rather than represent workers’ interests.  
The ideological identities and discourse of the unions come across clearly in interviews 
and ethnography, though based upon the same fieldwork observations, it is argued here 
that there is considerable distance between the discourse and the practice of the individual 
institution. The distance identified by this research is something of a historical trait of 
Brazilian trade unionism as discussed in chapter 3, where doctrinal aspects were diluted 
and outlawed communist parties generally worked within the parameters of the existing 
system (see Hall & Spalding 1986: 359; Collier and Collier 2002:757 and Santana 
1999:110).  
Using evidence from the more combative and antagonistic manifestation of worker 
representation, the strike, it is argued in the following analysis that the worker-union 
dynamics observed in the industrial action demonstrate interdependence. In the Brazilian 
context the strike represents the ‘manager of discontent’ role with evident sensibility or 
permeability to workers wishes rather than rigidly following any ideological or partisan 
goals.   
A general strike called by Marreta-PE was observed over its weeklong duration from the 
vote and declaration at assembly to the agreement to return to work. The strike cannot be 
considered a grass roots initiative, yet nor is it a one-way top down imposition. Workers 
actively participating in the strike seem to expect and wish for some type of industrial 
action to take place during the annual collective bargaining negotiations and evaluate 
union effectiveness or representativeness on their bureaucratic capability and willingness 
to call a strike. The behaviour observed by the active strike participants in demonstrations 
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and picketing has an almost carnival atmosphere at times. Workers supported by the union 
exercise their right to strike, venting their frustrations and revelling in the temporary 
reversal of the employment relationship where they can (at least in the instances observed) 
effectively impose their will upon employers.  
During the strike, the union acts to channel, discipline and control worker activity to 
remain within the tolerated legal parameters and avoid creating situations that could lead to 
the strike being declared as illegal and abusive by the authorities.  Whilst strike activity 
antagonises employers and their representatives it is arguably a more disciplined and 
controlled manifestation of industrial action than some of the ‘bloody-minded’ informal 
manifestations of unorganised conflict (Hyman 1984:106), as the burning buildings and 
evacuation of the initial PAC site worker mobilisations discussed later in this chapter 
would suggest.   
The agreement to end the strike made between the workers’ and employers’ union also had 
to be sold to the workers. This again demonstrates that representation is not exclusively a 
top-down, one-way process. The Marreta strike was ended on the 1st of November 2013 
with a pay increase across the categories of ten per cent (4.9% in real terms) and all 
existing social benefits (breakfast, lunch, return ticket to hometown) secured and, what 
seems to be a significant sticking point in bipartite negotiations, no payroll deductions or 
extra hours to compensate for the strike days.  
The comparative example provided by Marreta-PE in justifying the Sinduscon-PE business 
association offer was the ‘worst-case’ scenario of Fortaleza. Sticcrmf’s 31-day strike in 
2012 was the longest witnessed in Brazil that year. The agreed clause for the days to be 
compensated by workers over the following five months lead observers to describe the 
industrial action as extremely prejudicial to workers and weakened the credibility of the 
union.  
On the Fortaleza example, Head of the Labour Relations Secretariat for the state of Ceará 
(SRT/CE), Jeritza Juca (2013: interview), believes that the newly re-elected Sticcrmf 
directors had misread the strike process in the belief that their position would be 
strengthened through industrial action. Instead, the hard-line negotiating approach adopted 
by Ferreira’s Sinduscon-CE meant that the strike resulted in workers turning against the 
union. Since 2012 a more cautious approach to negotiations can be observed with no repeat 
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of the heightened conflict and no general strike called in 2016 despite Dieese’s Aguiar 
(2013: interview) describing it as something of a predictable annual tradition prior to 2012. 
This supports the idea of interdependence between the union and the rank and file and 
permeability of worker influence. Despite the more radical identity and discourse of some 
unions their approach is sensitive to workers’ wishes. This works in both directions. The 
more combative unions are obliged to moderate their activities to avoid losing the support 
of the category. Likewise, the Força Sindical unions of a moderate or pragmatic ideology 
are obliged to take a more militant and combative posture to employment relations due to 
pressure from the shop-floor.  
Brazil’s most prolonged strike of 2014 was at the CSP-Pecem steel plant construction site 
where workers are represented and organised by Sintepav-CE. Esdras, a Communist Party 
of Brazil member (PCdoB) and union press and communications officer observes that 
militancy is not in the ideological nature of Sintepav and Força Sindical, though he 
believes that they had no other choice than to support and organise the localised strikes in 
Pecém given the militancy of the revolting workers (Sticcrmf 2013: observations). The 
evolution of worker representation under the ‘new new’ Sintepav unions is discussed in 
more detail in the next section.   
MPT-CE’s Marques (2013: interview), citing the militancy and heightened conflict 
involving ‘moderate’ FS affiliated unions, argues that ideological and partisan identities 
represent the origins of individual unions and groups though can no longer be considered 
determinate of their approach to representation and industrial relations. This is consistent 
with the idea presented here, based upon observations of strike activity and a distance 
between the discourse and activity of the individual trade unions.  
Despite the observable cleavages, rivalries and antagonisms, ideological and partisan 
identities may influence, but do not define the institutional approach to representation. 
Union activity is or can be permeable to worker mobilisation. The antagonism and partisan 
rivalries between different groups and with employers and their representative 
organisations, contributes to a tendency to overstate the inevitability of a certain type of 
representation based upon peak association and political affiliations.  
The idea of permeability to worker interests is reinforced by the observations of the day-to-
day activities of the observed unions. Shadowing the inspection patrols of the Belo 
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Horizonte, Recife and Fortaleza unions (2013: observations), considerable uniformity of 
action is identified despite the oft-cited regional, ideological and partisan differences. 
Directors and inspection teams patrol their respective regions responding to complaints 
received from workers or reports of on-site unrest and/or workers having downed tools.  
When irregularities involving noncompliance with relevant legislation (CLT, CBAs, 
industry-specific health and safety NRs) are detected the union seeks to represent the 
workers’ interests, negotiate an immediate solution with employers where possible (known 
as ‘autocompostive’ solutions) and when immediate safety risks are detected, pressure the 
labour ministry to take urgent remedial action. Despite radical identities or reputations, the 
activities are mostly within the existing institutional parameters and seek to represent 
workers by bringing them within the formal system i.e. compliance with existing 
legislation.  
This observed extra level of regulation role performed by the distinctive unions represents 
an effective form of worker representation in the Brazilian context27. In the highly 
legislated Brazilian institutional model (see Noronha 2000) there is little in the way of 
‘exchangeable goods’ or scope for the bargaining ‘trade-offs’ identified by Archer (op cit) 
as requirements for successful corporatism. There were flexibilisation attempts in the 
1990s to allow for collective bargaining to supersede employment legislation though these 
were unsuccessful, part of the effective defence of labour rights by labour institutions 
across the decade (see chapters 2 & 3, Haagh & Cook 2005:185, Cook 2007:196).  
SRT/CE’s Juca (2013: interview) argues that despite the primacy given to collective 
bargaining processes in trade union representation, the number of bargaining issues or 
‘exchangeable goods’ is limited. She praises the provision of breakfast, lunch and snacks 
negotiated into the Fortaleza region CBA by Sticcrmf given an observable and related 
reduction in workplace accidents28. She is highly critical of CBAs that reproduce existing 
legislation and describes it as symptomatic of an unprepared trade union. She stresses on 
more than one occasion that ‘the law is to be obeyed not bargained’. In a mediation session 
observed (MTE/SRT/CE 2013: observation), Juca chastises the parties for repetition of 
CLT legislation in the drafted agreement. 																																																								
27 Observation of the unions visited during the 2013 fieldwork period has continued through the analysis of newsletters and social media 
activity. This also provides data on the representational activity of construction unions such as Sintracon-Sao Paulo, Sintracom - Campo 
Grande, STICC – Porto Alegre, STICMB – Pará not observed first hand. The secondary data reinforces the evidence of uniformity in the 
patrol and inspection day-to-day activities of the individual unions and the idea of effective and active representation through the extra 
layer of regulation role.   
28 According to Juca, autopsies of fatal workplace accidents showed a relationship between an empty stomach and the victim, the fatality 
rate was reduced with the introduction of meal provisions into the CBA 
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The importance of the trade union as an extra layer of regulation is highlighted when 
considering the negative complementarities of the Brazilian institutional model: extensive 
legislation, the regressive path dependency of exploitative employment relations, 
widespread noncompliance and weak workplace representative mechanisms. In light of 
these interrelated characteristics, the trade union has an important representational function 
to contribute towards greater compliance by defending the worker within the formal 
institutional system and its related protections.  
Despite the sometimes radical and combative discourse and identity of some unions and 
reports of violent confrontations, by and large the active unions fulfil the ‘managers of 
discontent’ (Wright Mills op cit) role. They mainly operate within the parameters of the 
existing institutional constraints both in their industrial action and day-to-day inspection 
patrols. Considering counterfactually the consequences of inactive union representation, 
which many suggest is somewhat epidemic in the Brazilian system, it is the absence of this 
extra layer of regulation that is of most relevance to labour. Union inactivity facilitates the 
persistence of the regressive path dependency of noncompliance and exploitative labour 
conditions identified in chapter 3. 
As per the overall objectives of the chapter, the identified active regulatory role of the 
unions observed supports the idea that complacent inactive trade unionism is not inevitable 
in the Brazilian system, despite the identified problems of fragmentation and absence of 
institutionalised mechanisms for workplace representation. This is consistent with the ideas 
(Crouch, Olson, Archer, Hyman op cit) that the danger of unrepresentative unions is not 
inevitable within a corporatist system. It is however, argued to be a heightened problem in 
the Brazilian variety of capitalism.  
In the instances of deficient representation, the systemic problems of fragmentation and 
weak workplace representation mechanisms are exposed. The short productive windows 
and national-level migration of workers between projects in the construction industry 
means workers will be subject to varying standards of representation causing instability 
and unpredictability. Pessanha & Morel (2009:105) highlight the ‘heterogeneity’ of 
collective representation where ‘various academic or trade union analyses have observed’ 
the coexistence of organisations engaged with their category with others demonstrating a 
‘low expressivity of the genuine interests of the rank and file’. Such heterogeneous 
representation in Brazil contributes to what this thesis describes as an incongruous LMI 
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system (see ch.2, part 2.2) and what Lee & McCann (2014:title) refer to as ‘regulatory 
indeterminacy’, discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
5.4 The Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) Sites and the Evolution 
of Sintepav 
Informative and dramatic examples of fragmentation and inconsistent trade union 
representation are observable from the large infrastructure construction sites of the state’s 
high profile Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). In its most extreme manifestation of 
industrial relations failure, the construction of the Jirau and Santo Antonio hydroelectric 
plants on the Rio Madeira river, the consequences were military intervention, mass 
evacuation and a construction site in flames.  
In contrast, the PAC modernisation project of the Replan oil refinery in Paulina the state of 
São Paulo could be considered something of an institutional success story. Sinticom-CUT 
union president Luiz Albano (2013:interview) describes challenges, tensions and some 
worker unrest being quickly addressed to the satisfaction of all parties. He attributes this to 
the responsiveness of his union and the early creation of a plant-level commission. The 
success described by Albano is in Sao Paulo - arguably Brazil’s most institutionally 
developed region, with a strong representative tradition spreading from the nearby ABC 
Paulista experience. Consequently, Replan workers were represented by an experienced 
union with close ties to the more encompassing and centralised CUT peak association. 
This is a competent example of the potential of the existing system allowing for responsive 
representation and plant-level commissions.    
Evidence from PAC sites in less institutionally developed regions in turn demonstrates the 
dangers of Brazil’s fragmented system. The construction of the Rio Madeira Hydroelectric 
plants in the remote state of Rondônia mobilised tens of thousands of workers to an area 
that could be considered a ‘green-field’ site, in both trade union activity and industrial 
development terms. The representative union for the two sites was the Sticcero union 
affiliated to the CUT peak association potentially able to mitigate for fragmentation and 
inexperience and without the same neo-pelego stigma (see Trópia 2004:3, Boito 1996:83) 
attached to the ‘new new’ FS unions.  
The levels of unrest at the Rio Madeira sites resulted in the evacuation of 20 thousand 
workers, the deployment of the National Guard and the personal intervention of the Labour 
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Minister as control of workers was lost and accommodation units were set on fire. It 
hindered a key PAC developmental policy of the PT and weakened its labour-friendly 
credentials (Veras 2014:128; Braga 2012a:235). Worker dissatisfaction and unrest was 
over a combination of factors and accentuated by the isolated nature of the site: precarious 
and insalubrious living and working conditions, noncompliance with labour legislation or 
commitments made upon recruitment thousands of miles away, high incidence of 
accidents, workers abandoned and stranded after being brought to the site by informal and 
opportunistic recruiters.29 Worker hostility was directed at both the employer and Sticcero, 
as it was believed that the union was acting in the interests of the state and employers by 
not supporting the wildcat strikes or adequately responding to workers’ grievances.  
Donizete from the state of Maranhão worked for six months at Jirau and was brought to 
Belo Horizonte by the Marreta-MG union ‘for his own safety’ (EPOMG 2013: group 
interview). In the absence of workplace representational mechanisms, his position as the 
worker elected on-site health and safety representative (Cipeiro) meant that he acted as a 
de facto shop steward. He was highly critical of Sticcero and described an on-site 
perception of the union as unsupportive of the workers’ considerable grievances and 
related desire to strike, acting instead in the interests of the government and Camargo 
Correa company. Donizete describes how they called an assembly to ‘try and trick’ the 
workers into calling off their wildcat strike and workers responded by throwing stones at 
the union entourage.30  
The unrest across the PAC sites is considered here to be a stress test upon the Brazilian 
industrial relations system, one that was essentially failed due to the fragmented and 
uneven nature of representation. The unions were unable to ‘manage the considerable 
discontent’ and their perceived inactivity or incapacity became a further source of 
grievance to the striking workers. Alternatively, the subsequent evolution and institutional 
response to the PAC failed stress test could be argued to represent the potential of the 
																																																								
29 The colloquial term ‘gato’ [cat] is used to describe informal sector recruitment agents. In the case of Jirau and Sto Antonio they would 
speculatively bring groups of workers to meet the high demand for workers, regularly abandoning them when things went wrong. Given 
the distances involved and lack of formal protections the role of the gato became synonymous with people-trafficking. This is discussed 
in more detail in chapter 6 on regulation. 
30 Donizete’s account of worker discontent with Sticcero’s representation and perceived attempts to convince and ‘deceive’ workers to 
end their wildcat strike and the hostile response is consistent with worker interviews from an allTV Amazônia (2012) news report.   
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system. This is argued to be the case upon analysis of the evolution of representation under 
the ‘new new’ Sintepav unions.31  
There was considerable unrest at other PAC sites including the Suape and Pecém 
developments in the states of Pernambuco and Ceará respectively. The representative trade 
unions were the Força Sindical affiliated Sintepav-CE & PE heavy construction unions 
formed in the early 2000s. Similar to the Rio Madeira sites, Suape and Pecem were in 
green-field industrial and trade union sites albeit within 100km of a major capital (Recife 
and Fortaleza respectively). Veras (2013: 243) describes how the Força Sindical (FS) peak 
association anticipated the imminent PAC construction boom and established the Sintepav-
PE ‘heavy’ construction union in 2000. According to Veras this ‘took advantage of the 
lack of attention’ by the local CUT affiliated Marreta-PE union, it was also made possible 
by the recent official sub-division of construction between heavy and light construction 
categories.  
When the construction boom at the PAC sites took off, tens of thousands of often skilled 
and experienced migrant workers found themselves in regions with very little industrial 
experience represented by newly formed unions with no previous background or tradition 
in representing such workers. Hindsight would suggest that tensions could have been 
anticipated, however Dieese’s Aguiar (2013: interview) describes on more than one 
occasion how both the federal government and trade unions were caught totally unawares 
by the prolonged and often-violent workers’ revolts that ensued. In his words, they were 
‘caught with their pants down’. Veras (2014:128) similarly describes the standard trade 
union response to revolting PAC workers as one of a ‘state of surprise’. 
High levels of worker unrest were witnessed at Suape oil refinery in Pernambuco and UTE 
Pecém I thermoelectric power station in Ceará with wildcat strikes, facilities being set on 
fire and violent confrontations with security forces. Initial heightened unrest and 
mobilisation was spontaneous and worker-lead. Discontent was manifested towards 
employers, the state and the official representative unions.  
Regional Labour Court Judge, Fabio Farias (2013: interview) shared his experiences with 
the Suape workers and Sintepav-PE in the role of Head Counsel of the MPT-PE prior to 																																																								
31 A similar process of evolution of representation mechanisms by Sticcero assisted by considerable involvement of the CUT peak 
association and national confederation Conticom is evident from secondary sources and reports from Jirau & Santo Antonio (CUT 2014, 
Veras 2014:130, Conticom 2015) Fieldwork research produced a greater amount and variety of primary source data on the Sintepav 
unions at the Suape and Pecem PAC sites respectively, including access to the two unions and state and business counterparts as well as 
workers that had been through both sites.  
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taking up the judgeship in April 2013. Farias is critical of the motives of the initial wildcat 
strikes, ‘it was enough for someone to say they found a maggot in their food for a 
“carnaval” to start’, he also describes how there would be a strike on the last working day 
before a prolonged public holiday and upon returning to work after the break there would 
be no evidence of demands presented or negotiations having taken place.  
Despite Farias’s observation on the frivolity of some of the strike activity, speaking to 
workers and rival union officials to the Sintepavs (Marreta MG & PE 2013: observations) 
who had been through Suape and/or other PAC construction sites, the grievances observed 
were often legitimate, varied and numerous. They ranged from the poor quality of meals 
and accommodation units provided to excessive hours and precarious safety conditions. 
These accounts heard first hand are consistent with the observations of the Labour 
Inspectors Union quoted by Veras (2013:246) ‘excessive working hours, incidence of 
accidents, undocumented work, payment delays and overcrowding of accommodation`.  
A site foreman working for Camargo Correa (2013: observations/interviews) in Fortaleza 
had previously worked at the Suape site and described the grievances he observed causing 
workers to down tools and protest as: non-payment for the tools used, huge discrepancies 
between the pay and conditions between workers of the main firms and sub-contracted 
companies, irregularities in the productivity bonuses promised and the way in which 
absences were being recorded.  
Farias attributes the observed militancy and visible anger to the experience gained from 
previous on-site conflicts citing the states of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia. The 
disparities created and formalised by the one union per region/sector can also be 
considered as an aggravating factor, the differences in benefits between collective 
bargaining agreements means that workers may look to immediately take action to achieve 
parity with accumulated collectively bargained benefits achieved in other regions. This 
again contributes to the incongruous LMI system characterised by a certain 
unpredictability or indeterminacy of employment outcomes and is symptomatic of the 
fragmentation at the intermediate level of representation.  
Marlon, a health and safety technician for Camargo Correa (2013: observation/interviews) 
also highlights the accumulated experience of migrant construction workers, specifically 
citing the construction of the Camaçari complex in the state of Bahia. Camaçari was 
perhaps the first of its type in terms of a large-scale green-field industrial development (oil 
		 198 
refinery and Ford plant) away from the more industrially developed southeast regions. The 
link to the state of Bahia means revolting PAC workers were commonly labelled as 
Baianos.  
The Sintepav union did not have this accumulated experience and Farias describes his 
frustration with Sintepav-PE’s actions during this period of spontaneous unrest:  
They invited me to an assembly to approve their agenda on a Wednesday at 7am in the 
city, sixty kilometres away from the nearest concentration of their category and 600km 
away from another mass of their workers. The meeting was publicised in the Official 
State Gazette (DOU) a publication usually read by judges and lawyers. No worker is 
ever going to read the DOU – I told them they couldn’t do this, they went ahead anyway 
and two days later workers are setting fire to the construction site. 
President of Sintepav-PE and FS state president Aldo Amaral (2013: interview) describes a 
huge challenge for the recently formed union to deal with so many workers arriving in 
such a short space of time in what was an unprecedented situation for the north-eastern 
state. Amaral, like Farias and Marlon, recognises that the migrant workers had 
considerable experience of on-site negotiation and political struggle. He also makes 
specific reference to the Camaçari complex in Bahia where many of the migrant workers 
had gained such experience.  
Other rival union and political representatives had described instances of on-site 
disagreements between workers and Amaral’s Sintepav-PE representatives during the 
initial wildcat strikes. Mirroring events described at the Rio Madeira site, Veras 
(2013:248) describes the worker response to a Sintepav-PE request to return to work in 
Suape with ‘stones thrown at directors who had to make a quick exit’ before the police 
arrived with rubber bullets and flash bombs.  
Similar initial challenges to the Sintepav union leadership were evident in the Pecem 
complex in Ceará (pre-steel plant in the same industrial complex). Sinduscon-CE president 
Ferreira (2013: interview) describes how groups of Baianos with no identifiable union or 
political affiliations migrate to the PAC sites with the sole intention of starting a strike. He 
further describes an ‘unprecedented’ incident of one worker called Baianinho shouting 
down everything presented by the Sintepav-CE president Raimundo in an assembly. Press 
officer and PCdoB member Esdras gives a similar account of workers challenging 
Sintepav-CE’s role as their representative institution with accommodation units being set 
on fire in the Pecem Thermoelectric complex in protest. 
		 199 
Tens of thousands of migrant workers were represented by local trade unions without the 
experience, capability or credibility to manage the discontent of the category designated to 
them under the unicity system. In this case it seems that the migrant workers had greater 
experience of industrial relations than some of the unions. Unions such as the Sintepavs, 
created in anticipation of the arrival of the thousands of workers rather than from the rank 
and file. The more representational dynamics of union representation that emerged in the 
1980s were not immediately reproduced inter-industrially or over a greater geographical 
distance in this instance. Even the involvement of the more centralised and influential two 
largest peak associations, CUT (Sticcero) and Força Sindical (Sintepav-PE & CE) was 
insufficient to organise and represent the discontented workers.  
In the short term, the PAC unrest exposed the dangers of the fragmented and unprepared 
(intentionally or not) trade unions distant from the shop floor, hindering a flagship national 
development programme. Yet when the evolution of worker representation at the PAC 
sites is analysed, the same case study also demonstrates the potential within the system. 
Farias describes how Sintepav-PE developed mechanisms to bring the employment 
relations to within the ‘institutionality’ of the Brazilian system, describing it as a literal 
example of how the representation process gradually adjusted to operate within the law. He 
further describes how the situation has evolved from the initial unorganised mobs in the 
Suape region to the current existence of adequate negotiation mechanisms operating within 
the Brazilian legal framework. He estimates that evolution process of representativeness by 
Sintepav-PE took approximately 3 years.  
Amaral describes the union’s most effective negotiation strategy as being to withdraw their 
labour or ‘cross their arms’ being the colloquial term used in Brazil. He points to the 
50,000 workers organised by Sintepav-PE who downed tools in the [then 2013] most 
recent industrial dispute in Suape as a clear sign of the effectiveness of the union’s 
organisation. Similar evolution from hostile workers challenging the credentials of the 
official union to active representation within Brazilian ‘institutionality’, is evident in the 
Pecem-Ceara case. Union president Raimundo (2013: interview) similarly speaks with 
pride of being responsible for supporting workers’ industrial action across the State’s main 
PAC sites in protest at poor health and safety conditions, quality of the meals and 
accommodation provided as well as noncompliance with the collective agreements in 
effect.   
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The terms and conditions within the collective bargaining agreements for Suape and 
Pecem workers since 2013 are significantly higher than any other professional category in 
the region of a similar level of qualification, particularly when compared with the 
remuneration levels and benefits in the light construction collective agreements where 
considerable overlap between the professional categories exists. Industrial action in the 
form of localised stoppages and disputes are still commonplace, particularly at the CSP-
Steel plant (see ch. 4 part 4.4.3 & ch. 6 part 6.3.3), though the representation of labour in 
this instance is organised, controlled and disciplined by the Sintepav unions.  
The Sintepav experience within the PAC construction projects demonstrates an example 
where union leaders are obliged to follow the shop-floor within the corporatist unicity 
system. The willingness to promote localised strikes in protest at conditions or to pressure 
employers to meet demands presented is argued to come from the rank and file. The initial 
wildcat disturbances suggest that workers, in the construction industry at least, will take 
matters into their own hands if they feel the legally designated union is not adequately 
representing them.  
Based upon the evolution of Sintepav, it can then be argued that the representational deficit 
caused by the unicity system can be overcome when workers are mobilised, militant and 
demanding of their regionally/sectorial designated union. In this sense any original pelego 
or self-interest motives in the creation of the union have been checked by an active and 
mobilised rank and file contributing to a responsive union-worker relationship more akin 
to that described by Hyman (1971) than the traditional idea of an inevitable and 
impermeable iron rule.  
A similar and simultaneous process of the evolution of labour representation is also evident 
at the national level of LMIs. Analysed in more detail in chapter 4, in response to the 
unrest witnessed across the PAC sites, unions, employer and government created the 
‘National Commitment for Improved Labour Conditions in the Construction Industry’ 
(NCILC). The initiative represents a prompt tripartite institutional response to the 
grievances and unrest witnessed across the PAC sites. In terms of the aims of this chapter it 
is indicative of the necessary unity and organisation for a successful corporatist system. It 
could similarly be argued to represent the national-level institutional capacity to mitigate 
the fragmented structure at the intermediate level. Consistent with the successful examples 
of worker representation, which often involved the creation of plant-level commissions, a 
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key recommendation of the NCILC was for the urgent introduction of compulsory 
workplace representation mechanisms.  
The focus on this chapter has been worker representation. Although not analysed in this 
chapter, effective representation of state and business interests are also key variables in 
reaching more equitable tripartite outcomes in a corporatist system as Archer (1998:68) 
recognises. At the CSP-Pecem steel plant construction site under Sintepav-CE worker 
representation, there have been critical levels of labour unrest and conflict over 2014 and 
2015. A third of working days were lost to strikes and this lead Marques and the MPT-CE 
to call a public hearing in February 2015. 
Up until very recently there was no corresponding local organisation to represent business 
interests with the formation of such an institution held up by state bureaucracy, Sinicon-CE 
was finally formalised in January 2016 (o Povo 2016). Therefore, a key weakness in the 
CSP example has been the fragmentation of the business side of representation, leading to 
outcomes incompatible with economic growth and stability. Institutional relations at the 
CSP-Pecem site are analysed in more detail in part 4.4.3 of chapter 4.  
Conclusion  
When applying the dangers and potential of corporatism to the formal Brazilian LMI 
system, it is argued that certain national characteristics heighten the probability of 
ineffective labour representation. There are observable institutional incompatibilities 
between the Brazilian model and the conditions argued to be necessary to realise the 
potential advantages of such a system. The LMIs at a formal systemic level are fragmented 
and decentralised. The potential for mutually beneficial trade offs between labour and 
business envisaged by Archer is limited by the highly-legislated nature of employment 
law. This means that there are few exchangeable goods available. The idea of wage 
moderation and trade offs are not as applicable to the Brazilian case as the advanced 
economy examples due to the historically persistent low wages, high inflation and 
exploitative employment conditions (see chapter 3).  
Despite the evident manifestations of the dangers of corporatism, the persistent reform 
arguments neglect the evident potential within the same system. They overestimate the 
defining nature or inevitability of formal systemic outcomes in Brazil. Considered 
counterfactually, the removal of unicity towards greater pluralism could aggravate existing 
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problems of fragmentation. Removal of the compulsory financing of unions could weaken 
the overall influence of labour within society and set it upon a less equitable LME path. 
This is consistent with Olson who argues that mandatory dues are necessary for 
encompassing trade union institutions. 
The idea of a natural emergence of ‘authentic’ labour institutions from an alternative 
system offering greater freedom of choice and liberty is somewhat speculative and often 
misinterprets the existing examples of effective representation. The ABC metalworkers 
example, Contag national confederation, centralised and encompassing national peak 
associations, together with the evolution of active and responsive worker representation in 
the construction industry presented in the second half of this chapter, all emerged from the 
existing system of monopoly of representation and compulsory dues. Reforms could be 
counterproductive in that they would remove this capacity for effective representation 
without addressing any of the existing problems.  
The example of the evolution of the Sintepav unions from fieldwork research suggests 
pelego representation is not a systemic inevitability. A mobilised and active rank and file 
can mitigate the danger of inactive and complacent trade unions. Permeability to worker 
influence is further evident in the identified distance between discourse and practice of the 
unions observed. There is likewise no inevitability of trade union action based upon their 
ideological and partisan identities and discourse. Evidence demonstrates that workers 
moderate the activity of traditionally more radical unions and unions labelled as moderate 
can be obliged by the rank and file to take a confrontational stance to employment 
relations.  
Primary and secondary observations demonstrate considerable uniformity in the day-to-day 
patrol and inspection activities of construction trade unions. Within the Brazilian context 
of comprehensive legislation, a historical legacy of exploitative employment conditions 
and widespread noncompliance (see chs. 3, 4 and 6) the trade union as an extra layer of 
regulation emerges as an effective labour representative function. Such a role brings 
workers to within the ‘institutionality’ and protections of the existing system rather than 
working against it. In terms of the research question it represents a key variable in the 
inconsistency between the employment rights and protections offered by the formal LMI 
system and the workplace reality, in the sense that greater de facto regulation could 
contribute significantly to improved conditions for workers. Together with representation, 
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regulation is considered a key area to address the research question and is discussed in the 
next chapter.  
The argued need for a regulatory role for unions is also indicative of a systemic weakness 
in the Brazilian system, that of a ‘weak shop floor presence’ and related inability for 
workers and employers to ensure compliance without resorting to external intervention. 
The examples of effective representation within the existing system, the ‘potential’, 
generally have workplace representation mechanisms as a key component. The case of the 
ABC metalworkers for example. In the construction industry, it is evident in the 
Sinticom/Paulina example and the need for workplace commissions was a lesson learned 
in the evolution of representation under Sintepav. The tripartite institutional response to the 
PAC disturbances, the NCILC initiative, produced strong recommendations for greater 
social dialogue and more compulsory mechanisms of workplace representation.  
Some of the necessary conditions for effective representation in a corporatist system are 
weak or absent in the Brazilian model, however, the deficiencies are not a systemic 
inevitability. There is the capacity for effective representation to exist or emerge from 
within the constraints of the existing system. Calls for reform tend to underestimate or 
misinterpret this evident existing potential and/or overstate the inevitability of ineffective 
representation.  
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Chapter 6 Regulation in the Brazilian Construction Industry 
The previous chapters argue that contemporary Brazilian labour market arrangements are 
not, nor have they ever been on a liberalisation type path. The corporatist elements of 
collective and individual labour rights in the Consolidation of Labour Law (the CLT path) 
dating back to the 1930s have proven resistant to liberalisation pressures and can be 
described as embedded. Historical path-tracing analysis in chapter 3 identifies another 
persistent path embedded in the highly unfavourable legacy for labour that can be traced 
back to colonialism, elite rule and slavery in the 19th century (the regressive path). The 
potential for greater institutional coordination and representation of labour is argued to 
exist within the CLT path, yet it still coexists and interacts with the regressive path; 
characterised by widespread noncompliance and exploitative labour conditions weakening 
the identified potential for greater institutional coordination and labour representation.  
Over the recent and unprecedented positive development trajectory under the PT 
government of falling inequality and poverty reduction (see ch. 2 - figure 2.10 & table 2.1), 
increasing coordinated intentions are evident. This is particularly the case with regards to 
the state: seeking to promote social dialogue accompanied by an observable increase in 
participation across the political economy, contrary to laissez-faire prescriptions. Despite 
these intentions, the ineffectiveness or lack of meaningful consensus or solutions that 
emerged from high profile tripartite initiatives such as the FNT, CNDI, CDES indicate that 
there are still considerable obstacles to achieving tangible institutional coordination.  
Chapter 5 discusses the issue of representation; the collective legislation mechanisms of 
the existing system, often criticised for producing complacent, inactive and oft co-opted 
pelego representative institutions on both the business and labour sides. Within 
Schneider’s (2013:91) five core features of HME/Latin American labour markets it 
corresponds to the ‘sparse unions’ characteristic. The problem of weak representation is 
recognised in this analysis (see ch. 4 and 5) though it is not an inevitable symptom of the 
existing system. 
The potential for more active representation is identified when workers are demanding of 
their representative unions and plant-level representation mechanisms are established. 
Counterfactual analysis found liberalising reform proposals towards a ‘free collective 
bargaining’ system to address problems with representation weak and potentially 
counterproductive. Given the dynamics of the collective representation system the ‘sparse 
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unions’ feature is not considered an adequate description of the Brazilian labour market 
system.  
Another persistent criticism of the Brazilian employment relations system is that it is 
excessively regulated (The Economist 2004:51, 2011:57, 2016:5; Pastore 2005:25; CNI 
2012:21), what classical economics tends to label as ‘rigid’ employment systems (Saint 
Paul 2000:1; World Bank 2013:102; Forteza & Rama 2006:75). Indeed, when compared to 
the European corporatist ideal type presented by Archer (1998:132) it is clear that there is 
less in the way of the necessary exchangeable goods or trade-offs to be made between 
labour and business in the legislated Brazilian example. Furthermore, in the middle-
income/emerging context characterised by low wages and unfavourable working 
conditions it is difficult to envisage wage-moderation characteristics of the German CME 
and Archer’s ideal type. This leads Noronha (2000 para. 2) to describe the Brazilian 
system as legislated rather than corporatist. There is evidence of worker employer trade-
offs in the automobile industry, the ABC pocket of efficiency standard already discussed 
and in recent PPE anti-cyclical initiatives, albeit the latter again of most relevance to the 
automobile industry in the southeast (see ch.4 part 4.1). 
This chapter focuses upon regulation as a key variable in the reality of employment and 
similarly relevant to the research question on the distance between what is envisaged in the 
formal employment rights and protection and the workplace reality. Within Schneider’s 
(2013:91) core HME labour market features, this corresponds to the ‘extensive regulation’ 
and ‘pervasive informality’ characteristics. There is some logical overlap with the previous 
chapters on relations and representation. Chapter 4 identifies prompt tripartite initiatives at 
the national level of industrial relations to address problems caused by widespread 
noncompliance and informal recruitment practices. Persistent difficulties in the 
effectiveness of such initiatives are observed at the workplace and intermediate levels of 
relations contributing to the prevalence of networks of mistrust (see ch. 4 figure 4.1).  
Regulation in this chapter refers to individual labour rights. These include, but are not 
limited to, arrangements encompassing: remuneration, working conditions, health and 
safety, unemployment and social security contributions, recruitment and dismissal aspects 
of the employment relationship. The first section analyses wider debates on the regulation 
of labour markets from an institutional perspective. It addresses the long-standing neo-
classical idea of high levels of employment regulation having negative consequences for 
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labour markets, such as informality, noncompliance and unemployment. It identifies a 
broader set of interrelated variables or complementarities to be considered for an effective 
analysis of the complexities of employment regulation and its enforcement. Continuing 
from this analysis, the definition and relevance of the informal sector within regulation 
debates is considered. This is consistent with the institutional approach of the thesis where 
informal institutions are of considerable explanatory relevance (see ch. 1).  
The second part of the chapter applies the approaches discussed and analysed in the first 
section to the Brazilian case. Assisted by the rational choice model of Cardoso & Lage 
(2007), analysis of Berg (2010) and fieldwork findings, the problem of noncompliance is 
analysed. Noncompliance or evasion is identified as a historical trait of employment 
relations in Brazil (ch. 3 part 3.2), fuelling networks of mistrust in industrial relations (ch. 
4 part 4.2) and where trade unions as an extra layer of regulation can contribute to 
observable labour outcomes (ch. 5 - conclusion). The persistent deregulation arguments are 
addressed in light of the problem of widespread noncompliance. An important 
consideration is to seek explanations for the observable difficulties of compliance in the 
Brazilian institutional model.   
The second half of the chapter applies the regulation issues to the construction industry 
where such issues on compliance and enforcement dominate debates and institutional 
activity at all levels (see ch. 4 on relations). The problem of noncompliance and the 
influence of the informal sector are discussed in light of research data from business, union 
and state activities observed and interviews with respective representatives. The conclusion 
looks to summarise the importance of regulation within research focus upon the 
inconsistency between formal systemic provisions and the workplace reality and its 
relevance to the Brazilian variety of capitalism.  
6.1 Labour Market Regulation  
This first section discusses general debates and approaches on the governance or regulation 
of the labour market. Regulation is considered here to be all rules, norms and practices 
relevant to the employment relationship. Consistent with the institutional approach and 
related definitions of this research project, regulation represents interrelated elements of a 
composite system and can be formal or informal. It is therefore important to analyse 
institutional complementarities within all manifestations of regulation.  
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Within theoretical debates there is a long-standing position with a variety of labels: 
orthodox, laissez-faire, classical, neoclassical, textbook amongst others, herein described 
as the rigidity or deregulation school of labour market regulation. Such a position favours 
the LME- type deregulated and flexible labour markets. More general discussion and 
critical analysis of liberal market ideas are in chapter one. Analysis of the deregulatory 
position in this chapter is narrowed to its idea of a universal positive correlation between 
the amount of regulation and negative LMI outcomes such as informality, noncompliance 
and unemployment and the related policy prescriptions for minimal regulatory 
intervention. This is considered in light of alternative positions and evidence-based 
findings. The different trajectories and realities of the labour market arrangements between 
the respectively more and less regulated CMEs and LMEs are of heightened relevance 
within this context.  
Mentioned in chapter two, Schneider and Karcher (2010:2) identify two opposing positions 
on labour market regulation in Latin America. The World Bank is critical of ‘rigidity and 
overregulation’ and in favour of ‘deregulation and flexibility’ whereas the ILO and IDB 
argue for the improved enforcement of existing legislation and greater dialogue between 
parties. The rigidity/deregulation school will be considered initially. It would be a 
generalisation to attribute such a position to the entire World Bank though the idea of a 
universal positive correlation between levels of employment legislation (‘rigidity’) and 
labour outcomes and compliance (the less interference the better) represents an underlying 
premise of the institution’s influential annual Doing Business Report (DBR) issued since 
2003. The 2008 report argues ‘laws created to protect workers often hurt them’ (World 
Bank, 2007:19). 
Berg and Cazes (2007), Deakin (2009) and Lee, McCann and Torm (2008) are all critical 
of the data sets used to support the deregulation arguments. Importantly for this thesis, 
Berg and Cazes (p.14) highlight the absence of tripartite negotiation and collective 
bargaining from the DBR index, described as ‘important means for achieving a ‘dynamic 
and responsive labour market’. Lee, McCann and Torm (p.421) describe how deregulated 
labour markets of Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea and Haiti score higher marks on the 
index than the ‘prosperous’, low ‘unemployment and high productivity’ economies of 
Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. This strongly suggests that the World Bank index is 
incapable of recognising the success and efficiency of CME-type economies.  
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Deakin (2009:6) makes specific reference to Botero et al’s (2004) comparison of 80 
different economies that is interpreted to support the idea of a negative impact of labour 
regulation. This index is used in the DBRs and by Schneider (2013:173) to support the 
‘extensive regulation’ characteristic of Latin American labour markets and Pastore’s 
(2005:26) prescriptions for the ‘modernisation’ of LMIs in Brazil. Deakin (2009:6-10) 
questions the reliability of the data sources used and identifies ‘problematic 
methodological issues’. A major weakness is the assumption that there is widespread 
compliance with the relevant legislation, the probability and incidence of evasion is not 
captured as a relevant variable. Lee and McCann (2014:8) describe the same World Bank 
DBR indicators as ‘ill-attuned to capturing the range of work relations that either entirely 
elude legal regulation or are subject to diminished standards’.     
By not considering or measuring noncompliance, the comparable rigidity indexes are 
incompatible with the new institutional approach and related definitions adopted by this 
thesis (see ch.1). The credibility and relevance of the comparable data on ‘rigidity’ are 
weak. This is due to the simplicity of the approach; the reductive focus upon a single 
institution – formal legislation – to provide explanations for the reality of employment. 
What can be observed from the employment relationship in a given society is the result of 
the complex interaction of a society’s set of historically embedded institutions.  
The widely-accepted definition of institutions is that they are both formal and informal; 
encompass ‘compliance procedures, and standard operating practices’ (Hall & Taylor 
1986:19) and ‘enforcement characteristics’ (North 2003: 1-2). The effectiveness of ‘old’ 
institutional approaches was limited or even flawed by its sole focus upon formal or 
‘parchment’ rules (Peters 2005:10, Lowndes 2010:60, Levitsky 2012:88). North (2003:2 
own emphasis) considers formal rules to be of less importance than the informal norms and 
argues that concentrating solely on the former ‘gives us an inadequate and frequently 
misleading notion about the relationship between formal constraints and performance’ 
when analysing ‘institutions, institutional change and economic performance’. This 
position weakens the applicability of the comparative ‘rigidity’ indexes used to support 
what Deakin (2009:1) describes as the ‘previously accepted wisdom on the supposedly 
negative economic impacts of labour law regulation’. 
A further incompatibility between the DBR/Botero et al regulation data and the 
institutional approach is the absence of any consideration of historical legacies or path 
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dependency. The idea of a universal relationship between higher levels of employment 
legislation with negative outcomes (unemployment, evasion, inefficiency etc.) represents 
what Hall & Taylor (1996:941) describe as a ‘traditional postulate that the same operative 
forces will generate the same results everywhere’. A simplification rejected by a path 
dependent approach and an important consideration when analysing relevant employment 
legislation and its enforcement. As Deakin (2011:36) observes: the origins of legal systems 
are ‘context-specific, their effects will not be constant across firms, industries or national 
systems’.  
From a new institutional perspective and considering the related importance of path 
dependency, complementarities and informal institutions, the deregulation approach not 
only appears weak and deficient though potentially counter-productive and misleading if 
used to inform policy. Alternative indexes that similarly attempt to measure and compare 
employment legislation such as the OECD’s Indicators of Employment Protection (IEP) 
recognise the limitations of the indicator where data reliability ‘suffers from problems of 
subjectivity’, availability for some countries, inability to capture the differences between 
legal provisions and practice and the synthetic nature of the indices (OECD 2004:99). As a 
result, the OECD index (2016c own emphasis) is accompanied by the following 
disclaimer: ‘it is important to note that employment protection refers to only one 
dimension of the complex set of factors that influence labour market flexibility.’ 
The Cambridge Centre for Business Research (CBR) attempt to address the weaknesses of 
the World Bank and OECD indexes and drawn from a study of employment legislation in 
France, Germany, India the UK and US. Deakin, Lele and Siems (2007:154-155) argue 
that the Botero et al/World Bank implication that economic performance could be 
improved if countries such as France ‘abolished some or all of their labour laws’ is based 
upon excessively reductive and misleading evidence and such a conclusion ‘cannot validly 
be drawn from the present state of knowledge on the workings of labour law systems’.  
Based upon the reductive nature of the datasets used, the absence of informal, context-
specific and path dependent considerations in particular, the deregulation argument does 
not stand up to evidential scrutiny; as Deakin (2009:17, 2012: 353) argues ‘the empirical 
basis for the deregulatory approach is not very strong’. Much of the evidence-based 
support came from a reductionist comparison of levels of unemployment between 
continental European economies and the more liberalised UK and US models. Even then 
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such conclusions were subject to scrutiny with Baker et al (2004:15) arguing that the 
econometric data is ‘at best inconclusive’ with regressions that find relationships between 
LMIs and the unemployment rate and ‘equally plausible regressions that do not’. A similar 
non-conclusive or ambiguous relationship between employment protections and 
unemployment are presented by Bertola, Boeri & Cazes (2000:62). 
The regulation – unemployment positive relationship is considered inconclusive and 
negligent of the ‘cyclical volatility of employment’ that is external to the levels of 
regulation (Bertola, Boeri & Cazes 2000:60, also see Crouch and Streeck 1997:6). It also 
neglects the quality of employment aspect. Consistent with Lee, McCann and Torm’s (op 
cit) observations on the DBR index, the empirical credibility of the deregulation position is 
further weakened by the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) distinction between the regulated 
labour markets of the CMEs and the more flexible arrangements of LMEs. Analysed in 
more detail in chapter 1, the convergence upon a single more flexible model of labour 
relations predicted and prescribed by the deregulation school did not take place (see Thelen 
2001:72).  
The distinctive paths or non-convergence between LMEs and CMEs challenges the 
deregulation school in the sense that comparable efficiency, income and levels of 
employment were achieved in the latter more regulated institutional model (see ch. 1 table 
1.2) and more equitable employment arrangements are evident in terms of distribution of 
income and greater stability from longer employment tenure and average skill levels. As 
Baker et al (2004:16) argue ‘a complete and convincing analysis of the relationship 
between labour-market institutions must explain the success of these more-regulated 
countries as well’. 
Lee and McCann (2014: 11) observe that ‘simplistic accounts of the impact of labour 
regulations are slowly ceding ground to more sophisticated analyses’, however the 
deregulation position has proven to be durable especially in certain policy circles despite 
the identified methodological and empirical weaknesses. This leads commentators to argue 
that its logic is predominantly ideological rather than evidence-based as Deakin (2009:17) 
observes:  
the analyses contained in the Doing Business reports have been framed by the World 
Bank’s prior commitment to the Washington consensus formula of the minimalist state, 
property rights and trade liberalization as the basis for growth. 
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On the impact of this influential ideological position Lee and McCann (2011:2) observe 
that:  
It has long been recognized that the simplistic dichotomy between ‘regulation’ and 
‘deregulation’ characteristic of the neoclassical economic tradition and Washington 
consensus policy agendas is both highly influential and also threatens the distributive 
objectives of labour market regulation. 
Between the World Bank’s rigidity and deregulation or the ILO/IDB’s enforcement and 
social dialogue diagnoses on labour market governance the position adopted in this chapter 
and across this thesis is implicit from the new institutional approach to research and the 
nature of the research problem per se – the distance between the formal LMI system and 
the reality of employment in the Brazilian institutional model. The deregulation arguments 
are rejected as incompatible with the research aims of this thesis and weak when subject to 
evidence-based scrutiny, the empirical example of labour arrangements in CME type 
economies in particular.  
The rejection of an inherent negative economic impact of labour regulation implied by the 
deregulatory agenda does not suggest an opposing argument in favour of more regulation. 
Such a reductive and universal assertion would be similarly flawed as Deakin (2009:16) 
concludes on the evidence-based approach to labour regulation: their impact cannot be 
predicted ‘through models with universal application’, they are context-specific.  Crouch 
and Streeck (1998:7) adequately capture the non-committal position adopted here on the 
amount of employment legislation 
Undoubtedly institutions may sometimes have a negative effect on economic 
performance, or they may outlive an earlier usefulness; but discovery of this will have 
to be the result of detailed theoretical and empirical investigation, not a conclusion to be 
derived axiomatically 
The approach to labour outcomes adopted here is that they are the result of a complex set 
of complementary institutions. One of these institutions is the formal legal code, the 
enforcement of which is similarly dependent upon the composite institutional system. The 
less deterministic position of Lee & McCann (2011: 1; 2014:12) writing in an ILO 
publication is favoured here, that ‘labour market regulation is inevitably complex, and its 
outcomes – social and economic – difficult to predict’. 
Lee & McCann (2011:17-18) highlight the complexity of the relationship between labour 
regulations and economic and social impact. To escape the neoclassical 
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‘regulation/deregulation dichotomy’ the concept of ‘regulatory indeterminacy’ or uncertain 
outcomes is presented, stressing the need to analyse complexities, indeterminacies and the 
design and operation of regulatory frameworks. The related ILO publication (McCann et al 
eds 2014:1) attribute the indeterminacy to three factors ‘1. the accelerating fragmentation 
of employing enterprises 2. Complex interactions that take place between labour market 
institutions; and 3. Varying effectiveness of labour law enforcement’. These factors are 
summarised and adapted here as fragmentation, complementarities and enforcement to 
analyse the issues of regulation in the Brazilian national system and construction industry 
case study across the remainder of the chapter. It also corresponds to the idea of the 
Brazilian variety of capitalism being characterised by an incongruous LMI system (see 
ch.2 part 2.2).  
An issue in research on labour market institutions is the application of methods, 
approaches and findings based upon analyses of advanced economies to middle-income or 
emerging examples. There is an observable overreliance upon data from advanced 
economies and negligent of the context specificities of middle-income/emerging 
economies. Such a criticism can be made of both the deregulation school and the varieties 
of capitalism approach in its original form. One particular area of controversy is the 
informal sector. Therefore, analysis of general debates on informality; its definition(s), 
causes and relationship with formal employment legislation merit analysis before moving 
on to the Brazilian case characterised by a large informal sector. 
Interpretations of informality are divided along similar fault lines to the World 
Bank/deregulation versus the ILO/enforcement and dialogue cleavage. Initially there is no 
set definition of informality and therefore measurements of the size of the informal sector 
can vary. Whichever measurement is used, the idea of levels of informality being of 
considerably greater relevance in middle-income/emerging cases than advanced economies 
is non contentious. ‘Pervasive informality’ (Schneider 2013: 91) as a core feature of 
Brazilian and Latin American labour markets is not disputed here, rather its relationship 
with formal legislation and enforcement institutions is questioned in light of the popular, 
influential and persistent deregulation arguments.      
The size of the informal sector in developing countries contributes to the problematic 
nature of comparable labour regulation statistics such as those used by the World Bank’s 
DBR and the credibility of findings based upon using such indexes (Deakin, Lele and Sims 
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2007:141). Similar to views on unemployment levels, the deregulation school identifies a 
direct correlation between the size of the informal sector and amount of regulatory 
intervention in the employment relationship. As already discussed and justified, such a 
reductionist approach based on questionable data and methodology is rejected here in 
favour of a more context-specific institutional approach. An approach which sees the size 
of the informal sector as an outcome resulting from a complex set of interacting formal and 
informal institutions of which formal labour legislation is but one relevant institution.     
The deregulation approach is also criticised for its over-simplification or reductionist view 
of informal employment. Citing the World Bank 2005 & 2010 DBRs, Lee & McCann 
(2014:4) criticise a ‘clear-cut dichotomy between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies 
where labour standards are ‘unknown’ or ‘entirely irrelevant in the informal sector. The 
same authors (2011:22) argue that such ‘simplistic characterizations do not attend to the 
complexities of their functioning in low-income settings’.  
From an institutional perspective there is a neglect of the complementarities between the 
formal legislation and employment in the informal sector. This is recognised by Cardoso 
(2010:181) in the relationship between the formal employment legislation and the excluded 
majority discussed in chapter three. Rather than two independent regulated and 
unregulated systems, studies recognise that they are related parts of the same wider 
institutional system. The ‘lighthouse effect’ of a strong influence of formal minimum wage 
legislation upon higher remuneration in informal employment in Brazil is recognised by 
Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo (2001:78) and Medeiros (2015: 289) discussed in chapter 2 
also identified by Groisman (2014: 100) and Lemos (2009:22). Boeri, Garibaldi & Ribeiro 
(2010:27) identify a similar complementarity in Argentina. The neglect of the relationship 
between formal legislation and informal employment is therefore a significant weakness of 
the deregulation approach.  
The construction industry case study similarly finds interdependency, overlap and co-
existence of formal and informal employment relationships. Rodrigues Costa’s (2013:147) 
study of construction sites in Belo Horizonte found workers to be well aware of the costs 
and benefits of informal productivity por metro working agreements or a formal 
employment agreement workers called ‘the union wage’, with a preference for the lower 
wages and greater stability offered by regulated work when available.  
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Workers interviewed as part of the fieldwork for this research project demonstrated 
preferences for both the lower remuneration and stability of the formal employment 
contract (On-site interviews Paulo’s firm 2013) and greater remuneration from unregulated 
work including self-employment (Observations and interviews Cefet-MG Progest 2013). 
The latter resembling what is described in the literature as the ‘upper-tier’ informal 
employment (Fields 1990 in Kucera and Roncolato 2008:321). This is consistent with 
Almeida and Carneiro’s (2012:64) findings on Brazil that find ‘lower paid formal sector 
jobs become attractive to some informal workers’.  
Consistent with the approach and parameters on regulation presented in this first section of 
the chapter, the relationship between the informal and formal sectors in the construction 
case study can be described as one of interrelated complexity rather than simplistic and 
reductionist dichotomies. Analysed in more detail in the second half of this chapter, 
evidence demonstrates the coexistence of regulated and unregulated work within the same 
supply chain and even the same firm. This again reinforces the idea of systemic 
incongruity even within the individual workplace. 
The next section discusses labour market regulation in the Brazilian national system. 
Despite this thesis’s rejection of the deregulation/World Bank/Botero et al approach and its 
implied negative impact of labour regulation, it still warrants further discussion given its 
persistent influence in policy debates. The deregulation ideology or agenda and its 
influence represent something of a ‘relevant institution’ of particular significance to the 
Brazilian model. A model categorised by the Botero et al (2004:46-47) study as having one 
of the world’s most regulated labour market; data subsequently cited by Schneider 
(2013:173), Pastore (2005:31) and the World Bank DBRs. Otherwise the more complex 
‘regulatory indeterminacy’ ILO/Lee and McCann (2011 & 2014) parameters are applied to 
consider the observable issues of labour market regulation in Brazil.  
6.2 Regulation of the Brazilian labour market  
Formal regulation of the employment relationship in Brazil contained within the 
Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho (CLT), health and safety laws (Normas 
Regulamentadoras - NRs) and legally enforceable collective bargaining agreements 
(CBAs), hereby referred to as the legislation. A detailed analysis of the contents of the 
legislation is not within the scope of this research project. The contestation of the 
deregulation ideology in the previous section does not imply a defence of the highly 
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legislated Brazilian system or negate the existence of any potential for equity enhancing 
reforms to the legislation. From an institutional perspective and supported by fieldwork 
observations, the focus of this chapter is to seek explanations for the widespread 
noncompliance contributing to ‘regulatory indeterminacy’, suggested here to impede more 
coordinated outcomes and negatively effect the quality of employment.   
Following the discussions in the previous section, formal legislation is one of a number of 
institutions that influence the employment relationship within a complex system. 
Predictably, Brazilian legislation is much criticised by the deregulation school as over-
regulated, ‘rigid’ and archaic (citing the 1930s origins of the CLT see the Economist 2011 
& 2016 op cit) and even as the main obstacle to improved economic development 
(Schneider F. & Enste 2000:108 and Perry et al 2007). As already argued in this thesis, the 
trajectory of Brazilian development since 2003 demonstrates considerable socio-economic 
improvements combined with sustained economic growth and increased or recovering 
trade union influence, all within the constraints of the existing legislation. This trend runs 
contrary to the deregulation school’s basic premises on the consequences of labour market 
intervention.   
Evidence from the recent development trajectory of the Brazilian economy, the ‘inclusive 
decade’, further weakens the deregulation arguments and criticisms of Brazilian labour 
legislation. For example, Bosch, Goñi and Maloney (2007:26) attribute the unemployment 
and increased informality in 1990s Brazil to the increase in labour rights over ‘several 
dimensions of the Constitutional reform’ in the 1980s. This position not only suffers from 
the problems of over simplicity and reductionism of similar indexes discussed in the first 
part of the chapter, it also neglects other cyclical and macro-economic reform variables 
outside of the scope of LMIs. Berg (2010:9 emphasis in original) observes that the 
deregulation argument cannot explain or runs contrary to the observable trends in the 
2000s where formalisation and wages increased ‘in spite of – or perhaps, as a result of’ 
increased regulation or intervention in the labour market’. Cook (2012:266) speculates that 
a recent lack of academic attention upon contemporary Latin American labour markets 
may be related to previous unsuccessful forecasts of ‘labor’s secular decline’.  
As already examined in chapter 2, Berg (idem: 23) identifies five factors contributing to 
the increased formalisation in Brazilian labour markets two of which correspond to greater 
de facto regulation of employment ‘improved labour inspection and new approaches to 
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formalization’ and ‘greater legal awareness and respect for the law’. Two of the remaining 
factors: favourable macroeconomic environment and reduced labour supply are arguably 
cyclical factors also neglected in the reductionist deregulation arguments. Only the 
contribution of the new simples tax arrangement, embraced by Pastore (2005:20), for small 
and medium enterprises has any consistency with deregulatory approaches.  
To argue that the observed sustained socio-economic improvements in 2000s Brazil are the 
result of more de facto regulation would be based upon the same misleading reductionist 
logic of the deregulation school that argues in the opposite direction. As already discussed, 
it is dependent upon a complex set of complementary institutions of which the formal 
legislation is but one. An oft-neglected aspect of the relevant institutions is their history or 
path dependency.  
As argued and concluded in chapter 3 on the history of Brazilian LMIs, two distinctive 
paths co-exist and interact in contemporary Brazil. The first is the initial conditions or 
regressive path dependency linked to slavery and exploitation. This path is characterised 
by an extremely low threshold for labour conditions and persistent and generalised 
noncompliance with any existing legislation – the para ingles ver institution. The second 
path relates to the introduction of LMIs in the 1930s, the CLT system still in place today 
associated with the promise and expectation of considerable labour rights.  
Criticisms of the existing CLT system as rigid, archaic and/or anti-modern are rejected 
here for the following reasons: Firstly, the lack of recognition of the influence of the 
historically embedded practices that pre-date the CLT system, noncompliance in particular. 
The CLT path did not displace the regressive path as Levine (1998:112) describes: ‘rules 
were grafted onto traditional political practices’; arbitrary, authoritarian and paternalistic 
practices described by Cardoso (2010:19) as ‘hostile to most Brazilians’ and distant from 
the CLT ideal. Ronconi (2015:23) identifies a relationship or complementarity between 
colonial legacies of labour exploitation and ‘stringent labour laws in an attempt to buy 
social peace’ he also observes a tendency for countries with such ‘stringent laws’ to 
enforce less.  
The argument here from a path dependency perspective is that factors contributing to the 
noncompliance or ineffectiveness pre-date the labour legislation itself. The majority of the 
workforce was excluded from the ‘stringent’ labour protections (see ch.3 figures 3.1-3.3) 
for most of its 75-year history. This historical element is neglected in analyses that 
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presume the existence of widespread compliance with legislation and ahistorical/static 
approaches that neglect the presence of continuities. The latter is consistent with Marshall 
(2007:15) on noncompliance in Latin America who concludes that ‘cultural norms relative 
to corruption and enforcement should be also taken into account to explain compliance 
levels’. Cultural norms argued here and in more detail in chapter 3 to be embedded in the 
19th century rather than the much-evaded labour legislation per se.  
The historical inconsistency between the extensive rights of the CLT and the observable 
reality for workers must take into account enforcement as a key contributor to the 
effectiveness of the formal legislation. French (2004:97) recognises the potential of the 
CLT as the ‘world’s most progressive labour legislation’ though argues that is was 
designed to be unenforced and its survival across the 20th century is dependent upon this 
deficiency as genuine enforcement would have provoked ‘profound conflict’ between 
government bureaucracy and powerful private interests’.  
The ‘archaic and rigid’ criticisms of the Brazilian labour legislation neglect the issue of its 
widespread non-enforcement for the majority of its existence. Cardoso and Lage (2007:77) 
identify improved labour inspection procedures since the 1990s, also recognised by Berg 
(2010:17) and identified as contributing to the socio-economic gains of the 2000s. It may 
be that enforcement only started being taken more seriously since the emergence of a 
strong civil society led by the trade unions and related democratisation process and 
constitutional reforms of the 1980s. 
The recent improvements in inspection need to be contextualised. Similar to the wider 
context of improving social indicators in Brazil in the 2000s, the society is starting from a 
very low threshold in terms of social equity levels (see ch. 3, IPEA 2012:8). This is also 
the case for enforcement improvements through inspection. The continued precariousness 
and limited impact of inspection are acknowledged by Berg and Cardoso & Lage (op cit) 
when citing the recent improvements.  
Anner (2007:44) and Berg (2010:18) highlight the low and decreasing number of labour 
inspectors in Brazil with the number well below half that recommended by the ILO’s 
convention 8132 to which Brazil is a signatory, leading Berg (idem:24) to argue that ‘the 
workforce would be well served by dedicating more resources to inspection’. Extended 																																																								
32 Article 81 recommends 1 inspector per 15,000 workers, as of 2013 Brazil had 0.45, five times less than Chile (ILOStat 2016) 
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fieldwork interviews with business, state and union leaders evidenced significant concern 
with the precariousness of human inspection resources.  
In an extended interview Sinduscon SP vice-president Ishikawa (2013: interview) was 
uncritical of existing employment regulation and very supportive of the robust and detailed 
health and safety specific legislation (NR-18). His main grievance was the MTE’s scarce 
inspection resources to deal with the negative effects of informality in the industry. He 
describes enforcement as the main weakness of existing legislation, with only eight MTE 
labour inspectors for the entire City of Sao Paulo with 400,000 workers in the light 
construction sector alone. A similar complaint made more recently by the Força Sindical 
(2016) peak association highlights only six inspectors for 87 thousand companies spread 
across 15 municipal areas of the Osasco region of Sao Paulo.   
Consistent with observations made by Almeida & Carneiro (2012:69) and Cardoso & Lage 
(2007:91), Ishikawa further laments that when the scarce MTE inspection resources are 
mobilised, it is predominantly to inspect large-scale construction activity in the formal 
sector. The informal sector, where the majority of labour rights and health and safety 
irregularities are concentrated is essentially bypassed by the State’s inspection activity. 
In separate interviews union lawyer for Marreta-MG, Julio and Conticom president, 
Claudinho (2013) defend the formal legislation and describe the weakened inspection and 
enforcement resources of the MTE as an intentional strategy on the part of the State. Julio 
describes it as ‘intentional and orchestrated’; Claudinho explains that a government 
dominated by business interests, Congress in particular, have a vested interest in weak 
inspection and enforcement institutions and have created convenient enforcement 
mechanisms. Both labour representatives described enforcement as weakened even further 
by the prevalence of inactive pelego unions (see ch. 5 on representation, peleguismo and 
the union as an extra layer of regulation). 
The national trade union for labour inspectors (Sinait) 2012-13 campaign focussed upon 
the urgent need for more inspectors to be recruited, a bureaucratic process subject to 
Presidential approval and also an ongoing demand of striking PAC workers (Sinait 2012). 
The union observe that there were 2,741 active labour inspectors, the lowest number for 20 
years and 902 short of the 3,643 required by national law (Sinait 2014). Anner (2008) cites 
complaints made by the regional association of inspectors for Rio Grande do Sul who, 
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consistent with the idea of willing neglect of enforcement, observe that the labour 
inspectorate has suffered from  
heavy political interference aimed at preventing inspection: political authorities, who 
are likewise landowners, have close links with the military police, which protects their 
interests, turning a blind eye to their actions (CEACR 2005: 309 in Anner 2008:50) 
The low number of inspectors available to the MTE is in breach of national law and 
international ILO conventions 81 and 129 to which Brazil is a signatory. A 2012 IPEA 
study, compiled in cooperation with the labour inspectors’ union and presented in a formal 
complaint made to the ILO, estimates that a further 5,273 labour inspectors are required 
over four years in Brazil to adequately combat the problems of workplace accidents 
(Barbosa, Corseuil & Reis 2012:22). SINAIT (2014) cite the 700 thousand accidents and 
2,700 fatalities per year in the workplace as a direct consequence of the lack of human 
resources to adequately inspect workplaces in Brazil.  
Labour inspector Jeritza Juca, currently working as the head of the Labour Relations 
Secretariat for the state of Ceara (2013: interview), believes that the alarming figure of 
2,741 auditors actually underestimates the seriousness of a situation she describes as 
chaotic. Many of the inspectors considered ‘active’ may be working in alternative 
supervisory or leadership roles, like in Juca’s own case, and a significant number may also 
be on long-term sick leave. Juca describes the demand for more inspectors as the main 
struggle for the professional category and adds that she has never seen conditions as bad 
for the MTE since 2003 and cannot understand the thinking of those in power throughout 
this period. When presented with Julio and Claudinho’s suggestion of intentionally 
weakened enforcement, Juca agreed that there did seem to be a vested interest in a weak 
MTE in her professional opinion. 
The idea of intentional neglect of enforcement is consistent with French’s (2004) analysis 
of the history of labour legislation in 20th century Brazil and the persistent exclusion of the 
majority of the workforce from the formal employment protections described across 
chapter 3. Intentional and persistent noncompliance is also recognised in 20th century 
European labour legislation (Rogowski 2015:157) and Ronconi (2015:23) observes a 
‘stringent labour laws and very weak enforcement’ relationship in less developed countries 
with a historical legacy of exploitative employment relations. Argued in chapter 3, this 
corresponds to the ‘drift/intentional neglect’ type of Streeck and Thelen’s (2005:31 see 
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ch.1) mechanisms of gradual change, though in this instance the neglect of enforcement 
serves to impede change and reinforce continuities with the regressive path.  
Cardoso & Lage (2007) argue convincingly that the greatest problem is not the formal 
system itself but the way it operates in practice. Considerable attention is given to the 
Labour ministry’s inspection resources and procedures already discussed, though it is 
recognised that this is one of a set of relevant enforcement institutions.  According to the 
authors (p.23) for capitalists to respect workers’ rights they are reliant upon four 
institutions; Trade Unions or ‘the capacity for collective action’, the activity of the State 
regulatory body (MTE), the Labour Courts (Justiça de Trabalho) and the Labour Public 
Prosecutor (MPT). The authors highlight the ease in which businesses can ignore and 
bypass legislation presenting a simplified rational choice/game-theory scenario shown in 
figure 6.1. Noncompliance with legislation is presented as a rational choice when the 
benefits of disobeying the law, the likelihood of detection and punishment and the severity 
of such potential sanctions are taken into account.  
Figure 6.1 Compliance with labour legislation structure of opportunities 
  Level of severity of sanction 
 High Low 
Risk of 
detection 
and being 
sanctioned 
High 1. Comply 3. Noncompliance 
Low 2. Noncompliance 4. Noncompliance 
Source: Cardoso & Lage (2007) p.71 
The reality of enforcement and compliance described by Cardoso and Lage is a key 
contributor to the networks of mistrust argued in this thesis to characterise employment 
relations (see ch. 4, figure 4.1). The difficulty for workers to take action against their 
employer is inherent to the employment relationship though can be argued to be 
heightened in the Brazilian context. A context characterised by pervasive informality, 
poverty and a historically low threshold for employment conditions. The formal 
protections have represented something of a utopia or aspiration rather than a widely-
respected right (Cardoso 2010:40). Based upon figure 6.1 and Cardoso & Lage’s analysis; 
it is likely that employers and workers are fully aware of ongoing noncompliance with 
employment law though employees will only take action at the end of a period of 
employment.  
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The scarce inspection and sanction resources of the Labour ministry are dependent upon 
complaints from workers and/or their representative unions. Concluded in the previous 
chapter on representation, the trade union as an extra layer or regulation is argued to have 
an effective role in the legislated Brazilian LMI context. Trade unions contributing to 
effective enforcement is similarly recognised by Anner (2008:43), Weill (1999:340) and 
Lee and McCann (2014:23). Despite the existence of resourceful trade unions this potential 
complementarity is weakened by the widespread absence of representational mechanisms 
in the workplace (plant-level) and the prevalence of inactive and complacent pelego unions 
discussed in previous chapters.  
Figure 6.2 Cases Received by the Labour Courts (Brazil 2003-2015) 
 
Source: TST (2016b) based on Cardoso and Lage (2007:111) with figures for 1980-2003 
Even if union and MTE inspection activity were intensified it would only add to the 
millions of cases slowly going through the labour courts demonstrated in figure 6.2. This 
context of systemic uncertainty or instability is adequately captured by Lee and McCann’s 
idea of regulatory indeterminacy. Within such a context the ABC standard of labour 
relations discussed in more detail in chapter 4, again stands out as something of a labour 
market ‘pocket of efficiency’; where working conditions are rarely an issue and resolved 
on a day-to-day basis by plant-level representatives (Rodrigues 2002:151-152) and 
workers will halt production almost immediately when irregularities are detected (Aguiar 
2013: interview). 
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The extraordinary and internationally unprecedented number of employment cases going 
through the labour courts per year shown in figure 6.2 are regularly cited by advocates of 
deregulation in Brazil. Consistent with more general arguments this position appears to be 
overly reductionist and negligent of enforcement, compliance and contextual aspects of 
regulation. The deregulation arguments based upon the amount of litigation are further 
weakened when the nature of the majority of the cases is considered. Based on data from 
Rio de Janeiro courts, Cardoso (2003:181) observes that the ‘vast majority’ of cases (over 
90 per cent) were related to straightforward payments of severance entitlements. The 
simplicity or non-complexity of the cases is similarly implicit in the fact that 80 per cent of 
the cases are resolved at the first hearing (CNJ 2015:13). 
All union legal representatives consulted relate that the vast majority of cases they pursue 
through the courts are decided in favour of the employee33. The extremely high and 
increasing levels of labour litigation can be described as symptomatic of complex systemic 
difficulties related to uneven and fragmented enforcement institutions contributing to the 
incongruous nature of LMIs in the Brazilian variety of capitalism. Employers and workers 
are in something of a noncompliance equilibrium related to the rational choice scenario 
demonstrated in figure 6.1, described by Cardoso (2003:125) as a business strategy of 
‘non-payment of labour rights and waiting for the worker to litigate against them’. Farias 
(2013: interview) similarly describes this situation observing that if only seven out of ten 
employees make a complaint and take their employer to court the business would be 
making an overall gain.  
6.3 Regulation in the Brazilian Construction Industry 
This second half of the chapter analyses regulation and enforcement issues in the 
construction sector drawn from fieldwork research and other compatible analyses. As per 
discussions in previous chapters, noncompliance and related outcomes dominate industrial 
relations sustaining the inconsistency between the formal legislation and workplace reality 
and reducing the possibility of more pro-active coordinated institutional arrangements.  
Identified in chapter 4, there is evidence of effective and responsive cooperative initiatives 
at the national level of collective bargaining in the long standing technocratic tripartite 
Committee for Construction Industry Working Conditions and Environment (CPN) that 																																																								
33 Sintepav-PE Lawyer Federico (2013:interview) observes an almost 100 per cent success rate with up to a thousand dismissal and 
severance cases in SUAPE the one or two that weren’t decided in the employee’s favour was due to the workers in question not 
providing requested documentation. 
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contribute to health and safety rules (NRs) and more recently a prompt coordinated 
institutional response to the unrest witnessed across the PAC sites with the creation of the 
National Commitment for Improved Labour Conditions in the Construction Industry 
(NCILC)’ signed in March 2012. However, in the Brazilian system there are observable 
problems related to implementation (enforcement) and institutional coherence 
(fragmentation), therefore tinkering with the design of formal legislation cannot be 
expected to contribute to greater compliance and related stability.  
This is argued to be the case with the NCILC initiative described in more detail in chapter 
4. The majority of the high profile voluntary initiative is repetition of existing legislation 
and a commitment to use existing formal mechanisms for recruitment and skill 
certification purposes (SINE and Certific) respectively. Industry reports observe that its 
effectiveness has been limited (Dieese 2013:15, Ganz Lúcio & Scherer 2012). Business 
representatives consulted (Sinduscon’s Ishikawa & Ferreira, Cyrela’s Ademilson and 
Camargo Correa’s Marlon 2013: interviews/observation) believed it to be limited in 
relevance to the Rio Madeira PAC sites. Their mistrust of the SINE and Certific persisted 
post NCILC, along with the distinctive preference for informal recruitment mechanisms 
(Rádio Peão) even for large, high-profile public projects.  
One example of the lack of impact of the NCILC and related difficulty in transforming 
legislation into widespread practice is summarised in figure 6.3 with 111 workers rescued 
by the MTE from degrading living conditions on the Sao Paulo – Guarulhos airport 
extension. The project involved 4 thousand workers at Latin America’s busiest airport and 
was overseen by one of Brazil’s largest and most high-profile construction companies, 
OAS, in the country’s most economically and institutionally developed region. 
Both the problem and institutional response to the Guarulhos case are indicative of the 
difficulty of effective implementation of labour policy and initiatives devised at the 
national level. The subsequent prescription made by the MTE to the main contractor 
(OAS) was to hire workers at their point of origin using the formal SINE recruitment 
system. OAS had previously agreed to this measure as part of the tri-partite NCILC 
initiative. The goal of full compliance with the NCILC recommendations at the Guarulhos 
airport site is publicised in the 2011-2012 sustainability report of the company responsible 
(OAS 2012:49). 
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Figure 6.3 Case: Sao Paulo Guarulhos airport extension – Process of 
informal recruitment to ‘conditions analogous to slavery’ and MTE 
Intervention  
 
Source: Wrobleski (2013), Sinduscon SP (2013) & Sindcongru (2013) 
The OAS example is far from being an isolated example, such cases generally make the 
headlines when they involve workers on high profile projects such as airports, the World 
Cup, Olympics, or well-known domestic and international firms. Analysis of numerous 
reports demonstrates that the problems are with one or more of the subcontractors within 
the supply chain. Union officials consulted describe the large companies as ‘non-
problematic’ in meeting relevant legislation for their direct employees. The productive 
windows of larger construction projects may involve hundreds of outsourced companies. 
The OAS/Guarulhos case is evidence of the difficulties these companies have to ensure the 
compliance with employment legislation across outsourced activities. This contributes to 
regulatory indeterminacy across the supply chain.  
6.3.1 Outsourcing  
From the union perspective and related to the supply-chain compliance difficulties 
described above, Marreta-MG president David Quirino (2013: interview) identifies 
outsourcing as representing the construction industry’s greatest problem. In his experience 
the smaller outsourced firms bring workers from the poorer regions of the country to work 
Workers from the states of Maranhao, Sergipe, Baia and Pernambuco are 
informally recruited by gangmaster to work at airport extension site.
Employees are transported over thousands of miles in a precarious and 
dangerous vehicle and accommodated across eleven houses in conditions 
described as 'overcrowded and degrading'.
Workers coerced into providing local addresses to evade legislation to 
protect migrant workers and further provisions made by the company 
responsible as part of the national tri-partite NCILC agreement.
Responding to complaints presented by the local trade union, MTE 
inspectors rescue 111 workers from 'conditions analagous to Slavery'. 
OAS have BR$ 15 million blocked by the justice system and have to 
respond legally for people traficking, slave labour and debt bondage.	 		
MTE Auditors demand that entire recruitment process is formally completed 
through formal SINE mechanisms at workers' point of origin and 
documentary evidence of compliance with migrant worker legal protections 
is provided. 
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in the cities with no consideration for the extensive welfare legislation in place, leaving 
them to go hungry in precarious accommodation and quite often abandoning them 
thousands of miles away from home when any difficulties emerge.  
Such unreliable firms or opportunistic gangmasters within the construction industry are 
commonly referred to as gatos. The informal recruitment and outsourcing practices of the 
gatos contributed to the dramatic breakdown of industrial relations across the PAC sites. 
The subsequent recommendations of the NCILC initiative (recruitment at point of origin 
and use of the formal SINE and Certific systems) were specifically aimed at removing this 
practice and its negative consequences from the construction industry.  
The problem of irregularities in outsourced companies, highlighted by all union 
representatives consulted34, is based upon accumulated experience. The unions observed 
that there are minimal issues with irregularities in employment with the larger companies 
such as OAS, it is further down the supply chain of the same firms that noncompliance 
resulting in a high incidence of accidents and what the legislation describes as ‘conditions 
analogous to slavery’ is identified.  
Within a context of a high number of fatal accidents within the construction sector, 450 per 
year and 16.5% of all formally registered workplace deaths35 (INSS 2013 in Filgueiras 
2015:1), there is a clear relationship between outsourcing and the failure of employment 
protections. This is recognised by the Labour Ministry and Trade Unions. The MTE 
director of health and safety Marinho states that ‘subcontracted workers are the most 
exposed to the risk of accidents’ and that this risk is aggravated by firms outsourcing the 
more dangerous activities to companies that rarely have well-elaborated accident 
prevention plans in place (Pyl 2012). Outsourced workers accounted for 80 per cent of 
fatal accidents at Petrobras between 1995 and 2013 and according to the MTE, 90 per cent 
of workers rescued in the 10 largest anti-slavery cases (Locatelli 2015).  
The authorities similarly recognise the issue of precarious employment and related health 
and safety irregularities in outsourced firms. In an initiative similar and parallel to the 
NCILC in 2013, the Labour Public Prosecutor (MPT) urged the eight largest construction 
companies (MRV Engenharia, Rossi, PDG-Goldfarb, Odebrecht, Brookfield, Cyrela, 																																																								
34 In particular conversations during the observation of the homologação (employment termination verification and sign-off) teams at 
Marreta PE and Sintepav-PE Pecém branch  
35 Data on industrial accidents argued to be problematic by (Takashi et al 2012:978) with a recognised tendency of underreporting of 
approximately 90%. 
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Gafisa and Direcional) to sign up to a Term of Behavioural Adjustment (TAC) to provide 
greater legal protections and guarantees to outsourced workers and eradicate the use of 
informal work (PRT -15ª Região 2013). 
Outsourcing is a divisive issue between business and labour representatives. This is evident 
at the sectorial level where Ishikawa and Ferreira (2013: interviews) are fully supportive of 
outsourcing and its logic, particularly within the construction industry. All union and state 
officials consulted were in opposition based upon their accumulated experience in dealing 
with the consequences of noncompliance by outsourced firms. Similar division is evident 
at the national level on advanced legal reform proposals PL 4330 to make outsourcing 
easier. The CUT and National Association of Labour Prosecutors (ANPT) fervently 
oppose the deregulatory measure and corresponding business organisations such as the 
FIESP and CNI are in favour. Union officials consulted had concerns for the wider effect 
upon the potential for decent work. In construction Quirino (2013) described the proposals 
as representing the legalisation of existing widespread illegality36.  
Analysis limited to the formal legislation and neglectful of the important variables of 
enforcement and compliance would not capture the relevance and controversy of 
outsourcing. In construction at least, independent of whichever part or company within the 
supply chain the worker is employed – they are protected by the extensive legislation and 
represented by the designated union independent of affiliation (see ch. 5 on the unicity 
system). Legally the main subcontracting company is held responsible for the rights and 
welfare of workers in the outsourced firms through the subsidiary and solidary 
responsibility laws. In formal legal terms, outsourcing does not allow for companies to 
evade the protective legislation37. They are still held responsible for the compliance of the 
subcontracted firms. Existing legislation ensures that subcontracting companies are liable 
for employment contributions when the resources of the subcontractor are exhausted, and 
solidary responsibility obliges the subcontracting party to meet its labour obligations when 
it has been negligent in auditing outsourced firms’ compliance (Camera dos Deputados 
2013).  																																																								
36 Quirino and director Zé Luis cited the case of the MRV firm one of the country’s largest residential construction firm that illegally 
outsourced all their productive activities. The firm were subsequently prosecuted by the Labour Public Prosecutor (MPT) for 
irregularities dating back to 2007, fined BRL 6.7 million to and made to sign a Term of Behavioural Adjustment (TAC) committing to 
an end to illicit outsourcing (PRT 15ª Região:2013). 
 
37  One way of avoiding labour legislation is to register individual workers as subcontracted companies, meaning all the substantial rights 
derived from the employment relationship are removed. This is a similar phenomenon to the false self-employment that predominates in 
the UK construction industry, described by the main union as ‘undoubtedly, the biggest employment challenge in construction’ and 
‘immoral though not illegal’ (UCATT 2014). Within the more regulated labour environment of Brazil, disguising relationships of 
employment is illegal even with the “consent” of the worker in question (Tribunal Superior de Trabalho 2012). Such a practice at one 
site involving twenty workers was under investigation by the Sinticom union when visited in 2013.   
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6.3.2 Internal Business Compliance Practices 
This sub-section considers regulatory indeterminacy based upon observations and first-
hand accounts with professionals responsible for compliance within the supply chain of a 
given employer. A week was spent observing the activities of Paulo38 (2013: observation 
and interviews), a professional responsible for internal site inspection for a medium size 
residential construction company in a provincial town 100 kilometres from the large state 
capital. It was Paulo’s role to monitor compliance with the relevant legislation and 
company policy across the supply chain. With fifteen years’ experience in the industry his 
attitude to inspection was to ‘play things by ear’, seeing improvisation, flexibility and 
creativity as key attributes to his role. He admitted at times this means turning a blind eye 
to some irregularities otherwise the company would end up with no workers, having 
ostracised or fired all their employees.  
On the first site visited on the Monday, the construction of a twenty-storey residential 
block, approximately half of the employees were absent from work without authorisation 
and a further four sub-contracted employees present were prohibited from entering the 
tower block construction as they were intoxicated. The foreman observed that this was 
commonplace, particularly on a Monday with the collective bargaining agreement allowing 
for four unauthorised absences per month without disciplinary sanctions. Speaking about 
the absences later with the HR manager and company director they expressed frustration 
with the labour union’s inflexibility for not accepting an offer to exchange the 
unauthorised absence clause for health insurance in the last round of collective bargaining 
as ‘they cannot be seen to be bargaining away acquired rights’.  
The frustrations expressed with the ‘union’s inflexibility’ were not extended to the general 
CLT and NR legislation. The HR manager described meeting regulations to be a challenge 
made more difficult as workers cannot be relied upon to monitor their own entitlements 
and often have to be chased or even disciplined to make sure their documentation and 
records are in order so the company would not be liable to sanctions in the case of any 
regulatory inspection or audit.  
Activities at four of the company’s construction sites were observed. The first site was 
overlooked by the MTE offices and was a model of compliance with health and safety and 
employment regulations. Another site was visited in a more remote area on the outskirts of 																																																								
38 Pseudonym 
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the town, neighbouring irregularly constructed housing settlements39. The building project 
in question was a beneficiary of state benefits in the form of subsidised credit as part of the 
Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV) popular house building programme. Although there 
were no obvious immediate safety hazards on the site, the conditions and facilities were in 
clear noncompliance with the requirements of the NRs and CBA with over half of the 
employees working without uniforms on informal day-labour agreements from the 
neighbouring community.     
Paulo candidly admitted that the use of informal labour and noncompliance was ‘conscious 
negligence’ by the company. Taking into account the scope and relative inactivity of the 
local trade union and the low probability of an MTE inspection and local availability of 
casual labour, little effort was made to guarantee compliance at this more remote site. The 
irregularities at this one site notwithstanding, general compliance and efforts to ensure 
worker well-being within this company appeared high. Registered employees interviewed 
on the main sites described being very satisfied with their conditions of employment and 
the working culture of the company in question.  
On another of the company’s MCMV sites, a subcontractor with five employees from the 
less-developed State of Maranhão was carrying out the rendering of the buildings. Upon 
arrival, the subcontractor had made no provisions for the accommodation of his team of 
migrant workers expecting them to sleep in the partially constructed buildings, use the 
portable toilets and wash with an outdoor hose. Despite being a long-standing cultural 
norm in the industry, such suggested living arrangements are in clear breach of numerous 
NR-18 industry-specific regulations. Detection could result in accusations of conditions 
‘analogous to slavery’ from the authorities and media mirroring the process of events 
described in figure 6.3. Paulo intervened finding compliant accommodation for the 
outsourced workers at the expense of the subcontractor who was initially resistant to the 
idea stating ‘his boys were used to it’ and ‘didn’t mind’ such conditions.  
Paulo explained why he and the company make a conscious effort to provide for their 
employees’ needs; the account was informative in the sense that very little reference was 
made to the possibility of detection and sanctions by the trade union and/or MTE. 
Neither I nor the company would consciously deceive or let our employees be 
exploited, this is a small town. I see these people in the street with their children, we go 																																																								
39 Commonly referred to as favelas 
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to the same church on Sundays, not only would it be wrong, it’s not possible in a small 
provincial town like this one.      
The influence of this Durkheimian collective consciousness described by Paulo seems to 
have a greater influence upon activity than the formal constraints of the relevant 
institutions. The local union was described by a director of Paulo’s company as irrelevant; 
workers interviewed seemed quite distant from their designated representative institution 
viewing it as having a purely administrative function to sign off on severance payments. 
This relationship differs significantly to that observed from the activity of the six unions 
observed in larger cities.  
Such community-related pastoral or paternal constraints are arbitrary and may not be 
considered in non-local employers’ decision making. With migrants composing the 
majority of construction workers in the state in question many workers may not benefit 
from this informal safety net. Consequently, this communitarian sensitivity cannot be 
expected or relied upon in other regions, in the larger cities and/or larger companies and 
construction sites like the Guarulhos airport extension case and PAC sites. Nonetheless, 
were widespread compliance with all the relevant existing legislation to characterise the 
employment relationship there would be no need to depend upon the arbitrary ‘good 
nature’ of employers.  
The example of the operation of Paulo’s company in a city of 100 thousand people 
arguably represents something of an ideal type or scale model of the construction industry 
in Brazil during the high growth of the ‘inclusive decade’ period covered in this research. 
Perhaps more so than the high-profile PAC examples cited across this thesis. A medium-
sized firm building standard residential blocks of apartments and condominiums aimed at 
the ‘new middle class’ and related consumption boom, assisted by state bank subsidies 
through the Minha Casa Minha Vida programme, characterises the industry across 
Brazilian cities in the 2010s. 
Within the employment practices of the same company there is evident inconsistency of 
enforcement and compliance or regulatory indeterminacy. This is evident between the full 
compliance on one site and the textbook informality elsewhere. Within the relatively short 
supply chain there is similarly evidence of tensions between formal compliance and widely 
accepted practices evident in the subcontractor’s attitude on acceptable accommodation for 
his team and the need for the contracting company to intervene. This represents micro-
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level evidence of the coexistence of compliance with the ‘stringent legislation’ and 
practices characteristic of the historically-embedded low threshold for decent work. The 
inconsistency is sustained by the availability of workers from the less-developed regions of 
the country (Maranhão in this case) and sectors of society such as the informal day 
labourers from a more deprived area of the city.      
Similar dynamics and tensions are apparent from the accounts of two social workers 
responsible for inspecting working conditions on supply chains across larger construction 
sites. The role of social worker within construction companies is a relatively recent 
development and arguably represents part of the trend of improved inspection and greater 
legal awareness recognised by Berg (2010:12). Laura40 (2013: interview) was working on 
the construction site of a shopping centre in one of Brazil’s largest cities involving 1,500 
construction workers and 50-60 different subcontracted companies. Her responsibilities 
involved delivering the initial six to eight hours of obligatory health and safety training for 
all workers new to the site as well as inspecting safety and welfare conditions across the 
supply chain. Carolina,41 (2013: interview) held a similar role in the same region for the 
consortium responsible for the construction of one of the main World Cup stadiums.  
Laura describes being supported by quite rigorous internal standards established by her 
high-profile employer to complement the already comprehensive items established by law. 
She however admits that there is still a lot left to be desired in terms of compliance in the 
workplace, particularly across the outsourced companies. Consistent with Quirino’s 
observation, Laura notices that sub-contractors bring workers long distances from the 
poorest parts of the country and leave them in sub-standard living conditions which are 
difficult to monitor given their off-site locations and the short productive windows of some 
firms. As workers affected are unlikely to complain, Laura has to proactively seek out such 
irregularities, preferably before they are detected by the local union or MTE, the former 
observed to be a more ‘rigorous detective’. 
Carolina’s World Cup site involved 3,000 workers, two-thirds migrants accommodated on-
site. She is overall very positive and proud of the working conditions established. Given 
the high profile of the site it saw a lot of union activity and was inspected on twenty 
occasions by the MTE. Consistent with Laura’s account, Carolina argues that her internal 
inspection duty is challenging due to opportunism amongst sub-contractors trying to avoid 																																																								
40 pseudonym 
41 pseudonym  
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their legal responsibilities hoping that they can avoid detection or sanctions from the 
contracting company until their services have been completed. 
Both Laura and Carolina recounted what they described as aggressive interventions by the 
local trade union. The union representatives involved (also consulted) attribute the number 
of MTE inspections and related good working conditions described by Carolina at the 
World Cup site as the result of their militancy and interventions in response to reports of 
widespread irregularities and wildcat strikes at the start of the project.  
Laura describes two-way pressure in her role on the shopping centre, that of the local 
union, likely and willing to intervene and support stoppages in response to irregularities 
reported by workers and from the managerial professionals on-site who are hostile to 
safety and welfare interventions when they are deemed to go against productivity and 
related deadlines.  
Similar to Paulo’s observations, Laura admits that it is impossible to respond to all 
irregularities observed and has to regularly turn a blind eye to avoid bringing production to 
a standstill. A regular grievance from the unions is that employers cover up accidents to 
avoid the obligatory reporting to the relevant authorities42. Laura admits that this is 
unfortunately commonplace even in the relatively more regulated environment of her 
company. On trade union interventions, she expressed considerable relief that her next 
location was outside of the designated region of this more combative union. Based upon 
reputation and previous experience she doubted there would be much pressure from the 
relevant union at the site of the next project.    
Laura and Carolina’s accounts on compliance and enforcement in high profile large 
construction sites and extensive supply chains are consistent with those observed in 
Paulo’s company on regulatory uncertainty, albeit to scale. The challenges of ensuring 
enforcement are evident with productivity pressures from within the firm itself and the 
unevenness of regulation across the supply chain with some subcontractors actively 
seeking to evade detection. The influence of union and MTE activities upon internal 
inspection activities emerges as a relevant variable and supports the idea presented in the 																																																								
42 Marreta MG directors (2013) complain of a widespread practice of employers pressuring or encouraging the emergency services to 
report deaths as having taken place in the ambulance or at hospital to avoid an automatic embargo of the site, this was said to occur even 
in cases where the body had lain dead on-site for hours before the arrival of medical staff. Camargo Correa’s Marlon (2013) recounted a 
popular anecdotal story in the industry on the construction of a residential tower where the firm responsible dressed a suicide victim in a 
uniform and all the appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE) before the emergency services arrived as they had mistakenly 
believed it was an employee that must have fallen whilst working on an informal and illegal overnight shift. 
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previous chapter of the union as an extra layer of regulation. However, Laura’s account of 
the next site being in a region where the union are less active suggests that this type of 
union contribution towards regulation is similarly fragmented, uneven and unpredictable. 
The idea of uneven regulation causing uncertain and inconsistent employment conditions 
across the supply chain is reinforced by the accounts from business inspection 
professionals Paulo, Laura and Carolina, the information received from trade unions and 
the reports on the incidence of irregularities and consequences of noncompliance amongst 
outsourced firms. It is a challenge for firms to regulate their own supply chains and there 
are observable tendencies to ignore and underreport irregularities. The potential for unions 
and the MTE to contribute to improved widespread compliance is constrained due to their 
presence being outside the workplace together with the issues of peleguismo, 
fragmentation and scarce resources already discussed in the previous two chapters.  
The complexity and complementarities of context-specific issues contributing to regulatory 
indeterminacy cannot be attributed to a single-issue. As a result, the ideas of too 
much/little legislation, representativeness of unions, amount of inspection resources are all 
of relevance though considered in isolation they do not determine the observed difficulties 
in greater regulation. The CSP Pecem steel plant again represents an informative case 
study on this complexity, particularly as it is an example where union representation and 
state inspection have been onerous.  
6.3.3 Regulatory Indeterminacy at the Pecem Steel Plant 
As already discussed in chapter 4 on relations, the Pecem site has a workforce with an 
accumulated experience of previous on-site negotiations and industrial action, highly likely 
to take defensive measures against any payment or safety irregularities detected across the 
supply chain and offensive action for improved pay and benefits. A willingness to 
challenge the designated union if they feel they are not fulfilling their representational 
responsibilities was evident at the construction of the thermoelectric plant PAC site at the 
same location as part of the outbreak of widespread unrest in 2011.  
Workers are represented by Sintepav-CE (see previous chapter on the evolution of 
Sintepav representation) whose active and resourceful representation is described by 
Dieese’s Aguiar (2015: interview) as somewhat exceptional amongst Brazilian trade 
unions. The site-specific collective bargaining agreement has terms and conditions above 
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those envisaged by the NCILC, adherence to which was rejected by the Posco company at 
the start of operations (eyewitness account from Juca 2013: interview) and superior to any 
comparative agreements nationwide (MPT Public Hearing 2015).  
Given the levels of unrest and related complaints from the mobilised workforce and active 
union, the state’s labour and inspection institutions (MTE & MPT) have similarly been 
very active at the site. Ibiapina (idem) from the MTE identified unsafe working conditions 
and persistent irregularities even after 198 inspections, 600 detected infractions and 
sanctions upon 102 different companies between 2010-2014. The deregulation argument of 
rigid, excessive legislation is not applicable here as there is very little if any arguments to 
justify the flexibilisation of health and safety measures. Furthermore, many of the non-
safety critical irregularities relate to straightforward wages and severance payment evasion 
(see ch. 4, table 4.4 - severance also dominates labour litigation cases more generally, see 
figure 6.2).  
Rather than contribute to improved compliance, the Pecem case saw a breakdown of 
employment relations resulting in 150 days lost to strikes at a high cost. There is an evident 
inability to meet basic employment commitments despite the pressure from workers, union 
and the state. The weak link in this instance is the employers. Unorganised, unrepresented 
and fragmented across the supply chain of over one hundred companies, a local business 
union for heavy construction corresponding to Sintepav-CE was only authorised in 2016, 
months before the completion of the steel plant. 
The Pecem case highlights the complexity of relevant regulatory factors. As already 
discussed, Cardoso and Lage (2007:23) identify four institutions upon which compliance 
with workers’ rights depend upon: Trade Unions, the MTE, the Labour Courts and the 
Labour Public Prosecutor (MPT). At the steel plant, all four of these institutions have 
maintained a strong and active presence yet there has still been a breakdown in industrial 
relations due to endemic noncompliance (see ch.4 part 4.4.3). This suggests that regulation 
depends upon an even more complex set of institutional factors than those envisaged by 
Cardoso and Lage in their criticisms of reductionist analyses that solely focus upon the 
quantity of formal legislation. Some of these complex factors may be outside of the 
immediate LMI scope of this research and are discussed in the following section.  
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6.3.4 Regulatory Complementarities and Wider Systemic Influence 
Considering CSP-Pecem as a scale model of wider labour relations highlights the complex 
set of interacting variables or complementarities necessary for effective regulation and its 
related stability to prevail. It should also be recognised that such outcomes are influenced 
by broader characteristics of the Brazilian system outside of the immediate LMI focus. 
Aguiar (2015: interview) is critical of the original price-sensitive concession to Korea’s 
Posco with a bid billions of dollars below the competing tenders from Europe and the 
United States. He argues the large discrepancy in the value of the bids should have set 
alarm bells ringing and a lack of due diligence meant that subsequent labour problems in 
the supply chain were somewhat inevitable.    
Three separate employment disputes originating from a public body withholding payment 
were observed during fieldwork. At a mediation session at the Belo Horizonte Regional 
MTE Office (MTE/DRT 2013: observation), one business owner had been unable to pay 
his increasingly hostile workers due to non payment by the state water company COPASA 
whose representative presented no justification for withholding payments other than 
mismanagement and indifference. A further two cases were observed in Fortaleza where 
large construction companies were said to be delaying completion of two high-profile 
public projects as the City Council was months in arrears with its contractual payment. The 
companies involved were receptive to union intervention and stoppages in the hope that it 
may pressure the authorities to make the outstanding payments. A return visit in 2015 
found Marlon’s Camargo Correa site, described by Sintepav-CE as a model of compliance 
in 2013, at a standstill as the Fortaleza City Council, Ministry of Tourism and PAC 
departments were in dispute as to who should finance the completion of the public 
infrastructure project.  
The Sao Paulo Federation for Industry (FIESP)’s Construction Industry Department 
produced the report ‘Responsibility with Investment - The Problem of Unpredictability in 
Construction Projects: Create New Laws or Adjust the Existing Ones’. The report, based 
upon business surveys, was in response to the widespread problem of delays and 
suspension of construction projects. Consistent with the idea of an incongruous system 
presented in this thesis, the main sentiment of the report is that the industry is held back by 
unpredictability. Fragmentation, incoherence and mismanagement of related public sector 
activities (regulatory, utilities, legal) described as slow, ‘disarticulated and inopportune’ 
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are cited (FIESP 2016:5,15). Consistent with the on-site problems observed in Fortaleza, 
an excess of bureaucracy contributing to delays in the release of funds is highlighted.  
The majority of the business survey-based report attributes the difficulties to problems of 
public administration. Labour is only one of 10 issues attributed to workplace stoppages. 
Scarcity of skilled workers is cited as the main problem, related to increased wage costs 
without any corresponding increase in productivity. There is no mention of levels of 
employment legislation. Bureaucracy is cited as a problem general to the Brazilian system 
and it is unpredictability, fragmentation and the slow nature of relevant state activity that is 
cited rather than amount of legislation per se (idem: 20). This is informative, as the FIESP 
is the organisation most commonly associated with neoliberal thought and the related 
deregulation position on labour markets in contemporary Brazil.  
The administrative indeterminacy or fragility observed permeates into labour relations. 
Issues outside of the immediate LMI focus of this research project are not discussed in any 
depth. However, the idea of wider problems in the Brazilian variety of capitalism affecting 
the regulation of employment is coherent with the arguments already presented. It 
reinforces the idea of the complexity of interrelated issues that influence regulatory 
outcomes. This in turn is consistent with the premise that deregulation arguments reducing 
the reality of the employment relationship to a consequence of the amount or rigidity of 
formal legislation are weak and misleading. It is worth highlighting that the levels of 
litigation shown in figure 6.3 exist elsewhere in the Brazilian polity. At the time of writing 
the construction of the Suape Oil Refinery in Pernambuco has been halted due to irregular 
payments between the state and large construction firms as part of the ongoing Lava Jato 
scandal (Jeronimo 2016).  
Sinduscon SP vice-president Ishikawa’s (2013: interview) main professional concern is the 
negative effects of the informal sector to all parties involved and he describes a successful 
shared agenda with the trade unions in Sao Paulo towards decent work and the combat of 
informality and related noncompliance. Sinduscon-CE president Ferreira (2013: interview) 
makes passing reference to the comparatively high holiday entitlements of Brazilian 
workers and tax burden upon payroll though his main grievance was the recent increase in 
wages without any corresponding increase in productivity. This view is consistent with the 
FIESP report and related surveys in which it can be presumed Ferreira actively 
participated. Like Ishikawa he viewed combatting informality and noncompliance as an 
		 237 
important mission of the Sinduscon business organisations and members responsible for 
labour irregularities are subject to sanctions and expulsion.  
The main point of disagreement between Ishikawa and Ferreira and labour representatives 
is the issue of outsourcing, associated with greater flexibility of labour arrangements 
though it does not; in theory at least, involve the deregulation of long-standing 
employment rights and protections. In a distinctive interpretation to trade union president 
Quirino’s (2013: interview) argument on outsourcing as the legalisation of widespread 
illegality, Ferreira (2013: interview) argues that it would provide outsourced workers with 
greater legal security than the current model and reduce informality.  
From both the construction industry specific FIESP report and this present research project 
there is no evident tangency between the position of business representatives and the 
universal arguments for deregulated labour markets (the Economist, Pastore, World Bank 
op cit). In the literature, the most fervent support of dismantling Brazil’s long-standing 
employment legislation is also somewhat limited to Pastore (1997, 1998 & 2005). There is 
minimal evidence of a corresponding deregulation desire or priority amongst business 
representatives. The FIESP report demonstrates greater frustration with issues outside of 
the scope of labour institutions that subsequently contribute to the observed regulatory 
indeterminacy in employment relations.  
Conclusion 
During fieldwork when discussing accounts of noncompliance and its consequences a 
regular question asked of LMI representatives was as to whether the evasion was due to 
employer incapacity to meet the legal requirements or intentional opportunist evasion. 
With hindsight, this was not an important or even relevant issue in the same sense that the 
‘too much or not enough legislation?’ question is highly reductionist, overly simplistic and 
potentially misleading. Noncompliance and the regulatory indeterminacy it generates is a 
widespread problem in Brazil and represents a systemic outcome of a complex set of 
context-specific variables of which the formal labour code is but one. Effective 
enforcement of the legislation is also dependent upon a similarly complex set of factors.   
Schneider (2013:181) highlights how difficult it is to ‘break out of the negative 
complementarities of hierarchical capitalism’ given the ‘many positive factors that need to 
converge’. This can similarly be applied to the issue of regulation, where a multiple set of 
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complex and context-specific factors are required to converge for widespread compliance 
to characterise employment across the political economy. Factors involve 
cultural/historical norms, the inspection and enforcement role of the state, civil society and 
business organisations as well as the national socio-economic reality. 
The Pecem steel plant case is of particular relevance given that a set of positive factors for 
labour (demanding workers and an active union and state) seemingly did converge though 
the outcome was predominantly one of persistent noncompliance leading to industrial 
relations failure. A disorganised, fragmented and underrepresented business sector and 
issues originating outside of the immediate LMI focus of this research (initial tendering 
processes) were factors frustrating the potential of the converged set of positive factors.  
Independent of whether evasion of labour laws is due to capability or an intentional 
strategy, the composite system of LMIs in practice contributes to a system where 
noncompliance can be seen as something of a rational choice (see figure 6.1). Discussion 
of the optimum level or quantity of employment legislation is not within the scope of this 
thesis nor is it considered to be a viable analytical exercise given that institutional labour 
market arrangements are context-specific. Attempts at creating such indexes such as that of 
Botero et al are argued to be limited and misleading as the authors of similar exercises 
(OECD 2016c) freely concede.  
In the case of Brazilian employment legislation there is evidence of contextual 
appropriateness of the ‘stringent’ labour laws. Considering the poverty and related 
vulnerability of certain sectors of the population evident in the high levels of regional and 
socio-economic inequality and the more dramatic consequences of noncompliance in the 
construction industry: workers thousands of miles from home in conditions analogous to 
slavery, health & safety irregularities contributing to fatal accidents, the extensive and 
highly detailed Brazilian legislation seems logical and rational.  
The idea of legislating for the size of a mattress, light and ventilation levels in workers’ 
accommodation, meal provision at evenings and weekends (NRs) and the amount of milk 
and cheese to be provided for breakfast (CBAs) and extra paid leave with travel expenses 
for return trips to a worker’s hometown (NCILC) may seem peculiar or excessive in other 
socio-economic contexts. The Brazilian context is distinctive from the advanced economic 
examples where much of the regulation debates take place. Archer’s (1998:5) Economic 
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Democracy discussed in chapter 1 is based upon societies where ‘decent wages and 
conditions’ are presumed to have already been achieved. This is not the case in Brazil. 
There is minimal evidence of tangency between business and managerial representatives 
consulted and the wider deregulation arguments. This is consistent with Cook’s (2007:86) 
observations on flexibilisation debates in Brazil in the 1990s. The FIESP construction 
industry report makes very little reference to the levels of labour regulation and 
informality. The main concern presented by the report and business representatives 
consulted relate to wider administrative problems of the Brazilian public sector outside of 
the immediate LMI scope.  
On labour, a skills deficit in the construction industry is described as ‘chronic’ by the 
FIESP report. Tripartite arrangements contributing to a skilled labour force is a key 
characteristic and comparative advantage of the CME-type economies. Despite the 
ongoing argument of this thesis on the existence of institutions with the design and 
capacity for tripartite consensual arrangements, with LMI activity and complementarities 
dominated by ‘regulatory indeterminacy’ and ‘networks of mistrust’ it is difficult to 
envisage this type of arrangement in Brazil in the near future. This further weakens the 
deregulation arguments in the Brazilian context, as it is difficult to envisage horizontalised 
freely-bargained solutions from a deregulated system within such a historically 
hierarchical social system.  
In practice, the LMI system and employment relations, in construction at least, are 
dominated by the uncertainty of compliance. This in turn fuels a multi-directional network 
of mistrust between relevant parties. This includes tensions between businesses within the 
same supply chain as the evidence presented would suggest. Consistent with the 
conclusion on institutional relations in chapter 4 and the idea of a regressive path 
dependency for labour in chapter 3 the redistributive capacity of labour market regulation 
in Brazil is hindered by its incongruity - the persistence of high inequality, fragmentation 
and uncertainty of such regulation. 
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Conclusion  
Crouch (1994:7-8) describes a research journey in the 1970s of the ‘revived school of 
corporatist analysis’ where academics initially hostile to corporatism and its illiberal or 
‘fascist connotations’ gradually became advocates of such a system. He describes his own 
transition from initially viewing corporatism as ‘antiliberal’, to a conviction that ‘it was 
only under the discipline of such arrangements that strong trade unions and collective 
bargaining could be made compatible with economic growth and stability.’ He describes a 
similar path taken by Schmitter (1974 & 1981) who studied corporatism across Latin 
America where: 
he had noticed, as had several other scholars, that in western Europe corporatist 
structures were more likely to be associated with social democracy than with fascism; 
and by 1981 was comparing such societies favourably with those that lacked these 
organizational characteristics.  
Albeit to scale, the research process of this thesis identifies with such a change of heart on 
the corporatist Brazilian system. Influenced by popular interpretations of ‘new’ and 
‘authentic’ trade unionism and the much-cited problem of peleguismo, the dramatic 
workplace level problems in the construction industry observed in 2011 raised immediate 
questions on the effects of the long-standing monopoly of representation (unicity) and 
compulsory contribution mechanisms (syndical tax).  
An image of the trade union in an air-conditioned ‘castle’ miles away from their 
designated category counting syndical tax contributions came to mind. This is not to say 
that peleguismo is not a widespread problem (see Claudinho 2013 & Marques 2015 
interviews). Evidence also suggests that this may have been the case in some of the 
observed instances in the construction industry (see Farias 2013 interview and the 
evolution of Sintepav in ch.5), yet more detailed systemic analysis from a new 
institutional/varieties of capitalism perspective shows that it is from the existing 
institutions of the existing corporatist system that the inconsistency between the formal 
rights and protection and the precarious reality of employment can be addressed.  
This first part of the conclusion summarises the explanations for the described 
inconsistency identified by this research project and discusses why it contributes to the 
understanding of LMIs within the Brazilian variety of capitalism. The following section 
tentatively generalises the wider theoretical contribution of the research. It stresses the 
importance of evidence-based findings and the need for scepticism when citing models that 
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neglect or exclude less-measurable, more subtle institutions: their history, informal 
manifestations and complementarities in particular. It then examines the limitations of the 
research findings and discusses relevant research agendas stemming from this thesis. It 
finishes by making some tentative predictions on the future of the Brazilian system in light 
of the ongoing economic and political crisis at the time of writing.  
The argument of this thesis is not that Brazil possesses an optimum or best-practice system 
of employment relations. Nor does it negate the possibility for equity-enhancing reforms of 
the existing system. What is shown, supported by evidence-based research, is the capacity 
of the existing institutions to influence the employment relationship in favour of labour 
interests. Given long-standing traits of economic instability and high levels of poverty and 
inequality inconsistent with the country’s level of development, this is not a widely-
recognised trait of Brazilian institutions. Schneider’s varieties of capitalism HME Latin 
American ideal-type where LMIs are argued to be characterised by ‘sparse-unions’ does 
not capture this characteristic. Shown across this thesis, the relevance of trade union 
activity in contemporary Brazil means that it represents a variation on the HME in its 
labour market dynamics.   
The existence and persistence of weak representation and its consequences for labour are 
acknowledged and represent a key focus of the research question. The benefits of an 
institutional approach demonstrate that the observed inconsistency is the result of a variety 
of institutional factors related to an incongruous system of historical, formal and informal 
institutional manifestations and their interaction or complementarities. This is the 
research’s significant contribution to empirical knowledge on Brazilian LMIs and 
represents a corrective to alternative interpretations. More reductionist approaches 
focussing on single issues or relationships are unable to capture such complexity, whether 
it be the deregulation approach on the negative effects of any intervention into the free 
workings of the labour market, or trade unionists and academics that identify the formal 
corporatist system as the main obstacle to the more ‘authentic’ or ‘grass-roots’ 
representation of labour interests.  
The capacity to achieve coordinated LMI solutions is an important consideration as 
empirical evidence demonstrates more equitable development in economies where labour 
market issues are resolved through tripartite cooperation or social dialogue than those 
economies where liberal market solutions prevail. This affirmation is based upon the 
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Varieties of Capitalism distinction between coordinated and liberal market systems. It is 
argued across this thesis that the existing system guaranteeing the existence and resources 
of trade union institutions has the capacity and design for tripartite cooperation. The 
research problem is the distance between the employment rights and protections of the 
formal LMI system and the widespread workplace realities that are closer to those of the 
Latin American hierarchical ideal-type than either the CME or LME advanced economy 
examples.  
The poor employment conditions observed are a function of several factors. Initially there 
is a historical legacy that has bequeathed Brazilian society with a very low threshold for 
employment conditions that still persists today, described across chapter 3 as the regressive 
path. Exploitative employment is a characteristic of 19th and early 20th century capitalism, 
particularly in post-colonial societies, however even within this context it is argued that 
such a legacy is heightened in the Brazilian case given the intensity, scale and duration of 
slavery and related oligarchical rule followed by the absence of any significant break with 
the inherited social structure. Within existing debates this is an important variable as the 
relevance of the regressive path is neglected in alternative ahistorical analyses that 
overstate the determinism of the formal CLT system to the reality of the employment 
relationship.  
The existing CLT system was introduced upon a long-standing institutional layer 
characterised by exploitative labour conditions and non-compliance with legislation 
excluding the vast majority of the workforce from the extensive collective and individual 
employment rights introduced. From a path dependency perspective, the labour reforms are 
introduced in the 1930s within a very challenging context in terms of their potential impact 
and effectiveness. This is not to say that the CLT was ineffective, despite its initial 
exclusionary and non-compliance (para ingles ver) traits, it has continually acted as a 
‘lighthouse’ for the majority of the population in defining employment rights as a goal or 
ambition, defining the political arena (see Cardoso 2010:181 & Collier and Collier 
2002:752-753 respectively). Popular interpretations of the formal Brazilian CLT system 
neglect the pervasiveness of the regressive path and the low threshold of acceptable 
employment conditions bequeathed upon society.  
Related to the potential of the existing system identified within the research question there 
is a further tendency in alternative analyses to neglect its capacity for gradual change and 
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overstate the inevitability or determinism of certain outcomes. Recognition of gradual 
change, specifically conversion/reconversion (Streeck & Thelen 2005: see ch.1 table 1.1) 
in the Brazilian LMI system is absent in critical analyses and reform proposals that often 
neglect less tangible institutional manifestations and overstate the deterministic influence 
and static nature of formal institutions. As both Cardoso (2003:34) and Collier and Collier 
(2002:757) recognise, the system provides the capacity for the rapid mobilisation of 
labour. Consistent with Collier and Collier’s (2002) analysis, it is argued in this thesis that 
labour mobilisations dependent upon the stability and continuity of the exiting corporatist 
LMI system have, since the 1980s, contributed to the sustained influence of labour 
interests in the political economy.  
The sustained influence of labour interests described, is evident in the democratisation 
process and new constitution of the 1980s. The momentum continues into the 1990s with 
the defence of collective and individual labour rights contrary to international 
deregulationary responses to globalisation and liberalisation pressures. There is an 
increased presence and influence of labour institutions at the highest levels of institutional 
relations over the period of unprecedented equity-enhancing growth and stability analysed 
in this thesis. Together with the more equitable development trajectory of the advanced 
CME-type economies, the survival of Brazilian LMI arrangements and the developmental 
success in the 21st century weakens the more ideological and reductionist deregulation 
arguments.  
A highly unfavourable and persistent historical legacy has been identified by this thesis as 
a relevant factor in explaining the inconsistency between potential and outcomes in 
Brazilian LMIs. This does not provide a complete explanation, particularly as, given the 
favourable set of institutional circumstances since the 1980s, what explains the continued 
observed inconsistency into the 2010s and during the positive phase of equitable growth? 
The exploratory analysis of employment relations in chapter 4 identifies representation and 
regulation as two key issues. Findings from both general employment relations and the 
construction industry find industrial relations to be locked into ‘networks of mistrust’ at the 
sectorial/regional level. The described equilibrium of negative complementarities is 
sustained by indeterminate regulation and representation mechanisms hindering the 
potential for equity-enhancing change from greater institutional coordination. 
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Theoretical analysis of representation in chapter 5 is found to be consistent with the idea 
presented across this thesis of the potential for equity-enhancing change from a corporatist 
system of labour representation (see Archer 1998:74 and Crouch 1994:7). The danger of 
oligarchical unrepresentative pelego type trade union institutions is recognised as a danger 
of such a system though one that can be mitigated by an active rank and file (see Olson 
1971:88 and Hyman 1971 in Crouch 1982:166).  
In the Brazilian context, it is recognised as a heightened risk given the historical legacy 
already discussed and the widespread absence of plant-level representation mechanisms, 
though analysis based upon observations of representation in the construction industry 
demonstrate that it is not a systemic inevitability. Consistent with the general industrial 
relations literature, unrepresentativeness can be mitigated against and individual trade 
unions can evolve to actively represent their category at the regional/sectorial level and on 
the shop floor (see evolution of the Sintepav unions in ch.5 and CSP Pecem examples 
discussed across chs. 4-6).  
The effective representation of labour interests at the national level is evident both 
generally and within the construction industry case study. A sustained union presence and 
influence is evident in tripartite forums and social dialogue processes contributing to 
minimum wage policy and anti-cyclical employment protection initiatives. A similar 
presence and influence is evident at the national level of the construction industry case 
study. There is the long-standing tripartite CPN health and safety forum and the prompt 
institutional response of the NCILC to problems observed at the workplace level of the 
PAC construction sites.  
It is at the intermediate and workplace levels of industrial relations that the Brazilian 
system is identified in this research as more problematic. ‘Sparse unions’ may characterise 
LMIs in certain industries and regions due to a fragmented system contributing to 
representational indeterminacy. As already argued this is not a systemic inevitability and 
there is evidence of effective representation within the constraints of the existing system. 
These are described here as ‘pockets of efficiency’ most evident in the ABC standard of 
trade unionism. When analysing the problems at the intermediate level it is important to 
recognise that the national-level presence and effectiveness of trade union peak 
associations and the pockets of efficiency identified at the intermediate and workplace 
levels are dependent upon the stability and resources provided by the same system. 
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The issue is that the evident effectiveness is unpredictable and coexists with incompatible 
underlying institutional characteristics. This is best described as an incongruous system 
which captures both the systemic inconsistencies and unpredictability together with the 
incompatibility between the rights, protections and representation in the formal labour 
system and the embedded day to day practices identified in the research problem. This 
envisages a less static and more complex system in Brazil with less inevitability than the 
HME description of labour markets in Latin America (see ch.2, figure 2.7).  
In the context of the construction industry, where employment relations are shown by this 
research as being dominated by networks of mistrust, there is evidence of effective union 
activity as an extra layer of regulation. This leads into the key factor of regulation to 
explain the inconsistency between the embedded LMI rights and protections and the 
workplace reality. This research finds regulation issues in Brazilian employment relations 
to be connected to a complex and composite set of institutional factors. Solely focussing 
upon formal legislation appears particularly inappropriate in such a context.  
As an institutional approach would suggest, compliance and enforcement are key variables 
to consider and the Brazilian system is characterised by ‘regulatory indeterminacy’ (Lee 
and McCann 2014: title). Such indeterminacy is found by this research to be related to a 
complex set of factors that characterise the composite regulatory system: inspection, the 
judiciary, fragmentation at the intermediate level and the historical legacy of employment 
relations already mentioned.  
The Pecem steel plant case study referred to across chapters 4-6 of this thesis is a 
particularly informative example. It highlights the complexity of factors that should be 
considered when analysing regulation issues. The high profile industrial development 
received considerable attention from the state regulatory authorities and had a militant 
mobilised workforce represented by an active and resourceful union that negotiated highly 
favourable employment terms and conditions into the collective bargaining agreement. In 
this instance, such an alignment of favourable complementarities did not produce an 
employment relations pocket of efficiency. The persistence of non-compliance with basic 
health and safety laws, payment of wages and employment rights resulted in an almost 
complete breakdown of industrial relations with a third of working days lost to strikes at a 
high cost.  
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In seeking explanations to the research problem, a complex set of context-specific and 
historically negative complementarities are identified. Representation and regulation stand 
out as key issues. In turn, observable and interrelated representation and regulation issues 
are similarly outcomes of a complex set of complementary institutional variables. 
Providing solutions or prescriptions for the identified problems is not within the aims or 
scope of this academic research exercise, however the recognition and analysis of such 
complexity from a new institutional perspective is an important contribution of this 
research. Important due to the counterproductive potential when more reductionist and 
ideological findings that ignore such complexity are used to inform policy.  
Recognition and analysis of the complexity of interrelated factors that contribute to the 
employment relationship is an initial contribution of this thesis. This is particularly the 
case when considering what can be considered popular misconceptions on the nature of the 
Brazilian LMI system. The weaknesses of deregulation arguments have already been 
discussed though persistent criticisms from other ideological positions also remain, 
especially on the corporatist unicity and syndical tax elements. The compulsory 
mechanisms are argued by many to impede the emergence of more ‘authentic’ labour 
representation. General theoretical discussions on corporatism and counterfactual analysis 
of this research in chapter 5 find these arguments to be weak. The popular and persistent 
idea of the inevitability of pelego institutions impeding the grass-roots emergence of more 
authentic representation is based upon an imagined narrative of ‘new’ trade unionism.  
A popular misinterpretation is identified here. What is widely depicted as ‘new’ and 
‘authentic’ trade unionism exists as a consequence of the same embedded LMI system 
identified in the research question. It is evident in the ABC standard of employment 
relations and the influence of trade union peak associations at the national level. Similar 
pockets of efficiency are identified in the construction industry example. More detailed 
analysis finds that these successful examples of tripartism/social dialogue are produced and 
sustained by the long-standing corporatist system rather than from outside or in opposition 
to the formal institutional parameters.  
A similar inconsistency is evident in the activity of the individual trade union. Many 
unions possess a radical, combative and anti-institutional identity and discourse, argued in 
this research to be a logical response to the levels of irregularity and networks of mistrust 
that prevail. Fieldwork observations show that the majority of the day-to-day trade union 
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activities work towards greater effectiveness of the existing system. The extra layer of 
regulation role is identified as a significant contribution to employment conditions (see ch. 
5, part 5.3). Historical analysis also finds the distance between the radical discourse and 
moderate practice of the union to be a long-standing institutional trait (see ch. 3 & 5, Hall 
& Spalding 1986: 359; Collier and Collier 2002:757 and Santana 1999:110).   
The new institutional methodological toolbox used by this research and its related 
importance of historical, formal and informal institutional manifestations and crucially 
their complementarities, aims to contribute to the wider study of labour. Recognition and 
analysis of the complexity of interacting factors that influence observable outcomes is 
compatible with the ILO related ‘Regulating for Decent Work Agenda’ in its ‘aims to 
development a coherent response’ to more reductionist and ideological approaches to LMIs 
such as the deregulation school (ILO 2016).  
An intended contribution of this thesis is at the comparative capitalisms analytical level. In 
a similar manner, this thesis has contested popular misconceptions on the Brazilian CLT 
system, it also extends upon Schneider’s Latin American HME ideal-type within 
comparative capitalisms debates. The sustained influence of peak associations at the 
national level since the 1980s and the role of resourceful and active unions in the identified 
pockets of efficiency at the intermediate and workplace levels, both generally and within 
the construction industry example, demonstrate that ‘sparse unions’ do not characterise 
LMIs in the Brazilian variety of capitalism.  
At the Brazil-specific level, the intended contributions of the thesis are the ‘inclusive 
decade’ and PT government period analysed, complemented by an innovative case study in 
the construction industry. Increased coordinatory or tripartite intentions and greater state 
involvement in the political economy are evident since the start of the PT government, 
particularly in the return of industrial policy. The construction industry represents an 
important and iconic element of this new direction. The MCMV housing and PAC 
infrastructure state investment initiatives were high profile drivers of the sustained 
economic growth and construction boom.  
In seeking explanations for the research problem, proportionately less institutional 
involvement or intervention in the labour aspect of the positive growth period is identified. 
Inspection resources have decreased over recent years despite the booming economy and 
levels of employment litigation increase and remain at internationally unprecedented levels 
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(see ch.6, figure 6.2). The observations of the reality of employment and industrial 
relations realised by this research, the idea of self-reproducing networks of mistrust and a 
non-compliance/litigation equilibrium somewhat dampens the optimism on any 
widespread structural or significant changes in the workplace over what the IPEA 
(2012:11) describe as the ‘inclusive decade’.  
Consistent with the new institutional approach to the research problem, the intended 
originality of this thesis can be found in a ‘composite’ set of ‘complementary’ factors. 
Firstly, there is the importance of history, it seems a basic premise that recognition of what 
came previously, the directions or paths taken and elements of change and continuity are 
essential for analysing present and future empirical questions.  
Comparisons between capitalist systems in advanced industrial economics (Varieties of 
Capitalism) and those in Latin America (Hierarchical Market Economies) is a useful 
exercise and informs the underlying premises and analytical parameters of this thesis. The 
results of this research exercise demonstrate that there must be an appreciation of historical 
particularities in comparative analysis. Within this context an exercise comparing New 
Zealand’s minimalist system of LMIs favourably to Brazil’s corporatist system (see 
Pastore 2005: 96-98) appears particularly reductionist and unhelpful. Considering systems 
with similar historical legacies and categorising different varieties of capitalism is a 
fruitful research agenda. It is also important to consider historical and contextual 
specificities of an individual society. This is apparent in comparisons between Brazil and 
Chile and explanations for the distinctive labour market paths taken over the last 40 years.  
Ideologically-loaded ahistorical accounts drawn from more easily quantifiable and 
reductionist data fail to include equally important factors to account for contemporary 
phenomena. Referring back to Franzosi’s (1995: 21) observations quoted in the 
introduction to the methodology of this thesis, things are excluded from analysis as they 
are ‘non-quantifiable and/or do not fit into pre-existing models’. Neglecting history and 
continuity and change in the past, i.e. path dependency and less tangible or measurable 
institutional manifestations will invariably produce partial results that are potentially 
misleading. More easily measurable formal institutions cannot be automatically presumed 
to be stable and effective as this research project demonstrates in a variety of contexts. 
Findings based upon analysis that incorporates more subtle institutional manifestations 
contributes to and demonstrates the value of a new institutional approach and the wider 
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study area of institutions and comparative capitalisms. This is evident in the relevance of 
the evidence-based findings of this research that run contrary to, or should at least 
encourage more critical interpretations of the deregulation argument. In particular, its 
discourse of universality and attempts to create a ‘scientific’ model to classify regulatory 
systems and influence policy debates.  
Similar to the problems of making a reductionist comparison between the systems of New 
Zealand and Brazil as evidence to support an argument, the non-critical use of Botero et 
al’s (2004) regulatory classification is problematic. It is applied to Brazil by Pastore 
(2005), Latin America by Schneider (2013) and the global economy by the World Bank 
Doing Business Reports (2004, 2007). It is ideologically-loaded and evidentially weak (see 
Deakin 2009:17, 2012: 353 in chapter 6). The indexes exclude any measurements of 
institutional relations and collective bargaining (see Berg and Cazes 2007:14). A partial 
consequence of such an omission means that the labour market arrangements of the 
world’s least developed economies score more favourably in this influential rigidity index 
than the most advanced and more regulated CME-type economies characterised by 
tripartism. (see Lee, McCann and Torm: 421 in chapter 6).   
This research’s contribution to theory and methods in studies on labour market institutions 
and comparative capitalisms is not within debates on whether there should be more or less 
regulation of employment. It instead seeks to move away from such a dichotomy. The 
relevant argument is that there are valuable inductive findings from evidence-based 
empirical case-study analysis that should be included in analytical models. The means used 
to arrive at the conclusions of this thesis (see chapter 1): the parameters of a new 
institutional approach, a less-analysed innovative case study, and extensive evidence-based 
data through prolonged primary research, can and perhaps should be replicated elsewhere 
to a make further contributions to contemporary understanding of labour markets and 
industrial relations.    
As already mentioned in this conclusion, this research is not a defence of the existing LMI 
arrangements in Brazil. Instead it emphasises the importance of its systemic specificities. 
For the understanding of corporatist and deregulated labour relations elsewhere, the thesis 
reinforces the position of Crouch and Streek (1998:7 own emphasis) quoted in chapter 6 
that findings should be ‘the result of detailed theoretical and empirical investigation’ not 
‘derived axiomatically’.  
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The potential for this evidence-based research to contribute or contest more ideologically 
loaded analyses is demonstrated by the fact that the findings not only challenge the free 
market interpretation of labour market regulation though distinctive interpretations from 
what, in simple terms, can be described as the other side of the ideological spectrum. The 
criticisms of the existing corporatist system from those that make reference to its 
authoritarian legacy, representational deficit and related tendency to create complacent 
and/or co-opted trade unions does include an analysis of history and path dependency. It is 
however, a partial interpretation of history if not a convenient partisan misreading of the 
path dependency of labour institutions in Brazil. 
The idea that an authentic, genuine and more militant labour movement would emerge 
were the long-standing corporatist arrangements to be removed (interestingly a similar 
policy objective to the rigidity/deregulation school) is fanciful. It neglects the relationship 
between the evidential pockets of strength and influence of labour and the existing 
corporatist system. In terms of more general contributions to theory and methodology this 
highlights the importance of complementarities in institutional analysis.  
The theory and methods behind the model of networks of mistrust (see ch.4 fig. 4.1) as a 
key factor to explain the inconsistency observed in the research problem reinforces the 
importance of incorporating less-measurable and informal variables and their 
complementarities. The model is based upon case-study evidence, primary and secondary 
data and similar labour studies (see Cardoso & Lage 2007). It includes the variables of 
enforcement, evasion and the related influence of trade unions and the State, factors often 
neglected in alternative analyses that overemphasise the determinism of formal 
institutional arrangements.  
This contributes to research methods as it demonstrates the importance of considering 
empirical problems as a function of several factors. This in turn should encourage some 
scepticism when considering analyses of single issues such as the amount of legislation or 
the relationship between the union and the rank and file. The empirical value and 
applicability of the networks of mistrust logic is evident in its application to the CSP 
Pecem steelworks case.  
Based upon accounts from a variety of tripartite actors the CSP case demonstrates the 
value of analysis incorporating multiple complementary dimensions when compared with 
studies overly focussed upon single issues. In the Pecem case, weak enforcement and 
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‘sparse’ or complacent trade unions were not in evidence yet there was still an intense 
breakdown of industrial relations similar to the events that inspired this research project. 
This demonstrates the importance of analysing the composite system including the 
historical and less tangible institutions and the way they interact to influence observable 
phenomena.  
Focussing upon complementarities, an established consideration of Varieties of Capitalism 
and new institutional approaches in general, is not an innovation by this research project. 
Networks of mistrust in this thesis contributes to comparative capitalisms by applying the 
institutional approach to a single economy using a less-studied industry as a case study. An 
in-type variation of the Latin American Variety of Capitalism is observed. It is found to be 
less deterministic than Schneider’s HME model and characterised by an incongruous 
system as the networks of mistrust model and its empirical examples would suggest. This 
contributes to an understanding of contemporary Brazil and challenges existing influential 
interpretations, which in turn could inform future comparative research of industrial 
relations elsewhere.  
In summary, the theoretical contribution of this research project is found in the importance 
placed upon informal less-measurable institutions and their complementarities, generating 
insights on a given society that challenge alternative interpretations. This adds to the 
Varieties of Capitalism agenda both in Latin America and elsewhere. More generally 
speaking, the relative success of the research project in making an original contribution to 
the understanding of Brazil vindicates the historical institutionalism approach, 
strengthening its importance and value within contemporary theoretical debates.    
As mentioned in chapter 1, an institutional approach acknowledges other causal forces in 
politics outside of its scope. It would be contradictory to argue that all relevant factors 
have been discussed within this thesis. What has been argued is that additional less-studied 
elements and the way they interact were incorporated into the research. A recognised 
limitation of the scope of this thesis is analysis of institutional influences outside of the 
immediate LMI scope. External variables are acknowledged – with regressive public 
spending and debt service burdens recognised in chapter 2 (see figures 2.1-2.6), historical 
persistence of macro-economic instability and related high inflation in chapter 3 (see part 
3.3) and wider systemic influences that effect compliance in the construction industry 
discussed in ch.6 (part 6.3.4 and see FIESP 2016 report).  
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Whilst the relevance of these factors is recognised, they are not analysed further in any 
depth. The existence of relevant institutional variables outside of the immediate scope of 
LMIs affecting the reality of the employment relationship is compatible with the porous 
approach of this research and its conclusions. The argument that outcomes have to be 
considered the result of a complex set of interacting institutions is coherent with the idea 
that there will be significant influence from institutions outside of LMIs. It is however 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is not anticipated that any identified relevance or 
influence of non-LMI institutions upon observable labour outcomes would contest or 
weaken the findings of this thesis. Indeed, the idea of negative outside influences is 
compatible with the ‘pockets of efficiency’ concept used across this thesis and applied to 
LMI outcomes - where some efficient institutional layers exist upon a less efficient 
structure (Guedes 1986:105).  
A further valid question of this research is on the generalisability of the construction 
industry case study. The importance, scale and distribution of construction activity across 
Brazil and its association with employment for individuals from the more deprived regions 
and sectors of society has already been commented upon. It is argued that construction 
work is perhaps more representative of employment across Brazil than the 
automobile/metalworker example, and as such represents a valuable comparative example.   
The observed capacity of construction workers for industrial action may be somewhat 
industry specific or exceptional when the nature of employment is considered. The 
concentration of hundreds of male workers per site, many with considerable accumulated 
experience in a variety of locations over relatively short productive windows results in an 
observable heightened capacity for industrial action which can pressure employers, the 
designated union and the state into action. This is evident on a daily basis across the 
industry nationwide. The high-profile and large-scale examples of the PAC sites and CSP 
Pecem sites are some of the more dramatic and intense examples of this capacity for 
collective action.  
It is questionable whether a similar capacity for collective action would exist in other 
sectors; retail workers for example spread across numerous individual outlets. This is an 
important consideration as the world of work shifts away from the traditional ideal type of 
blue-collar male-dominated industrial work. However, consistent with the findings here on 
the systemic potential for mobilisation, Braga (2012a:202-203; 2012b:112,117) identifies a 
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capacity for mobilisation within the parameters of the existing Brazilian LMI system 
amongst the new and less gender-specific category of call centre workers even against a 
backdrop of unfavourable circumstances that usually inhibits collective action.  
Construction is therefore argued to be a worthwhile case study; its generalisability and 
comparative value can contribute to wider research agendas. Given the male domination of 
employment in construction an alternative and similarly informative case study is that of 
domestic employment; a predominantly female category dispersed across individual 
households and historically excluded from any type of employment protection and 
representation mechanisms. There is strong evidence of increased organisation, 
formalisation and rights in domestic work over the period researched, culminating in 
increased employment rights and protections in 2015 (Lei Complementar no. 150).  
Consistent with findings in this thesis, contemporary studies on domestic workers in Brazil 
(Acciori 2016; Bernadino Costa 2015:155 and Gonçalves 2010:64) recognise that the 
recent increase in mobilisation and organisation of the category was assisted by the 
existence of the long-standing stable CLT corporatist trade union system. As argued in 
Chapter 1 (part 1.4), citing Pagano (1999: 327-330) and Haagh (2011:452) more equitable 
employment arrangements require the necessary set of institutions. Brazil has many of 
these institutions.  
At the time of putting the finishing touches to this thesis, Brazil is going through a political 
and economic crisis. There is observable concern from commentators that there will be 
considerable pressure for substantial deregulatory reform of the LMI system or ‘an attack 
on labour rights’. Based upon the analysis across this thesis, it is tentatively predicted that 
the existing LMI system of collective and individual employment rights and its related 
institutions will remain firmly in place. Whilst the PT party is currently in crisis, there is 
no corresponding weakening of state, union and business LMIs. Weak political parties and 
strong institutions is a historical characteristic of Brazil’s political economy (Mainwaring 
1992: 702).  
Pension reforms and outsourcing are two major current issues in Brazilian political 
economy with hundreds of thousands taking to the streets in protest at the perceived loss of 
rights. It is immediately apparent that many of these protestors do not currently benefit 
from employment protections, yet are vociferously defending an aim, ambition or 
expectation of benefitting from the existing CLT rights in the future. The ‘lighthouse’ still 
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shines brightly. Parallels and continuities are therefore observed between the present-day 
relationship between labour institutions and the population and that observed in the 1930s 
when the system was introduced.   
At the time of writing it seems highly likely that there will be reforms on individual issues 
such as the pension system, similar to those that took place in the 1990s (see annex 3.1). 
As was the case over this decade, it is probable that the existing system and its relevant 
institutions will remain stable through this period of economic and political uncertainty. 
Such a prediction is based upon the observation that at certain levels of the Brazilian 
variety of capitalism, LMIs are characterised by strong, resourceful and influential trade 
unions, making the model a distinctive variation of the HME ideal type. 
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Appendix I Fieldwork Research Data 
Aguiar, Reginaldo – Regional superintendent for the Dieese. Personal Interviews. Dieese regional 
offices. Fortaleza. 27 November 2013 & 16 January 2015 
Albano da Silva, Luiz. - President of the Sinticom light construction trade union for the Campinas 
Region. Personal interview at Sinticom headquarters, Campinas, São Paulo. 17 September 
2013 
Amaral, Aldo - President of Sintepav-PE & Força Sindical Pernambuco and Tavares, Federico 
Sintepav-PE lawyer. Personal interview. Força Sindical headquarters – Recife. 7 
November 2013 
Amigos de Haiti –Observation of multi-agency meeting including Marreta-MG officials on initiatives 
to assist recent migrants from Haiti, many working in the construction industry.  Belo 
Horizonte. 1 October 2013 
Camargo Correa – Week-long observation of activities at a public infrastructure construction site, 
shadowing health & safety technician Marlon and 20 individual interviews with workers 
on-site. 9-13 December 2013. Return-visit 10 January 2015 
Carolina (pseudonym) – Social worker for construction consortium working on World Cup 2014 
stadium. Confidential personal interview. Brazil. Between September and December 2013 
Damasceno, Livia – Coordinator, Escola Popular Orocílio Martins Gonçalves (EPOMG) technical 
school run by Marreta MG trade union. Personal Interview. EPOMG - Belo Horizonte 26 
September 2013 
Da Silva Gomes, Claudio (Claudinho). President of the national federation for CUT affiliated 
construction industry trade unions. Personal interview at CUT head office - City of São 
Paulo. 18 September 2013 
EPOMG – Observation (participatory & non-participatory) of activities at EPOMG/Marreta-MG 
Technical School. Belo Horizonte 25-26 September & 8-10 October 2013 
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Farias, Fabio Andre – Appeal Court Judge for the Regional Labour Court (TRT), former MTE 
Superintendent. Personal Interview. TRT 6a região. Recife, 7 November 2013 
Ferreira, Roberto Sergio – President of Sinduscon-CE business union. Personal Interview. Offices of 
SERT Engenharia. Fortaleza, 21 November 2013 
Gomes, Raimundo Nonato – President of Sintepav-CE, heavy construction industry workers in the 
state of Ceará. Sintepav-CE headquarters. Fortaleza, 14 November 2013 
Ishikawa, Haruo. Vice-President Capital – Labour Relations for Sinduscon-SP business union. 
Personal interview at the office of Ishikawa Engenharia. City of São Paulo, 18 September 
2013 
Júlio, José – Lawyer for Marreta-MG trade union. Personal interview. Marreta-MG headquarters. Belo 
Horizonte, 9 October 2013 
Juca, Jeritza – Head of Employment Relations Secretariat (SRT) at the MTE Regional Labour Office 
for Ceará. Personal Interview. Fortaleza, 02 December 2013 
Laura (pseudonym) – Social worker for a large well-known construction company. Confidential 
Personal Interview. Brazil. Between September and December 2013 
Local Journalist - Confidential personal interview, Ceará. January 2015 
Marques de Lima, Gerson - Head Prosecutor for the Labour Public Prosecutor (MPT). Personal 
Interview. MPT 7a Região Offices, Fortaleza. 25 February 2015 
Marreta – MG – Observation of day-to-day trade union activities including inspection patrols. Belo 
Horizonte region.  8-11 October 2013 
Marreta-PE – Trade Union for light construction industry in the greater Recife area. Observation of 
union activities, including inspection, strike activity, picketing and administrative duties. 
Pernambuco 23-25 & 28-30 October, 1 & 4 November 2013. 
Mendes, Amilton. – Trade union advisor for Sinticom. Informal interview at Sinticom headquarters, 
Campinas, São Paulo. 17 September 2013 
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Morais, Dulcilene – President of Marreta-PE Trade Union. Personal Interview. Recife, 23 October 
2013 
MPT 7a Região – Public Hearing on Labour Relations at the CSP-Pecem steel plant construction site. 
Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Federal de Ceará. Fortaleza, 26 February 2015 
MTE/DRT – Observation of mediation session between Copasa public utility company and a 
construction firm over non-payment for services. Accompanying a Marreta-MG 
representation. Personal interview with mediator Reginaldo after session.  Belo Horizonte. 
9 October 2013 
MTE/SRT/CE – Observation of two collective bargaining mediation sessions. Employment Relations 
Secretariat, MTE regional office. Fortaleza, 2 December 2013 
Paulo (pseudonym) – Site inspector for medium size residential construction company in a provincial 
town. Week-long observation of inspection activities including interviews with 14 on-site 
workers. Anonymity requested. Brazil. Between September and December 2013 
Progest – Full-day observation of training activities of the Progest project at the CEFET-MG. Personal 
interviews with 11 participants including Labourers, Builders, Foremen and small business 
owners.  Belo Horizonte, 28 September 2013  
Quirino de Paula, David & Zé Luis – President and director of Marreta-MG (respectively) 
construction trade union for the Greater Belo Horizonte Region. Marreta MG headquarters, 
Belo Horizonte, 30 September 2013. 
Rodrigues da Cunha, José Antonio – Site Foreman and EPOMG teacher. Personal interview at 
Marreta-MG headquarters, Belo Horizonte, 11 October 2013 
Rodrigues Costa, Luciano – Sociologist - Federal University of Viçosa (UFV). Personal Interview. 
UFV, 17 October 2013 
Santana, Ana Paula (school director); Lima, Gerson (Liga Operária director) and Donizete 
(construction worker –pseudonym). Group Interview at EPOMG/Marreta-MG Technical 
School. Belo Horizonte, 26 September 2013. 
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Santos, Ademilson – Human resources director for Cyrela Brazil Realty. Personal Interview. Le Parc 
residential construction site. Recife, 5 November 2013 
Scaffolders – Observations and interviews with three scaffolders recently dismissed from the CSP-
Pecem site on the condition of anonymity. São Gonçalo de Amarante, Ceará. entire-day 
sometime between January and February 2015 
Sinttel - Esquerdas Não Institucionais e Movimentos Anticapitalistas [The Non-Institutional Left and 
Anti-Capitalist Movements] Conference. Sinttel –Telecoms Trade Union headquarters, 
Recife, 9th November 2013 
Sintepav-CE – Observation of Sintepav-CE inspection activities. Fortaleza & Pecem. 18-20 
November 2013 
Sintepav-PE – Observation of the inspection activities of the trade union for the heavy construction 
industry workers in the state of Pernambuco (Sintepav-PE). Recife, 8 November 2013. 
Sticcrmf – Observation (participatory and non-participatory) of the communications team 
(Metamorfose Comunicações) activities for the light construction workers trade union for 
the greater Fortaleza area (Sticcrmf). Fortaleza. 23,27-29 November 2013 & 20 February 
2015  
Tomasi, Antonio. Sociologist –Coordinator of the CEFET - PROGEST - Engineering, Society and 
Technology programme. Personal Interview at CEFET-MG Technical University. Belo 
Horizonte, 24 September 2013 
Trópia, Patricia. Conference contribution. GT08 Trabalho, Politicas e Lutas Sociais [Labour, Politics 
and Social Struggles] International Symposium on Labour, Employment Relations, 
Education and Identity –SITRE V, UFMG, Belo Horizonte 26-28 May 2014 
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Abbreviations 
ABC Region in the State of Sao Paulo made up of the Santo Andre, Sao 
Bernardo & Sao Caetano municipal areas. 
ANPT Associação Nacional de Procuradores de Trabalho [National Association of 
Labour Prosecutors] 
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social [National	Bank	for	Economic	and	Social	Development] 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China 
BRL Brazilian Real 
CBA Collective Bargaining Agreement 
CBIC Câmara Brasileira da Indústria da Construção [Brazilian Chamber for the 
Construction Industry] 
CBR Cambridge Centre for Business Research 
CDES Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social [National Social and 
Economic Development Council]  
CEACR Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations 
CE State of Ceará 
Cefet Centro Federal de Educação Tecnológica [Federal Centre for Technical 
Education] 
CEPAL Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe [Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] 
Certific Certificação Profissional e Formação Inicial e Continuada [Professional 
Certification and Initial and Continuous Development] 
CESIT Centro de Estudos Sindicais e de Economia de Trabalho [The Centre for 
Studies in Trade Unionism and Labour Economics] 
CF88 Constituição Federal de 1988 [1988 Federal Constitution] 
CGT Comando Geral do Trabalhadores [General Workers’ Command] 
CIAT The Inter American Center of Tax Administrations 
CLT Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho [Consolidation of Labour Laws] 
CME Coordinated Market Economy 
CNDI Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Industrial 
 [National Industrial Development Council] 
CNI Confederação Nacional da Indústria [National Council for Industry] 
CNJ Conselho Nacional de Justiça [National Justice Council] 
CNTI Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria [National 
Confederation for Industrial Workers] 
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CNTIC Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria da Construção 
[National Confederation for Construction Workers]  
Contag Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Rurais [National Rural Workers 
Confederation] 
Conticom Confederação Nacional dos Sindicatos de Trabalhadores nas Indústrias da 
Construção e da Madeira filiados à CUT [National Confederation of 
CUT Affiliated Trade Unions in the Construction and Carpentry 
Industries] 
Contricom Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Construção e do Mobiliário 
[National Confederation of Construction Workers] 
COPASA Companhia de Saneamento de Minas Gerais [Minas Gerais Water Board] 
CoT Capitalism of Ties 
CPN  Comitê Permanente Nacional [Permanent National Health & Safety 
Committee] 
CPT Comissão Pastoral da Terra	[Pastoral Land Commission] 
CSP Companhia Siderúrgica de Pecém [Pecem Steel Company] 
CTB Central dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras do Brasil [Brazilian Workers’ 
Central] 
CTPS Carteira de Trabalho e Previdência Social [Work and Social Security 
Book] 
CUT Central Única dos Trabalhadores [Central Workers Union Peak 
Association] 
DBR Doing Business Report 
Dieese Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos 
[Inter-Trade Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic 
studies] 
DOU Diário Oficial da União [Official State Gazette] 
DRT Delegacia Regional de Trabalho [Regional Labour Office] 
EAP Economically Active Population 
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
EPOMG Escola Popular Orocílio Martins Gonçalves [Orocílio Martins Gonçalves 
School for Popular Education] 
FAT Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalho [Workers’ Protection Fund] 
Fenatracop Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias da Construção 
Pesada [National Federation for Heavy Construction Workers] 
FGTS Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço [Time of 
 Service Guarantee Fund] 
FHC Fernando Henrique Cardoso (President of Brazil 1995-2003) 
FIESP Federação de Indústria do Estado de São Paulo [Sao Paulo Federation for 
Industry] 
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FNT Forum Nacional de Trabalho [National Labour Forum] 
FS Força Sindical  
Funrural Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural [Rural Assistance Fund] 
HI Historical Institutionalism  
HME Hierarchical Market Economy 
HUC Horizontally Unionised Capitalism  
IAP Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensão [Retirement and Pension Institute] 
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics] 
IDB Inter-American Development Bank 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund  
INSS Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social [National Social Security Institute] 
IPEA Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada [Institute of Applied Economic 
Research] 
LME Liberal Market Economy  
LMI Labour Market Institution 
MCMV Minha Casa Minha Vida [My House My Life] 
MG State of Minas Gerais 
MNC Multinational Corporation  
MPT Ministério Público de Trabalho [Public Labour Prosecutor] 
MTE Ministério de Trabalho e Emprego [Labour Ministry] 
NCILC National Commitment for Improved Labour Conditions in the Construction 
Industry 
NCST Nova Central Sindical de Trabalhadores [New Workers’ Trade Union 
Central] 
NI New Institutional(ism) 
NIA New Institutional Approach 
NR Normas Regulamentadoras [Health and Safety Laws] 
NR-18 Normas Regulamentadoras - 18 [Construction Industry Specific Health and 
Safety Laws] 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAC Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento [Growth Acceleration 
Programme] 
PCdoB Partido Comunista do Brasil [Brazilian Communist Party]  
PE State of Pernambuco 
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PEC Posco Engineering and Construction 
PLR Participação nos Lucros e Resultados [Participation in Profits and Results] 
PPE Programa de Proteção do Emprego [Employment Protection Programme] 
Progest Programa de Estudos em Engenharia, Sociedade e Tecnologia 
[Engineering, Society and Technology Study Programme] 
PRT Procuradoria Regional de Trabalho [Regional Labour Prosecutor’s Office] 
PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade [Socialism and Freedom Party] 
PSTU Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado [United Socialist Workers’ 
Party] 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores [Workers’ Party] 
PUA Pacto de Unidade e Ação [Unity and Action Pact] 
RC Rational Choice 
Seconci Serviço Social da Construção Civil [Social Services for Light 
Construction] 
Sinait Sindicato Nacional dos Auditores Fiscais de Trabalho [National Trade 
Union for Labour Inspectors] 
Sindcongru Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias da Construção e do Mobiliário 
de Guarulhos [Trade Union for Construction Workers in the 
Guarulhos Region] 
Sinduscon Sindicato da Indústria da Construção Civil [Business Union for the Light 
Construction Industry] 
SINE Sistema Nacional de Emprego [National Employment System] 
Sinicon Sindicato Nacional da Indústria da Construção Pesada [National Union for 
the Heavy Construction/Infrastructure Industry] 
Sinicon CE Sindicato da Indústria da Construção Pesada do Estado de Ceará [Union for 
the Heavy Construction/Infrastructure Industry for the State of Ceará] 
Sintepav O Sindicato dos Trabalhadores das Indústrias de Construção de Estradas, 
Pavimentação e Obras de Terraplenagem em Geral [Trade Union for 
Workers in the Heavy Construction Industry] 
Sinticom Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias de Construção e do Mobiliário 
de Campinas e Região. [Trade Union for Construction Industry 
Workers in the Campinas Region] 
Sintracom Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias da Construção e do Mobiliário 
de Campo Grande [Trade Union for Light Construction Workers in 
the City of Campo Grande] 
 
Sintracon Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias da Construção Civil de São 
Paulo [Trade Union for Light Construction Workers in the City of Sao 
Paulo] 
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Sinttel Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Telecomunicações [Trade Union for 
Telecommunications Workers] 
SP State of Sao Paulo 
SRT Secretaria de Relações de Trabalho [Labour Relations Secretariat]  
Sticc – PA Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Construção Civil do Porto Alegre [Trade 
Union for Light Construction Workers for the Porto Alegre Region] 
Sticcero Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Construção Civil do Estado de Rondônia 
[Trade Union for Light Construction Workers for the State of 
Rondonia] 
Sticcrmf Sindicato dos Trabalhadores da Indústria da Construção Civil da Região 
Metropolitana de Fortaleza [Trade Union for Light Construction 
Workers in the Fortaleza Metropolitan Region] 
 
Sticrmb Sindicato dos Trabalhadores na Indústria da Construção Civil de Belém 
[Trade Union for Belém Light Construction Workers] 
TAC Termo de Ajuste de Conduta	[Term	of	Behavioural	Adjustment] 
TST Tribunal Superior de Trabalho [Upper Labour Court] 
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
UGT União Geral dos Trabalhadores [General Workers’ Union] 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
Unicamp Universidade Estadual de Campinas [Campinas State University] 
USP Universidade de Sao Paulo [Sao Paulo State University] 
VoC Varieties of Capitalism 
WUN Worldwide Universities Network 
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